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1. Affirmative action and trans-global 
study
Exploring affirmative action 
Affirmative action refers to programs designed and implemented to address 
the socio-economic and political situations of those considered historically 
‘disadvantaged’. However, the questions, ‘Who constitutes the disadvantaged?’ 
and, ‘What type of preferential programs are appropriate?’ can be contentious 
because the term ‘disadvantaged’ can be defined in different ways in different 
situations by different people; and often, certain definitions may favour certain 
groups ahead of others.
Affirmative action policies range from ‘strong’ approaches based on highly 
institutionalized quota-based and sanction-driven policies imposed by the state 
to ‘soft’ approaches based on very informal and voluntary systems. The most 
common preferential policies relate to special political representation, improved 
educational opportunities, provision for employment and access to means of 
economic advancement for social groups which may be identified as disadvantaged 
on the basis of gender, class, caste, ethnicity or physical disability (Kellough 
2006; Lipson 2006; Sterba 2009). The role of the government is important in 
the identification, categorization and prioritization of designated groups as 
well as in the conceptualization, planning and implementation of affirmative 
action programs (Sowell 2005). However, it should be noted that in some cases 
affirmative action can also be a result of voluntary decisions by corporations, 
civil society organizations, educational institutions and other relevant groups 
to provide assistance to those considered to be in need of preferential treatment 
given their marginalized position. 
The discourse on affirmative action spans a number of disciplinary boundaries, 
with scholars emphasizing different aspects of preferential programs. Those 
taking the legalistic approach often focus on preferential legislation and disputes 
over the legality of quotas in education and the labour market, as well as the 
deeper issues of equity and justice (Girardeau 2000). Economic arguments are 
concerned with the issue of the re-distribution of public resources and often 
raise questions about the relationship between affirmative action and economic 
growth and the potential of affirmative action to undermine growth or to feed 
on it (Chand 2007). In recent years the psychological aspect has been considered 
a significant area of study because of the way in which preferential treatment 
defines in-group and intergroup perceptions and behavioural dispositions and 
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how this shapes relationships within or between communities (Bobo 1998; 
Skitka and Crosby 2003). Political scientists tend to focus on the power dynamics 
of preferential policies relating to political governance and the policy-making 
process and how affirmative action is used to serve political interests (Neblo 
2008; 2009). The sociological perspective tends to provide a broad approach 
and tends to focus on the relationship between affirmative action and the labour 
market, ethnic relations, conflict, culture, power and equality (Choo and Feree 
2010; Jain, Sloane, and Horwitz 2003). Increasingly the study of affirmative 
action transcends disciplinary boundaries because of its multidimensional 
nature. Similarly, this book takes an interdisciplinary approach. 
The justifications used to support affirmative action are specific to local contexts 
and might include correcting historical wrongs and providing compensation, as 
in the US (Pincus 2003), South Africa (Horwitz 2009), Canada (Agocs 2009) and 
Namibia (Usiku 2009); addressing inequality, as in Malaysia (Gomez 2009; Gomez 
and Jomo 1999), Brazil (Bernardino-Costa 2010), Northern Ireland (Harvey 2010) 
and India (Parikh 2010); or resolving ethnic conflict, as in Fiji (Ratuva 2010). 
Some countries use either one or a combination of two or three justifications, 
depending on context. Often, affirmative action is associated with the moral 
virtues of equity and justice as well as a pragmatic need to contain tension 
and maintain stability. The assumption is that addressing historical wrongs and 
injustices helps to redress grievances and resolve long-standing ethnic conflict 
and this may lead to social transformation and progress (Kende 2009). 
The affirmative action debate
The preferential treatment of one group over another has raised a number of 
moral and philosophical questions, which continue to be contentious. While 
there is a consensus that affirmative action should, fundamentally, be based on 
the principles of justice and equality, controversy begins when the rights of a 
group are seen to be undermined while the disadvantaged situation of another 
group is being addressed.
From another perspective, affirmative action is considered by some as a form 
of “reverse discrimination” on the grounds that “if arbitrary discrimination 
has occurred because morally irrelevant characteristics of persons – such as 
sex, religion or race – have been taken into account to treat them differently, it 
would not be permissible to take into account the same characteristics in order 
to compensate them for the initial act of discrimination” (Faundez 1994: 4). In 
other words, reverse discrimination occurs when ethnicity (for instance) is used 
as the basis for affirmative action just because previous acts of discrimination 
that are being compensated for were based on ethnicity. Under this logic, one 
may argue that even if affirmative action is compensatory it is still unjustified 
1. Affirmative action and trans-global study
3
because it embodies hallmarks of reverse discrimination. The counter-argument 
is that since affirmative action involves redressing past wrongs and compensation 
for them as a way of contributing to good relations and future stability, it should 
not be seen as a form of discrimination at all (Pincus 2003). 
Another contentious issue relates to the question of whether affirmative action 
should be associated with group or individual rights. An argument against 
group rights is that affirmative action is justified only as a remedy for individuals 
who have suffered discrimination. On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that the need of individuals for redress is because they are part of a group that 
suffered discrimination and, hence, the best solution is for the entire group to be 
compensated. This idea is linked to the notion of distributive justice, premised 
on the utilitarian notion of the provision of the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people. Thus, providing opportunity for the disadvantaged, in 
particular the poorer sections of a community, is considered a morally justified 
way of serving the entire community. In this context, affirmative action is seen 
as essential in fostering greater equality, reducing tension and enhancing social 
and national integration.
Affirmative action based on ethnicity is often subject to emotional reaction 
because of the complex, and often nebulous, way ethnicity is linked to political 
and ideological interests. Because of its links with culture and identity, ethnicity 
is deeply embedded within a group’s collective consciousness. People tend to 
mobilize and politicize ethnic group consciousness readily, even to the extent 
of invoking extreme violence if they feel protective of their identity or feel 
insecure as a group. Ethnicity as a mode of stratification is more pronounced in 
some countries than others and, because of ethnicity’s sensitive and potentially 
flammable nature, some states are sensitive to reaction when designing affirmative 
action policies around ethnicity (Stanley 2009). To avoid such reactions, it 
has been suggested policy should move away from affirmative action towards 
alternative approaches such as labour market “diversity”, which involves the 
deliberate creation of a multi-cultural and multi-skilled workforce without the 
use of targeted quotas (Thomas 1990).
Quotas in education and employment are intended to ensure access to higher 
education and employment opportunities for groups which, historically, have 
been disadvantaged and which have thus lacked social mobility. Critics of quotas 
often argue that quotas victimise deserving people in the non-designated groups 
on the basis of their ethnic category and not on the basis of merit and there have 
been legal challenges to educational quotas in the US and in India. Nevertheless, 
as international studies have shown, there is still a recognition in some parts of 
the world that preferential policies in education and employment play a vital 
role as mechanisms of social levelling in order to create equal opportunities. 
(Zhou and Maxwell 2009).
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Affirmative action can also be used as a political and ideological tool by the 
state to appease ethnic minority groups or assimilate them into a dominant 
culture (Katznelson 2005). The mere practice of affirmative action can be a 
powerful ideologically symbolic exercise to project the image of proactive policy 
for social justice and national integration. However, this can be misleading 
because, as Wise (2005) points out, in the case of the US, behind the veneer 
of justice and equality at the rhetorical level, there are still layers of denial 
that hide institutionalized racism in everyday life. There is a perception that, 
despite affirmative action in the US, black and white middle classes, although 
inextricably linked, still exist entirely on different economic planes and that the 
achievement of equality is an immense challenge.
Sometimes, minorities which feel oppressed take the initiative to engage 
in direct ethnic bargaining and political negotiations for special programs, 
and even autonomy and secession, rather than wait for the state to take the 
initiative. Some prominent past cases included Sudeten Germans in interwar 
Czechoslovakia; Slovaks and Moravians in post-communist Czechoslovakia; 
Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, and Vojvodina; and Albanians in Kosovo 
(Jenne 2006).  
Affirmative action based on ethnicity is fraught with multiple challenges 
especially in relation to social issues of inequality, human rights, inclusiveness, 
citizenship and group recognition. Such challenges are even more pronounced 
in developing countries, where the policy development capacity of state 
institutions may not be as well developed as it is in developed countries, and 
where structural inequality is stark and firmly embedded. The governance 
process and the role of political elites are determining factors in the policy 
making and implementation process because even if affirmative action programs 
are ethically and philosophically sound they can still be subject to political 
manipulation to serve the interests of a selected few. 
Because of its multidimensional nature, debates on affirmative action 
can contribute to national discussions on broader issues of ethics, merit, 
redistribution of resources and power in society. Attempts to undermine the 
legitimacy of affirmative action through court challenges and political action 
take place at the same time as attempts to justify and promote it. For instance, 
Kende (2009) observes that resistance to affirmative action in the US has shaped 
ethnic relations and perceptions of the state as well as inter-group perception in 
significant ways. This is indeed the case in Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa, as 
this book demonstrates. The continuing debate on affirmative action in many 
countries is indicative of their complex history, which has given rise to a range 
of antagonistic groups and discourses clamouring for political advantage and 
policy influence (Bowser 2007). 
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Contextualising the trans-global approach 
This book is a trans-global study of affirmative action in post-colonial multi-
ethnic states and focuses on the interplay between ethnic politics and preferential 
programs in Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa. These countries have been chosen 
because they provide the most prominent examples of affirmative action based 
on ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, South East Asia and Oceania.
The term ‘trans-global’ is used in the book instead of ‘comparative’ because 
the latter is often associated with the use of ‘ideal’ variables to determine the 
similarities and differences between two or more countries. As such, it tends to 
be quite mechanical, through an over emphasis on the primacy of comparative 
methodology over in-depth analysis of unique experiences of the case studies 
(Lijphart 1971). This book is not aimed at comparing and contrasting the three 
case studies but is an attempt to highlight their unique characteristics and 
experiences, including the lessons they have learnt from each other. These 
unique experiences, often lost in comparative studies, need to be understood and 
appreciated in their own specific historical and cultural contexts. In providing 
an alternative approach to comparative study, this trans-global approach 
highlights the specific realities of individual case studies across the globe and 
examines their links rather than simply focusing on appearances of generalized 
similarities and differences. In short, the unique experiences of countries and 
the global links between these individual experiences are central to the trans-
global approach. This approach is important in the light of the cross-border 
transfer of ideas, experiences and models associated with affirmative action and 
development generally. Affirmative action has become trans-global in nature, 
with countries ‘borrowing’ policies and models they deem to be appropriate 
to their own situation from other countries. Fascinated with Malaysia’s 
affirmative action programs, both Fiji and South Africa borrowed, modified 
and implemented aspects of Malaysian affirmative action they believed to be 
appropriate to their local requirements, with sometimes similar and sometimes 
different consequences. 
It is not often that a trans-global study between small Pacific island states (SPIS) 
and bigger states in Asia and Africa is carried out. This is probably because 
of the assumption that SPIS are too insignificant in size and influence to be 
appropriate for trans-global study with bigger and more prominent countries. 
Reinforcing this line of thinking is the tendency to depict SPIS as marginal and 
vulnerable entities whose future as sustainable and viable states is questionable 
(Santos-Paulino, McGillivray and Naude 2010).
This study negates that view and emphasises that no matter how small or 
how big countries are, they all have unique histories and experiences, which 
deserve attention. Many post-colonial societies have unique features, as well as 
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shared experiences that were shaped by their own colonial and post-colonial 
histories and which must be given serious consideration in their own right. The 
SPIS’s borrowing and localization of global ideas and institutions, as well as 
their contribution to shaping global cultures, make trans-global study of SPIS 
important (Lamour 2005). 
The book critically examines the three case studies in terms of their unique 
historical, cultural, political and economic dynamics and draws together a 
number of common threads to enable us to understand affirmative action in 
other countries in a more informed manner. The countries in the case studies 
have all experienced ethnic inequality and tension although there are significant 
differences in how that inequality and tension has been manifested.
Fiji’s colonial history was characterized by ethnic demarcation, which 
continued to some degree after independence. Ethnic tension led to political 
instability, which contributed to coups on six occasions. Similarly, Malaysia’s 
colonial history created the conditions for ethnic demarcation and tension, 
which culminated in ethnic violence in 1969. In both Fiji and Malaysia, post-
colonial politics revolved around negotiating political balance and concessions 
through affirmative action. In contrast, South Africa had a highly repressive 
apartheid state and an extremely unequal economic structure controlled by 
a white minority. Political power shifted to the black majority following the 
1994 election and ever since there has been a concerted effort to provide greater 
economic and educational opportunities for blacks through affirmative action. 
While there was ethnic segregation in Fiji and Malaysia, it was not as rigid and 
coercive as South Africa’s apartheid system. Besides, there was still space for 
inter-ethnic political cooperation in the two countries, unlike in South Africa, 
where the majority blacks were denied basic rights for a long time. The three 
countries have had their share of ethno-political violence in the form of coups in 
Fiji, ethnic riots in Malaysia and various forms of community-based and state-
sponsored violence in South Africa.
Another shared characteristic of the three countries is that affirmative action 
is considered a major social engineering undertaking, rather than just a policy 
prescription, to restructure society as a way of addressing what Stewart, Brown 
and Langer (2007) refer to as “horizontal inequality”, or the differences between 
ethno-cultural groups. This entails engineering a new middle class and new 
patterns of ownership and power relations, with the hope of creating a more 
equitable, just and stable society. One of the latent effects of the economic 
advancement and empowerment of the indigenous middle class, as we will see 
in the three case studies, is an increase in inequality within the designated 
community.
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Another feature common to all three societies studied here is the role of elites 
who use their strategic position both as ethnic leaders, as well as state elites, in 
accessing state resources in the name of affirmative action for their communities. 
Associated with this is the formation of networks of patronage, consisting of 
political elites, state bureaucrats and businessmen who stand to gain from 
affirmative action. It is common practice in the three case studies to use 
affirmative action as a payoff for political loyalty. The distribution of affirmative 
action resources through the patronage system and the focus on creating an 
indigenous middle class contributes directly to intra-communal inequality.
Affirmative action in the three countries is justified by ideological notions 
such as “paramountcy of Fijian interest” in Fiji, Malay “special privilege” 
in Malaysia and “black empowerment” in South Africa. These ideological 
constructs not only identify the designated ethnic categories, they also give 
affirmative action a sense of possessing a political imperative and primordial 
destiny, often associated with the notion of divine right. Public articulation and 
wide acceptance of these ideological notions and implementation of affirmative 
action programs are relatively easily achieved in the three countries because the 
designated groups are demographically and politically dominant.
The case studies also show the constant tension and accommodation between 
neoliberal development policies and preferential programs. While affirmative 
action is seen by neoliberal policy thinkers as a distortion of economic 
development, there is also a belief that it should be targeted at poverty 
eradication across ethnic groups. The compromise between neoliberal policies 
and preferential programs is best represented in the effort to create an indigenous 
middle class. Privatized state assets often end up in the hands of state-aligned 
elites and the middle class.
While affirmative action has helped lessen inequality, it has not removed ethnic 
tension as initially envisaged. The ultimate question is whether affirmative 
action has led to a fairer, more just and peaceful society or whether it has simply 
worsened the existing situation. The book takes the view that the answer is a 
mixed one and reflects the complexity of the situation, rather than one which is 
simply positive or negative.
The book centres on Fiji, while Malaysia and South Africa provide the trans-
global cases. The Fiji section consists of six chapters (Chapters 2 to 7). Chapter 
2 examines the pro-indigenous affirmative action programs during the British 
colonial period. Most were rural focused and were meant to introduce indigenous 
Fijians into the cash economy but within the ambit of communal life under 
the native regulations. Indigenous Fijians were locked into a communal social 
order under rigid colonial laws that prevented them from full participation 
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in the mainstream economy and education. This later bred ethno-nationalist 
grievances when indigenous Fijians realised that they were lagging behind 
other ethnic groups in commerce, education and professional employment.
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the pro-indigenous policies of Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara’s Alliance Party after independence in 1970. These were no 
different from the colonial rural development strategy, except for the differences 
in scale and diversity. Some of the development projects worked and some did 
not. Many major agricultural projects failed, but the most successful project was 
the special educational scholarships for indigenous Fijians.
Chapter 4 looks at the political dynamics associated with the 1987 coup, including 
political and constitutional transformations. It argues that the 1987 coup was in 
fact a form of “political” affirmative action. It looks at how affirmative action 
was constitutionalized (both by the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions) and at the 
use of decrees to drive affirmative action policies which led to the Fijianization 
of the civil service and other areas of Fiji society. It also discusses some of the 
policies meant to enhance indigenous Fijian participation in the corporate sector 
as a way of consolidating an indigenous middle class.
Chapter 5 examines in detail the mandates and activities of institutions tasked 
with carrying out the state’s affirmative action programs. This includes the Fiji 
Development Board, National Bank of Fiji, Fijian Holdings Ltd, Native Land 
Trust Board and others. It discusses the failure of these institutions to deliver as 
a result of lack of capacity, corruption and political incompetence and patronage.
Chapter 6 deals with the affirmative action programs from 1999 after Mahendra 
Chaudhry became the first Indo-Fijian prime minister to 2006, when a further 
coup took place. It examines the differences between Chaudhry’s appeasement 
strategy and Laisenia Qarase’s social engineering approach after the 2000 coup, 
and how both approaches turned out to be disastrous for the two men’s political 
career and for the country’s political future.
Chapter 7 discusses the capture of state power by Commodore Bainimarama in 
2006 and some of the contradictory tendencies of his indigenous development 
strategies. On the one hand he demonized affirmative action but on the other 
hand he reinvented it under the rubric of rural development in order to mobilize 
support and gain legitimacy amongst indigenous Fijians for the purpose of 
electoral gain.
Chapter 8 is a discussion of affirmative action in Malaysia, its origin, justification, 
implementation and results. Where possible, parallels with Fiji are made. Chapter 
9 examines affirmative action in South Africa in the context of creating a new 
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social order after the collapse of apartheid. Chapter 10 draws together some of 
the commonalities between the three case studies and provides a discussion of 
some of the trans-global lessons learnt.     
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2. Proto-affirmative action: 
Indigenous Fijian development from 
cession to independence
Although the term ‘affirmative action’ was not used until after the 1987 military 
coup, various policies aimed at improving the socio-economic conditions of 
indigenous Fijians were adopted from the early days of colonialism. However, 
there were contradictory perceptions and policies as to how the question of 
indigenous Fijian ‘progress’ was to be dealt with. The first view, advocated by 
Governor im Thurn in the early 1900s as well as many white farmers, was that 
there should be a total liberalization of the indigenous Fijian system including 
the commercialization and individualization of the landownership system. 
On the opposite side of the continuum were those like Sir Arthur Gordon, 
the first Governor, and later Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, an indigenous statesman, 
who wanted a tight communal system which would facilitate the gradual 
evolution of indigenous Fijians in a social Darwinian way. In between was the 
perception that, while locked in communal organization, indigenous Fijians 
could be integrated slowly into the cash economy through participation in the 
copra and banana industries as famers and salesmen. It appeared that the third 
view prevailed because, as we shall see later, a number of projects to introduce 
indigenous Fijians to the cash economy were introduced, but within the ambit 
of communal hegemony. 
The interaction with the market economy was not based on sharing the control 
of the production process but on the provision of labour for village-based cash 
crops. Village-based semi-subsistence production was a low-cost production 
system that greatly subsidized the production cost, which enabled middlemen 
and exporters to make sizeable profits. Nevertheless, despite these economic 
engagements, the impact of such interaction with the market economy on the 
indigenous Fijian community in terms of socio-economic development was 
minimal. One of the restraining factors was that full entrepreneurship was 
considered destructive to the fabric of Fijian social life.
From 1874, when Fiji became a British colony, to independence in 1970, two 
separate but related modes of development were in place in Fiji. On the one 
hand was the entrenchment of communalism under the colonial native policy 
put in place in 1876, and on the other was the consolidation of the capitalist 
economy. The communal mode of production sustained a semi-subsistence way 
of life under the hegemony of chiefs, at the same time as capitalist economic 
development was creating fundamental socio-economic changes such as the 
growth of an embryonic indigenous Fijian working class whose new mode 
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of consciousness which came into conflict with the communal ethos of the 
native policy. After the 1940s serious attempts were made to reform the native 
administration with a view to strengthen communal hegemony rather than 
liberalize it. The liberalization process did not take place until the 1960s, as 
independence approached.   
This chapter looks at some early attempts to assimilate indigenous Fijians into 
the mainstream market economy and some of the consequent challenges. The 
first part looks briefly at the period from 1874, when Fiji became a British 
colony, to 1970, when Fiji gained independence.        
Indigenous Fijians in the embryonic market 
economy  
A quick glance at the growing capitalist economy in Fiji in the 19th century 
should give us an idea of the broader socio-economic space within which the 
indigenous communal system existed. The growth of a capitalist economy had 
direct bearing on the use of indigenous Fijian land, labour and a lukewarm 
involvement of indigenous Fijians in the market economy. The colonial economy 
from 1874 was dominated by sugar production, which was under the monopoly 
of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR). The colonial state played a 
direct role in facilitating the accumulation process, such as the importation of 
indentured labourers from India (Gillion 1962; Lal 1989). The use of indigenous 
Fijian labour was restricted by the native policy and there were reservations 
concerning the use of indigenous labour because of a fear of the breakdown of 
the indigenous social system, already threatened by western influence. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, CSR-produced sugar accounted for about 
80% of total export value (Narsey 1979). Like sugar, copra production was 
also an activity dominated by Europeans, using indigenous Fijian and Indo-
Fijian labour. But use of indigenous Fijian labour in this case was piecemeal 
and officially controlled under the Native Labour Ordinance. An Australian 
Company, Burns Philp (BP), one of the biggest companies operating in the 
Pacific, was responsible for the purchase and shipping of copra. In 1903, copra 
exports were worth 91,051 pounds sterling, compared to sugar exports worth 
403,301 pounds sterling. Heavy subsidies by the colonial state for sugar and 
copra production accounted for the high rates of return. For instance, there was 
a dramatic increase in copra production to 98,382 tonnes in 1970 from a mere 
29,969 tonnes in 1900. While this boosted the involvement of indigenous Fijians 
in the copra industry, they participated only as small-scale semi-subsistence 
farmers and labourers.  
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By the beginning of the twentieth century expatriate capital had substantially 
increased and virtually controlled all merchandising, insurance, banking 
and overseas shipping. Competition between European-run companies such 
as BP and Morris Hedstrom (MH) provided dynamism in the economy. Local 
companies, which consisted mostly of retailers, were too small to compete. The 
growth of European capital on the one hand and the rigid communal existence 
of indigenous Fijians on the other raised some concern. Governor Im Thurn saw 
authoritarian chiefly rule as a stumbling block to the progress of the indigenous 
Fijian people. This view was reflected in a speech to the Great Council of Chiefs 
in 1905, in which he accused chiefs of unfairly becoming prosperous through 
the imposition of exactions which prevented “…(ordinary Fijians) from gaining 
anything for themselves – any property to make life interesting to them”. He 
advocated “individuality” as “the habit of thought which we (government) 
and you (chiefs) should encourage in the Fijians” (Fiji Government 1905: 2-3). 
The means of social reform suggested by Im Thurn included teaching English 
in village schools to enable indigenous Fijians more cultural liberalization 
and social mobility, and the “freeing up” of some of the communal land for 
individual ownership and settlement by indigenous Fijians under the Native 
Land Ordinance No.14 of 1905. The idea of liberalization was resisted by chiefs, 
who preferred to continue ruling over an obedient community (Grattan 1963). 
Nevertheless, some of the land was “freed up” and sold and, as Scarr (1984: 112) 
noted, between 1905 and 1908, about 105,000 acres of land were sold as freehold 
and an additional 170,000 acres were put on long-term lease. Land liberalisation 
was later stopped after a fierce campaign in London by Lord Stanmore (Sir 
Arthur Gordon), who saw it as a threat to his native policy. Lord Stanmore 
vigorously defended his policies in Britain's House of Lords in reaction to im 
Thurn's reforms (Routledge 1985). It was also realised that speculation, rather 
than settlement, was taking place and the policy was stopped in 1911. 
This dramatic sequence of events showed that indirect rule through the 
chiefs continued to provide institutional resistance towards indigenous Fijian 
enterprise. Later, in 1915, a motion in the Legislative Council by council 
member Sir Henry Scott, which required that government was to take all 
the land that was not required for use by indigenous Fijians for European 
settlement, was defeated. According to Spate, “this date at latest may be taken 
as marking official endorsement of the view that Fijian interests were completely 
paramount” (Spate 1959: 16). The notion of the paramountcy of Fijian interest 
was initially conceived as a protective mechanism to shield indigenous Fijians 
from contesting forces; but later, especially as a result of the rise of ethno-
nationalism from the 1970s onwards, it became a rallying cry for indigenous 
Fijian political dominance.
Politics of preferential development
14
Although largely ‘marginalised’ from the mainstream colonial economy by a 
paternalistic native policy, indigenous Fijians were still subject to the demands 
of a modern economy through seasonal labour recruitment and taxation.1 The 
taxation burden compelled many indigenous Fijians to ‘commute’ between 
subsistence life and cash employment.2 They had to pay tax in kind and a 
significant number left their villages to work on European plantations and cane 
farms in order to be able to pay tax and avoid the penalty (Burns 1963). In fact 
by the 1880s 35% of indigenous Fijians paid their taxes in cane. This piecemeal 
‘proletarianisation’ was strictly controlled by the Native Labour Ordinance, 
which restricted the use of native labour (Narayan 1984). After the indentured 
system stopped in 1916, there was a growing demand for indigenous Fijian 
labour to work in the plantations, docks and other areas of commercial growth. 
Slow liberalisation of indigenous Fijian labour was still subject to the hegemonic 
control of the colonial state-chiefly system historical bloc.
Indigenous labourers were, however, continuously constrained by increasing 
demands, by chiefs for provision of communal labour and by the colonial state 
with its attempts, against the current of its own introduced capitalist economy, 
to contain Fijians in villages as subsistence producers. These constraints limited 
the involvement and active participation of indigenous Fijians in the developing 
colonial capitalist economy. The dilemma for indigenous Fijians was the minimal 
opportunities they had to earn an income in the face of increasing capitalist 
penetration of the economy and villages (Plange 1996: 215).
By the 1930s, the real growth was in mining, which was largely controlled by 
Emperor Gold Mines of Australia. Many indigenous Fijians were recruited from 
villages, with the help of the chiefs, to provide labour.3 Emberson-Bain (1994) 
observed that the recruitment of indigenous Fijian labour into the mines was 
done within the context of communal labour and under the supervision of 
1 From 1874, when Fiji became a colony, indigenous Fijian labourers were recruited piecemeal from villages 
to work on plantations, and within eight years indigenous plantation workers totalled more than 4,000, about 
25% of the total able-bodied men. The trend continued into the 1920s and 30s with the setting up of mines. 
In the mines, ethnic-Fijian workers were “subjected to class and racial exploitation” under a hierarchy of 
European, part-European, Rotuman and Indian bosses (ranked in that order). See Emberson-Bain (1994). The 
growth of the ethnic-Fijian working class did not lead directly to the development of a fully-fledged and 
independent proletarian class, as they were in many ways still subject to the patronising hegemony of the 
chiefly system. The development of class consciousness was subsumed under ethnic hegemony and provincial 
division and conflict within the indigenous Fijian labour force. At the time of the recruitment of Indian 
indentured workers, ethnic hegemony and the uneven development of capitalism laid the foundation for the 
separate production and reproduction of ethnic identities. 
2 This practice is still very common today. While many indigenous Fijians who live in villages commute to 
work every morning, a large number who live far away from urban centres ‘commute’ between villages and 
towns once a month or so to look for casual employment.     
3 The extent of the deplorable working conditions in the mines has been well documented (Emberson-Bain 
1994). The conditions in the mines led directly to the formation of the first indigenous Fijian labour union. 
Strikes in the mines were suppressed through the intervention of chiefs, acting on behalf of the colonial state 
and mining companies to remind indigenous Fijian miners that striking is “un-Fijian” and a sign of disrespect 
for Fijian chiefs.
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chiefs. At the mines, indigenous Fijian miners maintained their province-based 
communal identity. But in the context of the wider class structure, indigenous 
Fijians were at the bottom of the socio-economic strata, vis-a-vis Indo-Fijians, 
Rotumans, part-Europeans and Europeans (in that upward order of hierarchy). 
Chiefs were used effectively to break strikes and neutralise working class 
consciousness through ethnic and communal appeal (Howard 1989). 
The inter-war years were characterised by increased politicisation and 
mobilisation of class-consciousness. Colonial hegemony and the degrading 
working conditions it created were being challenged by the increasingly 
confident mobilisation of Indo-Fijian workers. In 19204 and 1921 two major 
strikes were organised to demand better wages and working conditions.5 Both 
strikes were repressed by force, using the largely indigenous Fijian militia. The 
use of indigenous Fijian military and police by the state against the Indo-Fijians 
helped to buttress the ethnic wedge of “divide and rule” entrenched by the 
Native Policy in support of capital. This became a common trend throughout 
the history of Fiji, where the alliance between chiefs and the state consolidated 
a power bloc to protect capital accumulation as well as “Fijian interest.”
On the political front, although Indo-Fijians were granted elected representation 
to the Legislative Council in 1929, indigenous Fijians were still “represented” 
through nominations. The indigenous Fijian representatives were mostly chiefs 
who, in effect, were the link between the ‘separate’ Native Administration 
mentioned earlier and the central government. The structure of the Legislative 
Council from the 1930s to the 1960s was an institutionalised form of ethnic 
segregation, reflecting the ethnic division in society generally.6 Through the 
nomination system, indigenous Fijians continued to be subservient to the 
chiefly authority and were deprived of direct experience in formal democracy. 
This was to contribute to the ambivalent attitude of indigenous Fijians towards 
democratic politics in later years.              
4 The strikes were organised by an Indian barrister sent by Gandhi to organise Indo-Fijian workers. 
5 In fact the very first strikes in Fiji occurred in February 1886 and March of the same year. The grievances 
concerned low wages.
6 For instance, under the amended 1937 Constitution, the Legislative Council consisted of: the Governor 
as President; 3 ex officio members; 13 official members; 5 European members; of whom 3 were elected and 2 
nominated; 5 Fijian nominated members; and 5 Indian members, of whom 3 were elected and 2 nominated. 
Voters were male only (voting was later extended to women in 1961), there was a minimum voting age of 21 
years and voters had to pass certain property and income qualifications (Fiji Government, 1938). Voting was 
strictly on the basis of the communal franchise system. 
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Reforms and transition to independence, 1940 
to 1970 
By the end of the Second World War a number of major changes had been made 
to the Fijian administration by Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna7 and Governor Mitchell. 
Amongst these were the setting up of the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) or 
Vale ni Volavola ni Qele Maroroi under the 1940 Native Land Trust Ordinance to 
administer Fijian land. The setting up of the NLTB ensured that administration 
of all native land was to come under a central authority. The NLTB was to 
oversee the leasing of land, codification of the ownership system and was to 
ensure that native land was put into productive use (NLTB 1990). As part of 
the reform, the post of Secretary for Fijian Affairs was created, with Sukuna as 
office holder, under the Fijian Affairs Ordinance of 1945. His title was Ai Talai 
ni Kovana or governor's representative. This new structure was a shift towards a 
more indirect rule, and, culturally, became the prism through which indigenous 
Fijians continued to define their collective identity in later years. It was “...a 
system empowered by law to organise some of the activities of the Fijian people 
for their own social, economic and political development as well as for the 
preservation of their traditional way of life” (Nayacakalou 1975: 85). These 
changes further consolidated chiefly hegemony within the indigenous Fijian 
political sphere, at the same time acting as leverage for communal segregation. 
But these changes were deemed to be justified because of the perceived political 
‘threat’ from Indo-Fijians, who, as shown in Table 2.1, out-numbered the 
indigenous Fijians by the mid-1940s. 
Table 2.1 Population changes 1921-1946
Year Fijian (%) Indian (%) European (%) Others (%) Total (000)
1921 54 39 4 4 127
1936 50 43 4 3 198
1946 45 46 4 4 260
Source: Fiji Government 1974.
The reforms of the1940s effectively reversed some of the earlier attempts 
at liberalising the Fijian Administration, attempts which in the 1930s had 
been in abeyance. Some of the early ‘liberal’ reforms included Im Thurn’s 
revision of the Native Regulation in 1912, by which the Governor attempted 
7 Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna is regarded by many as the most prominent indigenous Fijian to date. He was the first 
indigenous Fijian graduate as well as the first to be knighted. He became speaker of the Legislative Council 
and is considered to be the founder of the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) and a 
number of policies and institutions that govern indigenous Fijian political and land rights. See Scarr (1980), 
for a detailed biography of Sukuna.      
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to reduce the hegemonic power of chiefs; the modification of the Native 
Administration in 1914 by Governor Bickham Sweet Escott, to ensure more 
European administration at the district levels; and the increase in the number 
of Europeans in the Native Administration in 1915, followed by the abolition 
of the Native Affairs Department in 1916. The Native Affairs Department 
was revamped as the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB). However, Sukuna tried to 
complement consolidation of chiefly hegemony with neutralisation of worker 
consciousness and solidarity by deliberately fostering exclusively ethnic labour 
unions to ensure that indigenous Fijian workers were directly under chiefly 
control to maintain communal cohesion. In 1946, as part of the consolidation 
of indigenous communal solidarity, the racially exclusive Seaman’s Union was 
formed (Europeans were not allowed membership) and the wholly indigenous 
Fijian Fiji Mine Workers Union was formed in 1948. This, as Howard (1985: 
115) puts it, “not only served to divide further organised labour, but it also 
obviously was intended to create unions that were less likely to be militant since 
it was felt that the chiefs would exercise a restraining influence on the members 
of such unions.” 
Part of the reform was to incorporate indigenous Fijians into mainstream 
institutions slowly through gradual evolution within the Fijian Administration 
structure (NLTB 1996). Sukuna suggested in the Legislative Council on 25 
February 1944, that it was necessary to train chiefs and people in orderly, sound 
and progressive local government the better to fit them eventually for the give-
and-take of democratic institutions. Hence a number of initiatives were made 
within the framework of the Fijian Administration in the decade after the war 
to facilitate indigenous Fijian development. Apart from the restructuring of 
the Fijian Administration, these included: the setting up of the co-operative 
movement (Soqosoqo Cokovata ni Veivoli) under the Co-operative Ordinance of 
1947; the setting up of the Fijian Banana Venture in 1950; the setting up of the 
Fijian Development Fund (Lavo Musuki in Veivakatorocaketaki) by Ordinance 
No.14 of 1951; the creation of Economic Development Officer positions in 
1954 (following the incorporation of an economic development agenda into 
the Fijian Administration); and more rigid control of the galala (independent 
farming) system. These changes were part of attempts to gradually introduce 
indigenous Fijians into the market economy but within the context of communal 
hegemony under the rigid regulations of the Fijian Administration. However, 
one could argue that these initiatives were perhaps amongst the very first forms 
of affirmative action consciously carried out specifically for the purpose of 
enhancing the socio-economic position of indigenous Fijians. 
The Co-operative Society, set up under the 1947 Co-operative Ordinance, 
was seen as a viable alternative for indigenous Fijians instead of fully-fledged 
individualism. Although the Society was intended to be independent, over time 
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it was progressively influenced by the dictates of the Fijian Administration. It 
was initially assumed that because of their “communal” orientation, “Fijians 
were naturally inclined to co-operative effort” (Fiji Co-operative Dept. 1948: 
49). Within ten years of formation, the ethnic distribution of co-operative 
societies in Fiji were as follows: 51 for indigenous Fijians, 5 for Indo-Fijians, 
and 22 for other ethnic groups and mixed membership (Fiji Co-operative Dept. 
1958). Nevertheless, the co-operative movement encouraged self-help, self-
management and self-discipline and this came into conflict with the authoritarian 
communal requirements of the Native Administration. There was conflict at the 
level of leadership between elected co-operative officials and hereditary chiefs 
and in many cases local chiefs used their power to control local co-operative 
movements, and as a result many collapsed. There were constant attempts by 
hostile Fijian Administration officials to intervene and direct policies in keeping 
with the Fijian Administration agenda, away from what they saw as a movement 
which would threaten communal cohesion. There were other problems such as 
reckless extension of credit to kinsmen and inter-village jealousies (Spate 1959).
The main focus of conflict was between the communalistic structure favoured 
by chiefs and Fijian Administration officials on one hand, and the collectivist 
co-operative system based on mutual co-operation, democratic leadership and 
expectations of financial bonus (depending on performance) favoured by many 
ordinary villagers, on the other. 
Thus over the years one of the biggest barriers to the efficiency of the co-
operative movement was the way the authoritarian chiefly rule and communal 
obligations interfered with the operation of many co-operative societies (Young 
1984). In a major review in 1959, Spate concluded that “the movement’s history 
of difficulties illustrates perhaps better than anything else the inherent obstacles 
to economic advance imposed by the traditional system” (Spate 1959: 55). I take 
issue with Spate’s modernizationist generalization here. The problem was not 
so much the “traditional system,” but rather how certain individuals in the 
system used their status to siphon off benefits to themselves. Belshaw (1964), 
who was doing fieldwork almost around the same time, found cases of village-
based enterprises which were running well. 
The Fijian Banana Venture (FBV), sponsored by the Fijian Administration in 1950 
as a way of developing banana cultivation and marketing amongst indigenous 
Fijians, had mixed results due to a number of factors including the difficult 
logistics involved. Production was principally at the village level on a communal 
basis, although some producers were independent farmers. Banana cultivation 
went through difficulties and did not perform as expected, and in many parts 
of the banana growing area such as Nadroga production was in a “sorry state” 
(Belshaw 1964: 45).
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In his seminal study of rural socio-economic life in the 1950s, Belshaw observed 
a number of “specialized or expansionist enterprises” in various Fijian villages 
in Vitilevu, including village store keepers; cash-oriented farmers, some of 
whom engaged also in auxiliary business; cattle raisers; and marketing middle 
men. These were relatively small in number but at the same time they provided 
the engine for socio-economic development in villages. A problem was that 
these enterprises were tied up with a complex array of institutional forces such 
as the Fijian Affairs Board, cooperatives, community associations, provincial 
government and national government; and faced community obligations. 
The setting up of the Fijian Development Fund (FDF) in 1951 was one of the first 
of a series of attempts to encourage saving amongst indigenous Fijians. It was set 
up primarily for copra farmers, to ensure that part of their earnings was directed 
to communal development. The initial success of the FDF was due to the high 
post-war copra prices. The FDF dealt with items in three main categories: first, 
relatively small items, say up to F£1,000 in value, which were widely distributed 
(ploughs, bullocks, tractors, cocoa machines, copra driers and surveying); 
second, ‘intermediate’ projects, about F£5,000 in value (fisheries, small mining, 
cattle); and third, projects requiring high capitalisation and skilled management 
(land development, purchase and development of estates, timber projects). 
Rather than mobilising resources for generating income on a long-term basis, 
the FDF was concerned mostly with improvement of communal life through 
the development of village amenities (Fijian Affairs Board 1990). A compulsory 
deduction of F£10 per ton of copra produced by copra farmers was collected by 
the Fijian Affairs Board and credited to accounts of individuals or co-operative 
producers and sometimes to village accounts, bearing a 2% interest rate, and 
requiring a flat rate ledger fee of 10 shillings per account. Copra was sold only 
to Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) agents or licensed buyers. The FDF was controlled 
by a board of which the Secretary of Fijian Affairs was the Chair. Other members 
consisted of FAB members; legal and financial advisors to the board; and a 
number of European and indigenous Fijian nominated members. The FDF was 
highly bureaucratic and paternalistic and discouraged individual economic 
enterprise outside the ambit of the Fijian Administration. 
Aside from the development institutions, agents responsible for the day-to-
day operation of Fijian development were the Economic Development Officers 
(EDOs), who were appointed in 1954 for the purpose of bridging the divide 
between the development policies of the government’s Agricultural Department 
(which encouraged individual farming) and the Fijian Administration (which 
encouraged communal farming). By employing EDOs, it was hoped that 
there would be “less danger of conflicting policies being pursued and that 
agricultural assistance for Fijians would be developed within the framework of 
the well-established communal system rather than as in the past concentrated 
Politics of preferential development
20
on a comparatively few individuals” (Fiji Government 1954). The EDOs’ 
development program was laid down in a 1954 resolution of the Great Council 
of Chiefs: cultivation of economic crops should be organised as a communal 
service on family lands; building and repairing of houses to be done outside 
the development program; and EDOs were to see that programs of work were 
drawn up in consultation with those concerned and that those programs were 
in fact carried out. The EDOs were mostly high chiefs with diverse communal 
responsibilities and charged with the task of consolidating communal cohesion 
through economic development along the old tikina and koro program of work 
(Fiji Government 1957). Two of the EDOs, Ratu Sir George Cakobau and Ratu 
Penaia Ganilau, later became Governor General and President of Fiji respectively. 
Other EDOs included the paramount chiefs of Rewa and Nadroga. These were men 
of power with no expertise on ‘development’ who used their traditional status 
to act as comprador for the colonial state to keep the state system operational 
and to control indigenous Fijian labour. Most of them had influence at various 
levels of the state system from the top to the bottom, as shown in the case of 
the EDO for the Northern provinces (in Vanua Levu). Ganilau was the Roko 
Tui Cakaudrove (a state-designated civil servant/chief of Cakaudrove Province) 
and was a member of the following: Legislative Council; Legislative Council 
Standing Committee; Fijian Affairs Board; Fijian Development Fund Board; 
Central Road Board; Macuata Road Board; Taveuni Rural Authority; Taveuni 
Hospital Board of Visitors; Taveuni Native Land Trust Board Local Committee; 
and Taveuni Liquor Permit Committee. This example provides an indication of 
the extent of political authority and influence EDOs had.
Thus, paradoxically, under the EDO Fijian development was far from being a 
liberating process to catapult indigenous Fijians into the entrepreneurial world. 
Rather, it was part of a bigger design to help indigenous Fijians engage in the 
cash economy – but within the ambit of the state, province and chiefly control.
Another significant change was the increased regulation of the galala system 
(individual farming) in 1955. Under Governor Gordon’s Land Ordinance 
XXI of 1880, it was envisaged that indigenous Fijians would eventually be 
granted individual holding when the time was ripe. In the early twentieth 
century, Governor Im Thurn, as we saw earlier, also favoured liberalisation 
of land holdings. In the 1930s, with the encouragement of the Department 
of Agriculture, there were cases of independent farmers settling outside the 
communal system, although special exemption had to be granted by the District 
Administration. The number of exemptions increased during the war in the 
1940s as part of the effort to produce supplies for the forces. Sukuna, alarmed 
by the increasing number of exemptions, declared in 1944 in a memorandum 
to the Administrative Officers Conference that, while a number of indigenous 
Fijians desired to “live as peasant farmers, independently of the system, either 
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on their own lands or elsewhere”, government and the Fijian Regulations were 
prepared to “encourage” it -but “within the limits laid down in the Native 
Regulations” (Sukuna 1944: 1). In 1955 changes to the galala conditions 
under Native Regulations No.6 made commutation between the village and 
independent settlement more rigid. It also specified a number of conditions 
related to production which the galala should strictly follow.8 These conditions 
ensured that while independent farming was encouraged, it was to be carried 
out under the terms of the Native Regulations. 
If anything, the ‘reforms’ mentioned above merely further crystallised 
communal hegemony by reinforcing chiefly control and did little to advance the 
economic situation of indigenous Fijians, at a time when the colonial economy 
had progressively shown a clear link between ethnicity and socio-economic 
position. The class structure in the 1940s and 1950s had a distinctive ethnic 
dimension. The economy was dominated by expatriate and local European 
capital; below was a growing class of Indo-Fijian and Chinese petite-bourgeoisie 
and at the bottom was a large mass of impoverished Indo-Fijian cane farmers 
and indigenous Fijians in the semi-subsistence sector (Narayan 1984; Plange 
1996). However, it needs to be mentioned that amongst the indigenous Fijians 
was a class of comprador chiefs who were co-opted into the civil service or who, 
through the native regulations, wielded substantial power over the indigenous 
community. 
In addition, ethnic relations worsened during the war because of the refusal 
of the Indo-Fijians to join the army to fight the invading Japanese, and their 
demand for equal rights with Europeans as a condition for signing up. Instead, 
in 1943 the Indo-Fijian sugar workers went on strike to demand better prices for 
cane. Unlike the 1920 and 1921 strikes, the 1943 strike was led by union leaders. 
The organising unions were the Kisan Sangh (formed in the late 1930s) and the 
Akhil Fiji Krisnak Maha Sangh (All-Fiji Farmers’ Great Association), formed in 
1941. The 1943 strike, like the previous ones, reinforced the indigenous Fijian 
nationalist stereotype (encouraged by the ‘ethnic wedging’ technique of the 
colonial state) that Indo-Fijians were ‘scheming’ and were not to be trusted 
when it came to situations of national and security interest. 
During the post-war period there was a concerted effort to increase exports 
(Knapman 1987). Europeans still dominated agricultural production, despite the 
increase in the number of Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian farmers. In the late 
1950s, for instance, 557 Europeans were able to produce and export produce 
to the value of £2,159 each; 22,000 Indo-Fijians produced exports worth 
about £337; and indigenous Fijians produced exports to the value of £72.10s. 
8 The 1956 Census estimated that there were about 1,300 galala. This represented a little over 3.5% of all 
ratepayers and a little over 5.5% of all indigenous Fijians engaged in agriculture.  
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Europeans had much larger and more productive commercial estates, while at 
the other extreme, indigenous Fijians were mostly subsistence village farmers 
with occasional semi-commercial farming operations.
By the 1950s little had changed in relation to indigenous Fijian participation 
in commerce. The Fijian administration still played a hegemonic role and 
largely controlled the political and economic direction of indigenous Fijian 
‘development’, in a way that promoted communalism and undermined 
independent enterprise. In terms of the latter, communal ownership of land 
was a major obstacle. For instance, by 1956, a mere 0.2% of freehold land, 
which constituted the most productive commercially used land, was owned 
by indigenous Fijians. Within the commercial farming sector (excluding cattle 
farming), ethnic distribution of average per capita acres (land under commercial 
farming) in 1958 showed that there were 131.0 acres for Europeans, 7.0 acres 
for Indo-Fijians, 6.4 acres for Chinese and other Islanders and 4.8 acres for 
indigenous Fijians. If we include 36,000 acres of improved pastureland for cattle 
farming and 600 acres of fodder crops under European ownership, then the 
average per capita area in use by Europeans was over 192 acres or 27.7% of 
the total farm land in Fiji (Narayan 1984: 67). In sugar production (the largest 
industry in the colony) in terms of tons harvested, indigenous Fijians produced 
only 4.3% in 1953; 4.84% in 1954; 3.49% in 1955; 4.43% in 1956; and 3.25% 
in 1957 (Colonial Sugar Refinery 1959). Despite efforts to increase indigenous 
Fijian productivity in sugar farming – including the setting up of a CSR school 
in Drasa, to train young indigenous Fijians in a three-year practical course 
on sugarcane farming – indigenous Fijian production never exceeded 5% of 
total production. Most of the indigenous Fijian cane famers leased their own 
communal land and a few leased land from the Fiji Sugar Corporation (Belshaw 
1964). 
One of the drawbacks of agricultural development for indigenous Fijian farmers 
was the difficulty in getting a commercial loan. For instance in the 1950s and 
1960s, ethnic allocation of loans by the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board 
(later to become the Fiji Development Bank), which was set up to provide capital 
for agricultural development, disadvantaged indigenous Fijians. European 
borrowers, who accounted for only 15% of the total number of loans, received 
53% of the total loan value; Indo-Fijian borrowers accounted for 53% of the 
total number of loans and received 34% of the total loan value; and indigenous 
Fijians received 25% of the total number of loans but only 7% of the total value 
(Sutherland 1998). The figures for the financial year for 1960/61 showed that 
the average size of a loan to an indigenous Fijian was half that of loans to Indo-
Fijians and one tenth that of loans to Europeans. The bank was generally blamed 
for “favouring” Indo-Fijians. But the real situation was that indigenous Fijian 
land was communally owned and could not be used as collateral for loans (Burns 
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1963). In law, the bank could not make a claim on communally owned land. 
Even houses could not be used as collateral since they were built on communal 
land. Because of their distrust of banks, many indigenous Fijians joined credit 
unions. The credit union movement was introduced by Father Ganey in 1954. 
At the end of 1957 there were 231 unions with a total membership of 24,148. 
Members were, predominantly, indigenous Fijians. Many of the loans went to 
meet communal obligations (Schultze 1982). 
While communal land ownership was meant to ‘protect’ indigenous Fijian land, 
it also became a major barrier to economic development. On the other hand, 
Indo-Fijians used sugar cane crops on their leased farms as collateral for loans. 
A few indigenous Fijians who ventured into commercial farming on leased land 
were able to do likewise. 
Sukuna’s communal paradigm not only retarded progress in economic 
entrepreneurship, it also disadvantaged education for indigenous Fijians at 
large. Sukuna’s idea was that cohesion within Fijian communal life could only 
be sustained through absolute loyalty to chiefs, who were the only ones with 
the right to be educated. It was feared that educated commoners would pose 
a threat to chiefly authority and communal cohesion. An educated commoner 
intelligentsia, according to Sukuna, would be potentially subversive by 
“undermining and confusing authority to their own ends” (quoted in Scarr 
1980:146). The first secondary schools were set up primarily for children of 
chiefs (Whitehead 1981). 
The overall impact of the protective and paternalistic communalism under the 
native policy no doubt led to the relatively low achievement of indigenous 
Fijians in various areas of the economy and professional service. For instance 
in 1953, as Table 2.2 shows, the per capita cash income of Europeans and part-
Europeans (F$468) was highest, followed by Chinese (F$279), who were mostly 
shopkeepers, and then Indo-Fijians (F$113), while the indigenous Fijians had 
the lowest per capita of only F$60. However, differences in per capita income 
for both cash and subsistence between indigenous Fijians (F$121) and Indo-
Fijians (F$128) was not very significant, due to the substantial involvement of 
indigenous Fijians in the subsistence economy (Fiji 1956). The figures show a low 
level of indigenous Fijian participation in the capitalist sector of the economy 
compared to other ethnic groups.        
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Table 2.2 Estimated per capita income by ethnicity, 1953 (F$)
Ethnic Group Income per head(Cash and Subsistence)
Income per head
(Cash only)




Other Categories 147 113
Source: Fiji Legislative Council Paper No.44 of 1956. 
Also, in 1958, as Table 2.3 shows, in the various professions including lawyers, 
doctors and dentists, there were 2 indigenous Fijians, 58 Indo-Fijians, 1 Chinese, 2 
part-Europeans and 74 Europeans (Fiji 1960). Despite their under-representation 
in the areas of commerce and professional services, indigenous Fijians seemed, 
by virtue of their preponderance in small scale, semi-subsistence agriculture, 
to have performed well in crop cultivation for local consumption. For instance, 
they cultivated about 45% of the 80,000 acres of crops for local consumption. 
But they farmed only a little under 32% of the acreage used for export crops. 
Indigenous Fijians dominated banana cultivation; but a relatively low number 
of indigenous Fijians participated in rice and sugar farming.     
Table 2.3 Numbers qualified in selected professions, by ethnic group 1958
Ethnic Group Lawyers Doctors Dentists Total
Ethnic-Fijians - 1 1 2
Indo-Fijians 38 12 8 58
Chinese - 1 - 1
Part-Europeans 1 1 - 2
Europeans 17 51 6 74
Total 56 66 15 137
Source: Fiji Legislative Council Papers No.1 of 1960: 12.
This trend continued into the 1960s. Table 2.4 provides a general picture of the 
distribution of gross income in 1967, three years before independence. It shows 
that the proportion of indigenous Fijians receiving cash income above F$5,000 
was only 4%, compared to 16% for Indo-Fijians, 38% for Europeans and 24% 
for Chinese. In other words, indigenous Fijians were the least represented in 
the higher socio-economic strata. Indigenous Fijians predominated in the low-
income bracket (F$0-1,000), while there was an almost equal proportion of 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians within the F$1,001-2,000 range. 
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Table 2.4 Distribution of gross cash income of individuals, by ethnic 
groups, 1967, in percentages
Income Range (F$) Fijians (%) Indo-Fijians (%) Europeans (%) Chinese (%)
0-1,000 30 22 5 9
1,001-2,000 35 34 14 22
2,001-5,000 31 28 43 44
over 5,000 4 16 38 24
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Fiji Inland Revenue Department, National Accounts Report 1967: 5.
Around the same period (1966), the ratios of indigenous Fijian lawyers, doctors 
and dentists to Indo-Fijians in those occupations were; 0 indigenous Fijian to 38 
Indo-Fijians; 1 indigenous Fijian to 12 Indo-Fijians; and 1 indigenous Fijian to 8 
Indo-Fijians, respectively (Fiji 1966). 
The continuing disparity in indicators and the lack of indigenous Fijian 
progress in socio-economic terms were the subject of two major investigations 
by Spate and Burns. In his report, The Fijian People: Economic Problems and 
Prospects, Professor Spate argued that the lack of progress of indigenous Fijians 
in commerce could be attributed to the rigid communal system under the native 
policy (Spate 1959). Later, the Burns Report concurred with Spate's findings 
and emphasised the fact that communal ownership of land undermined the 
economic progress of indigenous Fijians (Burns 1963).
By the late 1950s and 1960s, the establishment of the forestry and tourism 
industries provided some hope for the future development of indigenous Fijians. 
Both these industries became important to indigenous Fijians because of the use 
of native forests (and native labour) for logging and the use of indigenous Fijian 
land (and labour in tourism development). But in both cases, the investors were 
foreign companies, sometimes with local shareholders. The Forestry Department 
was largely Fijian staffed. This created some difficulties with local chiefs, who 
saw it as their right to direct department officials as to which forest to log. One 
of the first sawmills to be set up under the Fijian Development Fund was the 
Kadavu sawmill in 1957. Complicated negotiations had to take place with the 31 
mataqalis who owned the land. 
The 1956 Census showed that about 600 out of the 1,000 workers in lumbering 
and sawmilling were indigenous Fijians. Indigenous Fijians accounted for two-
thirds of the supervisory and clerical workers and all 192 skilled workers. But 
over half the proprietary and managerial grades were occupied by Indo-Fijians 
and Europeans. Tourism, in particular, went through a period of unprecedented 
boom after the 1962 legislation to allow duty-free trading and the 1964 Hotel 
Aids Ordinance, which encouraged tourism investment. The growth of the 
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service industries associated with tourism (travel services, taxis, duty-free 
shopping and so on) largely benefited European capitalists, the Indo-Fijian 
petit-bourgeoisie and indigenous Fijian chiefs whose land was leased to hotel 
companies. The lowest-paid jobs were reserved for indigenous Fijians recruited 
from villages around hotel resorts. They were (and still are) largely used as 
marketing exhibits for the “smiling” and “friendly” Fijian image on which Fiji's 
tourism has thrived. This was to be the trend until independence.
Also in the 1950s and 1960s, an emergent proletarian class, and class-
consciousness, had developed across communal boundaries and strikes had 
become commonplace (Narayan 1984). The colonial state even suspected that 
some were instigated by the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), which by 
then was at the forefront of worker agitation in Australia. Perhaps one of the 
most significant strikes in this period was the 1955 Vatukoula gold miners’ 
strike, because it manifested a growing contradiction between communalism 
and working-class consciousness. Although miners lived and were organised 
along provincial lines in the mining town, the exploitative conditions of the 
work made it a necessity to seek new principles of social action. Despite pleas 
from four high-ranking chiefs, together with the Commissioner of Labour and 
District Commissioner, the strike went ahead and the arbitration ruled in the 
strikers' favour. Perhaps the most important class-based resistance was the first 
ever multi-racial strike in 1959 against European employers and the colonial 
state, which was seen as evidence of a growing class alliance between the Indo-
Fijian and indigenous Fijian proletariats (Sutherland 1993). The strike led to 
street riots in which European shops were targeted.
Some of the strikes in the 1960s were directly linked to the demand for 
independence, particularly by Indo-Fijians. To strengthen their political cause, 
the militant cane growers’ unions formed the Federation Party (FP). In a show 
of defiance, the members of the FP walked out of the Legislative Council in 1967 
to show their support for a “common roll” (one person one vote) as opposed to 
“communal roll” (voting for one's own ethnic representative). The communal 
roll was generally preferred by the indigenous Fijians because it complemented 
the Fijian Administration communal organisation in ‘protecting’ indigenous 
Fijian interests (Ali 1982). 
There were dramatic changes in the 1960s as part of the transition towards 
independence. The franchise was extended to indigenous Fijians (although only 
partially) for the first time in 1961, and further constitutional changes took place 
in succession in 1964 and 1965 to allow for greater electoral representation. In 
1966 the first full election took place with both common and communal rolls. 
The distribution of seats, shown in Table 2.5, shows that of the 34 elected 
members of the Legislative Council, there were 12 Indo-Fijians 1, 2 indigenous 
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Fijians and 10 Europeans. The population distribution of 42% indigenous 
Fijians, 51% Indo-Fijians and 4% Europeans meant that Europeans were much 
over-represented vis-a-vis other ethnic groups.      
Table 2.5 Seat distribution of Legislative Council 1966    
Voters Communal Seats Cross voting Seats Total
Indigenous Fijian 9 3 12
Indo-Fijian 9 3 12
General Voter (European and 
Part-European)
7 3 10
Total Elected 25 9 34
Elected by Great Council of Chiefs - - 2
Nominated by Governor - - 4
Total 40
Source: Ali 1982.
Indigenous Fijians were granted the franchise for the first time in 1963. The 
1965 Constitution incorporated Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders into the 
Fijian roll. Although voting was not entirely on the basis of the communal 
roll, the extensive use of ethnic discourse and mobilization during the election 
campaigns further reinforced communalism at the local level.9 Communalism at 
the national level, through the communal franchise, acted as the legitimising 
framework for communal mobilisation at the local level. A universal franchise 
did not undermine communalism, rather it merely reinforced it. 
The year 1966 was also important because it was then that the Fijian Association 
became a prominent electoral force. It later became the dominant group within 
the Alliance Party, the umbrella organisation that also incorporated the Indian 
Alliance (for Indo-Fijians) and General Electors’ Association (for Europeans, 
part-Europeans, Chinese and Pacific Islanders). Despite its “multi-racial” 
rhetoric and organisation, the Alliance Party became closely identified with the 
Fijian Administration and communal and chiefly hegemony.
Perhaps one of the most significant changes in the 1960s was the gradual 
relaxation of the rigid native policy rules. That relaxation was led by Dr Rusiate 
9 At this stage we need to distinguish between the ‘communal’ and the ‘common’ franchise. The concept 
of communal franchise referred to various ethnic categories voting only for representatives within their 
communal constituencies. The common roll franchise allowed everyone to vote for candidates from other 
ethnic categories. Communal franchise, a British colonial legacy, was first introduced for Europeans in 1904, 
and later extended to Indians in 1929 and eventually to Fijians in 1963. It assumed that stability was possible 
by allowing colonised people a small parliamentary political space within which they could articulate their 
frustrations, without having to resort to extra-legal means. It was believed that ‘communal safeguards’ would 
help to reinforce ‘national safeguards’. The communal franchise system encapsulated ethnic separation and 
helped make ethnic hegemony, especially the paramountcy of Fijian interest, an entrenched part of the 
political culture.  
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Nayacakalou, the leading indigenous Fijian scholar at the time. The thrust of the 
reform was based on Nayacakalou’s perception that greater liberalization was 
important for adaptation to modern realities (Nayacakalou 1975). There was a 
general feeling that Fijians needed to be emancipated from the control of the Fijian 
Regulations and central authority. This emancipation was part of the gradual 
opening up process to introduce indigenous Fijians into democratic politics and 
more individualistic living. At one level, social and political liberalisation was 
taking place, but at another, this was not so. Although the native regulations 
were lifted, and legally imposed and communal mobilisation was no longer the 
norm, communal institutions still existed in the form of the Great Council of 
Chiefs, Fijian Affairs Board, Native Land Trust Board, Fijian Development Fund 
and a number of pieces of legislation. Importantly, after almost half a century 
of coerced conformity, communalism had become an entrenched component of 
mainstream indigenous Fijian social psyche. It continued to be the social basis 
for mobilisation in politics and economic development. 
By 1969 independence was inevitable and negotiations over parliamentary 
representation started between the two major political parties, the National 
Federation Party [NFP] (representing the Indo-Fijians) and the Alliance Party 
(representing the indigenous Fijians and ‘Others’ category). The Alliance Party 
insisted on protection of indigenous Fijian communal interests. To safeguard 
this it was important to create a fine balance between the communal franchise 
on the one hand and the common franchise on the other. The result was an 
independence constitution which provided for a delicate ethnic balance by 
allocating 22 seats to indigenous Fijians, 22 to Indians and 8 to the General 
voters. Of these, 27 were classed as communal seats (12 Fijians 12 Indo-Fijian 
and 3 General Electors), and 25 were reserved ethnic seats in common-roll 
electorates.10 The seat allocation was intended to draw a balance between the 
changing demographic pattern and the need to maintain the “paramountcy of 
Fijian interest”. Although Indo-Fijians made up 51% and indigenous Fijians 
only 43% of the population in 1969 and 1970, it was felt that there was a need 
to keep a political ‘balance’ through recognition of the special interests of 
indigenous Fijians.
The 1970 Constitution was the result of accommodation among elites, where 
leaders of the various communities bargained their way to an eventual 
consociationalist solution. Interestingly, the Malaysian consociationalist model 
in the form of the Malaysian Alliance, consisting of political parties representing 
different ethnic communities, was seen as a possible model for Fiji. In fact the 
Malaysian Alliance Party, which later became a national umbrella political 
organization, was the model for the Alliance Party in Fiji. The optimism for 
10 Under the 1970 Constitution, the Fiji electoral system was quite complex. Voters had to vote on four 
separate ballot papers altogether in the communal and national seats (Fiji Government, 1970).    
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the Malaysian model was thwarted after the May 1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia, 
which revealed some of the fundamental contradictions and weaknesses of the 
Malaysian consociationalist approach. 
Despite provision for a universal franchise, first given in 1963, the independence 
constitution still perpetuated communalism through various ‘protective’ 
mechanisms in order to ensure the paramountcy of Fijian interests. Amongst 
these were legislation to preserve the inalienability of native land, provisions 
for institutional prominence of the Fijian Administration and provisions for 
the communal franchise. Thus communalism at the political level also found 
expression at the grassroots in terms of development initiatives and other forms 
of social organisation.        
Conclusion: Effects of the colonial native 
policy on the indigenous Fijian community
The native policy transformed the indigenous Fijian community in significant 
ways. At the cultural level it helped to shape a homogeneous collective ethnic 
identity. The Fijian Administration became the dominant institutional force 
around which indigenous Fijians defined their world view as a collective Taukei 
in relation to others. This homogeneous identity, crafted out of the diverse 
identities amongst the different tribes, later became institutionalised ‘officially’ 
in such institutions as the Fijian Affairs Board, Ministry of Fijian Affairs, Native 
Land Trust Board and even the 1970 and 1990 Constitutions. It also became the 
basis for political mobilisation and ethno-nationalism in later years (Norton, 
1994).
At the socio-economic level, the native policy locked indigenous Fijians into the 
village subsistence economy, and marginalised them in terms of the mainstream 
commercial arena, except as a source of seasonal cheap labour in the newly 
created plantations and as workers in the mines. Individual entrepreneurship 
was half-heartedly encouraged, although individuals were later allowed to 
pursue commercial farming on their galala, or individually leased communally 
owned land, on a limited basis. The lack of commercial and educational 
opportunities was a direct consequence of the restrictions deliberately imposed 
by the rigid communal system. When the restrictions were finally lifted in the 
1960s, indigenous Fijians found themselves at a disadvantage in terms of formal 
employment, commerce and education in relation to other ethnic groups. The 
indigenous elites saw greater economic and educational empowerment as an 
urgent priority even as Fiji was moving towards independence.        
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3. Politicized affirmative action: 
Independence in 1970 to the 1987 
military coup 
By the time of independence in 1970, Fiji was faced with a number of dilemmas. 
The first was how to create a collective national identity while maintaining 
distinctive cultural identities; the second was how to address indigenous Fijian 
development while ensuring an open market economy; and the third was how to 
consolidate a pluralistic parliamentary democracy while maintaining distinctive 
ethnic political rights through communally reserved parliamentary seats. 
Negotiating these sets of seemingly dichotomous variables required a political 
process which was ethno-politically sensitive, ideologically balanced and able 
to accommodate and ameliorate diverse and often antagonistic interests. 
Perhaps the most pressing issue was the question of indigenous Fijian 
development; and, in particular, how to articulate preferential development 
policies for indigenous Fijians while pursuing a multi-ethnic ideological stance 
and free market economy at the same time. The colonial economy had locked 
indigenous Fijians into the subsistence sector under the native policy and, in 
the process, had kept them outside mainstream commercial activities and higher 
education. By the time the rigid system was liberalized and indigenous Fijians 
were freed from the confinements of the native policies, they were suddenly 
awakened to the fact that economic and educational opportunities were being 
lost and other ethnic groups had done relatively well in relation to participation 
in the modern market economy. This bred multiple sentiments: the desire to 
fast track indigenous Fijian development and education, envy of other ethnic 
groups’ commercial success, demand for political empowerment to balance 
Indo-Fijian prowess in commerce and high expectation for the Alliance Party’s 
ability to drive indigenous Fijian development. This required not only strong 
and decisive leadership but also flexibility to be able to accommodate tension 
and negotiate differences. These were the major dilemmas faced by the Alliance 
Party under Mara after independence. To understand the complex dilemmas 
facing the Alliance and the contradictions of Alliance policies, a good place to 
start is to examine the party’s own structure and ideology.  
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The post-independence dominance of the 
Alliance Party 
While on the surface independent Fiji appeared peaceful, there were underlying 
fissures, which the leaders of the two major ethnic groups tried very hard to 
keep under wraps. A way of doing this was a consociational agreement to have 
a constitution which provided political balance between the ethnic groups. 
Apart from this the British had carefully nurtured an indigenous Fijian elite 
within the Alliance Party to take over political power upon independence. But 
the transition was not a simple matter. There were socio-economic and political 
complexities derived from the past that had to be addressed, in particular the 
ethnically divisive strategy of the colonial state as well as the issue of socio-
economic inequality and grievances.  
Dealing with the issue of economic redistribution would be a challenge for two 
reasons. Firstly, a culture of ethno-political competition over control of state 
power had been established, encouraged by an ethnically based party system in 
response to the constitutional provisions for communally reserved seats. Given 
this ethnicized political environment, any attempt to put in place pro-indigenous 
preferential policies was going to be met with stiff resistance, particularly by 
Indo-Fijians. The Alliance Party had to convince Indo-Fijians that affirmative 
action was good for ethnic relations. Secondly, the powerful European and 
Indo-Fijian business supporters of the Alliance Party needed to be convinced 
that redistributive policies through affirmative action were complementary and 
not adversarial to the ideology of multiracialism and would not threaten their 
economic and political interests. 
For the European, Chinese and Indo-Fijian business elites, the Alliance Party 
provided the political stability and security they needed. They saw the Alliance as 
the only political force to keep the agitating Indo-Fijian farmers and disgruntled 
indigenous nationalists under control. To the ordinary indigenous Fijians the 
Alliance Party, whose leadership was dominated by chiefs, encapsulated their 
socio-cultural and political identity as well as their socio-economic interests. 
To many ordinary Indo-Fijians, it was just another “Fijian” Party supported 
by only a few members of the Indian elite in the same way that the National 
Federation Party (NFP) was perceived by ordinary indigenous Fijians as just 
another “Indian” party supported by a handful of misplaced Fijians. Some more 
moderate Indo-Fijians saw the Alliance as the only political force which could 
run and sustain a multi-ethnic Fiji and protect Indo-Fijian interest in the face of 
competing ethno-political demands.
The Alliance Party’s multiracial philosophy was the brainchild of Mara, whose 
propensity towards racial inclusiveness was nurtured during his student days 
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at the Marist Brothers High School, a Catholic school and the first multi-racial 
school in Fiji. Most of the leading ethnic leaders of the Alliance government, 
consisting of indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians, Chinese and part-Europeans 
were old boys of the school. The “Marist Old Boy network” became a powerful 
political, social and economic force in Fiji over the years after independence.  
The structure of the Alliance Party was based on the post-independence Malaysian 
Alliance Party, which was a consociationalist arrangement incorporating three 
major political groups, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 
the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA). In a similar configuration, the Alliance Party consisted of the Fijian 
Association, Indian Alliance and General Electors Association (representing 
Europeans, part-Europeans, Chinese and Pacific Islanders).1 Ideologically, the 
Alliance Party advanced two seemingly contradictory principles: multi-racialism 
and communalism. While the notion of multi-racialism embraced pluralism, 
communalism emphasised ethnic compartmentalisation and the paramountcy of 
Fijian interests. Paradoxically, the two seemed mutually linked because multi-
racialism itself implied ethnic diversity, but this diversity was conceptualised 
in terms of ethnic distinctiveness. It was based on the ethnic pluralist notion of 
co-existence but distinctiveness and separation of cultures.
The main political power base of the Alliance Party was the Fijian Association, 
which was intimately linked with the institutions of the Fijian Administration, 
such as the Fijian Affairs Board, Native Land Trust Board and Great Council 
of Chiefs, and also the predominantly indigenous Fijian military. In other 
words, the Alliance Party was not only a political party in the ‘normal’ sense, 
but more than that, it acted as the ‘political arm’ of the chiefly establishment 
and indigenous Fijian communalism in the sphere of liberal democratic power 
politics. Through this, Alliance Party hegemony permeated various levels of the 
indigenous Fijian community, from the national parliamentary structure to the 
village level. It was a re-adaptation of the native policy, but now, instead of the 
colonial state, the Alliance government itself was the centripetal political force. 
This schema largely defined and reproduced the boundaries of indigenous Fijian 
political identity and loyalty both in the ‘traditional’ and liberal democratic 
sense. 
The Alliance cleverly used chiefly authority as an instrumentalist and 
ideological tool to legitimise and consolidate political leadership in the modern 
1 Although the Alliance Party proper was formed in 1966, the Fijian Association, the dominant group 
in the Alliance, was formed in 1956 to mobilise indigenous Fijian political support for the chiefly system 
and indigenous Fijian privileges. Ascribed chiefly leadership was regarded as legitimate and sacrosanct and 
could not be opposed. The Indian Alliance was started by small groups opposed to the National Federation 
Party. These were the Fiji National Congress, the Muslim Political Front, and the Muslim-based Fiji Minority 
Party. The General Electors Association was formed in 1966 to ensure greater effective participation of other 
minorities.      
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context. The convergence of traditional and modern politics was personified 
by the Alliance leader himself, Mara, who was groomed by Sukuna and the 
colonial state to take over political leadership upon independence. Mara, like 
Sukuna, was an Oxford graduate and a high chief. His colourful political career 
was characterised by his astute ability to utilise both his manoeuvring skills in 
modern power politics and the mythical mana of chiefly authority. His aloof and 
authoritarian style of leadership was resented by many, but to many indigenous 
Fijians it was a mark of divinely ordained chiefly rule. Mara was a complex 
leader who operated at the level of intellectual idealism and the pragmatism 
of realpolitik simultaneously. Despite his commitment to the ideals of multi-
racialism, he was also a great advocate of communalism because that was where 
his real political power base lay. The Alliance’s political ideology was based 
on this contradictory dualism; on the one hand the Alliance adhered to multi-
racialism to portray a universally acceptable political image and on the other 
hand it was pragmatically committed to the communalistic agenda, to mobilise 
indigenous Fijian support (Norton 1994). 
The Alliance fought and won the first post-independence General Election in 
1972 on the basis of this apparently contradictory philosophy by mobilising 
indigenous Fijian support using communal leverage and appealing to other 
ethnic groups through multi-racial rhetoric. The Alliance Party won a total of 
33 seats. This included all the indigenous Fijian and General Electors’ communal 
seats. The tally included 83 per cent of all indigenous Fijian votes, 79 per cent 
of General Elector votes and 24 per cent of Indo-Fijian votes. The NFP on the 
other hand won 19 seats, winning 75 per cent of all Indo-Fijian votes and two 
per cent of indigenous Fijian votes. Six of their indigenous Fijian candidates lost 
their deposits (Norton 1994).
In the 1970s some of the contradictions mentioned earlier began to surface. 
Some nationalistic indigenous Fijians began to criticise Mara for being too pro-
business, even pro-Indian, in order to maintain their support even at the cost 
of undermining indigenous interests. One of the critics of Mara was Sakeasi 
Butadroka, the then Assistant Minister for Commerce, Industry and Co-
operatives, who had spent time working in rural indigenous Fijian communities 
as a cooperative officer, and who accused the Alliance leaders of favouring 
Indo-Fijians and undermining indigenous Fijian interests. Butadroka’s fury was 
invoked by the revelation that an Indo-Fijian bus company was granted a licence 
ahead of the communally-owned bus company he was running in the Rewa 
Province. Butadroka was expelled by Mara from the Alliance Party in 1974 for 
his criticisms, and a year later in October 1975, he moved a motion in the House 
of Representatives that Indo-Fijians “be repatriated back to India and that their 
travelling expenses back home and compensation for their properties in the 
country be met by the British government” (Fiji, House of Representatives, 
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9 October 1975: 1104). The motion was not passed in its original form, as it 
was subsequently amended by Mara and the part relating to repatriation was 
deleted. The main thrust of the amended version thanked the Indo-Fijians for 
their contribution to Fiji. But the issue raised the fundamental question of socio-
economic parity, a central focus of this book.2 While the Alliance was fully 
aware of the issue of ethnic disparity, its approach was cautious, as it feared 
that an all-out affirmative action policy could antagonize both its Indo-Fijian 
supporters and the business community. 
Butadroka was to haunt Mara in the next five years when, during the 1977 
election, Butadroka polled an unprecedented 25% of the Fijian vote while the 
Indo-Fijian vote for the Alliance declined by 16%. The National Federation Party 
(NFP) won with a small majority and, for the first time, there was the possibility 
of an Indo-Fijian becoming Prime Minister. Of the total 52 seats, 24 were won 
by the Alliance Party, 26 by the NFP, 1 by Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party 
(FNP) and 1 by an independent. Interestingly, prior to this election, the Alliance 
government took a risk by implementing its 50-50 scholarship scheme, the first 
major educational affirmative action since independence. This meant that for all 
the government scholarships to the University of the South Pacific, 50% were 
to be for indigenous Fijians and 50% for other ethnic groups. This was strongly 
opposed by the Indo-Fijian community, who made up more than 50% of the Fiji 
population, and consequently that policy could have contributed to the decline 
in Indo-Fijian support for the Alliance Party. 
Nevertheless, the educational affirmative action policy turned out to be one of 
the most successful development strategies of the Alliance government because 
it opened the floodgates for hundreds of indigenous students who otherwise 
would not have been able to go to university because of their socio-economic 
position and because they had lower grades than their Indo-Fijian counterparts. 
This led to the expansion of a Fijian professional and middle class in a significant 
way within a span of ten to twenty years. 
From 1977 onwards the Alliance Party was targeted from both sides – from 
the indigenous Fijian nationalists, who thought that it was not doing enough 
for the indigenous people; and from the Indo-Fijians, who argued that it was 
biased against them. Moreover, the defeat of the Alliance Party during the first 
1977 election was a direct challenge to its multiracial ideology and its claim to 
be the guardian of indigenous Fijian interest. However, a few days after the 
defeat of the Alliance Party the Governor General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau (an 
indigenous Fijian high chief) re-appointed Mara as Prime Minister, despite his 
party controlling a minority of seats in parliament. This was done in the interest 
2 Butadroka, as a civil servant, had worked in the Co-operative Department and through his job he had first-
hand experience of the socio-economic situation of indigenous Fijians in the rural areas.   
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of security and also because Mara commanded the respect of the house more 
than did Siddiq Koya, a Muslim and disputed leader of the NFP. The NFP was 
embroiled in an internal leadership crisis between Hindu-led and Muslim-led 
factions.3 
Mara’s minority government ruled for a mere five months before it was brought 
down by a vote of no confidence and fresh elections were called in September. 
The power struggle within the NFP had factionalised the party, and the Alliance 
Party won a resounding victory, taking 36 seats to the NFP’s 15. The FNP failed 
to win a seat this time around and an independent candidate managed to win 
one seat. The FNP’s significant losses were partly due to the imprisonment of its 
leader, Sakeasi Butadroka, for making statements “which were likely to incite 
racial antagonism and were therefore likely to prejudice public peace” (Fiji 
Sun, 16 September 1977). It could also be deduced that indigenous Fijians had 
“learnt” from the loss of the Alliance Party during the 1977 election, and were 
not prepared to see another politically costly split within their ranks that would 
lead to Indo-Fijians coming to power. 
In the 1982 election the ethnic electoral pattern became more explicit, with 
84.1% of Indo-Fijians voting for the NFP, and 85.6% of indigenous-Fijians 
voting for the Alliance.4 But the economic conditions of the 1980s and the hard-
line Alliance response to those conditions increasingly brought into question 
the legitimacy of Alliance hegemony. In the 1987 election the Alliance Party 
was defeated.  
Alliance Party affirmative action policies 
As a party which espoused multiracialism, the Alliance Party was faced with a 
number of obstacles as far as its affirmative action policies were concerned. First 
was political opposition from the Indo-Fijian community, which felt that the 
3 With hindsight, it had been suggested by some that the action of the Governor General, in choosing Mara 
as Prime Minister, probably diffused a potential coup. Later in 1987, General Rabuka, who staged the 1987 
military coups, said that when the Alliance Party lost the election in 1977, he was anticipating a possible 
military coup attempt.
4 The 1982 election was marred by allegations of foreign intervention and dirty politics. Desperate to win 
the election and avoid a repetition of the 1977 scenario, the Alliance Party hired Australian consultants to do 
research on the political situation in Fiji and to make recommendations as to the best election strategy. Two 
strategies in particular caused political controversy, leading to an official inquiry. These were: “to bribe the 
leader of one opposing political party; and to manipulate the criminal justice system to prevent the leader of 
another party from going forward as a candidate” (Wilkinson 1983: 9). The preoccupation with ethnic politics 
from independence to the 1980s had two interrelated effects; first, it helped to undermine the significance of 
class politics; and second, it increasingly caused “ethnicity fatigue” amongst grassroots voters. The ethnic 
hegemonic veil was beginning to wear thin as socio-economic conditions worsened. The Alliance Party was 
increasingly been seen as the party of the chiefs and the rich. This class opposition was to later emerge and 
make historical inroads into national politics, via the formation of the Fiji Labour Party.
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preferential program was unfair to them. Second was the tactical and ideological 
problem of projecting affirmative action as a political necessity to address ethnic 
tension and hopefully tone down opposition. The third problem was whether 
indigenous Fijians were adaptable enough and ready to take full advantage of 
new opportunities, given that it was only as recently as 1966 that they were, 
for the first time, given full freedom of movement after being locked into the 
subsistence sector through the Native Regulations for much of the colonial 
period. The fourth obstacle was the logistical problems of implementing 
affirmative action.  
The leaders of the Alliance Party were high officials in the colonial state, 
including Economic Development Officers, as we saw in the last chapter. They 
transferred the development thinking and practice they were used to during 
the colonial era as the basis for the post-independence indigenous development 
paradigm. As part of its developmental strategy, the Alliance government 
helped to perpetuate in the minds of indigenous Fijians a number of colonially-
nurtured modernist ideologies that were to define the future trajectories of 
thinking on the subject of development for indigenous Fijians. These ideologies 
were toso ki liu (to move forward or progress) and veivakatorocaketaki (to uplift 
or develop). Both were based on the modernizationist ideological assumption 
that village life represented the old and archaic past and western economic 
values embedded in veivakatorocaketaki were to be embraced. The British were 
seen as agents of cultural enlightenment and British civilization, through the 
vosa vakavalagi (English language) and i tovo vakavavalagi (British or European 
culture), was perceived as the standard by which toso ki liu must be measured. 
Affirmative action for indigenous Fijians was articulated under the notion of 
veivakatorocaketake ni i taukei (Fijian development). 
The concept of Fijian development encapsulated the vakasama vou (new 
or western ideas) which required vuli vakavalagi (western education) and 
vakasama vakavalagi (European thinking). The paternalistic British colonial 
hegemony had constructed an epistemological stratification which elevated 
British and European thinking and marginalized the indigenous Fijian world 
view in a way which undermined the sense of self-worth of indigenous Fijians. 
Whereas Indo-Fijians had a negative perception of the British, the British were 
seen by indigenous Fijians not as colonial oppressors but as agents of cultural 
enlightenment and political guarantors that would keep potential Indo-Fijian 
political ambitions in check. This reinforced British hegemony as well as 
strengthening the power of chiefs, who acted as the comprador class and as 
mediators of British hegemony. By the time of independence, unlike in other 
former colonies, there was no celebratory spirit but rather a sense of sadness 
amongst indigenous Fijians as the Union Jack was lowered. However, indigenous 
Politics of preferential development
38
Fijians had to come to terms with the new reality and the new buzzword was 
veivakatorocaketaki, which was believed to be the vehicle to catapult indigenous 
Fijians into the future.
Over time the meaning of veivakatorocaketaki was enlarged to include a number 
of variables such as the transformation of village life towards self-help, the 
building of infrastructure such as roads, seawalls, bridges and wharves and even 
the building of community halls, churches, chiefs’ houses and church ministers’ 
houses. It also included migration from rural to urban life and acquisition of 
European goods and various cultural traits. The degree of Europeaness defined 
the degree of tosokokiliu. Unfortunately, this unilinear developmental thinking, 
reinforced and encouraged by both the colonial and post-colonial states and 
embedded in post-colonial thinking about affirmative action, failed to capture 
the complexities of Fijian society in the global context; nor did it capture the 
complex cultural dynamics of the indigenous Fijian community and its basic 
needs. This led to failure of many post-colonial affirmative action policies, as we 
shall see later. 
The term veivakatorocaketaki also embodied the indigenous Fijian perception 
of other ethnic groups. They saw themselves as located at the bottom of the 
economic heap compared to Indo-Fijian, Chinese and Europeans, who were 
seen as vutuniyau (affluent) and torocake vakailavo (developed). The perceived 
driving force for the torocake (progress) of other ethnic groups was based on 
both negative and positive stereotypes relating to assumed primordial ethno-
cultural characteristics. For instance, at one level Indo-Fijians were perceived as 
viavia levu (disrespectful) and kocokoco (selfish), yet at another level they were 
considered daucakacaka (hardworking) and gugumatua (full of perseverance). 
The Chinese were often associated with business and were perceived as mamaqi 
(miserly) and lawakica (cunning), yet intelligent and more trustworthy than 
Indo-Fijians. The Europeans were perceived as dau ni veivakararamataki or 
bearers of civilization, development and modernity but were also capable of 
incalculable evil through their vuku (intelligence). 
Understanding these epistemological realities is important in examining 
perceptions of development amongst indigenous Fijians and how these views 
shaped affirmative action policies before and after independence. However, 
let us not forget that the Alliance Party had been in power since the election 
under the first universal suffrage in 1966, even before independence in 1970; 
and many Alliance Party affirmative action policies since independence were 
a continuation of policies from the pre-independence era. Mara, as a senior 
civil servant during the colonial era who had worked in many rural areas, 
was passionate about indigenous Fijian development. To him, future political 
harmony and stability in Fiji lay in getting indigenous Fijians on the path to 
economic development. 
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In 1960 the government put into place a development plan for the coming 
five years, with a heavy emphasis on communications and agriculture. The 
underlying intention “was clearly to boost economic growth in the Fijian 
sector of the economy, as a means of reducing racial tensions and as a necessary 
condition for ultimate political independence” (Bayliss-Smith and Haynes 1988: 
129). In 1965 Development Plan 5, 1966-1970 (DP5) was put in place. Its focus 
was on growth, with a shift from the emphasis on public sector capital as in 
previous years. At the same time, there was a relaxation of the rigid Fijian 
regulations, and the galala plantation system was enthusiastically encouraged 
in order to create a new society of indigenous Fijian peasants who were market 
oriented and free from restrictive communal obligations. Earlier in 1961 the 
Land Development Authority (LDA) was established to administer and finance 
a new land development scheme (Burns 1963).5 This scheme was described by 
Watters thus:
Here clearly, is the type of institution needed to promote the settlement 
of interior pockets of land by Fijians and others as independent farmers 
on secure tenancies. If such institutions can avoid the twin dangers of 
excessive paternalism and bureaucracy and their planning is technically 
sound, they could play a crucial role in rural development and accelerate 
the rate of social change in Fijian society (Watters 1969: 274).    
The emphasis here was to mainstream affirmative action into the government’s 
development plan. This was logistically effective because state resources could 
be easily “diverted” to indigenous Fijian rural projects through a national 
development framework; and it was politically clever because as part of the 
national economic plan it would not be seen as a separate indigenous Fijian 
project which would attract political flak. The idea of mainstreaming also 
related to the belief that progress involved rural-based indigenous Fijians 
being assimilated into the mainstream market economy. This notion was based 
on modernization discourse about the teleological path of development from 
traditional/rural to market/modern conditions. 
About 500 new farmers were resettled by the LDA in 1964, mostly in Lomaivuna, 
on the main island of Viti Levu. This number doubled in 1965, and in 1967, as 
Watters (1969) recorded, 5140 new farms were created along new feeder roads, 
occupying a total area of 40,000 hectares. The Lomaivuna scheme involved 
commercial banana cultivation, while a scheme on the island of Taveuni targeted 
cocoa production. In less than a decade after it started, “this ambitious program 
5 This is very similar to the Federal Land Development Agency (FELDA) in Malaysia to resettle Malays in 
rural areas for large scale agricultural production as we will see later. 
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quickly failed and collapsed altogether” (Brookfield 1979:  36). Just before 
independence in 1970, the LDA was abolished and its responsibilities were 
taken over by various government departments. 
The failure of the LDA scheme was attributed to “falling yields, disease and 
hurricane damage” (Bayliss-Smith and Hayes 1988: 129).6 The reasons for “falling 
yields” were linked simplistically to “communal obligations” (Bayliss-Smith and 
Haynes 1988: 130). Relocation from strict communal village life to independent 
entrepreneurial farming constituted a major social and psychological transition. 
In most cases, the new settlers recreated new communal kinship, based on 
families being from the same provinces or on other forms of traditional links.7 
In addition, many settlers saw their cash income as a way of meeting their 
communal obligations (communal fund-raising, provincial taxes, church levies, 
marriages, deaths etc.) back in their villages. This put pressure on many of them 
and greatly undermined their ability to accumulate wealth. 
However, putting the blame purely on “culture” tends to over-simplify the 
process of transformation from subsistence life to the market economy. The 
“culture failure” theory prevalent amongst some economists (e.g. Ron Duncan 
2007) argues from the neoliberal perspective that indigenous culture and 
entrepreneurship are incompatible and the former needs to be discarded if the 
latter is to survive. This view fails to appreciate the vast potential of indigenous 
culture in promoting entrepreneurial gains, as evident in many case studies in 
Fiji (Qalo 1997; Kingi 2006). The problem was not so much traditional culture 
as such but the lack of a process being in place to enhance entrepreneurial 
interests using both indigenous culture and market values in a mutually 
innovative way to enhance productivity. It has been proven that the two can 
co-exist, with one reinforcing rather than undermining the other, and there 
have been some amazing success stories of indigenous Fijian business which 
neoliberals have chosen to ignore. A model which revolved around enhancing 
the human capacity of the community for productivity rather than simply a 
capacity to serve the market could have worked. 
Over the years, some indigenous Fijian businesses have done well by 
enhancing the capacity for production. To blame culture can unfortunately 
be interpreted by some as blaming an entire ethno-cultural group; and in the 
modern multicultural world to blame culture can be construed as dogmatic and 
ethnocentric. Nevertheless, the collapse of the LDA as an institutional enterprise 
did not necessarily mean the failure of the entire process because many of the 
6 The establishment cost by the government was high, averaging £1,200. This included the cost of land 
clearance and planting, feeder roads and electricity supply. In addition to this was the cost of personal loans 
to settlers, most of which were never repaid (Ward 1965: 182-186).
7 Many of the settlers were from distant islands and provinces outside the places where the LDA schemes 
were located.
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farmers, through government encouragement, remained as root crop, vegetable 
and yaqona farmers in a semi-subsistence way. Because many of the farmers 
were from the small islands such as those of the Lau Group, some of them saw 
the scheme not primarily as a money-making enterprise but as a chance to 
migrate from the small islands to Vitilevu, where educational and employment 
opportunities were available. 
Towards the mid-1970s, as the euphoria of independence subsided, the 
government had to be seen to be committed to both national growth and 
indigenous development. There was demand for economic growth and import 
substitution and amongst the indigenous Fijian community the notion of 
veivakatorocaketakini i Taukei (Fijian development) was gaining currency 
within the rural communities and Fijian institutions. This idea was encapsulated 
Development Plan 6 (DP6) in 1970, which was strongly influenced by the 
Malaysian affirmative action plan in the form of the New Economic Policies 
(NEP), and which aimed to “improve distribution of incomes, including bridging 
of rural/urban and inter-ethnic disparities.” (Quoted in Fiji Central Planning 
Office 1980: 4). DP6 emphasised “rural development”, especially industries in 
which indigenous Fijians were most likely to be involved. By and large, rural 
development was associated with indigenous development, an approach based 
on the modernizationist notion of transformation of subsistence life into the 
market economy. This did not apply strictly to Indo-Fijians because, although 
most were rural-based, as sugar cane farmers, their lives revolved around the 
sugar industry and they were thus already mainstreamed into the market 
economy, although as poor cane producers. The rural development projects 
included pine planting, the Seaqaqa sugar cane project for indigenous Fijians 
and cattle projects in Uluisauvou and Yalalevu, both on the main island of Viti 
Levu. These rural development projects were continued by Development Plan 
7 (1976-1980) (DP7), which emphasised expansion and redistribution. The 
affirmative action intent of DP7 is summed up in one of its objectives thus: 
The main beneficiaries of policies aimed at achieving more equitable distribution 
of income and wealth will be the rural population generally and the Fijian 
population in particular. Powerful economic forces have tended to concentrate 
economic activity and hence prosperity in the urban centres – especially Suva 
and Lautoka. This concentration has tended to perpetuate existing business and 
commercial specialization along ethnic lines. A major objective in the Seventh 
Plan period and beyond will be to decentralize economic activity by location 
and broaden involvement by race and to enhance opportunities, material living 
standards and the social and cultural amenities of the rural areas (Fiji Central 
Planning Office 1975: 5). 
This development strategy, which attempted to change the close structural 
association between ethnicity and socio-economic status or class, was borrowed 
Politics of preferential development
42
directly from the Malaysian NEP. But unlike the Malaysian NEP, which was a 
massive social engineering undertaking involving politically-driven structural 
reconfiguration, the Fiji development strategy was a much softer program that 
operated purely at the policy level. Development Plan 8, 1981-85 (DP8) toned 
down the Fijian development strategy and focused more on diversification, 
generalized equity, self-help and the promotion of national unity. This was an 
interesting shift because, while the principles of equity and national unity were 
promoted, the ethnic factor was not made explicit, although it was assumed 
implicitly in the Plan’s objectives. Diversification was to take the risky burden 
away from the Indo-Fijian-dominated sugar monoculture which, during the five 
years from 1975 to 1980, increased production by over 55%. Between 1970 and 
1980 the contribution of sugar and its by-products to domestic exports rose 
from 66% to 81%; the share of sugar’s contribution to GDP rose from 12% 
to 16%; and sugar’s contribution to employment rose from less than 18% to 
over 22% of jobs (DP8 1980).8 The Plan’s emphasis was on primary industries 
because of the perception that indigenous Fijians were more at home with the 
land. 
There was also the view that, given the preponderance of Indo-Fijians in the 
sugar cane farming sector, indigenous Fijians could learn agricultural skills 
and do equally well either in cane or other areas of farming. The idea was 
to transform the indigenous Fijian culture of communal subsistence into the 
competitive world of a market economy. This was assumed to be the secret of 
socio-economic progress and growth. Development Plan 9, 1986-1990 (DP9) 
totally de-ethnicized the development framework, with the main focus on “real 
economic growth” (Fiji Central Planning Office 1985: 8). This was the period 
of global recession caused by the oil shock, and structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs) were being introduced into Fiji.
Some indigenous Fijian rural development projects 
While the Development Plans provided the macro-framework for socio-
economic development, there was effort at the ground level to make indigenous 
Fijian development work, despite overwhelming odds. Some of these efforts 
8 Development Plan 8 emphasised the need for more exports, as well as the expansion of domestic production 
as a part of the import substitution policy. Large-scale agricultural enterprises were encouraged with the 
direct involvement of a number of actors: private corporations; the Native Land Development Corporation; 
the government in co-operation with the landowners; groups of small holders, and groups of small holders 
organised into larger units. A key aspect of this participation was the involvement of the indigenous Fijians 
to ensure that they were able to ‘free up’ their land for development purposes. The involvement of the 
indigenous Fijians was intended to ensure that some of their land would be opened up for cultivation and also 
to have them directly involved in cultivation and management themselves. 
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were the Seaqaqa Sugar Cane Scheme (SSCS), the Yalavou Beef Scheme (YBS), 
the Native Land Development Corporation (NLDC) and the Farm Management 
Development Co-operative Association (FMCA). 
The SSCS project started in 1974 through a loan from the World Bank. Initially 
it was part of an attempt to integrate smallholders into large projects as a way 
of improving the distribution of income to rural areas and decreasing the high 
rate of failure amongst individual farms. Undeveloped native land was opened 
up and subdivided to settle about 802 farmers, both indigenous Fijians and 
Indo-Fijians. Because of the government’s intention for greater participation 
by indigenous Fijians in the sugar industry, 448 indigenous Fijians, compared 
to 339 Indo-Fijians, were selected for the scheme. The Fiji Development Bank 
(FDB) provided loans to individual farmers. The scheme was under the overall 
supervision and management of the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC), which 
provided technical support and which set the demanding target of 200,000 tons 
of cane to be harvested by 1980. This target was surpassed by 50% and the 
SSCS was hailed as an exemplary success. However, the predominance of sugar 
as a monoculture was contrary to the World Bank’s expectation there would be 
mixed cropping: 
In addition to sugar cane, each farm is being planted with about 1 ac of 
mixed citrus and 0.1 ac of pineapples for the local market. Subsistence 
rice, root crops and vegetables would be grown on small plots... (World 
Bank 1976: 8). 
The scale of the Seaqaqa scheme relative to Fiji’s economy was indeed a massive 
undertaking which amounted to at least 10% of all government expenditure on 
economic services in the late 1970s. The loans by the FDB to the settlers within 
the same period accounted for 30% of the total agricultural loans portfolio (Fiji 
Bureau of Statistics 1983: 32). 
One of the major concerns about the scheme was the relatively low performance 
of indigenous Fijian farmers compared to their Indo-Fijian counter-parts (Young 
and Gunasekera 1985). For instance, in 1981, a higher proportion of indigenous 
Fijians failed to produce enough cane to cover the credit allowance provided 
by the Fiji Sugar Corporation at the beginning of the season to cover input 
costs. The credit allowance, referred to as the Farm Basic Allowance (FBA), was 
calculated in terms of the amount of land the farmer had prepared and made 
ready for planting, and was expressed in terms of the anticipated production of 
cane to be delivered to the sugar mill in Labasa. Of all the Seaqaqa farmers, only 
53% managed to meet their FBA repayments. Of the successful farmers, 32% 
were indigenous Fijians and 78% were Indo-Fijians (Young and Gunasekera 
1985). Moreover, the reasons given were: 
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Native Fijians were less interested participants and had to be actively 
recruited from the very beginning. They also suffered numerous failures 
as individuals, and more than two-thirds of all Native Fijians in the project 
did not meet their production quotas. Relatively poor entrepreneurial 
performance by Native Fijians is a phenomenon that has been noted 
consistently for decades. This is related to lack of knowledge about the 
capitalist economy and the pull of village communal obligations in using 
up their time and resources (Young and Gunasekera 1985: 10).      
Although the observations above tend to be over simplistic, they do raise an 
important question regarding the inability of policy planners, most of whom 
were trained in mainstream economics, to create a model which allowed for 
mutual cross-fertilization between communal culture and entrepreneurship. 
The major strategy they used was to parachute subsistence indigenous Fijian 
farmers drawn from villages into the middle of the cash economy and hope 
that they survived through self-adaptation and even miracle. Indigenous Fijian 
farmers who settled on Seaqaqa maintained strong links with their original 
communities. They organised themselves into groups along provincial lines 
and there were expectations by their koro, yasana and relatives to contribute 
to communal fund-raising. Often there were psychological sanctions against 
non-commitment to these obligations in the form of allegations of being anti-
vanua. Some indigenous Fijian farmers who could not cope sold their farms to 
Indo-Fijian farmers. To many of these indigenous Fijians, commercial farming 
life was a mere diversion from their less stressful semi-subsistence life in the 
village which they could always go back to, while for Indo-Fijian farmers, sugar 
cane farm life was all they had and they had to work hard to maintain it. This 
also accounted for the different attitudes and different levels of success in cane 
farming between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijian farmers. 
Another significant factor about the Seaqaqa scheme was the mobilisation of 
communal labour for cane harvesting. Most of the cane cutters were recruited 
from villages in various provinces by the provincial councils to provide income, 
not for themselves, but for their Provincial Councils. Of the total number of cane 
cutters during the 1982 season, 1,988 (86.7%) were indigenous Fijians and 265 
(13.3%) were Indo-Fijians. In terms of regional distribution, 70% were from the 
Northern Division; 26.8% were from the Eastern Division and 3.3% were from 
the Central Division. The workers received FJ$5 a day gross, but for those who 
were part of communal groups, “communal savings schemes absorbed a high 
proportion of this wage” (Bayliss-Smith and Haynes 1988:140). 
The exploitative character of communally-organised labour was well illustrated 
by the case of the workers from Lau Province. A total of 236 were recruited by 
the Lau Provincial Council for the 1982 season. Transport was provided free for 
the islanders, who came from seven small islands in the province. The recruits 
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came from the islands of Moala (3 villages), Vanuabalavu (3 villages), Kabara 
(1 village), Nayau (2 villages), Cicia (3 villages), Ono (1 village) and Matuku (1 
village). As Table 3.1 shows, their gross pay averaged FJ$1.46 per person/day 
for the five-month season. Almost half of the wages went to living expenses and 
contributions to communal schemes, leaving FJ$0.83 for the cutters themselves. 
For the whole season, each of the 14 villages from which the workers originated 
gained on average FJ$727 in communal savings and only FJ$127 net for each 
worker. In other words, only 15% of the total amount of cash went to the 
individual workers and 85% went to the vanua (community).   
Table 3.1 Gross and net pay of Lau Islanders recruited by Lau Provincial 
Council to cut cane at Seaqaqa, 1982 Season (FJ$)     
Month (number










June (236) 7,940 2,260 2,260 3,420 14.50
July (236) 9,019 260 2,260 4,499 19.06
August (192) 9,139 1,510 1,870 5,759 30.00
September (193) 11,753 2,240 1,880 7,633 39.55
October (193) 9,102 1,910 1,910 5,282 27.37
Season’s Total 46,953 10,180 10,180 26,593 25 .33
Av.(per person) 1.46 (daily) 0.32 (daily) 727 (season) 0.83 (daily) 127 (season)
Source: Lau Provincial Council, Lau 21/45 Cane Cutting, File in District Office, Lakeba.
The distribution of income between the individual and the village community, as 
shown in the table above, clearly illustrates the point that communal obligations 
for cane workers were paramount over their individual accumulation. This 
was not so much due to the culture of the workers but to the way they were 
organized and the hegemonic institutional arrangement they worked under. 
The Lau Provincial Council was responsible for the entire logistical operation 
including recruitment, travel, work organization and allocation of pay. The 
Chairman of the Lau Provincial Council was Mara, the paramount chief of Lau 
and who was himself the Prime Minister and leader of the Alliance Party. Mara 
himself owned a cane farm in Seaqaqa and the use of cheap communal labour 
directly benefited him. 
Thus the case of Seaqaqa, one of the Alliance government’s flagship development 
projects as a form of affirmative action for indigenous Fijians, was one of the 
rare opportunities for indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian farmers to work side 
by side. While there was trans-ethnic engagement at one level on the farms, 
there was also the familiar communal segregation at another level. For instance, 
a separate farmers’ association for indigenous Fijians, called the Seaqaqa 
Fijian Co-operative Society (SFCS) was set up and became the basis for their 
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commercial solidarity. The formation of the SFCS was based on the assumption 
that as indigenous Fijians were new to commercial farming, it was prudent to 
form a co-operative, something rural indigenous Fijians were used to, to provide 
them with the necessary organizational, social and psychological support in a 
regimented farming environment. It exemplified the ambitious pursuit of the 
political imperative of Fijian development that relied on the deployment of a 
communal strategy to advance indigenous Fijian interests in a market economy. 
As far as indigenous Fijian farmers were concerned, the Seaqaqa scheme was a 
mixed success. While there were failures, there were also success stories; but in 
the national scheme of things, indigenous Fijians were still in the minority as far 
as sugar production was concerned. Despite the Seaqaqa scheme, the proportion 
of sugar produced by indigenous Fijians remained stagnant. As Table 3.2 shows, 
in 1989 Indo-Fijians produced FJ$161.91 million (95%) worth of sugar while 
indigenous Fijians produced only FJ$25 million (0.5%). In 1993 the production 
figures were FJ$156.99 million (86%) for Indo-Fijians and FJ$22 million (0.5%) 
for indigenous Fijians (Fiji Sugar Corporation 1994). 
Table 3.2 Sugar production by ethnicity, 1989-1993
Indo-Fijian Indigenous Fijian Others Total
Value (FJ$m) Value (FJ$m) Value (FJ$m) Value (FJ$m)
1989 161.91 25.27 3 .34 190.52
1990 142.59 19.94 3 .31 165.84
1991 144 .14 23.05 4.82 172.02
1992 164 .15 24 .26 5.86 194.26
1993 156.99 22.81 2.19 182.01
Source: Fiji Sugar Corporation Industrial Statistics.
A common development strategy used in the 1970s and 1980s was the formation 
of producer co-operatives. In Chapter 2 we saw that one of the drawbacks of the 
co-operative society was the misconception that communal labour under the 
Fijian Regulations was compatible with co-operative society principles. This 
misconception continued into the post-colonial era. Thus Development Plan 7 
of 1975 emphasised the formation of producer co-operatives to stimulate cash 
cropping as a tool of development policy for indigenous Fijians (Fiji Central 
Planning Office 1975). Thus one of the major initiatives was the setting up of the 
Farm Management Co-operative Association (FMCA) in 1978 with the support of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Co-operatives and the Ministry of Fijian 
Affairs and Rural Development. The objectives of the FMCA were along the lines 
of the strategic thrust of national agricultural development in Development Plan 
8, which were: to provide management services to indigenous Fijian landowners 
who wished to pursue commercial development of their land; to ensure that 
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land was developed on a sound commercial basis and was used in accordance 
with proper principles of land utilisation; to provide a training ground for 
indigenous Fijian land owners and young farm managers in agricultural and 
management skills; and to provide income for the indigenous Fijian land owners 
and employment for people living in rural areas (Fiji Central Planning Office 
1980). The FDB provided capital support and financial management advice. 
The FMCA scheme had mixed success. Its initial and main project, the Tailevu 
Dairy Co-operative, ended up accumulating debts and other projects too went 
the same way and had to struggle to survive. The ‘failure’ has been attributed 
to:
...a lack of focus of responsibility in the Native Fijian communal 
system, unskilled management, lack of financial accountability, and 
the subdivision of land into blocks that were farmed individually. The 
failure rate amongst Native Fijian block-holders was high as they lost 
interest in going it alone and went back to their villages (Young and 
Gunasekera 1982: 13).9 
The communal tendency of indigenous Fijians has again been blamed as a major 
hindrance to accumulation. Of a similar scheme in Lovoni, Ovalau Island, Young 
(1984) noted that the ongoing power struggle between the village chief, who 
wanted political control of the co-operative, and the co-operative executives, 
who wanted to maintain a purely technocratic line of management, threatened 
to destroy the producer co-operative. Young also described how a co-operative 
farmer gave away six of his cows for a relative’s wedding, without expressing 
any feeling of loss. This act of “generosity” was (and is) common amongst 
indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs. While they were encouraged to accumulate, 
they were also encouraged, in fact psychologically coerced at times, to respond 
promptly and obediently to communal obligations. 
Another major project was the Yalavou Cattle Scheme (YBS), which was set up 
by the government in 1978 with Australian bilateral assistance of FJ$7 million. 
The mostly indigenous Fijian farmers were provided with 500-acre blocks in a 
62,000 acre area of native land near Sigatoka in the South-western region. The 
farmers were nominated by the landowning groups and were gradually settled 
on the allocated blocks. By 1982, there was a total of 86 farmers raising cattle 
and goats. Some of the problems encountered in Yalavou were very similar to the 
problems in Seaqaqa. But in Yalavou, most of the farmers were from surrounding 
9 However, there were other factors, such as the deregulation policies of the government in the 1980s, which 
saw the dramatic demise of many co-operative projects. Importation of cheaper New Zealand dairy products 
by Rewa Dairy, the main dairy manufacturer, made it difficult for the Tailevu Dairy Co-operative to compete.
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villages and because of this they were still closely tied to their communities. The 
Yalavou scheme, despite its problems, continued to operate until August 1998, 
when it was temporarily closed due to unscrupulous business practices.
Perhaps one of the most ambitious Alliance initiatives, this time involving the 
Fijian Administration, was the setting up of the Native Land Development 
Corporation (NLDC) in 1974 as a commercial subsidiary of the Native Land Trust 
Board. The NLDC was to be involved in capital-intensive projects that were 
integrated into both the domestic and foreign market. It was to be involved 
in property management, real estate, merchandising and agriculture. The first 
NLDC project was a FJ$1.2 million, 1600-acre mechanised sugar cane plantation 
which was part of the larger Seaqaqa Cane Scheme. This was followed by a 
FJ$1.5 million investment supported by Australian aid for highly mechanised 
production of pigeon peas in Western Vanua Levu. The third project, worth 
FJ$1.5 million, was for horticultural production (mangoes and pawpaw) near 
the Nadi International Airport, for export. In addition the NLDC was involved 
in rice production.
All the NLDC projects failed and the NLDC debts had to be paid by the 
government. An important point to note is that the NLDC was in fact a neo-
traditional institution clothed in capitalist garb. As an arm of the NLTB, itself 
a neo-traditional establishment, its political and economic direction was the 
prerogative of chiefs who were members of the NLTB board. The President of 
the NLTB was the Governor General, himself a high chief, and members of the 
board consisted of chiefs and indigenous Fijian technocrats loyal to the Alliance 
Party. This system of Alliance cronyism was temporarily "broken" when 
the Labour Party’s Dr Bavadra became a board member while he was prime 
minister for a month before he was overthrown in a military coup in 1987. The 
NLDC embodied a dichotomy between communalism and accumulation. It also 
embodied a trade-off between commercial merit and communal cronyism. The 
collapse of the NLDC showed that communal capitalism contributed neither 
to private accumulation nor to communal wealth. Wealth was ‘virtual’ in that 
it was expressed in the form of communal prestige rather than in material 
manifestation. 
However, contrary to existing stereotypes that indigenous Fijians were 
‘culturally’ not capable of entrepreneurship, the problem needed to be 
contextualised in relation to the pressures exerted on indigenous Fijians 
by the socio-political power structure to maintain a communal way of life to 
‘protect’ them from being ‘undermined’ by other ethnic groups. This provided 
legitimacy for communal mobilisation, even in the context of a competitive 
market economy. In other words, communalism was not necessarily a primordial 
cultural feature, but needs to be explained in a broader socio-political context 
of power relations and hegemony. Nevertheless, communal investment was 
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encouraged at various levels of indigenous Fijian society. At the provincial 
level, the Alliance government sought to strengthen the Fijian Administration’s 
economic capability by encouraging yasana investment. Some of the early 
Provincial Council investments were in the area of wholesale and retailing co-
operatives, shipping, bus companies, copra production, piggeries, poultry farms, 
sugar cane and dairy farming and investment in existing companies belonging 
to other ethnic groups. As an example, in the 1970s the three Provinces of 
Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata formed a company called CBM (Cakaudrove Bua 
Macuata), headed by the paramount chief and former President of Fiji, Ratu 
Sir Penaia Ganilau, with interests in diverse forms of investments. In addition, 
CBM bought 2.5% of the shares in a major local company, Stinson and Pearce 
Limited, owned by a European former Alliance Party Finance Minister. CBM’s 
investment in the Ferry Freights Company, totalling FJ$150,000, was lost when 
the company collapsed. 
The province of Tailevu invested FJ$56,000 in the now-liquidated Fiji Poultry 
Company and other agricultural projects. The Province of Rewa also invested in 
a bus company which was also liquidated. The province of Lau set up the Yatu 
Lau Company as its investment wing and began investment in bus companies 
and shipping, under the chairmanship of its paramount chief, Prime Minister 
Mara. The company still continues and is heavily involved in real estate. The 
Province of Kadavu also set up the Kadavu Development Company and later 
Kadavu Holdings and was involved in an inter-island ferry service which failed. 
It is now involved in real estate. Other Provinces were involved in similar 
communal investments. In the early days the directors of these companies were 
mostly chiefs. Traditional status rather than commercial sense became a natural 
qualification for company directorship. This changed over time as younger and 
more educated people began to take over running of these companies. Today, 
almost every province in Fiji has an investment company involved in major 
projects such as real estate, commercial farming, shipping and other enterprises.
Perhaps the most successful commercial affirmative action scheme of the Alliance 
government and the Fijian Administration was Fijian Holdings Company, formed 
in 1984 by the Great Council of Chiefs. It has now grown into one of the biggest 
companies in Fiji and remains as the flagship affirmative action project of the 
government and Fijian Administration. The company will be discussed in detail 
later. In the early days, the shareholders were limited to Fijian Administration 
institutions such as provinces, NLTB and the Fijian Affairs Board.10 The provinces 
10 Private shares were opened up in 1992, but only for those officially categorised as “Fijians”; that is if one 
is registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula, the indigenous land and communal Fijian registration record, kept by 
the Native Land Commission (NLC).  
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collected their capital through communal collections (soli-vakavanua). It was 
the first real attempt at communal capitalism in Fiji (the communal mobilisation 
of resources for capitalist investment) on a large scale.
A significant feature of the NLDC and the provinces’ approach to communal 
investment was the institutional ‘collaboration’ between the central government 
under the Alliance and the Fijian Administration institutions (NLDC and 
Provincial Councils in this case). Thus any development policy that involved 
the Fijian Administration institutions was, either deliberately or unconsciously, 
an extension of the Alliance government’s communal and hegemonic design. 
Thus the communalist political and ideological strategy of maintaining the 
paramountcy of Fijian interest overshadowed the basic commercial rationale of 
generating material benefits. Indigenous Fijian failure in business was ascribed to 
a lack of resources for business success, such things as lack of capital and specific 
business skills; but the real cause was the influence of powerful social forces. 
As I will argue later when considering the case of the Fiji Development Bank’s 
Commercial Loans to Fijians Scheme (CLFS), the problem was not capital, nor 
even skills, but the overall design of the process, including its conceptualization, 
implementation and monitoring. Communal investment itself led to de-skilling 
since it emphasised a collective but limited contribution by individuals rather 
than encouraging individual thrift and sharpening individual skills; and a lot 
of finance poured into indigenous Fijian business was diverted or undermined 
by communal pressures and obligations.
Nevertheless, the government was convinced that the three main reasons for 
“weak performance of Fijians” in business were: “deficiencies in business skills, 
a culture that is generally not conducive to business practices and achievement, 
and lack of capital” (Fiji Government 1993: 55). These ‘excuses’ missed the 
forest for the trees because, as I have argued earlier, the relations of production 
based on communalism discouraged the development of skills and the desire 
for accumulation. Also, the stereotypic, racist and self-defeating argument 
that blames “a culture that is not conducive to business” has become a sort of 
self-fulfilling prophecy which many indigenous Fijians themselves have been 
led to believe. My argument is that the ‘culture’ of the indigenous Fijians as 
an ethnic group was not the problem; rather, it was the pattern of communal 
hegemony that was imposed and reproduced deliberately from the political 
level and which, over the years, has permeated throughout various levels of 
society and permanently crystallised as traditional ‘Fijian culture’. The ability 
to distinguish between ethnic (or Fijian) culture and political control disguised 
as ethnic ‘culture’ has become conceptually problematic and the source of 
current confusion. 
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Response to the failure of indigenous business 
The consistent failure of indigenous Fijian business led to the formation of a 
Project Evaluation Unit (PEU) in the Ministry of Fijian Affairs in February 1974. 
The PEU’s terms of reference included “evaluation of projects and requests 
for financial assistance, provision of management, accounting, and extension 
services, technical and economic feasibility studies and the identification of 
obstacles to the entry of Fijians into commerce and industry” (Fiji Government 
1980: 23). In 1975, the unit changed its name to Business Opportunity and 
Management Advisory Service (BOMAS) and it was later moved and attached to 
the FDB, where it met its ultimate demise. It was later resurrected as the Client 
Advisory and Training Department (CATD) in the late 1980s.
For provision of capital, in 1974 the government asked the FDB to introduce 
a “soft loan” scheme, with a maximum of FJ$100,000, specifically to help 
indigenous Fijians engage in business. It was called the Commercial Loans for 
Fijians Scheme (CLFS) and part of the conditions of the soft loans were that 
the interest rate was subsidised by 1%, the bank’s security requirement was 
relaxed, and there was a cash contribution of one-third of the value of the total 
project. But when the plan was revealed, it was strongly opposed by the Indo-
Fijian-dominated Suva Chamber of Commerce, who saw it as “discriminatory 
and therefore contrary to the country’s constitution” (Vusoniwailala 1976: 48). 
This led to controversy in the media which saw indigenous Fijian letter writers 
expressing nationalist sentiments under such headlines as “Indians Out of Fiji” 
and “They Don’t Appreciate Fijians”. One correspondent suggested that “by 
their opposition to governmental plans to improve the indigenous race’s lot, 
the Indians of the Suva Chamber of Commerce showed the ingratitude of the 
Indians to the Fijians’ hospitality” (Fiji Sun, 5 May 1975). Opposition to the 
special Fijian commercial scheme was due to Indo-Fijian businessmen seeing 
it as a competitive threat to their monopoly of the small business domain. The 
FDB project proposed to produce a class of indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs 
which could integrate into the Indo-Fijian-dominated business sector and break 
the cycle of an Indo-Fijian monopoly. The ethnic hostility it created was not 
surprising, as Indo-Fijian businessmen thought that state-subsidised business 
for indigenous Fijians was tantamount to unfair competition. Nevertheless, the 
project went ahead as the Alliance Party had promised its indigenous Fijian 
constituency. 
While indigenous Fijians were being encouraged to enter agricultural 
production, the state itself was involved in direct capitalist production. By the 
1980s, the state, under the Alliance government, had become directly involved 
in capitalist accumulation through its monopoly of the sugar industry, water 
supply, electricity, fish cannery, air services and forestry (Sutherland 1993; 
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Naidu 1989). It was also closely aligned to expatriate capital by subsiding the 
mining and tourism industry. Tourism not only benefited expatriate investors, 
it also generated wealth for a small group of chiefs, whose tribal land was leased 
to hotels, and most of whom had direct links with the Alliance Party hierarchy. 
Alliance elites and big business were closely linked. Some of the richest men 
in Fiji, such as Charles Stinson, Jim Ah Koy and Mahendra Patel, were closely 
linked to the Prime Minister, Mara. Mara was also known to have established 
a business empire of his own. The nationalist agitations of the 1970s and 1980s 
pointed out these business links as ‘evidence’ of the betrayal of the indigenous 
cause by Mara and the Alliance government. Despite attempts to serve the 
interests of indigenous Fijians through preferential policies, the positive impacts 
were not sufficient to create a visible indigenous bourgeois class and so satisfy 
the increasingly high expectations of indigenous Fijians.
It is true that the Alliance government’s economic affirmative action policies for 
indigenous Fijians in the 1970s and 1980s were wide-ranging, but the success 
of those policies, so far as developing an indigenous Fijian entrepreneurial class 
was concerned, was mixed. Some individuals took advantage of the situation and 
succeeded, while most did not. This heightened frustration amongst indigenous 
Fijians; and someone had to be blamed. Nationalist conspiracy theorists pointed 
fingers at Indo-Fijians, and ultimately the Alliance Party, for allowing Indo-
Fijians to thrive unchecked while indigenous Fijians were not provided with 
the same opportunities, despite the Alliance’s pro-indigenous policies over the 
years. The nationalists argued that the Alliance’s affirmative action policies were 
merely cosmetic exercises and that the real beneficiaries of Alliance policies were 
the indigenous Alliance elites and business elites of other ethnic groups. To 
bolster their political firepower, the nationalists joined forces with the militant 
unions and many joined the Fiji Labour Party when it was formed in 1985. 
While the Alliance Party was being attacked by the nationalists from one side, 
it was also assaulted from the other side by militant unionism, starting in the 
1970. Trade unions provided indigenous Fijian workers with an autonomous 
political space to express their new identity as members of the new proletarian 
class outside the confines of traditional loyalty. But for survival indigenous 
urban workers had to continually negotiate the multiple layers of loyalty, be 
they religious, political, cultural or professional, in an increasingly complex 
situation. The intensification of militancy within trade unions in the 1970s 
and 1980s was a direct consequence of the dramatic expansion of the capitalist 
economy after independence, through a shift from import-substitution to 
deregulation and export orientation and with it the increasingly unilateral 
control of the industrial relations machinery by the state and the restriction 
of workers’ rights (Howard 1991). Increasing deregulation provided foreign 
and local capital the leverage to maximise profit while squeezing workers hard. 
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Ironically, it was the result of the seemingly contradictory policy of the Alliance 
government which, at one level, was encouraging communalism, yet at another, 
was promoting economic growth.  
Threat to Alliance hegemony 
Pro-indigenous policies were pursued within a dramatically changing economic 
and political landscape at a time when communal politics was coming under 
pressure and working-class consciousness was being articulated in a militant 
way. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a dramatic expansion of the indigenous 
Fijian urban working and professional classes which, despite the attempts of 
the indigenous elites and the Alliance government to keep them under their 
guardianship and within their orbit, had formed alliances with Indo-Fijian 
workers. This was to transform the Fiji political landscape forever. The working 
class, through the unions, was beginning to exert its power through industrial 
action and this posed a threat to the ruling Alliance Party. The consolidation 
of the economy led to the emergence of a more organised and articulate labour 
movement. In 1970 there were eight strikes involving 887 workers, resulting 
in 752 lost man-days; in 1971 there was a total of 28 strikes involving 4063 
workers, resulting in the loss of 20,970 man-days. A year later, in 1972, there 
were 46 strikes involving 8,404 workers with a loss of 214,721 man-days. The 
1973 figures were 19 strikes, involving 9,083 workers and a loss of 807,972 man-
days (Reddy 1974: 11). 
Most unions were multi-ethnic, except for the teachers’ unions, which consisted 
of the predominantly indigenous Fijian Teachers Association (FTA) and the 
predominantly Indo-Fijian Fiji Teachers Union (FTU).11 Urbanised indigenous 
Fijian workers (who numbered about 52% of union membership in the 1970s) 
were less susceptible to communal pressures than were their rural counterparts, 
and were readily inclined to join unions. Despite this, many of them were still 
loyal to their chiefs and still identified with the communal ethos. Communal 
loyalty recognised no geo-social boundary and encompassed both the rural and 
urban spheres yet, at the same time, was not total: workers would simultaneously 
show loyalty to their vanua and loyalty to their unions. The former provided 
them with their sense of ethno-cultural identity and the latter with their means 
of socio-economic survival. In fact as a result of urbanisation the urban centres 
increasingly became important for communal organisation. For instance, a 
large number of chiefs lived in the urban centres and conducted collections for 
communal investment. 
11 The two teachers’ unions later merged into the Fiji Teachers Confederation, but still maintained their 
distinctive ethnic identities.
Politics of preferential development
54
Growing industrial unrest led to the enactment of the 1973 Trade Disputes Act 
to regulate union powers. But a more corporatist approach was put in place in 
1976 with the formation of the Tripartite Forum, consisting of trade unions, 
employers and government representatives to collectively manage the industrial 
relations process (Kumar 1980).12 The corporatist strategy collapsed in 1985 as 
a result of the government’s unilateral imposition of a nation-wide wage freeze, 
recommended by the World Bank employment mission, which argued that 
Fiji’s salaries were internationally uncompetitive and needed to be reduced to 
enhance export potential.13 The IMF experts also thought that wages in Fiji were 
“15% too high” (Narsey 1985: 3).
During this period Fiji was reeling from the effect of the global economic crisis 
that enveloped the world economy in the 1980s. Fiji’s economy was hit by a 
reduction in sugar production and lower returns for exported sugar and a decline 
in the tourism industry. Fiji’s foreign debt increased by 754%, from FJ$35 million 
in 1970 to FJ$264 million in 1981. In 1979 alone, debt servicing constituted 
18% of the annual budget. The state intervened harshly with ‘rationalisation 
measures’ such as pay cuts, redundancies of unestablished workers and the 
withdrawal of job guarantees for government-sponsored graduate teachers. This 
led to widespread protests, including a graduate teachers’ hunger strike. In its 
4-5 February 1985 Economic Summit the government justified the wage freeze 
thus:
...to create savings (of about $36 million) that can be used to spread 
the benefits of development more evenly among the population. The 
freeze should result in more money flowing into the banking system. 
This should make more finance available for loans-especially for projects 
that will boost industry, agriculture, export earnings and create jobs. 
It will encourage business to expand and invest. It should help to keep 
redundancies to a minimum or avoid it (Fiji Government 1985: 1) 
The trade unions argued that the unilateral wage freeze was not only an extra 
burden on the workers but also a denial of democratic processes. They saw the 
freeze as direct state intervention on behalf of the capitalist class, an action 
which used workers as sacrificial lambs to facilitate private accumulation (Naidu 
1986; Howard 1991). 
Apart from the imposed neo-liberal reforms, Mara’s government was increasingly 
becoming authoritarian and was moving more and more towards the right. Its 
12 Despite this, some militant unions such as the Fiji Mine Workers Union (FMWU) continued to resort to 
industrial action. As a result of the 1977 FMWU strike, 700 workers lost their jobs and the union was de- 
registered. A common trend in the 1970s was that militant union leaders were quickly “tamed” and co-opted 
into the ruling Alliance Party in various capacities.    
13 A 1982 World Bank-funded employment mission undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS), University of Sussex, made these recommendations. 
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foreign policy was being greatly influenced by the United States’ Cold War 
agenda. An example was that, in 1982, under US pressure, Fiji banned Soviet 
ships from calling into Fiji ports and, at the same time, allowed previously 
banned United States nuclear powered and armed ships to come into Fiji ports.14 
Mara’s government was seen by the radical unions as becoming increasingly 
despotic, with a powerful clique of chiefs and businessmen at the helm, mutually 
accommodating each other’s interests and with an eye for union bashing. There 
were also allegations of corruption at the top which led to several scandals.15 
Increasing authoritarianism at the national level was an indication of uneasiness 
about the growing opposition to Alliance hegemony, even from within the 
indigenous Fijian community. As Sutherland suggests, the “upper echelons of 
the Fijian community were worried that they were losing control over the Fijian 
masses” (Sutherland 1993: 179). So the Great Council of Chiefs in 1983 proposed 
a major reorganisation in the Fijian Administration. The last reorganisation 
was in the mid-1960s, when the Fijian regulations were withdrawn. But the 
resulting emancipation of indigenous Fijians was perceived by the Fijian power 
bloc as undermining its hegemony: “the abolition of the Fijian Regulations and 
the winding up of the Fijian judicial system, together with the non-enforcement 
of by-laws, meant that many of the decisions of the Provincial Councils were not 
pursued to their logical conclusion” (Fijian Affairs Board/Great Council of Chiefs 
1985: 65). The Great Council of Chiefs wanted to strengthen communal authority 
at the provincial level as a means of controlling urban drift and an increase in 
crime amongst youth and, also, to maintain a disciplined communal workforce. 
Their concern was that the “line of authority from the Provincial Council to 
the [Fijian Affairs Board], the Great Council of Chiefs and the Minister of Fijian 
Affairs is clear and understood...[b]elow the Provincial Council the Fijians 
tended to wander from one authority to another” (Fijian Affairs Board/Great 
Council of Chiefs 1985: 68). The Cole Report which resulted from this review 
recommended the extension of the power and jurisdiction of the provincial 
administration (Cole 1984).16 This effectively would have consolidated communal 
mobilisation at the provincial and grassroots level to maintain the Alliance’s 
14 This directly led to the formation of the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group (FANG) by the trade unions, churches, 
students’ unions and other civil groups.
15 A leading article in the Fiji Sun daily in 1985 titled “The Mara Empire” revealed the extent of wealth of 
Prime Minister Mara and his links with Fiji’s leading businessmen. As a result, the Fiji Sun was sued by Mara 
for defamation.  
16 Interestingly, the Cole Report was never implemented. The Alliance government announced one month 
before the 1987 election that it was going to be implemented. After the Alliance lost the election, the plan 
fizzled out. As late as 1994 Rabuka’s government announced that it was going to implement the Report. This 
was met with opposition from many indigenous Fijians. The latest reorganisation of the Fijian Administration 
was made in 1998 when the Fijian Affairs Board was made independent from the Ministry of Fijian Affairs. 
We will discuss this later. 
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power base at that level. This was important for the Alliance’s political influence 
and survival, to counter indigenous Fijian political ‘dissent’ in various forms, 
such as agitation through unionism in the urban areas. 
Indeed the biggest threat to Alliance hegemony started when trade unions 
organised a ‘Labour Summit’ to counter the anti-union policies of the Alliance 
Party. An academic who presented a paper at the summit argued, in response 
to the wage freeze, that the “net effect must be that the wages and salaries 
freeze means a forced transfer/gift of what would have gone to employees as 
increments to their wages and salaries, into the ownership of the employers” 
(Narsey 1985: 4).17 This trans-ethnic orientation, which put class struggle at 
the centre of the debate, set the tone for a new political paradigm. Thus the 
unions, in a later forum, accepted a resolution that a Labour Party be formed 
as a forum for the political mobilisation of workers of all ethnic groups, and to 
provide an alternative political organisation to counter the unilateral economic 
policy impositions of the ruling Alliance Party and the implicit support of the 
ineffective official opposition party (Naidu 1986). Both the ruling Alliance Party 
and the opposition NFP were seen to represent “bourgeois interests”, underneath 
their explicit ethnic characters (Narsey 1985). They both advocated neo-liberal 
structural adjustment policies (SAP) and the curtailment of union power. The 
Alliance government had every reason to be wary, since the principles of the 
Labour Party were antithetical to communalism and neo-liberalism, the two 
major ideological foundations of the Alliance government. The NFP was also 
wary of the formation of the Labour Party because Labour’s trans-ethnic appeal 
could undermine its fundamentally ethnic power base. 
One of the significant developments at this crucial stage of political realignment 
was a split within the unions. In April 1985 the white-collar unions formed a 
confederation of public sector unions. It consisted of the Fiji Public Service 
Association (FPSA), the umbrella civil service union and largest union in Fiji, 
the two ethnic-based teachers’ unions (now the Fiji Teachers Confederation) and 
ten others. The blue-collar unions, on the other hand, led by the Fiji Public 
Employees’ Union (Fiji’s second largest union) reacted to this by forming a 
confederation of their own. The split manifested the political and ideological 
contradiction that was to drive the unions apart; the blue-collar unions wanted 
to remain “apolitical” (Naidu 1986: 42) while the white-collar unions wanted a 
more confrontational and reformist strategy, achieved by forming the Fiji Labour 
Party (Howard 1991). The blue-collar workers’ unions consisted mostly of casual 
and permanent manual labourers, whose bargaining positions were weakened 
by the insecurity of their jobs and the close political links of their leaders with 
17 Dr. Waden Narsey, an IDS DPhil graduate, presented a paper titled, “The Wage Freeze and Development 
Plan: Contradictions in Fiji Government Policy,” which provided the economic discourse that was to be the 
basis of the formation of the Fiji Labour Party.
3. Politicized affirmative action: Independence in 1970 to the 1987 military coup
57
the Alliance hierarchy. The largest blue-collar workers’ union, the Fiji Public 
Employees’ Union (FPEU), was led and controlled by indigenous Fijians who 
were closely aligned with the Alliance elites. The white-collar unions, given 
their resourcefulness and relatively independent political aspirations, were 
more disposed to contest state control; thus their desire to form the Fiji Labour 
Party. Despite opposition from the blue-collar union leaders, the decision to 
form the party was made on 9 May 1985, during the biennial conference of the 
Fiji Trade Union Congress (FTUC). The Fiji Labour Party was formally launched 
on 6 July 1985.
In a way, these developments were taken seriously by the Alliance government, 
which saw its indigenous Fijian power base being eroded by militant unionism. 
Its affirmative action policies were meant to keep the loyalty of indigenous 
Fijians intact. The focus on rural development-based affirmative action had 
minimal impact on urban indigenous Fijians, who were more independent and 
less amenable to chiefly control than were rural dwellers. In short, affirmative 
action as a means of communal hegemony and consolidation of indigenous 
loyalty was not working as well as was anticipated. 
The emergence of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) reconfigured the dynamics of 
political power and shifted the debate from the usual Fijian versus Indian 
dichotomy to one based on a claim to the legitimate guardianship of indigenous 
Fijians. This posed a direct threat to the Alliance’s hegemony and at the same 
time gave the new FLP a sense of orientation into the new world of rhetorical 
and ideological warfare. Both parties wanted a share of indigenous support to 
enhance their legitimacy and their image. For the Alliance Party, indigenous 
Fijian support was crucial for its identity and survival; while the FLP needed 
to rebrand itself to shake off the image that it was an ethnically Indian party. 
The indigenous question became the battleground for political and ideological 
contestation as both sides accused the other of being “anti-Fijian”, while 
reserving the claim to be “pro-Fijian” for themselves. 
The FLP, led by Dr Timoci Bavadra, an indigenous Fijian medical doctor and 
unionist, fought the 1987 election in a Coalition with the predominantly Indo-
Fijian National Federation Party (NFP). This happened despite consensus during 
an FLP general meeting in Lautoka that no coalition of any sort should be entered 
into with the NFP. With the new image of a multi-ethnic and clean party, the FLP 
was to distance itself from the NFP, which was tainted with an ethnic “Indian” 
image. In protest at the coalition, some withdrew support from the FLP, but the 
leadership of the party, spearheaded by powerful and uncompromising labour 
leaders and some left-leaning intellectuals, was determined to move ahead. 
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Contestation over indigenous development 
The Coalition’s main election messages were targeted at the “poor, weak and 
disadvantaged” and at the promotion of “multi-racialism” (National Federation 
Party-Labour Party Coalition 1987). Amongst the Coalition’s concerns in this 
regard was the lack of economic progress of ordinary indigenous Fijians, which 
was blamed on neglect by the Alliance government, patronised by the chiefs 
and aligned with business.18 As I have discussed earlier, the power base of the 
Alliance government, under Mara, was chiefly and dependent on communal 
hegemony and this was identified by the Coalition as the major factor responsible 
for indigenous Fijian economic backwardness. On the other hand, the Alliance 
pointed out that for sustenance of political stability, chiefly authority was 
crucial; and a multi-ethnic business elite was needed for economic growth 
and progress. While the FLP approach was based on an urban-based social 
democratic ideology, the Alliance Party had a more conservative position which 
encompassed a combination of interests including big business, the chiefly 
hierarchy and conservative communal values. 
The rhetorical battle was taking place at a time when the Fiji economy was going 
through a recession and when indigenous Fijian participation in commerce had 
been improving, though not quickly enough. There was Indo-Fijian exclusive 
dominance in a range of economic sectors such as retail, wholesale, transport and 
the motor industry, amongst others, and they had the majority of practitioners 
in some professions. 
Indo-Fijian businessmen had exclusive control of various sectors of the 
economy such as transportation, real estate, merchandizing and retail, to name 
a few; and at the same time there was no readily visible indigenous Fijian 
entrepreneurial class. Comparative figures provided by the Bureau of Statistics 
on ‘economic activity’ confirmed the socio-economic disparities. For instance, 
23% of positions in the administrative and managerial category were occupied 
by indigenous Fijians, compared to 77% by Indo-Fijians. Among the clerical 
and related workers, 38% were indigenous Fijians and 62% were Indo-Fijians, 
while in the sales workers’ category, 26% were indigenous Fijians and 74% 
were Indo-Fijians (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1989: 52). 
18 Other Coalition election pledges included: anti-corruption legislation; a leadership code; abolition of the 
Official Secrets Act; and enactment of a freedom of information act. The economic policies related to economic 
growth, better utilisation of resources, more jobs, a just wage, better working conditions, fair prices and easier 
access to finance. It also promised to work towards housing for all and better education, adequate health and 
nutrition at low cost, a fair deal for women and youth, greater assistance for the elderly, disabled and destitute 
and a physically safer society. It also promised to bring about “a fair and open government” (NFP-Labour 
Coalition Election Manifesto 1987).      
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However, towards the other end of the socio-economic continuum, 55% of 
those engaged in rural agriculture (both subsistence and cash), such as animal 
husbandry, forestry and fishing, were indigenous Fijians, compared to only 35% 
for Indo-Fijians. Clearly, the figures indicated a preponderance of Indo-Fijians 
in the ‘middle class’ socio-economic categories and of indigenous Fijians in rural 
primary production. Most rural indigenous Fijian producers were village-based 
semi-subsistence farmers, living within the communal setting. In fact only 10% 
of the independent ‘rural settlements’ for fully-fledged commercial farming 
outside the rural village and including galal, belonged to indigenous Fijians 
and 90% were owned by Indo-Fijians. To compound the problem, indigenous 
Fijians had a higher urban unemployment rate of 15.6% (compared to 9.7% for 
Indo-Fijians) and formed over 70% of the prison population (Adinkrah 1995). 
Almost two decades after independence, it appeared that a lot still needed to be 
done in terms of affirmative action; but expectations of socio-economic progress 
amongst indigenous Fijians and their resentment of Indo-Fijian dominance in 
commerce had become a powerful political factor which could no longer be 
ignored. The FLP under Bavadra quickly exploited the situation to its advantage 
by blaming the Alliance government for the situation of the indigenous Fijians. 
Bavadra said:  
Ironically, the people who suffered most under the Alliance Government 
are the very people whose interests this government purports to 
champion, the native Fijians. By restricting the bulk of the Fijians to 
their communal lifestyle in the face of a rapidly advancing cash economy, 
the average Fijian has become more and more economically backward...
This is particularly invidious when the leaders themselves have amassed 
huge personal wealth (Fiji Sun 17 April 1986: 4). 
One of the most influential business links the Alliance elites had was with 
the Emperor Gold Mining Company at Vatukoula, which had, for years, been 
patronised by the Alliance through various forms of tax concessions and 
subsidy. Bavadra threatened to nationalise the mine if he came into power as a 
result of the extent of exploitation of workers and the raw deal the indigenous 
landowners of Nasomo were getting for their mined land (Emberson-Bain 1994). 
Bavadra also raised the question of liberalising the centralised authority of 
the Fijian Administration. In particular, he was concerned with empowering 
indigenous landowners by loosening the bureaucratic control of the NLTB on 
land:
The NLTB must be democratised so that it comes to serve the interests of 
all Fijians and not just the privileged few and their business associates. 
In addition, more effort must be made to see to it that those whose land is 
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being used get more for their money out of the NLTB...The system must 
be rationalised so that all Fijians, not just a few, benefit more (Bavadra 
1986: 74).  
The Coalition promised to set up a Native Lands and Resources Commission to 
facilitate greater participation of ordinary indigenous Fijians in decision-making 
relating to the development and management of their land. This was not to 
undermine but to “work with the NLTB” (Sutherland 1993: 178). This approach 
had two interrelated prongs: a concern for the socio-economic conditions of 
indigenous Fijians; and an opposition to the dominant communal hegemony of 
the Fijian Administration and the chiefly establishment. This played into the 
hands of the Alliance demagogues, who used it to demonize the FLP as being 
anti-Fijian. There were personal attacks on Bavadra, accusing him of liumuri 
(“anti-Fijian” or “traitor”) and a nodra vakarawanika na Kaidia or “stooge of the 
Indians” (Veitata 1987). The Alliance’s use of racial scare-mongering alleging a 
possible Indo-Fijian ‘take-over’ of indigenous Fijian land and the ‘suppression’ 
of indigenous Fijian culture (if the Coalition came to power) was a common 
tactic during the election campaign. 
The Alliance pointed to its pro-indigenous policies as evidence that it had the 
indigenous people at heart and declared that if the FLP came into power, all the 
affirmative action policies were going to be destroyed and the land and rights 
of indigenous Fijians were going to be taken away. Although indigenous land 
was solidly safeguarded by the tight provisions of the 1970 Constitution, which 
required 75% of the vote in both the House of Representatives and Senate and 
the assent of at least six of the Great Council of Chiefs’ nominees in the Senate 
(Fiji Constitution 1970), there was still fear that these provisions could still be 
changed under a new regime.    
Towards the coup 
The victory of the Coalition in the 1987 election marked the first change in 
government since independence in 1970. In fact the Alliance had been in power 
since 1966 as part of the transition towards independence. Out of a total of 52 
seats, the Coalition won 28 and the Alliance 24. Of the 28 Coalition seats, 19 
were held by Indo-Fijians, 7 by indigenous Fijians and 2 by general electors. 
Although the Coalition fought and won the election on a multi-racial platform, 
the results still showed the dominance of communalism in Fiji’s political culture. 
The Coalition won all the Indian communal seats. It also attracted 82% of the 
Indo-Fijian vote, compared to the 83% by the NFP in the 1982 election. At 
the same time the Alliance won all the Fijian communal seats and 78% of the 
indigenous Fijian votes. This was a decrease from 82% in the 1982 election. In 
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the general communal seats, the Alliance support fell from 89% in 1982 to 82% 
in 1987. However, in four critical national seats the Coalition managed to draw 
enough indigenous Fijian support to win them the election.
A day after the historic victory, the Fiji Times editorialised:  
There have always been those who doubted the people of Fiji, who 
said we would never live together in harmony, never reconcile our 
differences. But yesterday the people spoke. Although coming from 
different religions, many backgrounds, we are yet one people. So the 
greater victory is for democracy (The Fiji Times, 13 April 1987: 6). 
But this optimism was expressed too soon. Bavadra’s newly installed government 
was condemned by Alliance supporters as an “Indian government” (Matanitu ni 
Kaidia) and Bavadra “an Indians’ man”. Ravuvu (1991: 89), an ardent Bavadra 
critic and nationalist ideologue, exemplified this sentiment when he said: 
“Fijians could be forgiven for concluding that Bavadra had risen to the top 
because he was the Indians’ man. He was their choice, approved and appointed 
by their community”. The ethnicist discourse became the dominant sound-bite, 
and fear-mongering of conspiracy for “Indian take-over” was rife:
...the Coalition victory in the 1987 elections seemed like a clever stunt 
performed with strings, mirrors and “democracy”. The end result was 
that finally the Indians had got what they had long sought-control of the 
government and of the country (Ravuvu 1991: 87).    
Immediately after Dr Bavadra’s victory there were demonstrations on the 
streets of the main cities by the supporters of the Alliance Party and extremist 
nationalists. Corporations such as the Emperor Gold Mining Company allegedly 
funded some of these demonstrations. Led by the Taukei Movement (Indigenous 
People’s Movement) the aim of the indigenous Fijian demonstrators was the 
removal of the ‘Indian’ government and the reinstatement of an indigenous 
government. 
Increasingly, the situation deteriorated as spontaneous expressions of 
nationalism, fuelled by racial bigotry, spread like wild fire across the land. As 
I have observed elsewhere, this expression of nationalism, or taukeism,19 was a 
lethal juxtaposition of various ideological components:
Taukeism attempts to unite the Fijian community through the 
politicisation of culture, religion and race...a juxtaposition of racial, 
cultural, religious and warrior-machosist ideologies (Ratuva 1993: 59). 
19 The term taukei, which means original owner of the soil or land, is normally used by indigenous Fijians 
as a dichotomy to the term vulagi or ‘foreigner’– referring to Indians. 
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What is important to note at this stage is that communal hegemony was being 
mobilised to undermine liberal democracy. To maintain its formal control of the 
state apparatus, the Alliance government needed to consolidate its communal 
support and community elites needed the Alliance patronage for political 
prestige and power. The military, although theoretically “neutral” as an 
institutional security component of the state apparatus, had strong cultural and 
ideological links with the traditional power structure. This made it susceptible 
to manipulation by communalistic forces to serve the communalistic agenda 
ahead of the national interest (Sanday 1989). 
The defeat of the Alliance Party in the 1987 election signified the limitations and 
crisis of the old hegemonic order, which could no longer sustain domination and 
legitimation by manufacturing consent through the use of communal appeals. 
In the case of the Alliance hegemony, while it still maintained the support of 
the majority of indigenous Fijians, the electoral system’s numbers game had 
denied it the mandate to continue to rule. The Alliance Party had an important 
ally, the military, which was later deployed to achieve what the ballot box could 
not, to reassert its dominance. The nationalistic spontaneity following the April 
1987 election and the large-scale anti-Coalition street protests and propaganda 
in the media by the Methodist Church and by nationalist activists provided the 
environment for military intervention on 14 May 1987.      
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4. The 1987 military coup: 
Affirmative action by the gun 
Affirmative action became a much more intense political obsession after the 
1987 military coup. In fact the term ‘affirmative action’ itself was first used after 
the coup. The coup provided the perfect justification for large-scale affirmative 
action because the supporters of the coup assumed that lack of socio-economic 
progress by indigenous Fijians had led to the rise of ethno-nationalism and the 
coup and that the only way to avoid another coup was to address socio-economic 
grievances through affirmative action.
The 1987 coup was an outward eruption of the undercurrent of ethno-political 
fissures that have characterized ethnic politics in Fiji since the colonial days and 
that were allowed to take a more volatile trajectory after independence through 
institutionalized ethnic compartmentalization. Under the guise of parliamentary 
democracy and ethnic balance, the constitution helped to legitimize separate 
representation, ethnicized party membership and ethnic competition for state 
power. Democracy became the means to communal contestation and the capture 
of state power rather than a framework to ensure social cohesion and national 
consciousness. That was not all. The high expectations of indigenous Fijians 
for a better socio-economic life after independence were not being met and 
the situation was worsened by the constant fear of Indo-Fijian political threat. 
Tension came to the surface as a result of the activities of particular individuals 
and groups in politics, the community and the church who were closely 
associated with the Alliance Party, and who took advantage of the situation to 
mobilize people under the rallying cry of “Fiji for the Fijians.” Behind the ethno-
nationalist front were some non-Fijian businessmen and professionals who either 
passively or actively supported the ethno-nationalist euphoria because they felt 
that their privileges, which were well protected under the Alliance government, 
were going to be lost under the new NFP-Labour government. 
At the same time, the Fiji Labour Party and the NFP, confident of their 
electoral mandate, were oblivious to the rising ethno-political tension and 
the potential for future seismic transformations. The Labour Party leaders and 
ideologues assumed that the time was ripe in Fiji for class politics to displace 
communal politics and to create a multi-ethnic utopia for workers, peasants, the 
marginalized and the poor. The utopian ideology was that class consciousness 
had at last caught up with ethnic consciousness as a natural reaction to what 
was seen to be the Alliance Party’s elitist, bourgeois, chiefly interests. While 
the Alliance emphasised the indigenous Fijian/Indo-Fijian dichotomy, the Fiji 
Labour Party attempted to down play ethnicity altogether and emphasised 
the ‘rich versus poor’ dichotomy. Both views were shown to have their own 
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limitations as historical developments began to unfold. The reality was to 
be found somewhere in the middle. There was a complex interplay between 
class and ethnicity at different levels. The lack of socio-economic development 
amongst the rural and urban indigenous Fijian poor became a fertile breeding 
ground for ethno-nationalism. In times of crisis, socio-economic grievances 
were readily transformed into political anger and ethnic scapegoating. The 
visible wealth of Indo-Fijian business created potentially lethal political images 
amongst the poor and unemployed indigenous Fijians. This was a catalyst for 
communal dissatisfaction and mob violence, seen in street riots following the 
1987 and 2000 coups during which Indo-Fijian shops were targeted by hordes 
of youths. The images of Indo-Fijian wealth fed into the realm of collective social 
psychology, especially in relation to the use of inter-communal stereotypes, 
to demonize the other in mutually dichotomous ways. Indigenous Fijians 
stereotyped Indo-Fijians as cunning, selfish and untrustworthy, always on the 
lookout to grab Fijian land using devious means. The Indo-Fijians stereotyped 
indigenous Fijians as lazy, dumb and lacking modern cultural dispositions. Both 
communities were well aware of each other’s perception and have often ‘accepted’ 
them as ‘normal’. At times these behavioural dispositions were internalized and 
even acted out. It was common for indigenous Fijians to lament their lack of 
work acumen and business proficiency compared to Indo-Fijians, Chinese or 
Europeans. Such lament was a classic case of a group internalizing the social 
mirror image projected by others, as symbolic interactionist sociologists would 
suggest. The collective impact on the collective social psychology of indigenous 
Fijians of the internalization of stereotypes was destructive. It gave them a sense 
of hopelessness and inadequacy, a psychological void which was readily filled 
by, and transformed into, ethno-nationalist agitation and anger.
The growing sense of grievance was given an ideological boost by the Methodist 
Church, which portrayed Indo-Fijians as heathens whose godless ways would 
invite the wrath of God on Fiji. The best way to appease God was to cleanse Fiji of 
the lotu lasulasu (worshipers of false gods) (Norton 1994). Religious bigotry was 
invoked to give greater legitimacy to ethno-political expressions of anger. The 
volatile mixture of socio-economic grievances, fear of an Indo-Fijian take over, 
fear of the loss of identity, fear of political disempowerment, belief in divine 
legitimacy and a negative perception of Indo-Fijian culture formed a lethal 
cocktail which was ready to explode once a trigger was provided. Whether real 
or perceived, these sentiments drove and projected ethno-nationalist rhetoric in 
a violent way.
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Entry and retreat of the military     
The military coup on 14 May 1987, led by Lt Col Sitiveni Rabuka, removed the 
Coalition from power and replaced it with a military government consisting of 
supporters of the Alliance Party. The coup broke the shell of democracy which 
was difficult to put together again and which spawned a coup culture that was to 
plague the country for the next two decades. The second coup on 15 September 
of the same year was an attempt by the military to avoid the formation of a 
multi-party coalition that was to be formed by leaders of the Alliance and the 
Coalition. One of the first priorities of the military regime was to secure control 
of state power through the reconfiguration of the military command by the 
removal of the commander and his chief of staff, the dissolution of parliament 
and the suspension of the constitution. A second priority was to restore 
indigenous interests through the Fijianization of the civil service and through 
aggressive affirmative action policies. For the military government, the ethnic 
strife and coups were evidence enough that more had to be done to address 
the issue of indigenous development. They saw the capture of state power 
by indigenous forces as an opportune time to push through their nationalist 
development philosophy.
The military was part of the bigger historical bloc consisting of a conglomeration 
of institutions such as the Alliance Party, the Great Council of Chiefs, the 
Fijian Affairs Board, the Native Land Trust Board, Provincial Councils, District 
Councils, Village Councils, the Methodist Church and various other indigenous 
Fijian cultural organizations. These diverse forces constituted a powerful 
establishment which had been nurtured by the British colonial state and 
which continued in power after independence. These were institutions which 
shaped the developmental trajectory, ideological dogma, and official identity of 
indigenous Fijians. They acted as institutional agents of cultural patronage and 
communal exclusivity. Over the years, indigenous Fijians had to negotiate and 
redefine their cultural identities, political rights, ideological disposition and 
sense of place in relation to the demands for unquestioned conformity to these 
institutions, while at the same time seeking alternative sets of values.
To legitimise the coup and its communal agenda, the post-coup regime had to put 
in place a constitution. Thus the 1990 Constitution was promulgated to entrench 
indigenous Fijian political paramountcy. It was a dramatic shift away from the 
1970 Constitution, which had attempted to keep an ethnic balance in political 
representation. In the new constitution, the number of seats in Parliament was 
increased to 70; and of these 37 were for indigenous Fijians, 27 for Indo-Fijians 
and 5 for General Voters. The new Constitution provided that only indigenous 
Fijians were to be prime minister and president (Fiji Government. 1990a).
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The 1990 Constitution was the cause of considerable political uncertainty 
amongst Indo-Fijians, who saw their political rights being undermined. 
Pressure came from various quarters, such as the Indo-Fijian community, certain 
‘liberal’ indigenous Fijians and international organisations, for a review of Fiji’s 
constitution. Even the World Bank suggested that one of the ways in which 
economic growth in Fiji could be restored, apart from the implementation 
of structural adjustment measures, was the resolution of the constitutional 
question. Increasingly the post-coup regime under Rabuka slowly gave way and 
the reform process was soon underway.
The review of the 1990 Constitution marked an important epoch in the post-
coup era, because it signalled the ‘retreat’ of a communal monopoly of state 
power and the re-emergence of the multi-ethnic discourse at the centre of the 
political stage. One of the first requirements for the review was the setting up 
of a three-man Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) to review the 1990 
Constitution and make recommendations.
The CRC was appointed in March 1995 by Mara, who became President after 
the death of President Ganilau in December 1993. A significant provision of 
the review was recognition of the “internationally recognised principles 
and standards of individual and group rights; guarantee full protection and 
promotion of the rights, interest and concerns of the indigenous Fijian and 
Rotuman people; have full regard for the rights, interests and concerns of all 
ethnic groups in Fiji” (Reeves, Vakatora and Lal 1996: 2).
The new constitution established two major frameworks for inter-ethnic 
concessions, which were to be the basis for a new state system: first, it ensured 
that the rights of all individuals, communities and groups were fully respected; 
second, it ensured the recognition of the paramountcy of Fijian interests as a 
protective principle continued to apply, so as to ensure that the interests of the 
Fijian community were not subordinated to the interests of other communities. 
The first of these frameworks was reflected in two ways: the delicate balancing 
of parliamentary seats and the consociationalist proposal of a multi-party and 
multi-ethnic Cabinet. The constitution provided for 71 seats; of these, 46 were to 
be elected through the communal franchise and 25 through the open franchise. 
Of the 46 communal franchise seats, 23 were to be for indigenous Fijians; 19 
for Indo-Fijians, 1 for Rotumans and 3 for other ethnic groups. The 25 open 
seats were for unrestricted cross-ethnic voting. The consociationalist proposal 
established that, in forming the cabinet, “the Prime Minister must invite all 
parties whose membership in the House of Representatives comprise at least 
10% of the total membership of the House to be represented in the Cabinet in 
proportion to their numbers in the House” (Fiji Government 1997: 107). 
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The second concession was made by ensuring that both the President and the 
Vice-President were appointed by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (Great Council 
of Chiefs), thus guaranteeing that they would always be indigenous Fijians. 
Furthermore, other laws which safeguarded indigenous Fijian land and cultural 
rights such as the Fijian Affairs Act, Fijian Development Fund Act, Native Lands 
Act, Native Land Trust Act and Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act were 
made difficult to amend. The Constitution also provided that where possible, 
“Parliament must make provision for the application of customary laws and 
for dispute resolution in accordance with traditional Fijian processes” (Fiji 
Government 1997: 139). 
The third concession was the redefinition of the category of persons to be the 
recipients of affirmative action, entrenched in the 1990 Constitution as “Fijians 
and Rotumans”, to a broader category of “disadvantaged”. In other words, 
affirmative action was no longer exclusively associated with communalism and 
paramountcy of Fijian interest: it was to be extended trans-ethnically.      
The military coup and coerced affirmative action
Was the coup itself a form of coerced affirmative action? In other words, was the 
coup designed to improve the well-being of indigenous Fijians? Ravuvu seemed 
to agree by suggesting that the coup had “the objective of defusing potential 
violence and creating a form of government which would ensure political 
paramountcy for the Fijians in their own land” (Ravuvu 1991: 89). But, as I have 
mentioned earlier, the notion of paramountcy of Fijian interest was not exactly 
in the best interest of the indigenous Fijians because it merely locked them 
into a communalistic schema, which retarded their commercial advancement 
and bonded them to a neo-traditional political and cultural structure. The 
coup was not ‘progressive’ (or affirmative) in the sense of economic or political 
emancipation, but a reactionary attempt to preserve and reproduce the old order 
(Sutherland 1993). Furthermore, the notion of paramountcy of Fijian interest, 
which the coup was said to preserve, was already entrenched in the virtually 
unchangeable provisions of the 1970 Constitution dealing with indigenous rights. 
In this regard the coup was totally unnecessary. While at face value the coup 
was ‘preferential’ (that is, biased towards indigenous Fijians), it was certainly 
not ‘affirmative’ in the sense of being progressive.1 It was really after the coup 
that new affirmative action policies were drawn up. While the coup generally 
1 At face value, if we stretch the definition of preferential treatment far enough, the coup, at least from the 
point of view of the supporters, was a pro-indigenous Fijian scheme, although illegal, aimed at “advancing 
Fijian rights”. Even the real justifications for the coup by the coup-makers were not clear, as they began 
changing them as the circumstances demanded. But this is probably as far as the concept of preferential 
treatment could be comfortably applied. On the other hand, if we go beyond the face value, and consider the 
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had a reactionary basis in preserving the communal schema, some post-coup 
policies relating to affirmative action were to some extent ‘progressive’ in that 
there was a concerted drive towards economic advancement, as we shall later 
see. But on the other hand, even the ‘progressive’ affirmative action strategies, 
such as communal capitalism, still contained strong tendencies towards a narrow 
form of communalism.
Ravuvu further argued, in support of the coup, that: “It is imperative that Fijians 
must be given a special position in their country and that an element of positive 
discrimination be practised in favour of them for a period in education, politics, 
business development and other areas they are lagging behind” (Ravuvu 1991: 
99). Again, while the 1970 Constitution had protected “special rights” for 
indigenous Fijians, the Alliance government (and even the colonial government) 
had also put in place a number of ‘positive discrimination’ measures in education 
and commerce. But the problem with these affirmative action policies (especially 
in commerce) was that they were conceptualised and implemented as part of 
an attempt to preserve communal cohesion and prestige rather than to advance 
individual entrepreneurship. Strangely, the coup had been justified on the basis 
that it would solve the problems which the pro-coup establishment created in 
the first place. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis caused by the coup affected the entire 
population, including indigenous Fijians (Prasad 1988). For instance, according 
to Bryant (1993), in 1989 12% of indigenous Fijians lived below the poverty 
line, and this increased to 21% in 1991. This has been attributed largely to 
post-coup job redundancies, inflation and economic contractions generally 
(Barr 1990). Thus, both in political and economic terms, it is difficult to identify 
aspects of the coup that were ‘affirmative’ for indigenous Fijians. 
1990 constitution and political affirmative action
The question posed above could also be asked in relation to the post-coup 
1990 Constitution, itself a direct product of the 1987 military coup. Was the 
constitution a form of political affirmative action? This refers particularly to the 
notion that it was meant to protect the paramountcy of Fijian interest (through 
seat allocation, protection of political rights etc.). However, this should not be 
confused with the specific affirmative action provided for in the Constitutional, 
which will be dealt with separately and in more detail later. 
political, ideological and economic implications of the coup, we see that the coup was in fact ‘reactionary’ 
so far as it tried to ‘preserve’ communalism and the old order which had kept indigenous Fijians within the 
confinement of communal stagnation, rather than a means to socio-economic progress.
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For some, like Butadroka, the 1990 Constitution was the best protection for 
indigenous Fijian rights and a way to preserve Fijian unity. The major indigenous 
political party, the Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) echoed the same 
sentiments in its 1995 submission to the Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
(CRC), adding that the constitution had in fact united indigenous Fijians. 
However, the short seven-year history of the 1990 Constitution had instead 
seen increasing power struggles and factionalism amongst indigenous Fijian 
elites, instead of the communal cohesion which was originally anticipated by 
the pro-indigenous Fijian constitution. The power struggle between the leading 
traditional polities had origins in the pre-contact and colonial era (Routledge 
1985). Of interest in this regard were the differences between eastern and 
western chiefdoms. Many western chiefs saw the coup as reaffirming eastern 
chiefly control and called for the formation of a separate confederacy to be 
called the Yasayasa Vaka-Ra Confederacy. The Taukei Movement, the extremist 
organisation which was responsible for the post-coup violence, also split up due 
to differences in strategy and eventually died a natural death. 
The two most powerful men in the post-coup period, Mara and Rabuka, were 
consistently at loggerheads about how the post-coup state was to be administered. 
Both had tried to mobilise political support in different ways. Mara had a 
feudalistic and aloof approach to politics, based on his traditional appeal as a 
high chief and as a statesman of esteemed status in the Commonwealth when 
Prime Minister. He ran the Alliance Party, and later ruled the post-coup Interim 
Government in the same way he presided over his traditional subjects. That is, 
‘consensus’ meant no dissent and unquestioned adherence to the mana of the 
chief. On the other hand, Rabuka, a professional soldier and a political novice 
in liberal democratic governance, relied entirely on his charisma and almost 
mystical appeal to indigenous Fijians as the ‘hero’ of the coup. He also relied 
on his links to the military and kept reminding his opponents of his political 
potency by occasionally issuing veiled threats of “repossession of power.” 
Instead of working with Mara as deputy Prime Minister, Rabuka returned to 
the barracks as Commander of the Army. Within a few months he rocketed up 
the ranks from Lieutenant Colonel to Major General.
To reassert his power and undermine Rabuka’s power base, Mara considerably 
reduced the military allocation in the 1991 budget and in June 1991 invited 
Rabuka and Rev. Lasaro, the leader of the fundamentalist Methodist group, 
to join his Cabinet. Both refused the offer, perhaps sensing that by accepting 
they would have come under Mara’s direct control. On 8 June, Rabuka publicly 
denounced the Mara Cabinet and asked them to resign because “they have lost 
credibility” (The Fiji Times, June 9 1991: 1). He cited the continuing sugar 
industry crisis, Vatukoula gold mine strike, the unpopular VAT (Value Added 
Tax), and the formation of the new political party, the SVT, as evidence of the 
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interim government’s shortcomings. The sugar and gold mine disputes had been 
prolonged unnecessarily and no solution had been found; the imposition of the 
IMF-recommended VAT had provoked public dissatisfaction, while the formation 
of the SVT had factionalised the political loyalty of indigenous Fijians.2 Rabuka 
argued that the formation of the SVT would open the way for the formation of 
other political parties, thus creating further factionalism amongst indigenous 
Fijians at a time when there was a need for unity. However, he later joined the 
party after succumbing to political pressure from members of the Great Council 
of Chiefs and also to avoid being politically isolated, and thus became its first 
leader. 
The SVT was first conceived in July 1990 and was launched on 31 October 
1991 as the political arm of the Great Council of Chiefs. It was meant to take the 
place of the Alliance Party, whose cohesion as a “multi-racial” party had been 
undermined by the wave of post-coup indigenous Fijian nationalism, which saw 
the Fijian Association (originally an arm of the Alliance Party) joining forces 
with the Fijian Nationalists and other nationalist groups. The new party, to fight 
the rough and tumble of party politics on behalf of the Great Council of Chiefs 
and indigenous Fijian community, was to have a new image, while retaining as 
paramount the interests of chiefs and indigenous Fijians. It aimed to “promote 
the interests of the indigenous Fijians, their advancement, the protection of 
their rights and interests and provide means of social, economic and political 
development in association with other ethnic communities in Fiji” (Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei. 1991Article 1.4: 1).3 
So clearly, in this regard, the formation of the SVT was an attempt to preserve 
and perpetuate chiefly hegemony and communalism. This was further evident 
in its extensive use of Fijian Administration and state structures – in particular 
the Fijian Affairs Board, Great Council of Chiefs and Ministry of Fijian Affair’s 
urban and rural network– to mobilise the indigenous Fijian masses, more than 
the Alliance did during its period of rule. Rabuka’s power (in the context of 
2 Meanwhile the overthrown Coalition suffered a serious setback as a result of the death of Bavadra of 
cancer. This led to a split down the middle within the Coalition, and the Labour Party and NFP went their own 
separate ways. The Labour Party mounted an extensive international campaign for the return to democracy 
in Fiji, but many Indo-Fijians opted to vote with their feet and left the country in large numbers. We will 
examine this in more detail later.
3 The formation of the SVT provoked a number of indigenous Fijian political parties traditionally opposed 
to the Alliance and later the coup makers to form a united commoners’ front on 8 June  1991. The parties 
involved were the Fiji Labour Party, Fijian Conservative Party, Fijian Nationalist Party and All National 
Congress. The agenda for the meeting was, first, to discuss public issues such as the VAT, the Vatukoula Gold 
Mine strike and the sugar crisis and how to deal with them; and second, to form a common front to fight 
the SVT, which was seen as a chiefly party, in the next general election. It was also around the same time 
that a number of ethnic-Fijian nationalists, under the banner of Kudru Na Vanua (Rumble of the Land) had 
mooted the formation of a Fijian Commoners’ Council to counter the hegemony of the Great Council of Chiefs. 
However, the formation of a Fijian Commoners’ Front did not eventuate due to irreconcilable ideological 
differences between the participating political parties. 
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“democratic” politics) was established when he was elected leader of the SVT, 
ahead of Mara’s wife, herself a high chief. Dissatisfied with Rabuka’s leadership, 
a faction led by the late Josevata Kamikamica, former Co-deputy Prime Minister 
in Mara’s Interim Government, left the SVT and formed a new political party 
called the Fijian Association.4 As the first leader of the SVT, General Rabuka’s 
status as a ‘civilian’ politician was confirmed and the stage was set for him to 
contest the 1992 election under the terms of the 1990 Constitution, which he 
helped create through the coup. As expected, because of the constitution’s 
inherent bias towards an indigenous Fijian majority, the SVT won the 1992 
general election with ease. The election was to be a political laundering process 
for Rabuka, whose return to centre stage had to be through the democratic 
process (although under an ethnocratic constitution) he overthrew four years 
earlier. The point that needs emphasis here is that the coup and its aftermath 
had in fact fractionalised indigenous Fijian politics even further than assumed. 
A power struggle within the indigenous Fijian hierarchy as to who should hold 
power in post-coup Fiji progressively deepened. 
Another significant area of difference was the interpretation of the term 
“Fijian”. The 1990 Constitution defined a “Fijian” in two ways: firstly, in terms 
of direct patrilineal blood link; and secondly, acceptance by one’s mataqali for 
registration in the Vola ni Kawabula, the indigenous Fijian registry, outlining 
the pattern of land ownership inheritance and social hierarchy, based on the 
codified “traditional” social structure (Fiji Government. 1990a: 120). This 
provision was considered sexist and racist because it discriminated against 
those with indigenous Fijian mothers but with non-indigenous Fijian fathers.
The 1990 Constitution did not necessarily generate unity amongst indigenous 
Fijians (Madraiwiwi 1997). If the 1990 Constitution had in fact been meant to 
create communal cohesion, at least at the political leadership level, this was 
not to be the case. The 1990 Constitution remained a source of political and 
economic uncertainty, and as a result of both local and international pressure, 
it was eventually reviewed and replaced. The 1990 Constitution merely 
reaffirmed, although in a more dominant way, the paramountcy of Fijian 
interest already contained in the 1970 Constitution. However, it did provide 
for specific affirmative action provisions in economic development, civil service 
employment and education.  
4 Kamikamica (who passed away in 1998) was an economic “realist” (supporter of the Structural  Adjustment 
Programme). He also imposed the draconian Labour Decree mentioned in Chapter 4. But he was a political 
“liberal” who was more open to political change, compared to Rabuka, during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Rabuka’s political transformation took place later towards the mid-1990s.     
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Affirmative action provisions of the 1990 
constitution  
As I have already stated, the specific affirmative action provisions of the 1990 
Constitution dealing with socio-economic advancement should be distinguished 
here from the Constitution’s ‘political’ affirmative role of promoting indigenous 
rights and unity. Although this may sound like splitting hairs, the distinction 
made is one between the ‘higher’ ideological aspects on the one hand and the 
more concrete prescriptions on the other. 
The 1990 Constitution provided that “...Parliament shall, with the object of 
promoting and safeguarding the economic, social, educational, cultural, 
traditional and other interests of the Fijian and Rotuman people, enact laws for 
those objects and shall direct the Government to adopt any program or activity 
for the attainment of the said objects and the government shall duly comply 
with such directions” (Fiji Government. 1990a: Section 21). This provision was 
broad enough to give the government a free hand in giving directives to any 
state institution to carry out affirmative action policies. It was based on Article 
153 of the Malaysian Constitution which vested power in the Yang di-Pertuan 
(President), acting on behalf of the Cabinet, to safeguard “the special position 
of the Malays and natives of any States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate 
interests of other communities” (Malaysian Government. 1957: Article 153). 
Although various preferential policies for indigenous Fijians were already in 
place and were periodically mentioned in the various Government Development 
Plans in the 1970s and 1980s, it was deemed necessary by the post-coup 
government to have them entrenched more permanently in the Constitution. 
Apart from the constitutional provision itself, no laws were enacted to facilitate 
“those objects” mentioned. One of the reasons was that the post-coup SVT 
government did not have the legal expertise to draft affirmative action bills. In 
any case, fractionalisation within the SVT after the 1992 election would have 
made it difficult for the SVT to pass the controversial bills. 
Perhaps the most specific affirmative action provision in the 1990 Constitution 
was the prescribed quotas for the public service. While Section 127 (10) 
provided equal opportunity for “citizens who are suitably qualified” and “fair 
treatment in the number and distribution of offices to which candidates of that 
community are appointed on entry”, it contradicted itself by declaring that the 
Public Service Commission “shall ensure that each level of each department in 
the public service shall comprise not less than 50% Fijians and Rotumans and 
not less than 40% of the members of other communities” (Fiji Government. 
1990a: 115). This was gazetted on 18 December 1990 as part of the Public Service 
Commission Regulations (Fiji Government 1990: 910).
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Moreover, the interpretation of Section 21 created a dichotomy of opinions. The 
first interpretation was the ‘nationalist’ discourse, which insisted that being 
treated preferentially was an unquestionable right of indigenous Fijians as 
Taukei and therefore, it was argued, Section 21 was perfectly within the spirit of 
the international instruments relating to ‘indigenous rights’. In its submission 
to the Fiji Constitution Review Commission (CRC) in 1995, the ruling SVT drew 
attention to what it interpreted as the “consistent” nature of Section 21 of Fiji’s 
Constitution and Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination to which the Republic of Fiji was a party (Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei 1995: 95). 
The second position was based on the ‘liberal’ discourse, which argued that 
Section 21 implied domination by indigenous Fijians rather than addressing 
their disadvantaged position. The best approach, in this view, was to address the 
socio-economic position of the ‘disadvantaged’, no matter what their ethnicity 
was. A class-based rather than an ethnicity-based approach was advocated. For 
instance, in response to Section 21, and the 1990 Constitution generally, the 
National Federation Party/Labour Party Coalition produced a booklet entitled A 
Fraud on the Nation where it argued that:
There are disadvantaged people in all our communities, and our efforts 
should be directed to helping them all. Positive discrimination should 
be compatible with a democratic society; it should not vest paramount 
political power in any one community to the exclusion of others nor 
should it lead to the maintenance of separate systems for different racial 
groups. The remedial action must be proportionate, and related, to 
the need for it. The special provision must be temporary and should 
terminate after the objectives which justified them have been achieved. 
The constitution fails on all these tests (National Federation Party-
Labour Party Coalition 1990: 8-9).
Along the same trend of thought, the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum (CCF), a 
non-partisan and multi-ethnic civil society organisation, in its submission to 
the CRC recommended that affirmative action should not only address ethnic 
imbalance, but also the problems of the different disadvantaged social groups: 
The Constitution should recognise and encourage affirmative action for 
the poor and disadvantaged of all communities. Affirmative action policies 
should be researched in advance, carefully targeted, tested for cost 
effectiveness, transitional, time-limited and accountable (CCF 1995: 58). 
The CRC opted for a synthesised version of the two discourses by emphasising 
benefits for “Fijian and Rotuman people”, yet including “other ethnic 
communities” as well: 
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The Government of the Republic of Fiji Islands shall establish programmes 
which are reasonable and necessary to ensure for the Fijian and Rotuman 
people and other ethnic communities, and for women as well as men, 
and for all other disadvantaged citizens or groups of citizens, effective 
equality of access to; 
(a) education and training;
(b) land and housing;
(c) participation in commerce and all aspects of service of the Republic 
of the Fiji Islands at all levels, and;
(d) other opportunities, amenities or services essential to an adequate 
standard of living (Reeves, et al. 1996: 699). 
But the CRC dismissed the SVT argument about the compatibility of its position 
with the international instruments on indigenous rights, contending that the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination talked about 
“special measures” to facilitate the protection, advancement and development 
of “certain racial groups and individuals belonging to them”, for the purpose 
of ensuring equal “human rights and fundamental freedoms” through practices 
which “shall not be deemed racial discrimination” (Reeves, et al. 1996: 233). 
The SVT proposal merely helped to bolster the advancement of a politically 
dominant ethnic group, and marginalised others, and thus did not guarantee 
“human rights and fundamental freedoms” for other ethnic groups.   
The CRC’s recommendations were accepted after amendments by the Joint 
Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC), set up by parliament to review and 
make recommendations to parliament on the CFC report. The JPSC consisted 
of representatives of all political parties (which were ethnically-based). The 
recommendations were unanimously accepted by parliament, although with 
some amendments, and incorporated into the new Constitution. The affirmative 
action provisions of the new Constitution, which became effective from 25 
September 1998, provided that:
Parliament must make provision for programs designed to achieve for all 
groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged effective equality 
of access to:
(a) education and training
(b) land and housing
(c) participation in commerce and in all levels and branches of service of 
the State (Fiji Constitution (Amendment), Chapter 5,1997: 82). 
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It went further to create provision for an Act that specified:
(a) the goals of the program and the person or groups it is intended to 
benefit; 
(b) the means by which those persons or groups are to be assisted to 
achieve the goals;
(c) the performance indicators for judging the efficacy of the program in 
achieving the goals; and 
(d) if the program is for the benefit of a group, the criteria for the selection 
of the members of the group who will be entitled to participate in the 
program (Fiji Constitution (Amendment), Chapter 5, 1997: 82). 
Clearly the change in the definition of designated groups, from “Fijian and 
Rotuman people” (1990 Constitution) to “all groups or categories of persons who 
are disadvantaged” (1997 Constitution) was a fundamental shift, reflective of the 
new reconciliatory and consociationalist arrangements suggested by the new 
Constitution.5 Affirmative action has incorporated for a large and diverse group, 
defined not by ethnicity alone but by their being ‘disadvantaged’ in socio-
economic terms.6 The first attempt to operationalize the extended definition 
was when non-indigenous Fijian Melanesians, who were officially classified as 
‘others’, were also eligible for special scholarships and loans under the CLFS in 
1998. 
The major shift in definition of the designated groups reflected the atmosphere 
of national reconciliation apparent in the 1997 Constitution. Despite this change, 
a number of affirmative action policies had already been in place since the coup 
and contained in the 1990 Constitution, which had a significant impact in terms 
5 However, there are a number of outstanding issues in relation to this new definition, especially if 
legislation were to be enacted. How is the concept “disadvantaged” defined, and who should define it? Is 
the constitution referring to socio-economic (class) variables. If so, what are the variables and how do we 
objectively calculate and prioritise them? If the “disadvantaged” also refers to physical incapacity or political 
marginalisation, again how are these to be quantified and prioritised? Does it also include gender? If so, then 
another problem would be to disaggregate the “women” category into those who are really marginalised 
and those who are well to do and do not need affirmative action. If “disadvantaged” refers entirely to ethnic 
groups, how is that status to be justified?  This is especially so given that ethnic groups are not homogeneous; 
there are fundamental differences between the “haves”, who do not need affirmative action, and the “have 
nots”, who do. As in India, there could be great difficulty in controlling abuse and false claims to being part 
of the designated category.
6 One of the very first gestures of this redefinition was the implementation of  several affirmative measures 
by the government to ensure equitable treatment to members of the Melanesian (descendants of Solomon 
Islanders and Ni-Vanuatu who were brought to Fiji last century) and General Electors in Fiji on 9 September 
1998. This included scholarships and other developmental funds for minorities such as Melanesians  and 
others.
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of ethnic balance and ethnic relations. These were in the areas of civil service 
employment, education and economic development. We shall now discuss each 
in turn.   
Fijianization of the Civil Service
The 1990 Constitutional provision which prescribed that indigenous Fijians 
should not constitute “less than fifty per cent” of the civil service became the 
political mandate for large-scale ethnic discrimination in the civil service. After 
the coup, there was a process of deliberate displacement of Indo-Fijians in the 
civil service by the military regime, who did not trust their loyalty, or “ethnic 
reliability”, as Enloe (1980) puts it. The “state security map” (again borrowing 
from Enloe) put the Indo-Fijians at the bottom of the list of ethnic reliability. 
The figures below show this trend quite clearly.
In 1986, just before the coup, of the total number of civil service staff, 52% 
were Indo-Fijians, 43% were indigenous Fijians and 5% belonged to other 
ethnic groups. The high turnover of Indo-Fijian staff after the coup (as shown in 
Table 4.1) dramatically altered the ethnic pattern. In 1987, of the total turnover, 
79.5% were Indo-Fijians and Others, compared to 20.5% for indigenous 
Fijians; and in 1988 it was 68.2% and 31.8% respectively (PSC 1995). These 
figures were unusually higher than the average pre-coup turnover rate of 52% 
for indigenous Fijians and 48% for Indo-Fijians for 1986 and 1987 (Fiji Public 
Service Commission 1988). 
Table 4.1 Civil service staff turnover, 1987-1994
Year Fijian/Rotuman %(of total) Indian/Others %(of total) Total
1987 258 20.5 1003 79.5 1,261
1988 486 31.8 1041 68.2 1,527
1989 676 40.0 959 60 1,635
1990 532 48.8 560 51 .2 1,092
1991 393 40.9 567 59.1 960
1992 740 52 .6 666 47.4 1,406
1993 697 54.9 573 45 .1 1,270
1994 701 58.6 497 41 .4 1,198
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission 1995: 16.
However, by 1992 the rate of departure seemed to have ‘normalised’, with the 
figures for the two ethnic categories almost on par. The losses in the civil service 
were being made up by new appointments, which, as Table 4.2 shows, again 
favoured indigenous Fijians. From 1991 to 1994 indigenous Fijians constituted 
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about 60% of the annual appointments. Prior to the coup, in 1985, new 
appointments to the civil service were 47% for indigenous Fijians and 53% for 
Indo-Fijians and others (Fiji Public Service Commission 1986).    
Table 4.2 Civil service appointments, 1991-1994 
Year Fijian/Rotuman % Indian/Others % Total
1991 594 58.6 417 41 .4 1011
1992 1182 58.0 857 42 2039
1993 892 57.7 657 42 .3 1546
1994 631 57.2 472 42.8 1103
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission 1995: 16.
The turnover and appointment rates were reflected in the ethnic distribution in 
the civil service from 1991 to 1994. As already stated, the ethnic proportions 
in the civil service were 52% for Indo-Fijians and 43% for indigenous Fijians 
before the coup in 1986, and five years later, in 1991, the proportion became 
55.8% for indigenous Fijians and 44.2% for Indo-Fijians/Others (Fiji Public 
Service Commission 1995).7 This pattern was more or less consistent from 1991 
to 1994 (Table 4.3).         
Table 4.3 Total number of staff in the civil service by ethnicity
Year Fijian/Rotuman % Indian/Others % Total
1991 9,296 55.8 7,360 44 .2 16,656
1992 9,682 56 .6 7,429 43 .4 17,111
1993 9,631 56.8 7,317 43 .2 16,948
1994 9,709 57.2 7,261 42.8 16,970
Source: Fiji Public Service Commission 1995: 15.
The changes in ethnic proportions in the civil service within the ten years from 
1985 to 1995 were significant. In 1985, the figures were: indigenous Fijians 
(46.4%), Indo-Fijians (48%), minorities and expatriates (5.6%). In 1995 the 
proportion for indigenous Fijians had increased to 57.32%, while that for Indo-
Fijians had decreased to 38.57%, and minorities and expatriates decreased to 
4.11% (Reeves, et al. 1996). 
By 1997 only one of the ten heads of government departments was Indo-Fijian, 
compared to the relatively equal numbers prior to the coup. Most of those who 
left the civil service (about 80%) migrated. The migration pattern generally 
showed that in 1987 there was a net departure of 18,563, compared to 6,490 
7 Note that the category here is Indian/Others. The proportion for Indo-Fijians alone will reduce slightly if 
we subtract the number for Others, who make up about 5% of the population. 
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in 1986 and 6,193 in 1985 (Chetty and Prasad 1993: 10). Of these, 78.1% were 
Indo-Fijians (compared to 41.2% in 1980), 6.0% indigenous Fijians and 12.5% 
Others. However, by 1989 the total number of Indo-Fijians migrating had 
declined to almost half the 1987 figures (about 7,412), but the proportion still 
stood at 79%. Altogether, an estimated 50,104 people migrated in the period 
1987-1991, compared to 26,529 between 1982 and 1986. About 80% of these 
were Indo-Fijians (Chetty and Prasad 1993).
The job losses in the civil service and large-scale overseas migration of 
professional Indo-Fijians has been described as a result of ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
(Daily Post, 10 April 1999). Although not of the same degree and ferocity as, say, 
events in Kosovo or Rwanda, there was a definite trend of deliberate exclusion 
in politics and the civil service which impacted on people’s sense of security. 
The “at least not less than 50%” constitutional quota for indigenous Fijians 
became the political mandate for the Fijianization of the civil service.
The loss of highly qualified civil servants and the increased promotion 
of indigenous Fijians may have undermined the quality of state service. 
Affirmative action in the civil service became an extension of the communal 
ascendancy which the 1990 Constitution entrenched. Control of the civil service 
by indigenous Fijians was considered necessary for political paramountcy.
Apart from the civil service, the two other important state apparatuses over 
which indigenous political control was deemed necessary were the military 
and the police. The military, as we have seen, has always been predominantly 
manned by indigenous Fijians. The police force’s personnel in 1986 consisted of 
50% indigenous Fijian, 47% Indo-Fijian and 3% Others; in 1995, the figures 
were 58% indigenous Fijians, 40% Indo-Fijians and 2% Others (Fiji Police 
Department 1996). After the coup, the Indo-Fijian Commissioner of the police 
force was removed, together with other senior officers of questionable loyalty. 
He was replaced by an indigenous Fijian, who later retired to give way to an 
army officer, Colonel Isikia Savua. 
Affirmative action in this case had become a channel for ethno-nationalist 
demands. In this case, communalism went beyond its hegemonic tendency in 
manufacturing consent within the indigenous Fijian community and became the 
dominant ideology of the state. It became deployed as an ideological lever by 
the post-coup regime to marginalise Indo-Fijians in the name of paramountcy of 
Fijian interest. Thus a distinction should be made here between the two levels of 
communalism: between its role as a means of ideological and cultural spontaneity 
within the indigenous society; and, at the national level, as a politicised mode of 
ethnic domination. In a way, they were different sides of the same coin.
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Educational affirmative action  
As we have seen briefly in Chapter 3, affirmative action in education (the 50-50 
scholarship rule) had been in existence since 1977. But after the coup, affirmative 
action in education intensified, with the government pouring more resources 
into the education of indigenous Fijians. The ethnic disparities within the 
educational system had been a matter of concern to the government. However, 
this disparity needs to be historically contextualised in terms of the communal 
approach to education in the early days. 
During the colonial period a child’s access to formal education was based largely 
on her of his parents’ place in the colonial order, which in turn determined 
one’s political status and socio-economic position. The earliest schools were 
set up for the children of colonial officials and white residents. This selective 
education approach was institutionalised under the 1916 Education Ordinance, 
which established a Department of Education.8 In 1938, of the 442 schools in 
Fiji, 16 were exclusively for children of European and part-European origins, 
346 were for indigenous Fijians, and 80 for Indo-Fijians (Whitehead 1981).9 The 
standard of instruction in European schools was based on the New Zealand 
system of education, and they were staffed by qualified teachers from abroad, 
mainly from New Zealand.10 In contrast, out of the 346 schools for indigenous 
Fijians, only 144 were eligible for government grant-in-aid. Most indigenous 
Fijian schools were sub-standard and had neither proper facilities nor properly 
qualified teachers. Only seven were government schools and of these only one 
had education up to secondary level, where 38 pupils were enrolled in 1938. 
The first indigenous Fijian secondary schools were exclusively for children of 
chiefs. This was part of the colonial agenda to reinforce the hegemonic role of 
the chiefly class in the colonial order. It was much later, in the 1950s, that some 
commoners were also allowed entry into these schools. As for Indo-Fijians, in 
1938, of the 80 schools available to them, seven were government schools, and 66 
were eligible for grant-in-aid. Only one of the schools had a secondary section. 
Only about a third of Indo-Fijian children attended school.
8 The 1916 Education Ordinance was later repealed and replaced by the Education Ordinance of 1929. Under 
both ordinances, the Education Board was provided with wide-ranging powers to control the registration and 
classification of schools and teachers, the instruction to be given, the standards to be maintained, and the 
qualifications and number of teachers required for various grades of schools. With these powers, the Education 
Board was provided with a mandate for educational segregation, allowing for schools to be registered and 
classified along ethnic lines, with separate schools for Europeans and part-Europeans, indigenous Fijians, 
Chinese and Indo-Fijians. This system continued throughout the colonial period and, to some degree, after 
independence.
9 The facilities provided by the schools varied, depending on the school’s ethnic classification. European 
schools were freely supplied with books and stationery at cost price, except in the three government schools, 
where no fees were charged for primary classes, and £7.10s.0d for secondary classes.
10 Fiji’s education system was based on the New Zealand system until 1988, when Fiji developed its own 
secondary curriculum.  
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The pattern of education in the post-war years was very similar. During the 
1940s, 1950s and 1960s, school enrolment for indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian 
children increased considerably, and so did the government’s gross expenditure 
on education, but the ethnic disparity in the distribution was still significant. 
In 1947, for instance, state educational expenditure per pupil was £7.9s.7d for 
European children, £3.10s.5d for Indo-Fijian children and only £2.19s.0d for 
indigenous Fijian children. This pattern continued throughout the colonial 
period until 1970, when Fiji became independent (Narayan 1984). 
The apartheid-like ethnic separation of schools only helped to reproduce 
communal separation. The reproduction of values based on ethnic and class 
differentiation cloned a pattern of political behaviour consistent with the 
dominant hegemonic order. Robertson (1982: 89) noted that education played 
a role in the “preservation and modernisation of Fijian initiatives”. Chiefs were 
seen as modernising agents and, at the same time, guardians of indigenous 
Fijian interest, through education. Oxford-educated high chief Sukuna insisted 
that the separation of the turaga (chiefs) from the lewe ni vanua (commoners) 
was a necessity and needed to be reproduced through education. An educated 
commoner intelligentsia would be potentially subversive by “undermining and 
confusing authority to their own ends” (quoted in Scarr 1980: 146). Hence early 
higher education was to be restricted to children of chiefs (Whitehead 1981), 
while education for commoners was geared towards vocational subjects such 
as farming, boat building, mechanics and handicrafts. As a result of a request 
by the Great Council of Chiefs, the Queen Victoria School, modelled on the 
British public boarding schools, was set up to educate sons of chiefs.11 It was 
decided that instruction at the school was to be in English, while instruction 
in other indigenous Fijian schools was to be in the Fijian language. The chiefs 
had opposed but unsuccessfully the idea of commoners being taught in English 
during the period of im Thurn’s reforms as well as land reform as we saw earlier 
in Chapter 2.
So was education based not only on ethnic (or horizontal) differentiation, it 
was also based on class (vertical) regimentation.12 The process of ‘vertical’ 
regimentation in education reinforced communal hegemony, which emphasised 
11 The Ratu Kadavulevu School (RKS) was set up later for the same purpose. The Adi Cakobau School was 
set up later for daughters of chiefs.
12 Apart from reinforcing and reproducing divergent ethnic consciousness, cultural education for ethnic 
Fijians and Indo-Fijians also locked them into a subordinate level of cultural hierarchy. The teaching 
of vernacular language and aspects of local culture were considered secondary – in fact, token modes of 
pedagogy. The primary mode of instruction was, and still is, English. It was, and still is, the only compulsory 
subject in the Fiji school system. English was not only a language, but a mode of articulation and reasoning. 
It was a total cultural mould, an instrument of cultural hegemony. One’s degree of ‘civilisation’ and status in 
the community was determined by one’s proficiency in the English language and familiarity with English high 
class cultural values (Personal communication with Ratu Mosese Tuisawau, a British-educated high chief). 
High chiefs, especially the educated ones, were usually considered to be the most ‘civilised’ because of their 
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the natural right of chiefs not only to lead but also to have preferential access to 
education. It was really only in the 1960s (as a result of the transition process) 
and more so in the 1970s that education was recognised as a right for ordinary 
indigenous Fijians.13 This deliberate suppression of education for ordinary 
indigenous Fijians may give credit to the argument that communalism itself 
contributed to the relative retardation of indigenous Fijian education. 
As independence drew closer, the difference in educational attainment between 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians was becoming a serious political concern, 
especially given the dominance of Indo-Fijians in other areas of society such 
as commerce. Affirmative action in education was first recommended by the 
Royal Commission of 1969, which suggested some “positive discrimination 
provisions” for indigenous Fijians. Much later, in 1977, the Alliance government 
put in place a 50-50 scholarship policy for tertiary education. In other words, 
indigenous Fijians would receive 50% of the scholarships and the Indo-Fijian 
and Other ethnic categories would receive 50%. This was the first attempt at 
imposing quotas. This policy was encapsulated in Development Plan 6, which 
was accepted by both the Alliance and the NFP in its passage in parliament. 
However, when the government attempted to implement the policy when 
granting scholarships, there were allegations of discrimination from the Indo-
Fijian community. The reason for the allegations was that indigenous Fijian 
students could enter the University of the South Pacific’s14 Foundation (pre-
degree) Science Programme with 216 marks out of 400, while Indo-Fijians had 
to score 261 marks. This, as we saw earlier, became a major election issue during 
the 1977 general election, which the Alliance Party lost (Ali 1982). 
In the 1970s the Ministry of Fijian Affairs set up a Fijian education unit which 
worked collaboratively with the Ministry of Education to provide resources 
to indigenous Fijian schools, to provide scholarships and to monitor students’ 
progress and achievements. Despite the preferential academic policies towards 
indigenous Fijian education, there was still little improvement compared to 
Indo-Fijians. Baba (1979) showed that the failure rate amongst indigenous 
near-perfect imitation of British ‘Oxford’ English and of English upper-class cultural values and mannerisms. 
Some of these chiefs were educated at Oxford and were specially groomed by the colonial state to run Fiji and 
to continue to perpetuate British values after independence.
13 Even preferential choices (although not official) still allegedly persisted in the 1970s and 1980s. A 
controversial example was Prime Minister Mara’s son, Ratu Finau, who in 1977 achieved a Grade 4 pass (the 
lowest was Grade 5) in the pre-degree Preliminary 2 programme at the University of the South Pacific. But 
he was awarded a law scholarship despite the fact that he did not achieve a Grade 2 pass (the highest being 
Grade 1), the minimum for a law scholarship. Several other children from chiefly families were allegedly given 
scholarships ahead of indigenous Fijian students who scored higher. Coincidentally, 1977 was also the year 
when the 50-50 policy allocation for scholarships was implemented.            
14 The University of the South Pacific was set up in 1972 by 12 countries in the South Pacific as their main 
university. The countries are Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Western Samoa and Federated States of Micronesia. It is based in Suva, Fiji’s capital and has 
three campuses in Fiji, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. 
Politics of preferential development
82
Fijians at the University of the South Pacific was four times greater than that 
for Indo-Fijians. In 1980, only 20% of indigenous Fijians who sat the University 
Entrance Exam (UE) passed, compared to 33.4% of Indo-Fijians. This pattern 
was more or less consistent throughout the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1984, the 
annual average percentage of indigenous Fijian students who passed UE (i.e. 
those who passed compared to the total who sat) was 23%, compared to 26% 
for Indo-Fijians and 36% for Others.
In 1984, in response to this disparity in results by ethnicity, the Alliance 
government provided FJ$3.5 million towards Fijian education to upgrade 
indigenous Fijian educational facilities and resources (including teachers) 
at the primary and secondary school levels, and to provide scholarships for 
indigenous Fijian students. It was felt that providing assistance at an early 
stage of educational development was crucial in building up a solid educational 
base for indigenous Fijians. That made sense given the differential numbers in 
enrolment. For example, according to the 1986 census, of the total primary school 
enrolment of 67,426, there were 31,431 indigenous Fijians, 32,861 Indo-Fijians 
and 3,134 Others. In other words, indigenous Fijians constituted 46% of the 
total enrolment. (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1989). At the same census, of the total 
secondary school enrolment, there were 17,582 indigenous Fijians compared 
to 21,727 for Indo-Fijians and 2,907 for Others. This time the proportion for 
indigenous Fijians was 41%, a relative decline of 5%. According to the Fiji 
Bureau of Statistics:
[T]he larger differences in secondary enrolment between the two ethnic 
groups may in part be attributed to the unavailability of secondary 
schools in the rural areas. There were 55.0% of secondary schools in 
urban areas compared to 45.0% in rural areas. Comparatively, there was 
only 38.1% secondary enrolment in rural areas compared to 58.1% for 
primary enrolment (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1989: 30).
Indigenous Fijian students were concentrated in the rural areas. At the 1986 
Census, 67.3% of indigenous Fijians lived in rural areas, compared to 58.6% 
of Indo-Fijians. These figures were higher than the corresponding 1976 figures 
of 70% for indigenous Fijians and 60.5% for Indo-Fijians (Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics 1989: 13). This is evidence of the on-going impact of urbanisation 
on the demographics of the indigenous Fijian community. The uneven spatial 
distribution of schools was compounded by the higher failure rate for indigenous 
Fijian students in the Fiji Junior Examination in Form 4. The annual average 
failure rate for indigenous Fijians for this exam for the 5 years to 1995 was 20%, 
compared to 12% for other ethnic groups (Fiji Ministry of Education 1996: 
57). Thus, a higher number of indigenous Fijian students dropped out before 
reaching the Fiji School Leaving Certificate level in Form 6. 
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After the coup, major affirmative action measures included a further annual grant 
of FJ$2 million for Fijian education, establishment of the Fijian Education Unit 
in the Ministry of Education and the development of Educational Media Centres 
in rural areas for indigenous Fijian schools. The aim was for the “development 
of basic education, particularly improvement of access to secondary education 
for rural students” (Fiji Ministry of Education 1993: 130). However, despite 
ambitious efforts by the post-coup regime, the educational disparity between 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians persisted. For instance, in the Fiji School 
Leaving Certificate Examination (which took the place of UE in 1988) the average 
annual pass rate (i.e., percentage of all those who passed) for indigenous Fijians 
from 1990 to 1995 was 38%, compared to 60% for Indo-Fijians.
In the area of enrolment, the pre-coup pattern still persisted. In 1996, of the 
total 142,116 primary school enrolment, indigenous Fijians made up 54%. But 
out of the total of 69,921 for secondary enrolment, indigenous Fijians only made 
up 45% (Fiji Ministry of Education 1996). There was a difference of 9%, more 
than double the difference of only 5% in 1986 (as we have seen), a year before 
the coup. 
In terms of tertiary education, there was a steady increase in scholarships 
awarded to indigenous Fijians. Of the total number of university scholarships 
awarded by the Public Service Commission (PSC) from 1970 to 1974, 34% 
were awarded to indigenous Fijians; in the period 1975 to 1979, indigenous 
Fijians received 39%; in 1980 to 1984, 44%; in 1985 to 1989, 49%; and in the 
period1990 to 1992, 52%. These allocations were increasingly disproportionate, 
given the fact that indigenous Fijians constituted only about one third of all 
students qualifying to enter university. In addition to this, an average of 62% of 
all in-service training scholarships were allocated to indigenous Fijians after the 
coup, compared to the roughly 50-50 ratio before the coup (Fiji Public Service 
Commission 1995). Apart from the PSC (a government institution), the Fijian 
Affairs Board [FAB] (a major Fijian Administration institution) also provided 
scholarships, but exclusively for indigenous Fijians. Between 1984 and 1988 the 
FAB awarded 1,181 local scholarships and 150 overseas scholarships; from 1989 
to 1992 the local scholarships awarded increased dramatically to 1,719 and there 
were 108 overseas awards.
A World Bank Report estimated that about 75% of all indigenous Fijian 
students studying at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva were 
sponsored, while at the same time, 78% of Indo-Fijians were private students. 
Yet the proportions of Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians at USP were roughly 
equal (World Bank 1993). The report commented on the lack of any practical 
criteria for awarding scholarships, and noted an “acknowledged bias” in favour 
of indigenous Fijians. The report cautioned:
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Given that indigenous Fijians comprise roughly only a third of all 
students qualifying to enter university, Government’s reluctance to 
sponsor non-indigenous Fijians is clearly preventing qualified Indo-
Fijians from entering university and artificially restricting the supply 
of graduates, where students do not have the private means to support 
themselves (World Bank 1993: xv).   
Again, like the civil service affirmative action program, the pattern of affirmative 
action in education showed the extent to which the preferential award of 
scholarships had, instead of just advancing indigenous Fijian achievement, also 
undermined the rights of qualified Indo-Fijian students to university education. 
Educational affirmative action, in the context of communalism, as I have 
attempted to show, has meant the marginalisation of other ethnic groups. The 
ethnicization of what should be merit-based educational awards has continued 
to be an entrenched feature to reinforce the paramountcy of Fijian interests.
Economic affirmative action  
While the 1990 Constitution provided the political framework for affirmative 
action, there were a number of initiatives that were put into place either 
immediately after the coup, before the promulgation of the Constitution, or 
afterwards. Compared to the post-colonial Alliance affirmative action policies, 
which were bundled together with the national rural development program, 
this time affirmative action was more specific in focus and intention. The first 
coherent economic affirmative action policies of the post-coup period were 
contained in a set of proposals called the Nine Points Plan. The plan was 
produced by the Fijian Initiative Group (FIG), which consisted of indigenous 
Fijian professionals, civil servants and entrepreneurs, which first met in 1988 
(under the chairpersonship of Mara) and which became formalised in 1992. The 
proposals contained in the plan were: FJ$20 million equity was to be injected 
from the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB) to Fijian Holdings Company (FHC); a Unit 
Trust for Fijians was to be established; a Compulsory Savings Scheme (CSS) for 
Fijians was to be set up; Government concession to Fijian business was to be 
enhanced; a Management Advisory Services Department was to be established 
in the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB); and Fijians should have a minimum ownership 
of resource-based industries. Furthermore, certain sectors of the economy were 
to be reserved for indigenous Fijian investment; there should be ownership of a 
daily newspaper by indigenous Fijians; and the Fijian Affairs Board should be 
restructured and strengthened (Fijian Initiative Group 1992). 
In response to the first proposal, the government allocated a FJ$20 million 
grant to Fijian Holdings via the Fijian Affairs Board. Cabinet also approved of 
the compulsory savings concept, although it was never implemented. The Fiji 
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Development Bank bought shares in the Daily Post, an indigenous Fijian-owned 
daily newspaper, which due to operational and financial problems, was bought 
by the Fiji Government in February 1999. The idea was that the government 
shares were to be sold later to indigenous Fijians. There was also, in the 1990s, 
an increased indigenous Fijian share of the Unit Trust of Fiji. In 1993 a New 
Zealand company, Hays Consultant, undertook a review of the FAB structure 
and made recommendations about making the FAB more independent of the 
Ministry of Fijian Affairs to make it more responsive to desirable changes. These 
recommendations were accepted and came into force in early 1999.
The main follow up to the Nine Points Plan was the Ten Year Plan for Fijian 
Participation in Business (Ten Year Plan), authored by Laisenia Qarase, the 
Managing Director of the Fiji Development Bank (FDB), a leading proponent of 
ethnic Fijian affirmative action and later prime minister. It was commissioned 
by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP). The report, which was more comprehensive than the Nine Points Plan, 
suggested that the objective of affirmative action “should be the achievement 
of overall parity between Fijians and other communities in all spheres of 
activities within the shortest period of time possible” and should “ensure that 
indigenous Fijians achieve 50% ownership of the corporate sector and other 
business sectors by the year 2005” (Qarase 1994: 4) The five strategies suggested 
were: enactment of appropriate legislation with the object of promoting and 
safeguarding the interest of indigenous Fijians; reorganisation and strengthening 
of the Fijian Administration; accumulation of savings to provide investment 
capital; encouraging of indigenous Fijians in investment; and development of 
indigenous Fijian entrepreneurship, business education and training. These 
strategies merely reinforced the basic tenets of the Nine Points Plan, but the 
difference was the Ten Year Plan’s sense of urgency and the specific target of 
50% indigenous Fijian business ownership by the year 2005. 
The Ten Year Plan, which later became the government blueprint for indigenous 
Fijian business, identified a number of government-controlled industries for 
privatisation, with government shares to be transferred to Fijian Holdings and 
other indigenous Fijian corporations. These included big monopolies such as Fiji 
Post and Telecom, Fiji International Telecommunications Limited (FINTEL); Fiji 
Forest Industries Limited (FFI); Fiji Pine Limited (FPL); Tropic Woods Limited 
(TWL); Pacific Fisheries Company (PAFCO); and National Bank of Fiji (NBF) the 
crisis-ridden state-owned bank. 
A number of recommendations in the Ten Year Plan were promptly implemented. 
Some of these, similar to some of those implemented in the Nine Points Plan, 
included the reorganisation of the Fijian Administration, the expansion of Fijian 
Holdings Limited, the continuation of the Commercial Loans to Fijians Scheme, 
Unit Trust investment, the establishment of a Small Equity Fund within the 
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Ministry of Fijian Affairs and establishment of a management training scheme 
for indigenous Fijians in the private sector. The reorganisation of the Fijian 
Administration was based on the assumption that the modernisation process 
as required by affirmative action went hand-in-hand with the consolidation of 
communalism. By making the Fijian Affairs Board separate from the Ministry 
of Fijian Affairs, it was hoped that interference by the central government 
in the communal affairs of the Fijian Administration would be minimised, 
thus providing the latter with the necessary autonomy to streamline its 
communal organisational role and maintain cohesion within the indigenous 
Fijian community (Qarase 1995). However, on the other hand, in the drive 
for investment there were measures clearly designed to create a competitive 
indigenous Fijian “bourgeoisie.” 
As I have previously argued, the lack of a sizeable indigenous Fijian 
entrepreneurial class, to parallel the Indo-Fijian entrepreneurial class, was due to 
the emphasis on communal production in the colonial epoch and also during the 
period of Alliance rule. As Table 4.4 shows, towards the end of Alliance rule in 
1986 there was a distinctive relationship between ethnicity and socio-economic 
status. About 60% of those working in agriculture, animal husbandry, and 
forestry and fishing were indigenous Fijians, compared to 40% for Indo-Fijians. 
There was a preponderance of indigenous Fijians in rural-based activities, 
operating on a small scale from villages. Indigenous Fijians also dominated 
in the service industries, the main activity being tourism. Most hotels were 
located on native land and they tended to employ local villagers (mostly as 
low-paid workers), as part of the agreement with landowners. However, on the 
other hand, Indo-Fijians and other ethnic groups dominated the professional, 
technical and related workers (55%), administrative and managerial (74%), 
clerical and related workers (62%) and sales (74%) categories. 
Table 4.4 Occupational categories of economically active persons by 
ethnicity (Indians and Fijians only), 1986
Occupational Category Fijians % Indians % Total
Professional, technical and related workers 45 54 15,574
Administrative and managerial 23 76 2,090
Clerical and Related workers 38 62 13,726
Sales workers 26 74 13,832
Service workers 60 40 14,479
Agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry
workers and fishermen
60 40 102,614
Production, related workers, transport
equipment operators and labourers
56 44 28,268
Workers not classified by occupation and unemployed 70 30 13,407
Total 56 44 203,991
Source: Calculated from Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 1989: 52.
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Thus there was clearly ethnic disparity in the “middle class” categories. The 
conspicuously low representation of indigenous Fijians in the commercial 
sphere was evident in official company figures. For instance, between 1986 and 
1987, just before the coup, of the 700 companies registered by the Registrar 
of Companies, only 15% belonged to indigenous Fijians, compared to 50% 
ownership by Indo-Fijians; 20% by Others and 15% joint venture by all the 
ethnic groups (Office of Registrar of Companies, 1997).
However, it is important to point out that, although on the whole Indo-Fijians 
dominated business, even within the Indo-Fijian community itself there were 
socio-economic differences. A survey compiled by Prasad (1978: 263) showed 
that, although Gujaratis constituted a tiny proportion of the Indo-Fijian 
population, they registered 153 of the 156 Indo-Fijian tailor/draper businesses, 
35 of the 45 jewellery business, 22 of the 23 laundries, and all 13 of the 
bootmakers. Gujaratis registered 298 of the total 557 Fiji-Indian businesses. In 
comparison, non-Gujaratis tended to be dominant in the construction industry, 
with a 1:9 ratio. The same trend was evident in the transport industry, where 
non-Gujaratis registered 52 bus and taxi companies and Gujaratis only 2. All 
the butcheries were owned by non-Gujaratis (both Hindus and Muslims). Non-
Gujaratis also dominated other services such as photography, film distribution 
and auto-servicing. The “general merchant” business category was shared 
between all Indo-Fijian groups (Gujarati 50, Punjabi free immigrants 18 and 
the rest 69). This pattern of ownership persisted into the 1980s, as shown in 
a survey by Kelly (1990). Kelly showed that while Gujaratis still dominated 
tailoring, jewellery, duty free and shoe making, they had also moved into 
hardware. Of the 14 major hardware outlets, 6 belonged to Gujaratis; but there 
were no Gujaratis in the construction industry. 
The point I wish to make here is that disparity was not only inter-ethnic, it was 
also intra-ethnic. The inter-ethnic disparity tended to be over-emphasised, thus 
making it a contentious political issue. The preponderance of the Gujarati in 
‘visible’ economic activities was the basis for the distorted perception that all 
Indo-Fijians were ‘rich’. While there were identifiable inter-ethnic disparities, 
there were also intra-ethnic disparities. Class and ethnicity overlapped and cut 
across each other in various ways. But ethnic inequality has been emphasised 
because of the dominant perception in Fiji, which defines social relations 
fundamentally in ethnic terms.
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Implementing post-coup economic affirmative 
action policies
After the military coups in 1987, the need to expand and consolidate an 
indigenous Fijian entrepreneurial class became an increasingly urgent political 
priority. The former Minister for Trade and Commerce, Berenado Vunibobo, 
suggested that “Fijian society must be prepared to accept changes if our people 
are to become part of the mainstream of the economic life of our country” (Fiji 
Times, 11 January 1990: 8). “Changes” in this case referred to adaptation to 
commercial life. This was necessary to serve two purposes: firstly to enable 
indigenous Fijians to have a greater share of the market; and secondly to dispel 
the stereotypic myth reproduced over the years that indigenous Fijians were 
not culturally oriented towards private enterprise. The indigenous Fijian elites 
made it a point to be seen to be actively promoting indigenous Fijian business 
in order to win political support. Thus the focus on capital accumulation 
by indigenous Fijians at the more ‘visible’ macro level was politically more 
important for the ruling elites than the hidden “very small informally-operated 
businesses, including people who sold cordial and home-made sweets outside 
urban schools, prepared cooked food for wharf and factory workers, operated 
grass-cutting contracts and sold in the municipal markets” (Chung, 1989: 193). 
Thus after the coup, emphasis was on investment in the area of finance and 
equity (as reflected in the Nine Points Plan and Ten Year Plan), a significant shift 
from the primary commodity production strategy of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Both the Nine Points Plan and the Ten Year Plan were implemented in earnest. 
Some aspects of their implementation are outlined below.
One of the most important initiatives was the government grant of FJ$20 million 
to indigenous Fijian business in 1992. The grant was made to the Fijian Affairs 
Board, to buy “B” Class shares from Fijian Holdings Limited and hold them in 
trust for indigenous Fijians. These shares were to be sold to indigenous Fijian 
shareholders later. Since 1987, the operation of Fijian Holdings was aggressively 
extended to buy shares in many leading corporations in Fiji. Again, the 
involvement of the Fijian Affairs Board indicated the degree of importance put 
on the role of communal mobilisation, even in the realm of capitalist investment. 
The post-coup government in 1989 provided two major concessions for the 
Commercial Loans to Fijians Scheme (CLFS), which was set up by the FDB in 
1975 to assist indigenous Fijians in business. The concessions were: firstly, an 
increased subsidy of 5.5% per annum on loans up to FJ$200,000 under the 
scheme, giving an effective interest rate of 8% per annum to borrowers; and 
secondly, a cash grant equivalent to 10% of the fixed assets cost, with a maximum 
grant of FJ$20,000 for each project. Through government encouragement, 
loans under the CLFS increased dramatically after the coup. For instance, in 
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the twelve years between 1975 and 1988 there were only 4,720 loans, totalling 
about FJ$25 million. But in the five years from 1989 to 1994, there were 6,189 
loans totalling FJ$99 million. The upsurge in loan approval from 1989 reflected 
increased government concessions. Despite the initial optimism, CLFS had a 
high failure rate, with arrears averaging between 19% and 23%.  
An area in which the quota system was significant was in the taxi business. The 
taxi business was always dominated by Indo-Fijians, as shown in Table 4.5. But 
on 22 October 1993 a ministerial directive stated that Indo-Fijians were not to 
be issued new permits. As the table shows, this significantly impacted on the 
ethnic distribution of taxi permits.
Table 4.5 Distribution of taxi permits by ethnicity
Year Fijian Indian Others Total
1988 272 2,265 49 2,586
1989 272 2,265 49 2,586
1990 289 (+17) 2,260 (-5) 37 (-12) 2,586
1991 399 (+110) 2,274 (+14) 37 (nil) 2,710 (+124)
1992 554 (+155) 2,279 (+5) 46 (+9) 2,879 (+169)
1993 748 (+194) 2,235 (-44) 107 (+61) 3,090 (+21)
15 June, 1994 988 (+240) 2,239 (+4) 124 (+17) 3,351 (+261)
16 August, 1994 1,100 (+112) 2,239 139 (+15) 3,478 (+127)
11 Nov, 1994 1,234 (+134) 2,239 153 (+14) 3,626 (+148)
31 Dec, 1994 1,289 (+55) 2,239 155 (+2) 3,683 (+57)
Source: Fiji Dept. of Road and Transport, 1994: 18.
The pattern of taxi ownership before the coup was roughly similar to that of 
1988 and 1989 (Fiji Department of Road and Transport, 1994). After 1990 there 
was a deliberate policy to increase the issue of new permits to indigenous Fijians. 
In 1990, 17 new permits were issued, and this steadily increased over the years, 
so that by June, 1994 alone there was an increase of 240 in the number of new 
permits issued to indigenous Fijians since 1993. In comparison, the number of 
taxi permits issued to Indo-Fijians had declined from 2,265 in 1989 to 2,239 
in June, 1994. As a result of the ministerial directive in 1993, no new permits 
were issued to Indo-Fijians from mid-1994 onwards. By the end of December 
1994, 1,289 permits were held by indigenous Fijians compared to 2,239 held 
by Indo-Fijians. However, if the same average rate of increase continued, that 
is an average of 135 permits per month for indigenous Fijians and 0 permits per 
month for Indo-Fijians, the number of permits for both ethnic groups would be 
the same within 7 months from the end of December 1994. 
The issue of taxi permits was a clear case of reverse discrimination where, 
while there was a genuine need to increase indigenous Fijians’ share of the taxi 
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business, there was at the same time a deliberate policy to minimise the Indo-
Fijian share. Funding for new taxis for indigenous Fijians was provided by the 
CLFS, as mentioned earlier. But in 1995, CLFS funding for new permits was 
suspended due to the high rate of arrears.
One of the main indigenous Fijian commercial acquisitions was Fiji Television 
Limited (FTL). The government granted a 12-year exclusive television broadcast 
licence to FTL on the understanding that indigenous Fijian control of FTL would 
increase. In 1995, the main shareholders in FTL were FDB, 51%; Television 
New Zealand (TVNZ), 15%; Fiji Post and Telecom (FPTL), 14%; and the general 
public, 20%. The 51% of shares owned by FDB were held in trust on behalf of 
indigenous Fijians, represented by the 14 Provincial Councils (Qarase, 1994). 
The Provincial Councils owned Yasana Holdings Limited (YHL), a company 
established by the Fijian Affairs Board to look after provincial investment.  
The Village Housing Scheme (VHS) was set up by the Fiji National Provident 
Fund (FNPF) in 1987 to provide homes for Fijians living in rural villages. A total 
of 27,373 applications amounting to FJ$53.91 million were approved and paid 
out (Fiji National Provident Fund, 1996: 8).   
The Small Business Equity Scheme (SBES) was set up by the FNPF in 1990 to 
provide finance for small businesses, especially those owned by indigenous 
Fijians. Since it started, a total of 4,621 members were assisted, representing 
FJ$17.22 million in payments. In 1996, a total of 1,379 applications amounting 
to FJ$3.5 million were approved. Of these, indigenous Fijians submitted about 
90% or 1,200 applications totalling F$2.76 million in payment. The details are 
shown in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Total Small Business Equity Scheme (SBES) Loans to 1996
Loan Type Number % Amount (F$) %
Transportation 54 3.9 183,071 5 .2
Agriculture/Fishing 187 13 .6 547,365 15 .6
Retail/Wholesale 189 13.7 453,106 12.9
Small Industries 109 7.9 346,371 10.0
Equity Investments 722 52 .3 1,189,717 34.0
Property Investments 49 3 .6 540,110 15 .4
Others 69 5.0 241,469 6.9
Total 1,379 100 3,501,209 100
Source: Fiji National Provident Fund, 1996: 8.
Apart from the above, indigenous Fijians were encouraged to join together (as 
tokatoka, mataqali, tikina and other forms of group) and set up companies, with 
the government’s support. One such company was the Gaunavou Investments 
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Company Limited [GICL0 (Gaunavou translates as “modern times”). GICL 
(incorporated as a public company on 11 November 1994), was set up by 
the Suva City Fijian Urban Constituency branch of the ruling SVT “with the 
positive intention to start and promote indigenous Fijian enterprise and business 
activities” (Daily Post, 13 March 1999: 6). Amongst the shareholders were Prime 
Minister Rabuka and a number of government cabinet ministers. GICL, which 
was concerned with family-based shareholding, was meant to supplement 
Yasana Holdings (which dealt with provincial investments) and Fijian Holdings, 
which dealt with bigger shareholders.
In all of the above economic affirmative action projects, three main strategies 
could be identified. The first was the emphasis on communal investment, such 
as Fijian Holdings, Yasana Holdings and involvement of the Fijian Affairs Board; 
second was small scale of investment; and third was ethnic marginalisation as 
a result of strict quotas, as in the cased of taxi permits. The first two largely 
involved communal capitalism, a term introduced before, but which will be 
discussed in detail next. Communal capitalism was a re-adaptation of neo-
traditional communalism in the new context of commerce, and as such posed 
a fundamental contradiction; on the one hand there was the need to create an 
independent indigenous Fijian entrepreneurial class, and on the other, the use 
of neo-traditional communal arrangement in this process. The latter provided an 
inhibiting environment for the former.      
Communal capitalism
I define communal capitalism as a process whereby the communal system 
within the Fijian Administration was deployed to form commercial entities, 
and to collect and invest capital. Communal capitalism had a structure and a 
rationale. The structure followed exactly the same official structure as the Fijian 
Administration. It involved the tokatoka, mataqali, koro, tikina, yasana, and 
even the Fijian Affairs Board and Great Council of Chiefs. These various levels 
of socio-political organisations either had their own companies or were part of a 
collective commercial organisation under the yasana or Fijian Affairs Board. The 
rationale was that these communal groupings were to raise finance at different 
levels for the purpose of collective investment. The assumption was that capital 
investment was for the collective benefit of the vanua. For instance, capital for 
the provincial shares in Yasana Holdings or Fijian Holdings was collected from 
the 14 yasanas (provinces), who collected capital from the tikinas, who in turn 
collected from the koros. The koro collected its dues from the different mataqalis 
or tokatokas. Communal capitalism incorporated elements of both the communal 
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semi-subsistence and individual capitalism modes. The resultant synthesis 
was a complex interplay between two systems, an “articulation” between the 
communal semi-subsistence and capitalist modes of production.
We could describe communal capitalism as, by and large, capitalist 
entrepreneurship operating within the framework of neo-traditional social 
relations. The chiefs were mostly made directors of provincial and local 
community-based companies and their blessing was sought in every investment 
endeavour. Invested capital was conceptualised as a communal entity that 
belonged to the vanua15 or community and was symbolically epitomised in the 
chief. This mystifying appeal inspired individuals to selflessly provide capital 
through soli-vakavanua (community collection) in the name of the vanua. The 
significance of capital as an accumulative factor of production was undermined 
by loyalty to communal obligation towards the vanua. The overriding hegemony 
of the vanua as an ideological formation subsumed the identity of the individuals. 
Ownership of a company, for instance, was not seen primarily as a means 
towards accumulation but as an expression of political strength and prestige for 
the chiefs, acting on behalf of the community (personal communication with a 
group of Kadavu province villagers). So provinces were continually engaged in 
competition in their soli-vakavanua as a show of traditional rivalry for prestige 
rather than for the purpose of capital investment and competition in the market. 
Capital thus became part of the hegemonic mechanism by which chiefs were able 
to exert control over the vanua and individuals. Mismanagement and corruption 
by chiefs were considered an unquestioned part of their traditional privilege as 
head and guardian of the vanua. Recently, a number of chiefs, including the wife 
of the president, were legally challenged for abuse of the privileges described 
above. Many chiefs have, over the years, financially enriched themselves 
through this neo-traditional arrangement.
Given the contradictory demands of communal organisation and capitalist 
accumulation, there have been obvious challenges for indigenous Fijians to make 
headway in mainstream commerce. Despite the efforts directed at affirmative 
action up to 2000 there was insignificant progress in the commercial performance 
of indigenous Fijians. 
Rural indigenous Fijians and affirmative action
The earliest forms of pro-indigenous development and affirmative action 
policies took place in rural areas during the colonial period and also during the 
post-colonial Alliance rule. A number of later affirmative action projects, based 
15 The term vanua has a very ideological, political and spiritual dimension to it. It refers to the relationship 
between the land and people. It is a blanket term which refers to communal institutions, norms and values.  
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on communal capitalism (such as Fijian Holdings) directly involved villagers 
through yasana (provincial) shares. What we need to find out is, to what extent 
have the benefits of these affirmative action projects ‘trickled’ down to the 
villages in terms of socio-economic benefits over the years? 
In 1986, for instance, about 36% of the “economically active” indigenous Fijians 
in the rural area were employed in the public or private sector and received 
a wage or salary. This ratio dropped slightly to 35% in 1989 (Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics, 1991). However, in 1995 it rose again to 37%. Table 4.7 shows that 
in 1995 the total number of economically active rural indigenous Fijians (who 
made up 30.2% of the total population) involved in commercial activities were 
as follows: 2.4% retailing; 17.2% cash cropping; 1.9% livestock; 3.2% fishing; 
0.2% forestry; 1.7% service; 10.6% paid employment. In other words, only 
37% had some form of steady cash income. Within a period of almost ten years, 
from 1986 to 1995, non-subsistence economic activity in the rural areas hardly 
increased. This was despite two decades of rural-targeted affirmative action. 
Based on the above table, the percentage of indigenous Fijian villagers in business 
in relation to the total Fijian population (approximately 393,575) showed the 
following trend: retail (0.4%); manufacturing (0.005%); cash crop (2.86%); 
livestock (0.32%); fishing (0.5%); forestry (0.03%); service (2.7%); and paid 
employment (1.7%). This constitutes only about 6.19% of the total Fijian 
population. Also, as the table shows, economic disparity between provinces 
was very conspicuous, ranging from 18,107 people in businesses in Ba to 1,026 
in Serua. Only 4 of the 14 provinces had more than 5,000 people in some form 
of business activity. 
In rural areas, where communalism was still very strong, economic progress, as I 
have attempted to show above, had been virtually static, despite two decades of 
affirmative action which attempted to introduce commerce into village life. This 
contrasted with Malaysia, where the impact of affirmative action was felt within 
a short time. Indeed, the fact that indigenous Fijians congregated in communally 
organised villages inhibited their commercial development. For instance, 
figures show that in 1989, of the total 23,026 commercial farmers who lived in 
settlements outside communal villages, 20,398 (88.5%) were Indo-Fijians and 
2,628 (11.4%) were indigenous Fijians (Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 1991).
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Has embourgeoisement worked?   
The emphasis on creating and enlarging an indigenous Fijian middle class 
was part of an aggressive post-coup initiative. However, this enthusiasm was 
largely channelled towards communal capitalism. What that meant in reality 
was that indigenous Fijian business was to be embodied in indigenous-owned 
corporations such as Fijian Holdings, which would invest on behalf of indigenous 
Fijians. This undermined the competitiveness needed for individual enterprise 
and individual social mobility, thus retarding the expansion of an indigenous 
middle class. The insignificant change in the ethnic ‘middle class’ occupational 
categories for indigenous Fijians relative to Indo-Fijians in Table 4.8 for 1986 
and 1996 appears to confirm this.
Although Table 4.8 shows an increase in the number of indigenous Fijians in 
the managerial category, from 487 in 1986 to 1,292 in 1996, the real significance 
of this was much less than it appeared to be. The increase in number by almost 
three times was due to two main reasons: firstly, the definition of managerial 
category in 1996 incorporated various other sub-categories which were not 
included in 1986; secondly, as we recall, there was an increase in the number of 
loans to indigenous Fijians by the CLFS from 1992 to 1996 and thus there was 
a proliferation of companies formed to formalise business ventures. But as we 
shall see later, a lot of these CLFS loans ended up in arrears or as bad debts. This 
would have exaggerated the total number of companies owned by indigenous 
Fijian. 
Nevertheless, in general, the pattern of ethnic disparity in 1996 was almost 
the same as that ten years earlier. Indo-Fijians still dominated the managerial 
positions, with 76% of such positions being held by Indo-Fijians in 1986, 
increasing to 78% in 1996. Despite economic affirmative action measures, the 
ethnic gap had not closed: rather, it had slightly increased.            
Table 4.8 Ethnic distribution of ‘middle class’ occupational categories, 




1986 1996 1986 1996
Managerial 487 (23%) 1,292 (22%) 1,603 (76%) 4,548 (78%)
Professional and 
Technical
7,124 (45%) 13,699 (53%) 8,450 (54%) 12,351 (47%)
Total 7,611 (43) 14,981 (47%) 10,053 (57%) 16,899 (53%)
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1989; 1998.
The 1996 census report further disaggregated the managerial category into 
four sub-categories: director/chief executive; small business manager; specialist 
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managers; and other department managers. The ethnic disparity within these 
categories is shown in Table 4.9. In all sub-categories, Indo-Fijians dominated, 
with between 60% and 82% of the total. The largest difference was for the chief 
executive position, in which there were 82% Indo-Fijians and 18% indigenous 
Fijians.  
Table 4.9 Ethnic distribution of corporate managers’ category, 199616
Man. Category Fijian (Number) % Indian (Number) %
Directors/Chief Executives 196 18 879 82
Small business
managers
568 20 2,344 80
Specialist managers 193 40 285 60
Other department
managers
335 24 1,040 76
Total 1,292 22 4,548 78
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1998: 175.
The only area where there was a marked increase for indigenous Fijians was 
in the professional and technical category (as shown in Table 4.8). There was 
an increase in the number of indigenous Fijians in that category from 45% in 
1986 to 53% in 1996. This relative increase was due mainly to two reasons: first 
was the large-scale migration of Indo-Fijian professionals after the 1987 coup; 
and second was the post-coup affirmative action in employment and education 
which led to the marginalisation of Indo-Fijians in the public service, as we saw 
earlier. Most indigenous professionals and technical experts were in the public 
sector (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1998).
It is apparent that very little progress had been made in terms large-scale 
penetration of indigenous Fijians into the corporate sector, despite the 
concerted affirmative action drive. Other available figures tend to confirm this. 
As mentioned earlier, just before the 1987 coup only 15% of the companies 
registered by the Registrar of Companies belonged to indigenous Fijians, 
compared to 50% for Indo-Fijians, 20% by Others and 15% joint ventures by 
all other ethnic groups. In 1997, of the 101 local companies registered under the 
Tax Free Zones (TFZ) up to 1997, less than 10% were indigenous Fijian-owned. 
Of the 71 local companies in operation within the same period, in the TFZ only 
about 7 were indigenous Fijian-owned (Fiji Trade and Investment Board 1997).
Moreover, the post-coup state economy, especially after 1990, went through 
a period of contraction, and was not favourable for investment. Although the 
growth rate between 1989 and 1990 was a high 8%, it was followed by a period 
16 The 1996 Census Report breaks down the corporate manager category into four sub-categories; directors 
and chief executives; small business managers; specialist managers; and other department managers.    
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of low growth. From 1991 to 1995 real per capita output growth averaged only 
1% per year (World Bank 1995: 1). But despite this, the fact remains that this 
unfavourable investment climate affected everyone, including both Indo-Fijian 
and indigenous Fijians. Thus it cannot be seen as ‘the’ explanation for the 
continuing ethnic disparity in socio-economic performance.
Clearly, evidence showed insignificant improvement in the socio-economic 
situation of indigenous Fijians relative to Indo-Fijians between 1970 and the 
late 1990s, despite the exhaustive affirmative action measures. Indeed, the 
problem, as I have argued, needed to be understood in the broader sociological 
and political dimension, which requires an analysis of the interplay between 
socio-economic imperatives and the dictates of the dominant ideological and 
political processes rooted in the communal schema. Affirmative action and 
associated development policies have continuously been subsumed under 
communal hegemony, thus undermining intended socio-economic progress. But 
the prevailing belief in official circles tended to undermine attempts to come 
to terms with the fundamental cause of the problem, as reflected in Qarase’s 
assertion: 
There is no doubt that the long-term security and stability of Fiji will 
depend, to a large extent, on the country’s ability to close the gap that 
exists between Fijians and other ethnic groups in the various sectors 
mentioned. Closing the gap is a national problem and the solutions will 
require the support of all communities in Fiji. There is no time for debate 
on “why” and “how” Fijians are so far behind in Fiji’s modern economy. 
Such a debate would mainly be irrelevant and futile (Qarase 1994: 4).
But stifling the debate on the “why” and “how” of the indigenous economic 
malaise continued to reproduce the problem. The problem was embedded in the 
socio-political and ideological schema of communalism. This is perhaps where 
Fiji and Malaysia differed in some respects. Affirmative action in Malaysia tried 
to promote individual rather than communal investment. 
The Malaysian connection
Fiji, like other developing countries (e.g. South Africa, Namibia) had been 
obsessed with the Malaysian model of affirmative action, considered to be 
highly ‘successful.’ The business affirmative action strategy in Fiji, especially in 
relation to the development of indigenous investment and financial institutions, 
was based on the Malaysian model and this modelling intensified after the 1987 
coup.
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Fiji’s links with Malaysia went back a long way. Relations were first established 
when the 1st Battalion of the Fiji Infantry Regiment was deployed in Malaysia 
(then called Malaya) from 1952-56 as part of the Commonwealth forces sent 
to suppress the communist insurgency during the “Malayan Emergency”. The 
Malaya operation was politically significant because it reinforced the prevailing 
self-perception of indigenous Fijians as a “warrior race”, to be deployed not only 
locally against Indo-Fijian trouble makers, but also internationally to support 
other indigenous peoples against “foreign” dominance (Nawadra 1995). The 
version of events Fijian soldiers were indoctrinated with was simple – to ‘save’ 
the indigenous Malays (kai Maleya) from the ‘evil’ communists (komunisi). In 
fact the term komunisi, like kai Idia (Indian), came to be associated with people 
of unscrupulous and arrogant behaviour within indigenous Fijian society.
Trained and ideologically conditioned in ethnic warfare at home, the Fijian 
soldiers  perfectly fitted into their “liberating” role in Malaya against the largely 
Chinese communists. The Fijian soldiers’ exploits have been mythologised in 
traditional dances (meke) and songs (sere).17 Significantly, many of the future 
leaders of Fiji, including the a Governor General and President, Ratu Penaia 
Ganilau (then a colonel and himself commander), and several members of the 
Alliance Party Cabinet, were officers in the deployed Fiji Battalion. This was 
where the political link was cemented, leading to Fiji’s interest in ‘importing’ 
the Malaysian political model of consociationalism, which attempted to maintain 
national unity, yet provided for indigenous Malay political ascendancy. The 
Malaysian political model was seen as a desirable future alternative for Fiji 
after independence in 1970, but this idea was temporarily shelved after the 
May 1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia. During his reign as Prime Minister, Mara, 
himself a great fan of Malaysian politics, visited Malaysia to cement political 
and economic ties. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established 
in 1977 and Malaysia set up its embassy in Fiji in 1984. In 1988, one year after 
the coup, Fiji set up its embassy in Kuala Lumpur.
The political and economic links between Fiji and Malaysia strengthened 
after the 1987 military coup. The coup was seen as a parallel event to the 
1969 Malaysian race riots, after which indigenous Malaysian ascendancy 
was politically crystallised. Now that the coup had provided the platform for 
indigenous Fijian ascendancy, there was almost a sense of urgency to emulate the 
Bumiputeraism experience, as reflected in the words of the former ambassador 
to Malaysia, Dr Ahmed Ali, quoted in the Fiji Ministry of Information monthly 
bulletin, Fiji Focus: 
17 Bula Maleya (Hello Malaya), one of the most popular songs in the South Pacific, was appropriated  by 
Elvis Presley as the lyric for his song, Drums of the Island.  
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Fiji has much to learn from Malaysia... Fiji should also examine Malaysia’s 
approach to elevating the socio-economic position of its Bhumiputras and 
securing them their political primacy. In addition Fiji could also draw 
from Malaysia’s strategies for unity, its insistence on its own values, its 
religious and language policies – all these provide guidelines towards 
successful living in a multi-ethnic society (Fiji Ministry of Information. 
1994: 39). 
A bilateral agreement was put in place to facilitate trade promotion and training 
for Fiji citizens and in 1993 the Fiji Trades and Investment Board mounted a 
Fiji Week in Kuala Lumpur as a way of reinforcing trade links. In the mid 1990s 
Malaysia was Fiji’s second largest importer of sugar, after the European Union. 
This accounted for 103 million tonnes of sugar annually through a long-term 
agreement.18 
Malaysian corporate investment in Fiji was limited to Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
manufacturing, tourism and finance. Some of the latest acquisitions included 
South Pacific Textile (Fiji) Ltd, employing 250 people; the SIA Cash and Carry 
– a joint venture with local employees operating a retail outlet for imported 
garment and fashion accessories and the Malaysian Bank/National Bank of 
Fiji partnership; and massive equity in the Carpenters Corporation, one of the 
largest wholesale and retail outlets in Fiji. In tourism, the Malaysian Berjaya 
Corporation owned the Berjaya Inn; Sateras Resources Limited owned the 
Tokatoka Resort near Nadi International Airport and the Suva Motor Inn in 
Suva; and the Malaysian Shangri-La owned the Mocambo Hotel and the Fijian 
Hotel, Fiji’s largest five-star tourist resort at that time. In selling Fiji to Malaysian 
investors, Dr Ahmed Ali said:
...businessmen in both Malaysia and Fiji can tap the huge opportunities 
available in each other’s countries...We want to welcome Malaysians to 
Fiji to do business and even share their knowledge and experience with 
us both in the public and private sectors. We also want to give something 
in return, not merely take (quoted in Business Times 1994: 10). 
Part of the training program through the bilateral agreement was the sponsoring 
of the Chief Executive of Fijian Holdings Company to study affirmative action 
in Malaysia, in particular how the Bumiputera trust agency, National Equity 
Corporation (NEC), worked and how it could be emulated in Fijian Holdings.19 
18 In 1993 the trade balance with Malaysia was between F$16-F$30 million surplus. Malaysia’s exports to 
Fiji include yarn, rubber, telecommunication and electrical appliances.
19 NEC is one of Malaysia’s leading investment institutions, set up by the Malaysian government to 
facilitate the Bumiputera participation in business. Through heavy government subsidy, and help from the 
Bumiputera Investment Foundation (which helps Bumiputeras to save money and develop entrepreneurship 
and investment skills), the corporation has been able to achieve a level of investment exceeding US$8.26 
billion. The government assistance package includes general financial support of about US$1,475 million, 
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In August 1996, Gen. Rabuka visited Malaysia, where he expressed deep interest 
in “Malaysia’s privatisation policy because it ensured indigenous participation 
in government-owned programs and assets” (The Fiji Times, 10 August 1996: 4) 
and took up Malaysia’s offer to help in Fiji’s privatisation program. But Rabuka 
was advised by Prime Minister Mahathir (who has been a leading campaigner 
for Fiji’s re-admittance into the Commonwealth), that, while privatisation was 
important (Fiji had embarked on a major privatisation program), it was also 
important that “strict consideration must be given to ensuring that there is no 
direct sell-out of Government programs and assets” (quoted in The Fiji Times, 
10 August  1996: 4). Rabuka’s later visit to Malaysia was in September 1998, 
to coincide with the Commonwealth Games in Kuala Lumpur. During this trip, 
Rabuka was given a car by the Malaysian Prime Minister as a gift.
During the third Fiji/Malaysia bilateral meeting in Fiji in July 1997, Fiji’s Foreign 
Minister reiterated what had become a recurrent rhetoric about Fiji’s obsession 
with Malaysia:
Fiji hopes to draw on the success of Malaysia in the last 20 years as a 
model at this crucial state in the nation’s political history...Fiji realised 
that political stability was a requirement for economic growth. We 
should consider the Malaysian example as a very good pointer for us in 
the context (Fiji Times, July 3 1997: 3).
Perhaps the most controversial Malaysian involvement in Fiji was when the 
ruling SVT Party and the government employed Malaysian Federal judge, 
Zakaria Yatim, in the review of Fiji’s 1990 Constitution. Yatim’s role was to 
provide input based on the position of the Bumiputera provided in the Malaysian 
Constitution. He prepared the SVT submission to the CRC and also worked for 
the government as consultant for the Fijian Affairs Board and Prime Minister’s 
office. Part of his contribution was to transplant the affirmative action provisions 
of the Malaysian constitution into the Fiji Constitution. Yatim’s role was publicly 
criticised by the opposition parties as tantamount to “foreign intervention”, 
and even in Australia, a judge said that he was “distressed to learn that an 
advisor to the Fijian leader was a Malaysian Constitutional expert”, claiming 
that “The constitution of Malaysia was one of the most repressive constitutions 
one could imagine” (Daily Post, 17 June 1997: 3). 
In adapting the Malaysian affirmative action model, Fiji was also faced with its 
own version of Malaysia’s long-standing dilemma of reconciling the communal 
agenda and economic modernisation. 
transfer of government shares at par to the corporation from forty profitable companies, a 14-year tax holiday 
and exemption from stamp duties and share transfer tax and use of government infrastructure and facilities to 
promote two unit trust schemes to mobilise the savings of Malays for investment (Fijian Holdings 1994: 11-12). 
Today Fijian Holdings Company operates as a miniature version of NEC.
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5. Social engineering: Attempts to 
create an indigenous entrepreneurial 
class 
The affirmative action policies after the 1987 coup was driven largely by the 
desire to “catch up” with the Indo-Fijian in the business sector by engaging 
indigenous Fijians in entrepreneurship to a greater degree. The creation of 
a vibrant indigenous middle class was a way of driving indigenous Fijian 
development forward to maintain ethnic balance and stability. Most of the 
affirmative action projects were targeted at urban, middle-class indigenous 
Fijians and hardly any was targeted at rural development for villages. 
As we saw in the last chapter, the post-coup affirmative action programs 
prescribed under the Nine Points Plan, and later the Ten Year Plan, shifted the 
emphasis from primary production to large-scale financial investment, based on 
the Bumiputera model, to create an indigenous Fijian bourgeoisie to counteract 
the economic power of Indo-Fijians. 
This chapter examines in detail some of the main post-coup affirmative action 
initiatives in the area of investment, focusing on the following: Fijian Holdings 
investment; Fiji Development Bank’s Commercial Loans to Fijians Scheme; the 
Equity Investment Management Company Limited (EIMCOL) store scheme; the 
Fiji National Provident Fund Small Business Equity Scheme and National Bank 
of Fiji loans. In particular it will focus on communal capitalism and implications 
for the formation of an indigenous bourgeoisie generally. 
Many of these projects were interrelated. All of them were collaborative 
initiatives between the government and Fijian institutions. Some of them, as we 
have seen in the last chapter, continued from the Alliance era, and were given 
an extra boost after the coup, while some were post-coup initiatives. However, 
for a number of reasons, many of these initiatives failed and left behind negative 
images of affirmative action.  
Fijian Holdings Company 
As we have seen, Fijian Holdings Company (FHC) was formed by the Great 
Council of Chiefs before the coup, but became the main focus of the drive 
towards indigenous capitalism after the coup. While it had played the role of 
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facilitator of indigenous Fijian business since it started, it was aggressively 
expanded after 1987 in an attempt to capture a large segment of the corporate 
sector for indigenous Fijians.
In fact Fijian Holdings has its genesis back in 1970 after independence, when 
Prime Minister Mara approached the Australian multi-national Burns Philp 
Limited (BP) to help in the development of indigenous Fijian entrepreneurship 
through collaboration in business in the form of share acquisition. BP was 
the biggest company operating in Fiji and the South Pacific and had interests 
in shipping, butcheries, wholesale, retail, copra production, breweries, and 
automobiles, to name a few. Part of the agreement was for indigenous Fijians to 
be members of the company board of directors to accustom them to boardroom 
culture. Through this arrangement, it was hoped that, not only would the 
indigenous Fijians benefit financially from their investment, they would also 
receive the necessary training and acquire skills that would catapult them into 
the competitive world of business.
However, it was not until 16 February 1984 that the Great Council of Chiefs 
(GCC) decided to buy up to 50% in Burns Philp, under the following conditions: 
FJ$40 million was to be raised to buy shares from Burns Philp; Provincial 
Councils and other indigenous Fijian organisations were to be encouraged to 
collect their initial shares of FJ$1.5 million; a joint venture between the Fijian 
Affairs Board and Burns Philp was to be encouraged, and the Fiji government 
was to seek assistance from the Australian government for further financing; the 
Native Land Development Corporation (NLDC) was to be the holding company, 
and carry out negotiations with Burns Philp on the purchase of shares. While 
there was an urge to enter into capitalist investment, there was also a desire to 
do so within the patronising ambit of communal organisation.
Because the NLDC did not have the expertise and capacity to undertake such 
a high-risk business venture, it was decided to create a new entity to be called 
Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL). FHL was incorporated in 1984 with the following 
objectives: 
...to increase Fijian participation in the commercial sector. The company 
achieves this through acquisition of equity in established, well-managed, 
profitable companies with excellent prospects for growth. It will: maintain 
a prudent and conservative approach to financial decision-making; Seek 
investments which have economically strategic significance; Endeavour 
to ensure the benefits from its investments are spread as widely as 
possible among the Fijian people; Promote the training of Fijian business 
executives, bearing in mind the need for attainment of high standards of 
professionalism, competitive performance and commercial skills (Fijian 
Holdings 1996: 3).
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FHL’s role was limited to the acquisition of equity. Its strategy was “to increase 
Fijian participation in the commercial economy...through acquisition of equity 
in established, well-managed, profitable companies with excellent prospects 
for growth”, with “benefits spread as widely as possible among the Fijian 
people” (Fijian Holdings Limited 1994: 1). To ensure wide distribution of 
its benefits amongst indigenous Fijians, three types of shares were initially 
suggested; Provincial shares, Native Land Trust Board shares and Fijian Affairs 
Board shares.1 Thus, as Table 5.1 shows, on 10 December 1984, when FHL was 
incorporated, the value of shares, distributed between the Provinces, Native 
Land Trust Board and Fijian Affairs Board, totalled more than FJ$1 million. 
Table 5.1 Initial Fijian Holdings shares, December 1984  
Shareholders Amount ($F)
Ba Provincial Council 51,968.25
Bua Provincial Council 50,000.00
Kadavu Development Company 51,608.07
Lomaiviti Provincial Council 51,968.25
Macuata Provincial Council 51,968.25
Nadroga Provincial Council 51,968.25
Rewa Provincial Council 51,968.25
Lau Provincial Council 50,501.25
Naitasiri Provincial Co-operative 31,227.13
Cakaudrove Provincial Council 100,000.00
Fijian Affairs Board 101,968.25
Native Land Trust Board 500,000.00
Total 1,145,145.95
Note: At this stage, only 10 of the 14 Provinces had been allocated their shares. The Kadavu Development 
Company and the Naitasiri Provincial Co-operatives are owned by the Kadavu and Naitasiri Provinces 
respectively. 
Source: Fijian Holdings Limited 1984. 
The provinces without equity shares during the initial stage were Namosi, Ra, 
Serua and Tailevu, but later on they were also involved. Of the FJ$1,145,145.95 
1 This approach was modelled along the lines of Malaysian state-established and supervised enterprises 
such as the National Equity Corporation (NEC), which held shares in trust on behalf of the Bumiputeras. But 
one of the fundamental differences was that the Malaysian investment institutions, although linked to statal 
political interference, were run by bureaucrats, operating within the capitalist entrepreneurial framework, 
outside the realm of traditional politics and culture. In the case of Fiji, traditional institutions were directly 
part of the investment projects. While Malaysian financial institutions held shares in trust for individual 
Bumiputeras, and were (and still are) ultimately accountable to the government, Fijian Holdings held shares in 
trust for neo-traditional/neo-colonial socio-political institutions (Fijian Affairs, Native Land Trust Board and 
Provinces), claiming to represent the legitimate interest of indigenous Fijians, and were ultimately responsible 
to the Great Council of Chiefs.  
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collected by the provinces, FJ$1million was used to purchase 1,000,000 “A 
Class” shares in a big company called Basic Industries Limited.2 At this time 
there were no limited liability shareholdings.
The communal shares were based on two assumptions; first, indigenous Fijian 
elites were convinced that, after years of dependence on colonial paternalism 
and communal encapsulation, indigenous Fijians were not in a situation to 
independently pursue large-scale investment as individuals; secondly, it was 
assumed that communal shares represented the common interest of the vanua 
and thus had to be sustained at all cost. Thus communal shares became symbolic 
of two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand was the response to the 
modernisation imperative and on the other was the need to maintain communal 
socio-political cohesion. 
Two proposals were later made to FHL as a way of expanding its investment: the 
first was that Fijian Holdings should buy majority shares in two companies, Fiji 
Industries Limited and Standard Concrete Industries Limited (both owned by 
Basic Industries Limited, a foreign company); the second option was that shares 
should be bought from the Carlton Brewery (Fiji) Limited.3 The second option 
suggested that the state-subsidised Fiji Development Bank (FDB), which already 
had the capital, should act as a middle dealer by buying the shares, and then 
later sell them to FHL. This would solve the problem of raising initial capital 
and also ensure a smooth transition of equity sales.
The Great Council of Chiefs agreed to the proposals, and as a way forward, an 
action plan was drawn up by the FHL board to increase share capital from the 
Provincial Councils, the Fijian Affairs Board and the Native Land Trust Board 
to finance the purchase of shares from Basic Industries and Carlton Brewery.4 
Fijian Holdings rapidly increased its investment and growth within a few years. 
In fact in 1985, a year after its inception, it was already paying dividends 
to shareholders. By 1992, profit after tax had reached FJ$2,752,554, after 
a downturn in 1987 and 1988 because of the effects of the military coup on 
the economy. The increase in investment and return was reflected in the rate 
2 “A Class” shares are high dividend investments compared to low dividend “B Class” shares.
3 Carlton Brewery is an Australian multinational which brews Fiji Bitter (the only beer brewed in Fiji), 
Carlton Beer and Fosters Beer.  
4 It was proposed that FJ$2 million was to be raised to buy shares in Basic Industries and FJ$4 million for 
Carlton Brewery, to top up the FJ$1million already collected, to make a total of FJ$5 million. A number of 
Provinces were not happy with the change in plan from investment in Burns Philip to investment in Basic 
Industries and Carlton Brewery, because they were not informed beforehand. The Board of Fijian Holdings 
considered the Burns Philip investment a risk because of its declining operations in Fiji, having sold most of 
its assets to W.R. Carpenters. The Methodist Church of Fiji, the largest and most politically powerful religious 
organisation objected to the Carlton Brewery shares, because of their association with liquor, drunkenness, 
crime and other forms of anti-social behaviour.
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of dividends paid. As Table 5.2 shows, since 1985 the dividend increased 
substantially, except during the 1987 and 1988 period due to the disruption 
caused by the military coup.  
Table 5.2 Fijian Holdings dividends paid, 1985-1992







1992 (interim) 10 173,645
1992 (partly) 10 464,793
Total 1,445,644
Source: Fijian Holdings Limited 1993: 4.
Fijian Holding’s communal investment strategy posed two fundamental problems: 
first, it was difficult to see how an indigenous Fijian bourgeois class could 
develop (as in Malaysia) if investment was restricted to communal institutions; 
second, there was the question of how redistribution of benefits to the people 
could take place. There was increasing pressure from leading indigenous Fijian 
bureaucrats and professionals not to restrict shares to the Fijian Administration 
institutions, and to open up shares to individuals. As a response to this pressure, 
the status of the company changed in 1992 from ‘public’ to ‘private’, to allow 
for private investment, either on an individual or group basis. 
It was hoped the change would “greatly increase the number of shareholders 
and … cater for individual Fijian investors, Fijian-owned companies and tikina 
councils”,5 so that the “benefits of Fijian Holdings’ shareholdings are spread as 
widely as possible” (Fijian Holdings Limited 1993: 7-8). The ceiling for individual 
shares was put at FJ$10,000 and to ensure that only indigenous Fijians were to 
buy shares individual shareholders were confined to those registered in the Vola 
ni Kawa Bula, the kinship register, which officially defined a “Fijian”. So while 
the restriction which guaranteed monopoly by communal investment was lifted, 
a further restriction, based on the ethnic background of individual investors, 
was imposed. This restriction was a direct application of the 1990 Constitution 
provision on pro-indigenous affirmative action and the controversial definition 
of the ethnic category, “Fijian”.
5 A tikina is a district, which usually consists of several villages. Several tikina make up a yasana (province).
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Moreover, the prescribed ceiling of FJ$10,000 was too low to yield a reasonably 
high return, especially for the aspiring indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs. The 
rules were changed overnight by the FHL board, who themselves had an 
interest in individual shares. We will deal with the acquisition of individual 
and associated problem shares later, but at this stage we need to examine the 
commercial operation of FHL and some of its dilemmas.
The dramatic expansion and consolidation of FHL in the 1990–1994 period was a 
result of the FJ$20 million interest-free loan provided by the post-coup government 
in 1989, under the Nine Points Plan affirmative action initiative. Paid-up capital grew 
from FJ$1.2 million in 1985 to FJ$27.5 million in 1994. The total assets rose from 
FJ$1.3 million in 1985 to FJ$36.3 million in 1994. The net value of assets increased 
from FJ$170,248 in 1985 to FJ$3.2 million in 1994. FHL dividend paid to shareholders 
was at 20% for “A Shares” and 5% for “B Shares”. The “B Shares” were held in 
trust and invested for indigenous Fijians by the FAB from the FJ$20 million provided 
by the government as mentioned above. The dividend paid on these shares was to 
accumulate in a sinking fund to cater for the repayment of the FJ$20 million loan by 
the FAB to the government. It was anticipated that over time these shares would be 
sold to indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs. 
By 1994, as Table 5.3 shows, FHL had an interest in nine major companies in Fiji. 
Table 5.3 Details of Fijian Holdings Limited’s investment portfolio, as at 30 
June 1994
Company No. of Shares Shareholding (%) Amount (FJD$)
Basic Industries Ltd:
• Original 1,232,000 41 1,242,486
• Ex Pioneer 1,500,000 50 2,270,132
• Ex FDB 268,000 9 309,741
• Ex BP (FIL Shares) 1,050,000 1,050,000
• Hume Industries (Ex CSR) 2,000,000 2,000,000
Fiji Sugar Corporation
(Ex Fiji Government)







Unit Trust of Fiji 500,000 8.9 700,000
Motibhai & Company Ltd 2,000,000 100 (P) 2,007,125











Goodman Fielder Watties 2,000,000 100 (P) 2,003,757
Total 27,111,948
Source: Fijian Holdings Limited 1995; Fijian Holdings Limited 1996.
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Table 5.4 shows the percentage of shares, profits and type of investment of FHL. 
The annual profitability of FHL was the impetus for aggressive expansion of its 
acquisition and investment diversification.
Table 5.4 Fijian Holdings investments, 1995
Company Shares % Profit (F$) Types of Investment 
Basic Industries Ltd 100 2 .2 million Manufacturing
Fijian Property Trust Ltd 89.7 not available Real Estate
Carpenters Property Ltd 50.01 .808 million Real Estate
Merchant Bank of Fiji 50 .870 million Commercial, Personal Loans
Carlton Brewery Fiji Ltd 30.1 2 .45 million Beer Production
Goodman Fielder (Fiji) Ltd 100* not available Consumer Goods
Motibhai & Company Ltd 100* 3.91 million Diverse Commercial interests
Fiji Sugar Corporation 12.8 12 .3 million Sugar Production
Unit Trust of Fiji 8.9 1.09 million Capital Investment 
* For Goodman Fielder, 100% is for the preference shares, and 10% for the ordinary shares. For Motibhai, 
100% is for the preference shares.
Source: Fijian Holdings Limited 1995.
The pattern of FHL investment shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 indicated four 
tendencies. Firstly, in line with the Ten Year Plan for greater indigenous control 
of the corporate sector, FHL had progressively expanded into buying whole 
companies and majority equity. This was indicative of the degree of confidence 
it had generated with the financial and political support of the government and 
leading private sector businesses. 
Secondly, faced with the reality of the market, FHL had to temporarily abandon its 
communal character and purchase shares from non-indigenous Fijian companies 
such as Motibhai Group, an Indo-Fijian company which had close links with the 
Mara regime. The rest were expatriate companies, except for the Unit Trust of 
Fiji and Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC), which were public companies. 
Thirdly, funding for the FHL shares came from two major sources, government 
and FDB. FDB itself was a para-statal institution, subsidised by the government, 
and headed by Laisenia Qarase, the author of the Ten Year Plan. Most of the 
shares, as shown in Table 5.4, were originally secured by the FDB and then sold 
later to FHL. The government contribution of FJ$20 million, as already stated, 
was held in trust by the FAB for future distribution. The direct link between 
the state and the communal schema was evident here. The link was not only 
political and ideological but also financial. However, on the one hand FHL had 
to rely on political patronage and financial support from the state, and on the 
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other it relied on the private sector for investment. We have to remember that 
the state, at this time, was fundamentally an ethnocratic one, under the 1990 
Constitution.
Fourthly, while the long-term beneficiaries of the FHL were supposedly the 
shareholders (communal and individual), the most immediate beneficiaries 
were the corporations in which FLH invested. FHL provided the badly needed 
capital to sustain some of those companies at a time when economic contraction 
had affected local investment. In other words, affirmative action was directly 
subsidising the operation of local and foreign companies such as Motibhai 
Group of Fiji and Carlton Brewery of Australia. Furthermore, some of these 
companies, such as Carlton Brewery, Basic Industries and Goodman Fielder, 
were monopolies which would be able to enjoy their dominance in the market 
through links with the indigenous Fijian elites and direct state patronage.6 
Another issue of concern was the distribution of benefits from FHL shares. 
Again, here, we need to disaggregate between two levels of analysis: ideological 
discourse and empirical contextualisation. The first refers to the political 
justification for Fijian Holdings’ operations, as reflected in Fijian Holdings’ 
philosophy: “As a Fijian institution we have a responsibility for promoting and 
protecting the commercial interests of the Fijian community [my emphasis] and 
helping to secure its rightful place in the economic affairs of the nation” (Fijian 
Holdings Limited 1996: 1). The second level refers to the actual flow of economic 
benefits and socio-political implications of FHL’s shareholdings. An empirical 
examination of the operations of Fijian Holdings is crucial in this regard.   
Who ‘controlled’ Fijian Holdings Limited? 
FHL was set up under the communal jurisdiction of the Great Council of Chiefs, 
with the direct involvement of the government. But how was this political 
mandate translated into commercial shares? Table 5.5 shows that in 1992 the 
total number of shares for the “A” category was 4,647,934, while the total for the 
“B” category was 20,000,000; with a combined total of 24,647,934 shares. Of this 
total, communal shares (which included shares held by NLTB, FAB, Provincial 
Councils and Tikina Councils) comprised 22,521,934 shares or 91% of the total 
of FHL shares. On the other hand, the individual shares (this included family 
and individual group shares) comprised 2,126,000 or 9% of the total FHL shares.
6 For some time Fijian Holdings executives have been trying to reverse some of the government’s deregulation 
policies such as competition in cement and concrete manufacturing which has been monopolised by Basic 
Industries.   
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Table 5.5 Shareholding for Fijian Holdings Limited
Shareholders A Class 
Shares
% A B Class 
Shares
% B Communal Individual
Native Land Trust Board 500,000 10.75 - - x
Fijian Affairs Board 100,000 2 .1 20,000,000 100 x
Ba Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Lomaiviti Provincial Council 55,100 1.18 - - x
Nadroga Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Macuata Provincial Council 116,612 2 .5 - - x
Rewa Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Lau Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Cakaudrove Provincial Council 120,000 2.58 - - x
Bua Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Koula Trust 40,000 0.86 - - x
Kadavu Development Company 50,100 1.07 - - x
Naitasiri Province Co-op Ass Ltd 31,327 0.67 - - x
Ra Provincial Council 50,100 1.07 - - x
Tailevu Provincial Council 19,951 0.42 - - x
Serua Provincial Council 10,100 0.21 - - x
Namosi Provincial Council 10,660 0.22 - - x
Cicia Plantation Co-op 400,000 8.6 - - x
Nabukebuke Nailili Co Ltd 2,000 0.04 - - x
5X Investment Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
KB Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Kubuna Holdings Ltd 5,000 0.1 - - x
Kesaia Palu Vatu 1,000 0.02 - - x
Markin Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
AWR Investments Ltd 10,000 0.21 - - x
Mavana Investments 200,000 4 .3 - - x
Bakani Investments 150,000 3 .2 - - x
Q-Ten Investments 200,000 4 .3 - - x
Kingfisher Enterprises Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Vensalisi Investments Ltd 80,000 1.72 - - x
Stiks Investments Ltd 150,000 3 .2 - - x
Duavata Holdings Ltd 150,000 3 .2 - - x
Ratu Mara Education Trust Fund 300,000 6 .4 - - x
Vunikoro Investment Ltd 50,000 1.07 - - x
Lana Investments Ltd 95,000 2.04 - - x
Nabuabua Holdings Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Mualevu Tikina Holdings Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
KYJ Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Baravi and Associates Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
M.B Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Kepa Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Vunidogo Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Rukuruku Investments Ltd 50,484 1.08 - - x
Taoi Investments Ltd 200,000 4 .3 - - x
Rafire Investments Ltd 100,000 2 .1 - - x
Rabuli Investment Ltd 50,000 1.07 - - x
Total 4,647,934 100 20,000,000 100 25 21
Source: Fijian Holdings Limited 1992. 
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Although there was a dominance of communal shares over individual shares, 
the value of the individual shares was far superior if one were to divide the 
communal provincial shares by the population of the provinces. The reality 
about the communal shares was that they did very little to enhance wealth 
distribution because not only was the return minimal, but also they were locked 
up in the communal institutions and very little, if any, value trickled down to 
the ordinary people.
Fijian Holdings and communal capitalism
Communal investment was one of the cornerstones of communal capitalism. 
Indeed, we have seen how communal capitalism became the dominant mode of 
investment in FHL (totalling 91% of total FHL shares). Communal investment 
within FHL occurred at various levels of communal organisation: the NLTB and 
FAB, provincial and tikina levels. Although under commercial law these bodies 
were legal entities in their own right, politically they were regarded as dau 
ni veiqaravi (servants) of the vanua and the Great Council of Chiefs. We now 
examine each of the main communal investors.
Native Land Trust Board (NLTB)
I wish to do three things here. First, to briefly explain the role and activities 
of the NLTB; second, to examine some of the contradictions it encountered as 
a communal institution attempting to be involved in commercial ventures; and 
third, to examine the implications of NLTB shares in FHL in the light of the 
broader socio-political context. 
The biggest communal shareholder under the “A” Class shares (10.75%), NLTB 
was founded in 1940 by Sukuna, who described it “as a monument of trust in 
British rule, of confidence in its honesty and hopes for the future” (Native Land 
Trust Board 1975: 2). Its role was to administer indigenous Fijian land. The 
NLTB was to “provide the best services with the effective use of Native Land 
and other resources at our disposal to meet the expectations of our landowners, 
tenants, Government and other customers” (Native Land Trust Board 1995: 8). 
By 2000 the NLTB administered about 83% of the country’s land, and of this 
420,000 hectares are leased out to 24,700 tenants in agriculture, commerce, 
industry, tourism, and public and civil projects. From 1990 to 1994, through 
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the NLTB indigenous Fijian landowners received about FJ$80.7 million worth 
of rentals, jobs, dividends, royalties and commercial ventures linked to land 
development.7
The NLTB’s other role was to hold in trust and invest some funds for landowners. 
For instance, by 1987 FJ$1,837,907 worth of term deposits had been made for 
unclaimed funds at an interest rate ranging from 4.25% to 16.0%. In addition, 
the NLTB also administered a portfolio of shares in companies as trustees for 
landowners (Native Land Trust Board 1990). The respective landowning mataqali 
gave the NLTB the authority to reinvest royalties from leases or timber cutting 
concessions over native land. The companies for which the NLTB held shares in 
trust for landowners to December 1987 consisted of two timber companies and 
nine tourist development companies. The NLTB held a total of 464,444 shares in 
these various companies.
However, the NLTB’s main dilemma has been the contradiction between its 
communal role as guardian of native land on one hand, and how it had used 
this role to enter into investment. The President of the NLTB was the Head of 
State, and the Chairman was the Minister for Fijian Affairs. Board members were 
carefully selected from the chiefly hierarchy and indigenous Fijian bureaucratic 
elite. Thus the heavily political and communalistic constitution of the board 
readily undermined some of its bureaucratic and commercial responsibilities.
To illustrate the above, in 1982 a grant of FJ$1,766,000, disbursed over three 
years, was received from the Australian government “to enable landowning 
units to participate in the development of the indigenous timber industry” 
(Native Land Trust Board 1990: 16). But the fund was diverted to financing a 
company, Kubuna/Fiji Forest Industry (FFI), and was used to purchase 7,000 
redeemable preference shares of 50c each issued at a premium of FJ$49.50 each 
with a preferred dividend rate of 12.5% per annum (The Review, May 1997). 
The Kubuna/FFI Company had three components: the Kubuna Company, FFI and 
Westralian Forests Industries Ltd. The Kubuna Company belonged to the four 
provinces that made up the traditional Kubuna Confederacy.8 The paramount 
7 The mostly Indo-Fijian cane farmers’ leases on indigenous Fijian-owned land began to expire in 1997. The 
leases, 30,000 in all, were administered by the NLTB. The original ten-year leases were issued under a 1967 
ordinance and amended in 1977 to fall under the Agricultural and Landlord Tenants Act (ALTA). Leases were 
for 10 years, with a right to two 10-year extensions. As we noted earlier, 25% of lease money from native land 
was allocated to the NLTB for “administrative” purposes and the rest was distributed to landowners on the 
basis of their chiefly status and standing in the social hierarchy. This, together with the various investment 
and landowners’ trust assets contributed to the NLTB’s income, thus providing a source of its capital for Fijian 
Holdings shares.
8 In the traditional context there are three main confederacies (matanitu) in Fiji: Kubuna, Tovata and 
Burebasaga. They have their roots in the pre-colonial attempts to form centralised governments in Fiji by early 
European settlers and chiefs. A number of Provinces make up a Confederacy. These are based on traditional 
alliances between tribal polities. Today they still exist as a means of ceremonial and traditional mobilisation. 
In a way, the political loyalty of indigenous Fijians is diverse: they have loyalty to various levels of tribal 
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chief of the Kubuna Confederacy was Ratu Sir George Cakobau, former Governor 
General of Fiji and by virtue of that also President of the NLTB.9 In charge of 
the financial operations of the company was the General Manager of the NLTB, 
Josevata Kamikamica, a member of the Kubuna Confederacy and thus subject of 
Ratu Sir George Cakobau. The FFI was a joint venture between CBM Holdings 
and Westralian Forest Industries, an Australian company, which provided the 
management and technical skills. CBM, owned by landowners of the three 
provinces of Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata, was under the trusteeship of Ratu 
Sir Penaia Ganilau, the paramount chief of the three provinces, and also former 
President of Fiji, and successor to Ratu Sir George Cakobau, as Fiji’s Governor 
General and President of the NLTB. Again, in 1989 a government-guaranteed 
loan was made from the European Investment Bank for purchase of FJ$1,575,986 
worth of shares in FFI which The NLTB had almost identical arrangements 
with two other logging companies, the Pacific Lumber Company and Timbers 
(Fiji) Ltd. Public funds were diverted to fund their operations.10 The ‘latent 
beneficiaries’, so to speak, were politically powerful individuals (both in the 
modern and traditional sense) who were able to exercise their authority in ways 
that would serve their communal or personal interests. 
In another case, the NLTB purchased FJ$1,863,343 worth of shares from the 
Native Land Development Corporation (NLDC), an entity set up by the NLTB 
itself to develop native land for commercial purposes as part of the Alliance 
Party’s affirmative action policy. Two loans were made to finance the operation 
of the NLDC: a loan worth 900,000 European Units of account from the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and a loan of FJ$1,380,000 from the Fiji 
government. The NLDC, which was headed by the Governor General’s nephew, 
defaulted on its principal and interest payment for both loans, accumulating a 
total of FJ$1,656,330 in bad debt by 1989 (Native Land Trust Board 1990: 17). 
In 1987, the NLDC was dissolved because of investment losses.
categories, loyalty to the Confederacy and loyalty to the state. The ownership of the collectively-owned ethnic 
Fijian companies theoretically belong to the “people” in the community, but the real power lies in the chief, 
since he “owns” the land and the “people”. Chiefs are mostly made directors, shareholders, managers etc. 
“in the name of the people”. Primordial servitude has been re-adapted to modern commercial exploitation.   
9 As Governor General, he was Representative of the British Crown, Head of State and Chairman of the 
Native Land Trust Board. George Cakobau was the great great grandson of Seru Cakobau who along with other 
chiefs, ceded Fiji to Britain.
10 What enabled the NLTB to make arbitrary decisions in relation to indigenous Fijian land was the power 
it was vested with to grant logging licences and concessions on all Native Land under the Native Land Trust 
Act, which says that “The control of all Native Land shall be vested in the Board (NLTB) and all such land 
shall be administered by the board for the benefit of the Fijian owners” (Native Land Trust Act, Chapter 134). 
Granting of a logging licence by the NLTB does not require the consent of the members of the landowning 
unit, but if necessary the NLTB will carry out consultation. A concession is also a licence but is usually 
granted over a large area, usually to a major logging company, and over land owned by many owning units, 
and for a longer period than a standard licence. Most of the logging licences involving ethnic Fijian loggers 
were for joint-ventures with foreign companies.     
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The point I wish to raise here regarding the two cases above is that, because of 
the convergence of state power (through the Head of State, himself a high chief) 
and communalism in the operation of the NLTB, the distinction between state 
interest and communal interest became blurred. In fact state interest became 
subsumed under communal interest. Thus it was easy to channel and ‘launder’ 
money from bilateral and multi-lateral aid, meant for national purposes, into 
communal projects. The high chiefs who also had uncontested state power 
became agencies of communalisation through the NLTB. It was really this 
communal role which justified NLTB’s investment in FHL. 
NLTB’s FHL investment was questionable on two grounds: first, NLTB’s poor 
record in commercial ventures; and second, NLTB’s investment of FJ$500,000 
on behalf of landowners denied landowners the opportunity to be involved 
in direct investment on their own. Purely on commercial grounds, NLTB’s 
record as a commercial entity has been disastrous. At the end of 1992, NLTB 
had an overdraft of FJ$14.8 million, increasing to FJ$16.1 million in 1993, and 
with FJ$4.4 million worth of cheques still pending presentation to the bank 
(TheReview, June 1997: 19). Losses had been recorded since 1986, and the 
accounts had not been audited since 1991. The unaudited figures showed an 
operating deficit of FJ$1.8 million in 1990, FJ$1.3 million in 1991 and FJ$1.6 
million in 1992. By 1997, the NLTB was on the verge of bankruptcy, despite a 
substantial government annual subsidy of FJ$1 million and the 25% of the rent 
it received for collecting and distribution of lease monies. A major restructuring 
in 1998 to make it more commercially viable and salvage its operation saw almost 
half the workforce made redundant (Daily Post, 10 November 1998).
NLTB’s commercial endeavours have been disastrous due to its inability to 
systematically and objectively reconcile commercial logic and the communal 
principles on which it was based. Its investment in FHL had two worrying 
implications. First, its paternalistic attitude in holding in trust landowner’s funds 
for FHL investment would do little to enhance the entrepreneurial potential of 
landowners, who would do better as individual FHL shareholders. Thus, instead 
of encouraging entrepreneurship, NLTB’s investment in FHL merely reinforced 
the pattern of economic dependence and paternalism that has been central to 
the communal schema since the colonial epoch. Second, the commission which 
NLTB generated from its FHL investment was ploughed back into sustaining the 
NLTB bureaucracy. Thus it is difficult to see how NLTB investment could in any 
way contribute to indigenous commercial “advancement”.      
Fijian Affairs Board (FAB)
The FAB was the largest shareholder in FHL with 100,000 “A” class shares (2.1%) 
and 20 million “B” class shares (100%). FJ$20 million was provided by the 
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government under the Nine Points Plan to be invested in FHL and held in trust 
for indigenous Fijians. It was envisaged that the amount of shares would soon 
be dispersed and sold to other indigenous Fijian shareholders over time. This 
would depend on how much return the FAB’s investment in FHL generated. 
As a low-interest investment portfolio, the “B” class shares were government 
guaranteed and the money borrowed to purchase them had to be repaid within 
20 years without interest.
The FAB had a much broader role than did the NLTB. As the secretariat of the 
Fijian Administration, it was directly responsible to the Great Council of Chiefs. 
Although the FAB under the old structure was directly linked to the central state 
structure, the 1998 restructuring along the lines of the Hays Report meant that 
the FAB became independent of the state bureaucracy. This was a requirement 
of the Nine Points Plan and Ten Year Plan to ensure that, without interference 
by the state bureaucracy, especially with the expectation of a new multi-racial 
coalition under the new consociationalist arrangement, the FAB would be able to 
independently consolidate its program for indigenous advancement. Politically, 
this reform constituted a retrogressive step, reminiscent of the 1940s reform by 
Sukuna to consolidate communal hegemony. 
In holding the FJ$20 million under trust, FAB was in fact acting as a trust 
agency for the government and for indigenous Fijians. Unlike in Malaysia, 
where Bumiputera trust agencies such as the National Equity Corporation (PNB) 
were fully-fledged financial institutions, FAB was not. As a purely communal 
institution serving the bureaucracy of the Fijian Administration, and without 
any experience or expertise in commercial matters, it would be difficult for 
the FAB to actualise its ideological mandate to serve the paramountcy of Fijian 
interest in ways that would be consistent with the requirements of modern 
commerce.         
Provincial shares   
As we have seen earlier, the total number of shares for the 14 provinces was 
663,800 or 14% of the “A” Class shares. The provincial shares differed from both 
the NLTB and FAB shares because investment capital was collected directly from 
people through soli vakavanua (communal collection) at the various levels of 
communal mobilisation of communal capitalism. 
The provinces, which were largely rural and whose population, in the main, 
lived a subsistence existence, were organised and administered under the Fijian 
Administration, through a mixture of state bureaucracy and communal socio-
political arrangement. Capital for investment was generated through appeals to 
a communal sense of obligation to the chief and vanua. Provincial collection was 
through provincial taxation, which was meant entirely to sustain the provincial 
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bureaucracy, and soqo ni vanua (“traditional” festivals), where there was a 
collective effort to mobilise members of a province both within and outside 
the village (those in urban areas and those who lived in other provinces). Some 
of the money collected through the latter was usually for “investment.” Most 
soqo ni vanua were held in urban areas, especially Suva, because they would 
generate more money than if they were held in the village. These fund-raising 
festivals would be called by names which would project both a communal and 
‘modern’ identity. Some examples were the Bulou ni Ceva (Lady of the South) 
for Kadavu Province, Adi Tagimaucia (Princess Tagimaucia, the name of a 
flower) for Cakaudrove Province and Adi Natuicake (Princess of the East) for 
Lau Province.11 
Fund-raising in the soqo ni vanua would involve competition between various 
tikina or districts. Collection thus became a means of achieving communal 
honour and prestige. Part of the festivities would be ceremonial presentations 
as a means of showing communal solidarity with other tikina, with emphasis 
on kinship links. The tikinas collected money from the koros, which in turn 
collected money from the various mataqalis or tokatokas. The rank and file of 
the communal structure was actively involved in this process. Thus the soqo 
ni vanua had the purpose not only of collecting capital, but also, at a broader 
sociological level, to reaffirm communal cohesion and identity. The latter was 
important here because it had become a paramount priority, which in many cases 
undermined the commercial significance of the fund-raising. Money collected 
was no longer perceived purely in terms of monetary value but also in terms of 
noda vei nanumi vakaveiwekani (concern for each other as kinsfolk). The money 
collected was passed on to the Provincial Council bureaucrats who then worked 
out the investment technicalities with the relevant financial institutions and 
authorities on behalf of the people of the provinces.
Provincial investment had two fundamentally flawed assumptions. The first 
was the belief that the interest of the vanua or community directly translated 
into the interests of the individuals (tamata yadudua). Communal interest 
was symbolised in the chiefly authority. Thus, to provide generously to the 
community coffers was an expression of selflessness and communal solidarity. 
On the other hand, there was veiled psychological coercion: not being generous 
(dau solisoli) to communal soli (fund-raising) was considered “un-chiefly” (tawa 
vakaturaga) and “un-Fijian” (tawa vakaitaukei). At worst, there was the veiled 
threat of being punished by the supernatural mana of the vanua and turaga 
(chiefs) through disease or mishap. Thus, this ideological mystification, which 
underscored communal hegemony, made it easy for chiefs, bureaucrats and 
politicians to extract capital from indigenous Fijian peasants and urban workers. 
11 The feminine gender names are because, as part of the fund-raising, there would also be a beauty queen 
competition to provide a festive mood. 
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The second assumption was similar to the neo-classical notion of the “trickle-
down” effect of economic distribution, where it was assumed that the benefits 
of development would, in time, trickle down to the bottom from the top. In 
the context of provincial investment, villagers were told that the investment 
was for the vanua and thus for “their benefit”. The investment details were not 
properly explained to the people at the grassroots level.12 But analysis of the 
actual provincial investment figures in FHL throws into doubt the existence of 
“benefits” for villagers (Ratuva 2000). 
The total number of shares held by the 14 provinces (with a total ethnic Fijian 
population of 394,999) was 663,800 in 1992, amounting to an average of 50,000 
per province. That meant that the number of provincial shares per indigenous 
Fijian individual was only 1.68. Even if we calculated the number of shares in 
relation to the rural indigenous Fijian population, which was around 233,175, 
then the shares per head would amount to 2.84. Needless to say, an average of 
2.84 shares (worth about FJ$1 each) was hardly sufficient to advance indigenous 
Fijian business. While large amounts of money have been extracted from the 
indigenous Fijian community for provincial investment, hardly any has trickled 
down in the form of improvement in the commercial sector in the provinces.   
Fijian Holdings and private investment
Private investment in FHL started in September 1992, when FHL changed its 
status from being a public to being a private company. The total number of 
shares held by private investors for the 30 companies in 1992 was 2,126,000 or 
9% of total FHL shares, and that figure has since grown. 
The fundamental problem with private shares was that ownership was 
concentrated within a small group of influential state bureaucrats and 
professionals with established links with the state bureaucracy and banking 
fraternity. Sale of the private shares was opened without proper publicity 
and some individuals concerned were able to use inside information to form 
companies and snap up the limited individual shares available (The Fiji Times, 
23 December 1992). 
As evidence of the above, the Deputy General Manager of the National 
Bank of Fiji secured a loan of FJ$107,000, by mortgage, on 10 March 1992, 
12 One of the strategies used previously in the provincial money collections was that people were told that 
money collected by individuals was to constitute their individual shares. Once individuals had collected the 
money, they were told that it would be culturally and legally proper that their shares were to be registered 
under their respective chiefs’ names. Officially the shares belonged to the chiefs, who legally had the right 
to sell those shares and acquire new equities. This was indeed the case in respect of the Kadavu Provincial 
Council in 1993, where district chiefs became the legal trustees of the individual shares. In other words 
individual cash collections were transferred to legal ownership by the chiefs.   
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to buy Fijian Holdings shares for FJ$100,000. The company, KB Investments 
(Registration Number 9502), registered on 6 December 1991, provided two 
shares of FJ$1.00 each, while the National Bank of Fiji provided the rest. KB 
Investments received the bank loan only three months after it was set up. KB 
Investments, together with four individuals, also formed a company called the 
5X Investments Limited, which secured a loan of FJ$75,000 from the National 
Bank of Fiji, to buy FJ$100,000 worth of Fijian Holdings shares. 5X Investments, 
with registration number 9515, was registered on 13 December 1991, seven days 
after the registration of KB Investments, and secured its bank loan on 27 January 
1992, less than two months after it was registered. Owners of 5X Limited and 
KB Limited paid up only FJ$1.00 shares each. Another company, BIL, owned by 
the relatives of KB’s director, secured a loan of FJ$120,000 from the FDB on 24 
March (Korovulavula 1994). 
In another case, Vensalisi Investment Limited (owned by the then Director of 
Public Prosecution and later Solicitor General, High Court Judge and diplomat, 
and also a board member of FHL) secured a loan of FJ$64,000 by debenture from 
the FDB to buy FJ$80,000 worth of shares from Fijian Holdings. This was just 
three months after the registration of the company (Registered Number 9613) 
on 6 February 1992. The FDB also provided Q-Ten Investments Ltd., a company 
owned by its own Managing Director, Laisenia Qarase (who was, we may recall, 
author of the Ten Year Plan), with two separate loans: one for FJ$112,400 on 2 
August 1990, and the other for FJ$353,217.86 on 22 May 1992, using the same 
property as mortgage.13 Q-Ten Investments Limited used some of the money to 
buy FJ$200,000 worth of shares from the FHL (Korovulavula 1994).
Qarase also used his privileged position to secure a loan of FJ$150,000 from 
the FDB for Mavana Investments Limited, a tikina company of which he was 
director and a shareholder. The loan was secured on 24 June 1992. This was 
a few days before the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Filipe Bole (a traditional 
kinsman of Qarase), received a loan of FJ$81,000 from the FDB on 2 July 1992 
for Mualevu Tikina Holdings, a tikina company for which he was director and 
shareholder. Eight days later, the former Minister of Justice, Qoriniasi Bale, 
secured a loan of FJ$81,000 from the FDB for his Nabuabua Holdings. Mr Bale 
was later deregistered as a lawyer for defrauding clients of thousands of dollars.
Laisenia Qarase was a board member of FHL, and was also a board member and 
chairman of more than one dozen government and statutory bodies. He was also 
the chief business and financial advisor to the FAB and Great Council of Chiefs 
and was one of the brains behind the organisation, operation and logistics of 
FHL. A close associate of Laisenia Qarase, and Chief Executive of FHL, Sitiveni 
Weleilakeba, also secured a loan of FJ$120,000 from the FDB on 17 March 1992 
13 The Certificate of title number for the property is C.T.14743. 
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to buy FHL shares for FJ$150,000 (Office of Registrar of Companies 1997). Qarase 
also approved an FDB loan for his brother to purchase one of Qarase’s properties, 
originally purchased via an FDB mortgage (Fiji Times, 23 December 1992).
While the Great Council of Chiefs had tried to limit FHL investors to those 
indigenous Fijians registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula, in a number of cases 
some non-indigenous Fijians, linked to the power elites, were also shareholders. 
Three such companies, Kingfisher Holdings Limited (with FJ$100,000 worth of 
shares in FHL), Nabuabua Holdings Limited (FJ$100,000) and Taoi Investments 
Limited (FJ$200,000) had, at a certain time, shareholders who were non-
indigenous Fijians (Fijian Holdings Limited 1992). Taoi Investments Limited 
secured FJ$155,598.98 from the FDB on 25 April 1991, and bought FHL shares 
worth FJ$200,000 (Office of Registrar of Companies 1997). The General Manager 
of the Fiji Pine Commission and former Conservator of Forests registered a family 
company called KJY Investments Limited (Registered Number 9748) on 24 April 
1992, which borrowed FJ$80,000 from the FDB to top up its FJ$100,000 share in 
e FHL (Korovulavula 1994).
The chairman of the FHL, Mr Lyle Cupit, was one of the most influential economic 
advisors to the Fiji government. He was a former Head of the Australian-based 
Carpenters Group of Companies, which for a long time controlled much of 
the wholesale, retailing, shipping, automobile, agriculture and real estate in 
Fiji (Fijian Holdings Limited 1995). He was also owner of one of Fiji’s largest 
privately owned agricultural enterprises, Consolidated Agriculture Fiji Limited, 
and chairman of the government-owned Fiji Sugar Corporation and of the FHL-
owned Basic Industries.14 
There was a clear link between FHL investment and influential individuals in 
the state bureaucracy and the banking fraternity. The individuals concerned 
were able to take advantage of their intra-class privileged position to acquire 
loans from either the FDB or NBF for FHL investments. Thus, even within the 
context of communal capitalism, class factors (not in the traditional but in a 
bureaucratic and socio-economic sense) played a significant role in determining 
one’s place in communal investment.
It appeared that affirmative action relating to FHL investment largely benefited 
individual indigenous Fijians who needed affirmative action the least. Most of 
those mentioned above were already well-to-do by virtue of their position in 
society. Affirmative action merely provided a further opportunity to accumulate 
14 The Consolidated Agriculture Fiji Limited agricultural land in the Navua flats was destroyed by cyclone 
floods in January 1993. Amidst allegations of irregularities, corruption and political patronage, the flooded 
land was sold to the Fiji Government for FJD$7 million, for the purpose of “training” Fijian youths in farming 
skills (Fiji Times, July 4 1996). Most of the land, without the use of modern technology for clearing and 
development remained unused. In fact a lot of it was rendered unusable by the flood (Daily Post, May 2 1999).
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more wealth. It was also clear that these individuals and the bank executives 
(FDB and NBF) from whom they acquired loans formed a close clique. The fact 
that loans were acquired within a very short time after the companies were 
registered and a few weeks or days before the FHL private shares became 
available raised suspicion about illegal “insider trading”. It was clear that the 
direct beneficiaries of affirmative action (some of whom were mentioned earlier) 
were themselves members of the Fijian Initiative Group, which produced the 
Nine Point Plan. The generally suppressive political climate of the post-coup 
period discouraged any attempt at a political challenge to the above unethical 
practices.
Worse still, the indigenous Fijians at large were not informed of the decision to 
allow private investment. The “clique”, as they came to be known, maintained 
virtual secrecy about the private shares sale and proceeded to acquire them 
themselves. In a Senate session, on 14 December 1992, Senator Korovulavula 
queried: “Shares to individuals were only opened to the public in September 
and I wonder how they (individuals) managed to secure those enormous loan 
facilities within such a short time” (Fiji Times, 15 December 1992). 
In response to public criticism about conflict of interest, FDB General Manager 
Qarase said that all his loan applications were dealt with “strictly in accordance 
with the firm policies and practice of the bank” (Fiji Times, 21 December 1992). 
This did not lessen the barrage of criticism, well summed up by the Fiji Times 
editorial of 23 December 1992:
But when you take a hard look at how Fijian Holdings Limited sold 
those shares last year to certain Fijian individuals and Fijian-owned 
companies, you must admit there’s something not quite right about it...
As it happened they (ordinary Fijians) lost out on a chance to boost their 
earning power because Fijian Holdings Limited didn’t give them much 
of a chance to take up its offer to sell them shares...The money that got 
the company off the ground was public money. [T]he haste in which 
they were sought and finalised was rather unseeingly, involving mostly 
a small coterie of insiders, people working in financial institutions and 
bankers whose paths often cross in their line of work. (Fiji Times, 23 
December 1992).
It was clear that it was rather difficult to see how investments by the NLTB, 
FAB and provinces could directly translate into the advancement of indigenous 
Fijian commercial life in material terms. By locking capital ownership within the 
communal institutions, under the mythological rhetoric of vanua ownership, 
there was very little chance of benefits “trickling down” to ordinary indigenous 
Fijians in ways that would improve their living standard. At the same time, as we 
have seen, the real individual beneficiaries of FHL private investment have been 
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well-connected individuals using their knowledge of the financial market and 
official authority to monopolise the private shares. So the dilemma of FHL as the 
government’s flagship affirmative action program was that it simply reproduced 
the communal system through communal capitalism and reinforced inequality 
by facilitating the dominant shares of a few indigenous elites. The situation was 
even more worrying when we consider the fact that in the Ten Year Plan there 
was an ambitious recommendation to “apply the FHL model in the forestry, 
fisheries, tourism and television sectors” (Qarase 1995: 2). In the next section we 
discuss other forms of economic affirmative action proposals prescribed by the 
Nine Points Plan and how they have been implemented.
However, as a result of the controversies, some of the individual investors sold 
their shares. Despite all these problems, FHL grew to become one of the biggest 
companies in Fiji, so that by 2008 it had assets totalling FJ$260.8 million and 
this increased by 13% to FJ$299.9 million in 2009 (Fijian Holdings Limited 
2010). FHL investment ranges from 0.2% to 100% equity in companies, in a 
variety of areas. 
After the coup in 2006 and the formation of the Fiji Independent Commission 
Against Corruption (FICAC), investigation into the affairs of Fijian Holdings 
was launched and Qarase was charged, convicted and jailed for 12 months for 
corruption on 13 August 2012. 
Financial market investment
Both the Nine Points Plan and the Ten Year Plan were concerned with the 
lack of indigenous Fijian activity in the area of financial trading. As a result 
of a concerted drive towards financial market investment, there was increased 
investment in the Unit Trust of Fiji (UTF). 
Set up by the Government in 1976, the UTF in the post-coup period was 
increasingly dominated by indigenous Fijian investors. The UTF accumulated 
capital through selling units and equity received was invested in shares, 
mortgages and government securities, amongst others. As shown in Table 5.6, 
from about 6 million units in 1992, UTF grew to about 7 million units in 1994. 
Based on these figures, the unit-holdings for indigenous Fijians represented 
38.0% of the total unit holdings in 1992 and increased to 40% in 1994. This was 
a dramatic increase from 15% in 1986, before the coup. However, if we exclude 
the unit-holdings for the government and the Fiji National Provident Fund, a 
public institution, then indigenous Fijian unit holdings represent 60.5% of the 
total shareholding as at 30 September 1994. 
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Table 5.6 Unit Trust of Fiji: Distribution of unit holders
Unit Holders 1992 1993 1994
Govt. of Fiji 209,827 228,991 248,038
FNPF 2,059,135 2,059,135 2,059,135
Sugar Cane Growers 384,616 384,616 384,616
Fijian Dev. Fund Board 193,450 210,220 226,979
UTOF Ltd 74,869 74,869 74,869
Assns. & Groups 448,992 478,161 470,274
Individuals 1,179,465 1,045,254 1,627,991
Provincial Councils 298,614 348,475 252,599
Fijian Affairs Board 392,233 560,685 560,685
Fijian Holdings Ltd 500,000 500,000 500,000
National Mutual 301,449 327,581 360,319
Total 6,024,650 6,217,987 6,765,505
Source: Unit Trust of Fiji 1996.
Of the eleven major investment categories, four could be classified as indigenous 
Fijian communal investments. These were the Fijian Development Fund Board, 
Provincial Councils, FAB and FHL. Again, the pattern of communal capitalism 
clearly emerged. This becomes much clearer when we examine all the indigenous 
Fijian investments in detail as shown in Table 5.7.    
Table 5.7 Unit holders by indigenous Fijians at 30 September 1994
Unit Holders 1992 1993 1994
Fijian Affairs Board 392,233 560,685 560,685
Fijian Dev. Fund Board 193,450 210,220 226,979
Fijian Holdings Ltd 500,000 500,000 500,000
Provincial Councils 181,423 308,627 227,415
Tikina Councils 114,933 193,860 83,296
Village 181,494 203,073 197,225
Individuals 746,675 573,369 907,087
Total 2,310,208 2,549,834 2,702,687
Source: Unit Trust of Fiji 1996.
Table 5.7 shows that unit-holdings for indigenous Fijians increased from FJ$2.3 
million in 1992 (38% of total unit-holding) to FJ$2.7 million in 1994 (40% of 
total unit holding). In 1992, 70% of the total indigenous Fijian unit holders 
were communal institutions (consisting of FAB, Fijian Development Fund Board, 
Fijian Holdings, Provincial Councils, Tikina [district] Councils and Villages) 
and the rest were individual unit holders. In 1994, the figure was more or less 
the same. Again, the dominance of communal shareholding through the Fijian 
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Administration hierarchy indicated the extent to which the communal schema 
dominated the indigenous Fijian commercial ethos, even at the sophisticated 
level of financial trading. 
So far we have looked at two cases of communal capitalism. Next we shall discuss 
two other cases of affirmative action (FDB and NBF), focusing, not so much on 
communal capitalism, although both banks were largely responsible for the 
controversial loans for private investments in FHL, but in commercial projects 
which, nevertheless, were linked to the broader processes of communalism and 
which seriously affected their operations. First we look at the FDB.
The Fiji Development Bank  
We have seen that the FDB was responsible for funding major affirmative 
action projects such as FHL and rural commercial ventures. It was one of the 
first commercial institutions which the Fiji government mandated to assist “in 
the national endeavour to increase participation in the economy by indigenous 
Fijians and Rotumans” (Fiji Development Bank 1993: 7).15 This was in line with 
FDB’s mission statement to “provide finance, financial and advisory services to 
assist in the economic development of Fiji and in particular the development of 
agriculture, commerce and industry” (Fiji Development Bank 1997b: 7). Some of 
the agricultural schemes which the FDB helped to fund were the Seaqaqa Sugar 
Scheme and the Agricultural Co-operatives we saw earlier.
The two FDB projects which specifically targeted the promotion of indigenous 
Fijian commerce were the Fiji Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme (CLFS) and 
the Fijian store scheme, referred to as Equity Investment Management Company 
Limited (EIMCOL).   
15 The Fiji Development Bank itself was set up on 1 July 1967, under the 1967 Fiji Development Bank Act 
to take over the role of the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board, set up in 1951. It is a semi-autonomous 
statutory body, with a board of directors appointed by the Minister of Finance. The bank is subsidised by the 
government, as it is seen as the government’s most important development vehicle. The specific objectives of 
the bank, apart from allowing special provision for indigenous Fijian participation in commerce, are to attain 
a well-balanced lending program in Fiji’s main economic sectors, to acquire equity in selected commercial 
enterprises for eventual purchase by individuals and institutional investors in Fiji, to plan and develop 
supervised lending schemes to promote rural prosperity, to diversify Fiji’s financing facilities, and to utilise 
modern technology to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the bank’s operation.          
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Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme 
When the Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme (CLFS) started in 1974, there 
was criticism from the Indo-Fijian business community, which saw it as a form 
of discrimination. Further concessions were granted after the 1987 coup to 
facilitate easier access and repayment, as we discussed earlier. 
The post-coup regime asked the FDB to review the soft loan policies for 
indigenous Fijians, and consequently the ceiling was raised from FJ$100,000 to 
FJ$200,000, and the interest subsidy was increased from 1% to 5.5% per annum. 
Furthermore, if the loan involved the purchase of fixed assets, the government 
would provide 10% of the cost. This change in policy led to a dramatic increase 
in lending to FJ$45.4 million in the period between 1989 and 1991, an average 
of FJ$3 million a month. By the end of 1991, 8,497 loans valued at FJ$71.8 
million had been made. This was at the height of the “lending boom”, when the 
economy was experiencing a healthy growth rate of 8%; but towards the middle 
of the 1990s the Fiji economy experienced a major slow down, which affected 
the FDB’s operation. By 1996, the amount administered under this scheme was 
FJ$66.9 million. This made up 20.3% of the number and 27.2% of the value of 
the bank’s total loan portfolio. Table 5.8 shows the total amount and number of 
commercial loans made by the FDB to indigenous Fijians under CLFS from the 
period 1990 to 1995.
Table 5.8 Commercial Loans to Fijians Scheme (CLFS) approvals, amount 
(F$000) and number of loans (in bracket) 
























































































Total 22,096 (1,530) 20,132 (1,019) 16,598 (980) 17,789 (906) 24,334 (771)
Source: Fiji Development Bank 1997a: 13.
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The table shows a general decrease in the number of loans (but not in the 
amount) from 1990 to 1995. This was due to the economic slowdown after 1989-
1990, the peak growth period. Also, the FDB began to carefully monitor its 
loans because of a high rate of “non-performance”. However, the significant 
increase in amount (despite the decrease in number) during the 1994/95 period 
was due to the dramatic increase in the real estate portfolio as a result of two 
huge communal investment loans for two high-rise office blocks in downtown 
Suva, for the Rewa Province (the province in which Suva City is located) and 
Suvavou, the traditional owners of the land on which Suva City is built. 
The investment/financial institutions portfolio needs special mention here 
because of its links with FHL. A sizeable amount of this portfolio was invested 
in FHL. Loans for this portfolio started in the 1991/92 period, the same time 
at which FHL opened up equity to private investment, as we saw earlier. 
The CLFS loans became an important source of capital for FHL and for Unit 
Trust of Fiji private investment. The amount lent varied considerably, and in 
many cases depended on the socio-economic status of the clients. Two loan-
size categories (100,000-250,000 and 250,000-500,000), as shown in Table 5.9, 
consisted of seven clients only. These included the Managing Director of the 
Fiji Development Bank himself and other members of the “clique” (mentioned 
earlier in this chapter) which controlled the individual shares in FHL.
Table 5.9 Financial institutions portfolio








Source: Fiji Development Bank 1997a.
The government subsidy to CLFS was substantial, as it was part of the 
government’s economic affirmative action policy and was used to ensure that the 
Fiji Development Bank continued to remain afloat, despite the loan concessions. 
From 1985 to 1994 a total of FJ$9,352,321 worth of subsidy and FJ$1,838,156 
worth of guarantee was provided by government. These were in addition to the 
annual subsidy the government provided the FDB.16 Although CLFS loans were 
16 It should be noted that the FDB’s CLFS was a totally different portfolio to the normal bank commercial 
loan. From 1992 to 1996, of the FJ$248.3 million worth of loans approved, loans worth FJ$164.6 million were 
normal commercial loans, while loans worth FJ$83.7 million were for CLFS, a ratio of about 2:1. In other 
words, about half of the total FDB loan portfolio was for indigenous Fijian affirmative action.
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strictly for indigenous Fijians, political imperatives were beginning to dictate 
otherwise. The SVT government had formed a Coalition government with 
the General Electors Party after the 1992 election and, as part of the political 
concessions involved, CLFS loans were extended to other ethnic minorities 
under the “General” or “Others” ethnic classification in 1993. Table 5.10 shows 
the CLFS loans approval, by ethnicity, with the general electors loans totalling 
more than FJ$1 million in 1994 and close to FJ$2 million in 1996, although the 
number of loans was still relatively small.  
Table 5.10 CLFS loans approval by ethnic classification
1994 1995 1996
Ethnicity Number F$000 Number F$000 Number F$000
Fijian/Rotuman 754 15,140 564 27,710 195 18,351
General Electors 45 1,241 38 1,798 7 197,000
Total 799 16,381 602 28,508 202 18,545
Source: Fiji Development Bank Board Paper No. 11/397(28 February 1997): Annual Review for Commercial 
Loans to Fijians, Rotumans and General Electors.
The inclusion of the general electors (who consisted of Chinese, Europeans, 
part-Europeans and Pacific Islanders) in the CLFS may have been a useful 
political lever to ensure that the SVT-General Voters Party Coalition remained 
cohesive at a time when indigenous support was divided between Rabuka’s SVT, 
Kamikamica’s Fijian Association Party (FAP) and Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist 
Party (FNP). Further concessions for general electors were provided just before 
the 1999 election in the form of scholarships and an increase in the CLFS ceiling 
to FJ$200,000. This occurred after the coalition between the SVT and the United 
General Party (UGP), a new party for general electors, was formed.
One of the key features of the CLFS loans was regional inequality in the 
distribution pattern. Most of the loans went to urban or semi-urban localities 
and very few went to the rural areas. More than 50% of the loans were 
concentrated in Suva, the capital city. The loans practically reinforced existing 
wealth maldistribution and helped to worsen regional wealth disparity.
Despite its noble intentions, CLFS was based on the vacuous assumption that 
merely increasing the capital input into indigenous Fijian business would 
in some way generate commercial success. This view has been consistently 
perpetuated in the Ten Year Plan and even various FDB Annual Reports from 
1994 to 1996. This was the reason for the increase in the ceiling in 1988. It was 
assumed that the lack of commercial enthusiasm of indigenous Fijians could be 
addressed by quantitatively expanding the loan portfolio. However, the socio-
economic and political climate of investment was far more complex, as FDB itself 
later realised in some of its assessment reports. One of the problems was that 
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CLFS clients did not have the necessary skills to fully implement the business 
plans which accompanied the loans. This problem had been recognised much 
earlier in the 1960s and 1970s. The communal encapsulation and marginalisation 
of indigenous Fijians from mainstream commerce largely contributed to this. 
Ironically, despite recognition of the problem, there was an almost deliberate 
attempt to perpetuate it through encouragement of communal capitalism. 
The CLFS crisis: Affirmative action in question 
By the middle of the 1990s, the ambitious plan for wide capital disbursement 
under CLFS was beginning to feel the strain of increased arrears. Clearly there 
has been a high level of non-performance in the CLFS over the years. The level 
of non-performance for the CLFS portfolio was 45.28% for 1994, 42.41% in 
1995 and 34.06% in 1996. The level of write-offs increased from 17% in 1994 to 
21.59% in 1995 and 23.63% in 1996 (Fiji Development Bank 1996b). 
One of the most popular loans was in the real estate portfolio. This needs some 
discussion here because, not only did real estate constitute the greatest amount 
in terms of disbursement, it was also considered to be the most easily identifiable 
in terms of visible evidence of indigenous progress. Also, there was a view that 
real estate did not involve much commercial ingenuity but rather that it was a 
passive form of investment which involved no more than putting one’s property 
up for rent and waiting for money to flow in. This seemed attractive to many 
indigenous Fijians. After the military coups in 1987, the cost of residential 
houses slumped as a result of the dramatic downturn in the immediate post-coup 
economy and massive emigration by Indo-Fijians. A large number of expatriates 
were recruited to fill vacancies left by the large number of professionals who 
had migrated and these provided a growing market for the real estate business.
In 1989, in an attempt to encourage indigenous Fijians to invest in property, the 
government provided grants for fixed asset loans. This led to a dramatic increase 
in real estate loans. This initiative was withdrawn in 1991, after just two years 
of implementation, due to declining commercial performance. This resulted in a 
decline in real estate loans by 50%. However, in 1993 the number of real estate 
loans went up again because of the Fiji National Provident Fund’s (FNPF) newly-
introduced Small Business Equity Scheme (SBES).17 The SBES was another form 
of commercial affirmative action, meant to enable indigenous Fijians to produce 
17 The Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF), the national life saving scheme, was established to take the 
place of the pension scheme, first introduced by the colonial state. While pension funds can be collected 
only after retirement, FNPF money can be used to buy residential houses, pay for education or for investment 
purposes. 
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the necessary equity contribution.18 Some of these loans were used to make up 
the equity for real estate loans from the FDB, and this accounted for the increase 
in the number of real estate loans by more than 60% (Fiji Development Bank 
1994a).
However, by the mid-1990s the real estate portfolio was beginning to face 
problems. On 25 July1996 a paper to review the CLFC real estate performance 
was commissioned and its findings painted the doomsday scenario that there was 
a “nation-wide low” and that real estate loans performance was “deteriorating” 
(Fiji Development Bank 1996c). It recommended that measures be put in place 
before the situation worsened. Records showed that the total CLFS real estate 
sector collections decreased by 18.47% from 60.65% in June 1995 to 42.18% 
as at March 1996 (Fiji Development Bank 1996c). By 30 June 1996 the CLFS 
debt had accumulated to FJ$34.5 million. A significant number of debts were 
unserviceable. The crisis was not limited to the CLFS, but affected the FDB’s 
real estate portfolio in general, which posed a serious threat to the lending 
capacity of the bank because as at 31 March 1996 the real estate portfolio made 
up FJ$116.98 million of FDB’s total loan portfolio of FJ$326.9 million – almost 
half of the total loan portfolio.
The reasons for this mounting debt and portfolio decline were, firstly, the 
oversupply of executive homes, due to the early rush after the coup by indigenous 
Fijians to buy homes for investments.19 There was no systematic survey of the 
real estate market before the loans floodgates were opened. Secondly, in the case 
of Suva, where most of the debtors concentrated, there was competition with 
non-indigenous investors who had built luxurious flats around the city area 
and many expatriates had moved in to occupy them as they were much cheaper, 
safer from crime (compared to the middle-class suburbs) and more convenient 
for travelling to work, for shopping, and to other city centre facilities.   
Given the extent of the real estate portfolio crisis, the FDB review team 
recommended that:
(1) Loans for executive house rental be discouraged until December 1996 
to new applicants.          
18 The SBES for transport purposes, like taxis and boats, were suspended in 1993. This affected some of 
the indigenous-Fijian business proposals already in the pipeline. A classic example was when hundreds of 
the urban working population of Kadavu, one of the 14 provinces, were asked by the provincial business 
wing, the Kadavu Development Company (KDC), to contribute certain portions of their FNPF savings to the 
cost of the company’s inter-island ferry. Many filled and signed the forms they were provided, to approve 
deductions from their FNPF, but were disappointed when the scheme fell through. In sociological terms, the 
KDC’s approach to acquiring capital is a common method by ethnic-Fijian elites to manipulate primordial 
relations, loyalties and institutions to serve certain commercial interests. 
19 On the other hand, the decline in the number of real estate loans to Indo-Fijians, as with other types of 
loans, was due to the political uncertainty in Fiji, and also because of the uncertainty about the soon-to-expire 
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA), on which most Indo-Fijian farmers relied for their livelihood. 
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(2) Lending for live-in residential property should continue. But care 
was to be exercised to ensure that only those with secure employment 
were to be considered, and direct deductions were to be “pursued with 
intensity”.
(3) Emphasis was to be placed on collection and rehabilitation of poorly 
performing accounts (Fiji Development Bank 1996c: 2).
Despite the crisis besetting the CLFS real estate portfolio, two large loans were 
made in 1995 to two indigenous Fijian companies which had close connections 
with the government and chiefly support. The first loan, worth FJ$3 million, 
was made to the Rewa Provincial Council, and the second, worth FJ$2 million, 
was made to Nadonumai Holdings Limited, belonging to the people of Suvavou. 
Suva, the capital city, was situated in Rewa province. The paramount traditional 
chief of Rewa was Adi Lala, the wife of the President of the Republic and former 
Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. The Managing Director of the FDB at 
the time of the loans, Qarase, came from the same province as Mara. Nadonumai 
Holdings Limited was owned by the original settlers of Suva, who were relocated 
by the British colonial state to a new settlement, called Suvavou (new Suva) to 
clear the Suva peninsula for a new capital for Fiji in 1882.20 Despite attempts by 
the Suvavou people to be paid compensation by the colonial and post-colonial 
states, it was not until 1994 that the Rabuka government gave the Suvavou 
people a goodwill gesture by providing them with a piece of land and FJ$2 
million loan, to be topped up by the FDB, to build an office block in downtown 
Suva. Both these loans, clearly facilitated by state patronage, increased the 
real estate loans figure in 1995, despite the decrease in the number of loans. 
Part of the deal was that the two buildings were to be rented by government 
departments. The two high-profile loans were politically significant because, 
as two of the very few indigenous Fijian-owned high-rise buildings in Suva, 
they symbolised indigenous Fijian real estate “success” in a highly visible way. 
They also symbolised the shift towards “think big” indigenous projects, as in 
Malaysia, through purchase of high-cost assets. Importantly, the two building 
were communally owned and symbolised the strong political links between the 
FDB and the ruling power elites and were an example of how affirmative action 
resources could be readily disbursed along political lines.
The real estate portfolio was not the only one in trouble. Another review of 
working capital loans for the retailing and wholesaling sectors of the CLFS, 
dated 22 March 1994, noted with dismay that 80.4% by number and 41% 
by value of the total working capital loans for retailing and wholesaling were 
20 The first capital of Fiji, Levuka town on the island of Ovalau, was the scene of the British take-over 
ceremony on 10 October 1874. In 1882 the capital shifted to Suva, the current capital, because it had more 
space for expansion, unlike Levuka, which was surrounded by hills.    
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outstanding. This unusually high degree of “non-performance” was blamed on 
“market problems” and “misuse of funds” (Fiji Development Bank 1994b: 6), so 
the review recommended that the loans in this particular portfolio be frozen. 
The “market problems” were partly because retailing and wholesaling had 
been traditionally the monopoly of Indo-Fijians, and it was very difficult make 
inroads into these domains. The problem of “misuse of funds” was blamed on 
diversion of funds to communal obligations. The case of the EIMCOL projects, 
as we shall see later, bore testimony to these two problems. 
As the crisis deepened, there was a sharp decline in CLFS approvals in 1996, 
both in terms of numbers and value. By 31 December 1996, 2,023 accounts 
valued at FJ$68.72 million were still outstanding. Up to the same period, real 
estate constituted 57.95% by value, but Retail /Wholesale and Transport/
Communication made up the majority in terms of number of loans, with 30.65% 
and 31.34% respectively.21 These outstanding loans varied in terms of size. The 
most difficult loans to recover were smaller loans (0-10,000), because a lot of 
the small businesses set up through these loans were not commercially viable 
and could not compete with bigger and better established businesses (Fiji 
Development Bank 1996a).
By 1996 the sectors with deteriorating performance, in terms of percentage of 
outstanding loans to total size of the portfolio were infrastructure/construction 
(32.5% in 1995 to 87.7% in 1996), tourism (14.4% in 1995 to 41.5% in 1996) and 
wholesale/retail/restaurant (51.8% in 1995 to 54.9% in 1996) (Fiji Development 
Bank 1997b). The poor performance of the wholesale/retail sector was due to 
five major loans totalling FJ$2.3 million to Tropikana Industries Limited and 
four EIMCOL companies, all of which suffered financial difficulties and had 
to close down. The best-performing loans were in the financial institutional 
portfolio (as we saw earlier), most of which were used to buy Fijian Holdings 
Limited shares.
By June 1996 the number of loans had drastically declined by 50%, but the 
value of approvals went down by only 0.29%. The decline in the number of 
loans was due to two reasons; firstly, FDB had to suspend lending for retail, 
wholesale and transport projects; and secondly, two large loans were made for 
high-rise commercial buildings in Suva, as we have seen. While this increased 
the amount loaned, it actually reduced the number of loans in the real estate 
portfolio.
21 However, the FDB had some consolation in 1996. The arrears in terms of percentage to the total portfolio 
decreased from 25.34% to 20.48%. There was also a slight decrease in the percentage of the loan provision in 
relation to the CLFS from 9.13% to 7.93%. The non-performing accounts percentage to portfolio decreased 
from 44.28% to 25.74%. The write-offs portfolio decreased from 7.45% to 6.74%. These “decreases” were 
due largely to the combined effects of cleaning-up exercises, approval of quality loans and imposition of 
certain policy restrictions.  
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FDB’s solution to the CLFS’s problems was to introduce loan restrictions. These 
were not positive steps to remedy the crisis but interventionist policies to 
punish current and potential customers and salvage the CLFS from its ultimate 
demise and, perhaps, save FDB from public ridicule and political backlash. For 
instance, as far back as May 1991 the fixed asset grant was suspended. In July 
1995, working capital loans for retail and wholesale, together with loans for the 
purchase of road freight transport vehicles (RFTV) with a weight of 2 tonnes 
or less were also suspended. In December of the same year, taxi loans to new 
clients in the central and eastern regions were suspended as well. However, all 
these suspensions were for the duration of one year, pending improvement in 
financial conditions. Further loan suspensions, some extensions from expired 
1996 suspensions, were carried out in 1996. These were: loans for purchase 
of RFTV with a weight of 2 tonnes or less, extended to July 1997; all forms 
of purchase of RFTV of 3 tonnes capacity; lending for executive rental homes 
(discouraged), working capital loans for retail/wholesale extended to September 
1997; new loans (to new clients) of FJ$10,000 or less for any purpose under the 
Wholesale/Retail sector for 1 year to September 1997; taxi loans in the central 
and eastern regions, extended to December 1997.
In terminating lending for certain projects, the FDB explained that:
The FDB believes, however, that it is prudent banking practice to terminate 
lending in specific sectors when there is clear evidence that many clients 
in those sectors are getting into difficulties. To continue lending would 
be to ignore the warning signals and create even greater difficulties 
for the Bank and customers. The suspension period gives the Bank an 
opportunity to improve supervision of poorly performing accounts and to 
rehabilitate them. Resumption of lending is dependent on the outcome of 
performance reviews (Fiji Development Bank 1997a: 13).
Various internal reviews were critical of the CLFS performance. For instance, 
the reviews for 1994 and 1996 were far from being encouraging.22 A 1994 review 
confirmed what was generally felt:
One disturbing fact still remains that even after 18 years from inception 
of this scheme, Fijians and Rotumans have not really ventured into 
manufacturing, tourism and construction type of business. They prefer 
to invest in those projects that do not require much entrepreneurial and 
technical skills (Fiji Development Bank 1994a: 4). 
22 Review performance of the FDB Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme (CLFS) is undertaken every year 
or so, not by an independent body, but by the research section of the FDB, to determine its effectiveness 
and viability over time, and also to make recommendations. It is usually undertaken upon request by the 
Ministry of Finance, and the findings are submitted to the FDB Board, who are all appointees of the Minister 
for Finance.  
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This observation is very significant because it shows that while the problem 
had been identified by the FDB, it failed to look for appropriate solutions to 
address the problem. The 1994 FDB Annual Review of CLFS (different from the 
one earlier quoted) identified a number of problems, which directly implicated 
the commercially inhibiting influence of communalism: lack of proper planning, 
lack of cash control, lack of stock control, lack of business exposure, no business 
contacts and lack of knowledge of legal and other requirements necessary to set 
up business (Fiji Development Bank 1994b).
My intention in outlining these details is to illustrate in an empirical way the 
wide gap between political rhetoric in favour of indigenous affirmative action at 
one level and the concrete problems of implementation at the operationalization 
level. This survey is also relevant in terms of making the point that, contrary to 
prevailing reasoning that lack of capital was to be blamed for indigenous Fijian 
economic backwardness (Sutherland 1998), the problem was more fundamental. 
It was the inability to utilise available capital due to lack of innovative ideas 
about how to generate the maximum out of the existing communal life 
of indigenous Fijians. As a source of development funds the FDB was the 
most important institutional vehicle for economic affirmative action by the 
government and Fijian Administration, but it was confronted with a number of 
problems which were to threaten its capacity to carry out this mandate. First, 
it did not provide the necessary entrepreneurial skills to enable CLFS clients to 
compete with the established business. The training they were provided was 
merely for operating business accounts rather than how to manage a business 
in a competitive economic climate by forging business links and networks,. The 
FDB’s policy was geared towards ‘delivering the goods’ in the form of loans, 
and there was little emphasis on capacity building and empowerment to enable 
clients to independently and creatively pursue their business. Second, there 
was no thorough sociological assessment of the possible contradictions between 
traditional cultural obligations and commercial practices that would undermine 
the viability of the business. In many ways, CLFS clients were still strongly 
attached to communal demands such as communal collections. Ironically, while 
at the political level there was encouragement of CLFS loans for individual 
entrepreneurship, there were also expectations that recipients remained loyal to 
their yasana, tikina,koro,mataqali and tokatoka and were obliged to contribute 
to communal demands (personal communication with a number of CLFS clients). 
There was also commitment to one’s kinship obligation which demanded the 
free offering of resources such as food. 
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Equity Investment Management Company 
Limited (EIMCOL)
The Equity Investment Management Company Limited (EIMCOL) was set up 
in 1990 as a successor to the Business Opportunity and Management Advisory 
Service (BOMAS), set up in 1975 to “work solely with the Fijians”, and to help 
them in their endeavour to enter the commercial world (Hailey 1992: 12).23
EIMCOL, unlike the CLFS, was not directly part of the FDB’s portfolio but was a 
semi-autonomous project, established in 1990, and administered and facilitated 
by the FDB after BOMAS, originally attached to the FAB, collapsed.24 The aim 
was to “assist Fijians and Rotumans enter the retail trade...long-term venture 
designed to school the participants in the commercial disciplines of retailing” 
(Qarase 1995: 21). The EIMCOL project was to be a national show piece for the 
FDB by producing indigenous Fijian supermarket managers. Unlike the CLFS 
projects, where clients ran their own business, EIMCOL stores were to be run 
directly by FDB. The idea was based on the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Stret Pasin 
Store (Street Fashion Store) model, where PNG nationals served as trainees in 
small Chinese shops, learning basic knowledge and skills of retailing at a micro 
level. In many ways, the PNG project served its purpose initially, but as a result 
of the general social unrest and lawlessness, retailing declined dramatically. The 
FDB sent one of its senior executives to PNG to study the project and, upon his 
return, enthusiastically recommended its implementation in Fiji. But instead of 
starting small by training clients for small retailing activities, the FDB embarked 
on a “think big” project by training supermarket managers. Applicants were 
restricted to indigenous Fijians and Rotumans, who were vetted and put on 
a training program with Carpenters Group, a major corporation with links to 
FHL, for six months.25 
Upon completion of training, the successful “trainee managers” (as they were 
officially called) were allocated a supermarket each to run but were directly 
accountable to the FDB. The supermarkets were owned by a series of EIMCOL 
limited liability companies (i.e. each shop was owned by an EIMCOL company), 
23 BOMAS had a very short life. It was first under the Ministry of Fijian Affairs and later it came under 
the Fiji Development Bank. Its role was fundamentally to train ethnic Fijians in the basics of entrepreneurial 
skills, to enable them to become independent business people. BOMAS failed because it was “inappropriate, 
poorly planned, under-funded, and starved of resources and qualified staff” (see Hailey 1992).  
24 The EIMCOL was approved by Cabinet in December 1988 and the government committed itself to a 
FJ$3 million grant to the project. On 20 May 1989, the position of manager was advertised and EIMCOL was 
registered two months later. The Directors of EIMCOL were Laisenia Qarase, FDB Managing Director; Harry 
Kiss, former Director of the Ports Authority of Fiji; Tevita Vugakoto, FDB’s General Manager Administration 
and Special Projects and Jone Tabuya, General Manager, EIMCOL.     
25 A Post and Telecommunication technical officer, with inappropriate qualifications, was appointed 
training officer, but his appointment was later terminated due to incompetence. A General Manager was also 
appointed on 20 May 1989, who was later sacked after EIMCOL went into a crisis.
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with the FDB and government as shareholders and funders. The government 
contributed one-third (FJ$3 million) and the FDB two thirds, (FJ$6 million) of 
the interest-free loan. EIMCOL management monitored the performance and 
provided instructions and supervision occasionally. Ownership of the shop 
was to be transferred to the trainee after 15 years, or earlier, depending on the 
completion of the full loan repayment. By 1992, nine shops, located mainly 
around the capital, Suva, had been purchased at different prices, and were run 
by EIMCOL trainee managers. 
Within two years of its beginning, EIMCOL began to go through a series of 
crises, which led to its collapse. On 31 December 1991, the General Manager 
was sacked and was replaced. In late 1992 three EIMCOL supermarkets 
(Natokawaqa, Navua and Bureta Street)26 were closed, and on 17 September 1993, 
the remaining six supermarkets were sold to the store managers, despite the 
FDB’s initial promise that ownership would not be transferred until satisfactory 
payment of the loans had been made. The supermarkets were sold at prices 
that were far above the original prices. By 1996, all the EIMCOL supermarkets 
had been sold and EIMCOL as a commercial project collapsed. It threatened 
to bring down the FDB’s pro-indigenous Fijian commercial program and, more 
importantly, given its high profile as a “model” for indigenous Fijian business, it 
was a major political blow to the government’s affirmative action program. This, 
together with other factors, contributed to the forced resignation of Mr. Qarase 
as Managing Director of the FDB in 1997.27 
Although it was not part of the plan, the reason given by the FDB for selling the 
shops was that the managers wanted to run the shops themselves. But one thing 
was clear, the transfer of ownership at an early stage meant that the FDB was 
going to be free of the cumulative liabilities it had created itself. The managers 
were to be ultimately responsible for the inevitable crisis, but the FDB was 
not to escape responsibility altogether as legal and political challenges were 
mounted against it.
The collapse of the EIMCOL scheme was the result of a number of interrelated 
reasons. While in principle the EIMCOL project looked viable, FDB’s ambitious 
haste to concretise the idea was driven more by the political need to show the 
indigenous Fijians, and in particular the Great Council of Chiefs and the Fijian 
Administration, to whom Qarase was directly responsible as financial advisor, 
that the prevailing sentiments for affirmative action could be satisfied and that 
something concrete was being done. As the leading development institution in 
26 The Natokawaqa supermarket was closed three months after its purchase because the sale was declared 
null and void since it was still under legal proceedings with a caveat by an interested party. 
27 In July 1997 Isoa Kaloumaira, General Manager Finance, Planning, Research and Marketing was 
appointed Managing Director of the FDB to take the place of Laisenia Qarase, who became General Manager 
of the Merchant Bank of Fiji, another subsidiary of Fijian Holdings Limited. 
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the country, the FDB felt that it had both the political and moral responsibility 
to be at the forefront of facilitating the indigenous Fijians’ participation 
in commerce. The FDB could not provide the appropriate managerial and 
commercial skills and knowledge, backed by relevant logistical systems. The 
general manager and training officer initially appointed to EIMCOL had neither 
the experience nor the expertise in the sort of commercial venture that EIMCOL 
was intended to carry out. Training for trainee managers in the initial stages 
was less than commendable. For instance, on 18 November 1992 the trainee 
managers, disgusted with the EIMCOL management, wrote a letter to the Prime 
Minister, where, amongst other things, they pointed out that:
During training, the trainees spent most of the time doing practical 
labour work and very little time was spent on identifying the elements of 
real business, like working out prices, controlling cash flow, controlling 
creditors and debtors and identifying real sources and markets. As a 
result of these, the trainees, after acquiring their individual shops 
took a longer time to adjust/orientate themselves to the commercial 
environment. Overall, the managers underwent very poor training 
and were not prepared well for what they encountered. They were 
led to believe that they would be running small retail outlets. Instead 
they were given supermarkets to run. They were not prepared to run 
supermarkets. They were out of their depths and most had to improvise 
to survive (Fiji Times, 18 November 1992: 5).
Furthermore, purchase of the supermarkets was made without due consideration 
of some basic socio-economic factors such as location, consumer market and 
potential competition. Most, if not all, of the EIMCOL supermarkets were 
located close to established and thriving Indo-Fijian-owned supermarkets and 
retail shops, which were selling goods at considerably lower prices. EIMCOL did 
not have an import arm or a central buying house from where the supermarkets 
could buy goods cheaply and instead they had to purchase bulk goods from 
Indo-Fijian supermarkets. One of the supermarkets was designated as the 
buying and distribution centre. Due to their higher retail prices compared 
to their competitors the EIMCOL supermarkets could not survive for long. In 
a lot of cases the supermarkets allocated were in such bad shape that trainee 
managers had to spend a lot of time and funds on repairing plant, equipment, 
fixtures and fittings.
As a result of the wide publicity of the EIMCOL crisis, bordering on a national 
scandal, the FDB became defensive, and shifted the blame to the trainee 
managers. In a strongly worded letter to the editor of The Fiji Times, Qarase 
insisted that the manager trainees were to be blamed because of their lack of 
commitment and for flouting basic commercial rules. He said that “as students 
and trainees they appear to be adopting a ‘we know best’ attitude instead of 
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applying themselves to learning the basics of their business” (The Fiji Times, 19 
November 1992: 5). The “blaming the victim” syndrome adopted by Qarase was 
further deployed in an advertisement in The Fiji Times, while referring to the 
initial sacking of two supermarket managers:
In both the cases referred to in the recent media publicity, the managers 
concerned failed to follow the rules. They were not totally committed. 
Their appointments were terminated due to consistent mismanagement, 
failure to abide by the principles of business and continuing breaches 
of their terms and conditions of employment. Both managers had ample 
opportunity of over two years to learn and to improve their performance. 
They had the benefit of intensive, concentrated training covering 
many aspects of retailing, combined with hands-on experience. They 
knew that the scheme was about performance and those who did not 
perform to a satisfactory level were dropped. They did not perform...
We had a number of meetings with them to discuss their problems. 
It made no difference. They continued to break the commercial rules 
and to demonstrate their lack of discipline. The FDB had no choice but 
to terminate their appointments. At the end of the day, the Bank has 
a fundamental responsibility to safeguard taxpayers’ funds under its 
stewardship (The Fiji Times, 28 November 1992).               
Politicians also joined in the controversy. Senator Manu Korovulavula, an 
indigenous Fijian Senator and businessman, addressed the Senate and charged:
They (FDB) are bankers who do not have any exposure to food 
merchandising business, more so in the scale of supermarket. How 
then can they justifiably say they can teach people what and how they 
should carry out their work, when they themselves do not really know, 
because they had no such training or relative past work experience 
(Korovulavula, Speech to Senate, 12 July 1994: 5).     
Senator Korovulavula suggested that any form of commercial affirmative action 
for indigenous Fijians should include the contribution of Indo-Fijians and other 
races:
The Government of the day, perhaps, is not aware of or advised that 
a considerable number of successful businessmen, in particular the 
Indians, on account of the solo Fijian efforts to enter and participate in 
business, with respect stood aside and observed with deep regret the 
series of Fijian business failures. In silence there are those who do care 
for the Fijians to be successful in business too. They might feel that it 
might be unbecoming of them if they offered their assistance that might 
not be welcomed for political conservative orientation. Humans as we 
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are, it would be unnatural to think that every person in Fiji is ready and 
willing to help the less fortunate, who struggle each day to make ends 
meet (Korovulavula, Speech to the Fiji Senate, 12 July 1994: 5). 
The Fiji Senate passed a motion, “That this house expresses deep concern at 
the past method of commercial management adopted by the Equity Investment 
Company Limited (EIMCOL), with regard to the disbursement of FJ$3 million 
grant by Government” (Fiji Parliament. 1994). The collapse of the EIMCOL 
caused a major political stir which saw Indo-Fijian political leaders calling for 
a total review of the wastage of public resources through indigenous-Fijian 
affirmative action.
One of the consequences of the collapse of the EIMCOL was ethnic scapegoating. 
The leader of the indigenous group Kudru na Vanua (Rumble of the Land) told 
the author that “the failure of Fijian business is a result of Vere Vakaidia (Indian 
conspiracy)”. Based more on perception than reality, ethnic scapegoating 
diverted attention from the real issues that needed addressing.
The National Bank of Fiji (NBF): Hand-outs and 
coup payoffs 
 After the 1987 military coup there was forced “Fijianization” of a number 
of institutions (such as in the civil service, as we have seen). Amongst them 
was the National Bank of Fiji. Unlike the FDB, the National Bank of Fiji (NBF) 
did not have a formal government mandate to put in place affirmative action 
programs for indigenous Fijians. But after the military coups in 1987, the post-
coup regime unilaterally imposed pro-indigenous measures in the NBF which 
later had drastic consequences.28 
After he staged the coup the then Lt Colonel (now Major General) Rabuka 
unilaterally appointed Visanti Makrava, a Rotuman (politically classified as 
indigenous), an NBF branch manager (Samabula Branch), to become the Chief 
Manager of NBF, without the knowledge of the NBF board or the Minister of 
28 Until 1999, NBF was a 100% Fiji government-owned bank, set up as a fully commercial bank in 1974, 
under the NBF Act, which suggests that the NBF’s financial role should be undertaken in the “national 
interest”. The term ‘national interest’ being ideologically loaded, it became the convenient justification for 
the complex commercial and socio-political mess it ended up with. The pro-ethnic-Fijian agenda  was not 
formally prescribed but was part of the post-coup political design, subtly infused into the psyche of the 
bank management by the military regime. The post-coup political climate, characterised by firmly entrenched 
ethnic polarisation, nationalist passion for permanent ethnic-Fijian paramountcy and rhetorical opposition 
to what was seen as Indo-Fijian dominance of the economy, was the perfect setting and created a fertile 
atmosphere for the bank’s unwritten political agenda.
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Finance.29 The “appointment” took place in typical military junta style. Makrava 
and a group of M16-toting soldiers entered the NBF headquarters and told the 
then Chief Manager, Gordon Ryan, an Australian expatriate, seconded by the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia, to vacate his office because he (Makarava) 
had been appointed by Rabuka as NBF Chief Manager. Makarava himself had 
complained to Rabuka about the expatriate managers “on holiday” in Fiji, 
and the need to localise the top management positions. This was more than 
welcomed by the military, which in fact became the first beneficiaries of the 
gunpoint localisation. They were provided with special bank facilities, including 
preferential loans. In the name of indigenous well-being, unsecured loans were 
“handed out” liberally to supporters of the coup (The Review, July 1995).
Makrava handpicked a number of indigenous Fijians and Rotumans for the 
top management positions, despite their lack of experience and expertise. But 
within a few years the bank was enveloped in crisis. In 1994, the Auditor General 
reported that approval limits were being exceeded, repayments were irregular, 
loans were repaid from overdrawn personal accounts, loans were not reviewed 
or monitored, and there was no insurance cover for some loan securities (Fiji 
Office of Auditor General 1994). Loans were made available liberally to family 
members, friends and those with powerful political connections and in many 
cases securities were not provided. For instance, the NBF branch on Makarava’s 
home island of Rotuma had about FJ$400,000 in deposits and F$13 million 
in loans. This was a loan to deposit ratio of more than 300%. This compared 
unfavourably with the ratio of 50% for Nadi, Fiji’s fastest growing urban centre. 
Many loans were given under political pressure. A Korean logging company, 
Taveuni Woo Il, in which the former President, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, had 
a 33% shareholding , with a further 20% of shares held by the Cakaudrove 
Provincial Council, and with a paid-up capital of FJ$1.5 million, owed more than 
FJ$5 million on security of about FJ$1.4 million. There were many other loans 
that were approved under political duress. The former Deputy Chief Manager, 
Kalivati Bakani, admitted that the political pressure, though indirect, ensured 
that “you got the message” (The Review, July 1995: 21).
Post-coup propaganda convinced many indigenous Fijians that the bank had 
indeed been “recaptured” from expatriates to serve their commercial interests. 
Many withdrew their accounts from other expatriate banks like the Australian 
WESTPAC and the trans-Tasman Australia New Zealand Bank (ANZ) and joined 
NBF and its newly introduced NBF Group Insurance Scheme (GIS).30 This mass 
29 The Minister of Finance was directly responsible for the National Bank of Fiji. He appointed the members 
of the Board. At the time of Visanti Makarava’s “appointment” as Chief Manager, the Minister of Finance was 
the late Josua Cavalevu.
30 This involved individuals joining an insurance scheme as part of a collective professional or social group, 
with relatively generous loan conditions. 
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exodus was partly an attraction to the relatively liberal conditions of the NBF 
loans and partly a feeling of patriotism whipped up by the coup makers that 
investment in NBF was politically good for indigenous Fijians. 
By 1995, when the NBF problem became a public scandal, the NBF had paid-
up capital of a mere FJ$15 million. By 30 June 1995, it had FJ$450 million in 
deposits, against FJ$390 million worth of loans, despite the Reserve Bank of 
Fiji directive that loan growth be contained at FJD$355 million, as a condition 
for the FJ$15 million government sinking fund deposits and its own funds. 
Doubtful loans were estimated by the accounting firm Aidney-Dickson to be 
FJ$93 million, while the World Bank’s estimate was FJ$120 million (The Review, 
July 1995). Worse still, there was a liquidity shortfall of over FJ$70 million. Due 
to this, overnight borrowings were around FJ$15-20 million in December 1993, 
reaching FJ$70 million in 1995. The crisis was so deep that the newly appointed 
Minister of Finance, Berenado Vunibobo, said that, “The National Bank of 
Fiji is, for all intents and purposes, insolvent”, and angrily said that he “was 
shocked. [I]t is fundamentally flawed” (The Review, July 1995:16). More than 
FJ$300 million in bad debt had been incurred, and the bank began borrowing 
about FJ$80 million a day to maintain liquidity.
Ironically, things began to swing back in a full circle. In 1995 the new Minister 
of Finance quickly moved to remove top bank executives (mostly indigenous 
Fijians promoted or planted there during the coup) and brought in expatriate 
bankers to clear up the mess. The list of bad debtors printed by the Fiji Times 
read like a “Who’s Who” list, headed by President Mara. It included Prime 
Minister General Rabuka’s companies, chiefs, government ministers, senior army 
officers, senior civil servants and selected coup supporters. Individual debtors 
and families who were part of the Fijian political and military elite owed up 
to FJ$1 million each. The decision by the government to lay off National Bank 
of Fiji workers as part of the recovery measures led to a nation-wide strike by 
the Bank Employees Association. A compromise was reached whereby workers 
were to be given a handsome retirement package.31
Perhaps the coup was able to inspire a sense of an entrepreneurial urge 
amongst indigenous Fijian elites as they saw a chance to take advantage of their 
unrestricted power and access to state resources to unilaterally push through 
some of their communal aspirations. But the means was irregular and the process 
was not directed and managed in a way that made commercial sense. Some loans 
were political payoffs to those who played a significant role in the coups. A 
31 Towards the end of 1996, criminal charges of corruption were laid against a number of leading figures 
in the loan scandal. Of these, two were government ministers (Mr. Ovini Bokini, former Minister for Lands 
and Mr. Koresi Matatolu, former Minister for Agriculture). The accused included Makrava, the sacked Chief 
Manager of the National Bank of Fiji, and other business people. Mr. Bokini faced 32 charges of corruption. 
Investigations into these charges mysteriously fizzled out as a result of political pressure.  
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number of people who were responsible for the ethnic beatings and burning in 
the streets of Suva were allegedly given loans up to FJ$500,000 without security 
(Fiji Times, 10 August 1995). Many others who played important roles in the 
coup were likewise allegedly “rewarded” by the NBF.
At the height of the political controversy surrounding the scandal, General 
Rabuka defended himself by saying that NBF Chief Manager, Makrava, as 
his appointee, had done a lot for the indigenous Fijians, and those who were 
criticising him were conspiring against indigenous Fijian interests. 
The crisis of the NBF loans, some of which were for “commercial” and some for 
“personal” purposes, was due to a number of factors. It can be easily argued that 
the main “blame” had to be located within the whole politics of communalism 
itself, which led to the take-over of the bank and the imposition of preferential 
loans. The laxity in repayment, borne of the feeling that the NBF had become 
a communal bank of some sort, made the situation worse. The main difference 
between the NBF and the other affirmative action policies (FHL, UTF, CLFS and 
EIMCOL) was that while the shortcomings of the other ones had to do with their 
communal approach to investment, the NBF fiasco was based on unsystematic 
and coerced communal disbursement of public funds.32 The entire indigenous 
Fijian state elite was caught up in the fiasco. It was a blatant case of greed, ethical 
irresponsibility and criminalization of the state never before seen in the history 
of Fiji. While the financial loss to the economy was substantial and reversible in 
the short term, the psychological impact to the indigenous Fijian community in 
terms of diminished self-esteem and reinforcement of anti-indigenous reputation 
and stereotypes as commercially incapable would linger on.
The failure of many affirmative action projects contributed to friction and 
division within the indigenous Fijian community as manifested at the political 
level. During the 1999 general election, the ruling SVT Party under Rabuka lost 
the election to a Fiji Labour Party-led coalition and for the first time an Indo-
Fijian became prime minister of Fiji. This contributed to Fiji’s third coup a year 
later.   




6. Appeasement, scams and tension: 
Affirmative action programs, 1999 to 2006
Affirmative action programs between 1999, after the FLP-led coalition came to 
power, and the 2006 coup can be understood in terms of three major trends. 
The first was the failed appeasement strategy by the FLP-led coalition under 
Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry (1999 to 2000); the second was the use 
of affirmative action as a conflict resolution mechanism and associated scams 
(2000-2001); and the third was attempted reconciliation and tension leading to 
the 2006 coup (2002 to 2006).
The dominant feature of the first period was the urgent attempt by the Labour-led 
coalition to mobilize indigenous Fijian support through the public proclamation 
of its support for affirmative action: a desperate move to win acceptance in a 
hostile and volatile political environment. When Chaudhry’s coalition came to 
power in 1999 it was faced with two seemingly contradictory tasks – first was 
the urgent need to appease indigenous Fijians by promising to continue with 
special measures for them while at the same time addressing the interests of 
Indo-Fijians who voted overwhelmingly for the FLP. This involved a very fine 
and potentially fragile balancing act to satisfy two communities with different 
expectations. The appeasement effort did not work because indigenous ethno-
nationalists were determined to destabilize Chaudhry’s government, until it was 
removed in a coup in May 2000.
The second phase of affirmative action, carried out by the military-appointed 
interim government under Laisenia Qarase between the May 2000 coup and August 
2001 election, was meant to lessen ethno-political tension in the wake of the 2000 
upheaval. However, it was beset by irregularities, corruption and manipulation 
for electoral gain by the interim ministers. Scams led to the suspension of the 
affirmative action program as investigations continued into millions of dollars’ 
worth of fraud. The strategic approach to implement affirmative action initiatives 
to help take Fiji out of the political doldrums was tainted by abuse of power 
and lack of proper government purchasing procedures. Paradoxically, the scams 
did not deter indigenous Fijian voters from voting overwhelmingly for Qarase’s 
Soqosoqo Duavata Lewenivanua Party (S DL) during the 2001 election.
The third phase, between 2001 and 2006, was dominated by the SDL’s use 
of affirmative action as part of its broader national reconciliation program. 
Although the victory of the SDL during the 2001 election provided Qarase’s 
pro-indigenous policies the boost and legitimacy they needed in the wake of the 
embarrassing scams, the political climate had changed and the military, which 
supported affirmative action policies immediately after the 2000 coup to help 
quell tension, was vehemently opposed to some of Qarase’s bold policies, such 
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as the Qoliqoli Bill and Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill (RTUB). The 
tensions which followed culminated in the overthrow of Qarase’s government 
by the military on 6 December 2006.
Appeasement and the 2000 coup
In 1999 Mahendra Chaudhry was appointed Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister 
after the victory of the Labour-led coalition. This was the first election under 
the 1997 Constitution which prescribed the alternative voting (AV) system 
which gave voters the option to either vote “above the line” for the preferred 
political party (which have already exchanged preferences amongst themselves) 
or “below the line” for their preferred candidates numbered in order of priority. 
The AV system was meant to avoid dominance by a single party thus forcing 
formation of a coalition government as a way of moderating extremist parties 
and creating middle ground politics. However, the results of the 1999 election 
did not reflect this expectation. The FLP won all 19 Indo-Fijian communal seats 
and 18 of the 25 open seats. The NFP, under Jai Ram Reddy, which went into the 
election by forming a “moderate” alliance with the SVT, under Sitiveni Rabuka, 
did not win any seat after losing a total of 20. Reddy’s alliance with Rabuka 
was seen by Indo-Fijians as an act of betrayal and Chaudhry was quick to take 
advantage of this. The SVT, in power since the 1992 election, won only 8 seats 
and lost 24. The details of the election results are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Results of the 1999 election 
Party Votes % Seats +/-
Fiji Labour Party 231,946 32 .2 37 +30
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei 143,177 19.9 8 -24
National Federation Party 104,985 14 .6 0 -20
Fijian Association Party 72,907 10.1 10 +5
Christian Democratic Alliance 70,153 9.7 3 New
Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party 31,587 4 .4 2 New
Party of National Unity 28,874 4.0 4 New
United General Party 10,144 1 .4 2 New
United National Labour Party 3,963 0.6 0 New
Coalition of Independent Nationals 2,405 0.3 0 New
Lio 'On Famör Rotuma Party 1,982 0.3 0 New
Party of the Truth 234 0.0 0 New
Farmers and General Workers Coalition Party 197 0.0 0 New
Viti Levu Dynamic Multiracial Democratic Party 124 0.0 0 New
Natural Law Party 109 0.0 0 New
Nationalist Democratic Party 13 0.0 0 New
Independents 17,382 2 .4 5 +4
Invalid/blank votes 39,567 - - -
Total 399,759 100 71 +1
Source: Fiji Election Office 1999.
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The SVT’s election loss can be attributed directly to a shift in indigenous Fijian 
support to emerging parties such as the Fijian Association Party (FAP) ,which 
won 10 seats; the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA), 3 seats; the Nationalist 
Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP), 2 seats; and the Party of National Unity (PANU), 
2 seats. Division within the ranks of indigenous Fijians was of significant 
advantage to the Fiji Labour Party, which formed a coalition government with 
the FAP, led by Kuini Speed, Bavadra’s former wife, and the CDA, which was set 
up with the blessing of the President, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. Of the 18 cabinet 
posts, 11 were allocated to indigenous Fijians, a move which was generally 
interpreted as Chaudhry’s tactical manoeuvre to appease indigenous Fijians.
In response to threats of violence and destabilization, one of the very first tasks 
for Chaudhry when he became prime minister was to allay fears that he would 
revoke existing affirmative action programs. The first assurance was provided 
by the president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who during his speech to open 
parliament on 15 June 1999 emphasised the Labour-led coalition’s commitment 
to safeguarding and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous people 
of Fiji as enshrined in the constitution (Mara 1999). In his address to the GCC in 
the same month Chaudhry proclaimed in no uncertain terms that the Labour-led 
coalition fully recognized the unique and special position of indigenous Fijians 
and Rotumans and emphasized continued assistance in the areas of education, 
land, housing and participation in business. He promised the chiefs that $5 
million would be set aside for indigenous Fijian education. He also expressed 
concern about the low success rate of indigenous business and one of the 
solutions he offered was injection of funds for more training and management 
support and guidance (Chaudhry 1999).
As a way of winning popular support, the coalition devised a pro-poor economic 
policy, which was contained in the 2000 national budget announced at the end 
of 1999. The budget emphasised the importance of the social service sector, 
notably education, social welfare, poverty alleviation, healthcare and micro-
enterprise initiatives for those who wanted to start their own business. There 
was also a proposal for the removal of Value Added Tax (VAT) on some basic 
food items as well as reduced housing rates, electricity and water rates (Fiji 
Government 1999). There was an increase in Family Assistance Allowance by 
$1.5 million to $5.6 million. In addition, the Housing Authority interest rate 
for those with income below $6,500 was reduced from 11.5% to 6% and over 
time the interest rate for those with a salary above $6,500 would be decreased 
progressively. The Coalition also introduced the Student Loan Scheme to enable 
children from poor families to attend tertiary institutions. The government also 
put a stop to some privatization initiatives and started a review of the rice quota 
for import and export.
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Buoyed by the popular pro-poor policies, the coalition government started 
treading on more politically sensitive ground. For instance, they set up a 
commission of inquiry to carry out an investigation into the government 
tendering process of the privatisation deals, corrupt practices within the civil 
service, tax evasion practices of prominent indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian 
businessmen and the tendering process for the mahogany forest harvesting and 
Y2K computer systems upgrade contracts, of which it was alleged that thousands 
of dollars changed hands between big companies and prominent indigenous 
Fijians. Some of these issues were very closely tied up with affirmative action, 
especially with regards to government tenders in favour of indigenous Fijian 
contractors. Opponents interpreted these moves as Chaudhry’s attempt to deepen 
his hegemonic control of the state system, weaken the power of the business 
community and above all indirectly undermine affirmative action despite his 
public rhetoric about support for indigenous interests. This sentiment, often 
coloured by nationalist overtones, was echoed by George Speight, the self-styled 
leader of the 2000 coup, when he wrote to the GCC after his illegal instalment 
as prime minister in May 2000 that “before the People’s Coalition Party came to 
power, Mr Chaudhry was a leading opposition spokesperson, who was always 
critical of affirmative action in favour of the indigenous community” and he 
“made sure when he came to power that this affirmative action, in favour of the 
indigenous community was removed” (Speight 2000).
Chaudhry’s own uncompromising approach and his choice to ignore political 
advice regarding indigenous sentiments were probably his greatest enemies. 
Despite being warned by the president not to touch land issues, Chaudhry 
was adamant that land reform was a priority. One of the coalition’s very first 
initiatives was the establishment of the Land Use Commission (LUC), first 
proposed by the Bavadra government to oversee the development of indigenous 
Fijian land. As part of the initiative he invited a number of chiefs to accompany 
him to Sarawak in Malaysia to observe aspects of development of native land 
and how these could provide relevant lessons for indigenous Fijians. He also 
recommended that some of the powers of the NLTB be curtailed and transferred 
to the LUC.
Although there were some good ideas behind the land reform project as far 
as encouraging indigenous entrepreneurship was concerned, politically and 
culturally, tinkering with the land system, even minimally, was a taboo issue. In 
the midst of the controversies and opposition, Chaudhry, who previously had 
minimal links with indigenous Fijian chiefs, used the Malaysian trip as well as 
patronage of selected chiefs not linked to nationalist groups to consolidate his 
position. For instance he diverted a FJ$175,000 grant from the Government of 
Taiwan to build the house of Sairusi Nagagavoka, a prominent chief from Ba 
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Province (where Chaudhry was born), who happened to be a close friend as well 
(Fiji Times, 24 February 2008). This was quickly branded as buying loyalty and 
as corruption and did little to enhance his public relations efforts.
Suspicions were further aroused when the government’s farming assistance 
to cane farmers was introduced. Cane farmers who were displaced were given 
$28,000 upon vacating the land to move to other areas of their choice, while the 
indigenous Fijian farmers who replaced the displaced Indo-Fijian farmers were 
not given any assistance at all. A total of 708 applications were received and 206 
of these were approved. Of the approved applications, 14 were from indigenous 
Fijians who received a total of $392,000 and 192 were from Indo-Fijians who 
received a total of $5,204,000. In his speech to parliament on 21 November 
2001 Qarase referred to this as evidence of Chaudhry’s ethnic bias and disdain 
of indigenous interest (Qarase 2001). The farming assistance formula was 
subsequently altered by the SDL government after the 2001 election – the new 
formula awarded $10,000 equally to both outgoing farmers, who were mostly 
Indo-Fijians, and incoming farmers, who were mostly indigenous Fijians.
Apart from sugar, rice was also a significant agricultural commodity targeted 
by the Labour-led coalition as a priority. The allocation of $4.5 million for the 
opening of the Rewa Rice mill was an attempt to resurrect an ailing industry as 
well as to provide cheaper rice for customers. Opposition to this plan came from 
rice importers such as Punjas Limited, owned by a very influential Gujarati 
family, and nationalists who saw it as another move mostly in favour of Indo-
Fijian rice farmers.
Indigenous nationalists painted almost every Chaudhry policy on land and 
development as anti-indigenous and pro-Indo-Fijian. This fuelled ethnic and 
religious prejudices and a wave of ethno-nationalist grievances and protests 
reminiscent of 1987. As the situation became desperate Chaudhry made a public 
appeal in his last public speech a week before his government was toppled: “Let 
me remind those people who are protesting today…the rights and interests of 
our indigenous community – the Fijians and Rotumans take precedence over 
the rights and interests of other communities” (Lal and Pretes 2008: 141). In 
the same speech he made an emotional plea to appease indigenous landowners: 
Another reason for agricultural development is that land in this country 
is largely owned by our Fijian brothers and sisters. Now much of that 
land is lying idle and underdeveloped except in the sugar cane belt. A lot 
of other land is not put to productive use. The government’s strategies 
are to see that by investing money in agriculture that we will encourage 
our Fijian brothers and sisters to develop their land so that they can 
benefit from that development (Lal and Pretes 2008: 140). 
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These words fell on deaf ears as the protests and acts of destabilization continued, 
reaching a climax on 19 May 2000 as thousands of indigenous Fijians marched 
through central Suva City. The protest culminated in street riots, looting and 
burning in the CBD. The march coincided with the taking over of parliament by 
members of the elite Counter-Revolutionary Warfare unit (CRW) from the Fiji 
Military and a number of politicians and activists led by George Speight.
The president, Mara, whose daughter was amongst those taken hostage, 
denounced the coup and declared a state of emergency. On 29 May the military 
asked him to vakatikitiki (move aside) as it suspended the constitution and 
assumed control of political power through martial law. The members of the 
government were held for 56 days and were released after the Muanikau Accord 
between Speight and his group and the military was signed, with the promise 
of amnesty for the former upon return of all weapons to the military. After 
Speight’s men released the hostages and returned most of the weapons, they 
were promptly arrested at the Kalabu Primary School where they converged to 
set up a new base after they left parliament. The leaders were tried and some, 
including Speight, were imprisoned.
Support for indigenous Fijian affirmative action was Chaudhry’s trump card for 
appeasing indigenous Fijians. The hope of doing so diminished as a result of the 
coalition’s other controversial policies (such as proposals for land reform, farming 
assistance and an inquiry into corruption, amongst others) which were deemed 
to be anti-indigenous. The failure to sway indigenous Fijians was worsened by 
Chaudhry’s strong-headed and uncompromising approach to governance and 
politics and his refusal to listen to advice from indigenous Fijian leaders or heed 
warnings of impending instability from close advisers. 
Conflict resolution and scams: Revisiting 1987  
In the wake of the 2000 coup, an interim government was set up by the military 
under the leadership of Laisenia Qarase. One of Qarase’s first projects was the 
creation of a new affirmative action framework for indigenous Fijians to address 
the grievances which inspired the 2000 political upheaval. The responsibility 
entrusted to Qarase’s interim government was quite a difficult one, given the 
failure of past affirmative action programs and the fluid and tense political 
climate in the wake of the 2000 coup. The economy was in free fall, tourism 
had declined drastically, agriculture and manufacturing had been disrupted, 
unemployment skyrocketed in an unprecedented way and ethnic distrust had 
worsened considerably. To make matters worse, the constitution was suspended, 
6. Appeasement, scams and tension: Affirmative action programs, 1999 to 2006
147
the institutions of the state had been paralysed and people’s confidence in state 
security had been seriously compromised as a result of widespread violence at 
the time of the coup and the threat of further violence in the following months.
The interim government was faced with two major dilemmas. First, what was 
the most convenient way to rebuild the state institutions and inter-communal 
trust without being seen to be politically partial? Second, what was the best 
way to rebuild the national economy while at the same time recognizing 
that indigenous development interests were critical for stability and had to 
be tackled immediately? The interim government thought it wise, given the 
still reverberating chorus of ethno-nationalism and its potential for further 
destabilization, to address the issue of indigenous Fijian development head on. 
The first task was to devise an affirmative action framework in the form of two 
major documents, namely the Blueprint for the Protection of Fijian & Rotuman 
Rights and Interests (Blueprint) and the 20–year Development Plan (2001 – 2020) 
for the Enhancement of Participation of Indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the 
Socio-economic Development of Fiji, commonly known as the 20 Year Plan (20YP). 
The Blueprint  
The Blueprint identified some crucial areas for indigenous development, especially 
“issues which have been of great concern to indigenous Fijians and Rotumans 
regarding the security of their rights and interests as the indigenous communities 
in Fiji, and also the advancement and acceleration of their development, so that 
they can participate on an equitable basis in the progress of our country” (Fiji 
Government 2000: 1). The document set out ways in which indigenous Fijians 
could “fully exercise their rights of self-determination within the unitary state of 
the Republic of the Fiji Islands” and “safeguard the paramountcy of their interests 
in our multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society” (ibid). So, essentially, the thrust 
of the Blueprint revolved around the notions of advancement, equity and self-
determination – terms which were not new at all; but in the circumstances they 
provided hope for many indigenous Fijians caught up in the political melee. The 
major proposals of the Blueprint are summarized in Table 6. 2.  
The Blueprint consisted of a total of 42 programs, comprising 12 legislative 
initiatives (Table 6.3), 15 policy directives (Table 6.4), and 15 budgetary 
provisions (Table 6.5). These tables show a common dilemma of affirmative 
action in Fiji – that is, in order to carry out a project which is fundamentally 
for the indigenous community, the entire state machinery had to be mobilised 
to enact the relevant legislation, formulate policies and fund the initiatives. The 
question of whether this is fair in a multicultural society is often contentious. 
Given the circumstances in Fiji after the 2000 coup, the case in support of 
conflict resolution was a powerful and convincing one which had ramifications 
not just for indigenous Fijians, but also for the entire nation.  
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Table 6.2 Summary of the Blueprint proposals 
Concepts Description
Constitution Promulgation of a pro-indigenous constitution (such as the 1990 
Constitution)  
Land Transfer of some state land to indigenous landowners
Land lease Revocation of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) 
which formed the basis of agreement between indigenous land 
owners and Indo-Fijian farmers to be replaced by the Native Land 
Trust Act (NLTA)
Fishing rights Transfer of ownership of offshore areas (i qoliqoli) from the state 
to landowners
Land compensation Land compensation for landowners whose land is used for 
commercial and other purposes
Fijian administration Strengthening the Fijian administration and Great Council of 
Chiefs as independent institutions
Fijian trust Establishment of a Fijian trust fund to facilitate saving and 
investment for the indigenous community
Fijian foundation Establish a Fijian foundation to carry out research into Fijian 
culture, language, ethno-history and ethno-geography and make 
these compulsory subjects in schools
National saving Establish a compulsory national savings scheme to finance 
indigenous business and education
Affirmative action law Enactment of an affirmative action enabling law
Mineral royalty Review of underground mineral and water legislation to increase 
royalty for indigenous Fijians
Tax exemption Enact enabling legislation for tax exemption for indigenous Fijian 
companies
Land administration Improvement of service by NLTB and Native Lands and Fisheries 
Commission
Government assistance Government financial assistance for NLTB and Fijian Holdings Ltd 
Source: Fiji Government 2001.
Table 6.3 Legislative initiatives under the Blueprint 
Legislative initiatives Ministry responsible
Preparation and promulgation of a new Constitution Prime Minister’s Office
Affirmative Action Legislation Prime Minister’s Office
Return of Schedule A & B Lands to NLTB Lands and Mineral Resources 
Removal of native land from the ambit of ALTA to NLTA MALR/NLTB/SLO 
Ownership rights of traditional qoliqoli to land owners Fijian Affairs and SLO 
Establishment of Land Claims Tribunal Fijian Affairs, SLO and PM 
Review of Fijian Affairs & GCC Regulations Fijian Affairs
Establishment of the Fijian Development Trust Fund PM 
National Savings Scheme for Fijians and Rotumans PM and Finance
Review of Mining Laws Lands and Mineral Resources and SLO 
Review of Company Tax Act Finance 
Review of NLTA & ALTA Native Land Trust Board and SLO 
Source: Fiji Government 2002.
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As Table 6.3 shows, relevant pieces of legislation were meant to be passed by 
parliament to legalize and safeguard the Blueprint. Of the proposed legislative 
initiatives at least three were eventually carried out. These included the Social 
Justice Act of 2001; return of some state land to indigenous landowners; and 
the switch from the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) to the Native 
Land Trust Act (NLTA). By and large, ALTA was seen as more favourable to Indo-
Fijian tenants because of the lower rent paid under its provisions and NLTA was 
seen as more favourable to indigenous Fijians landowners because of the higher 
rent. The attempt to enact the law on fishing rights (Qoliqoli Bill) later fuelled 
tension between Qarase’s government and the military, as we will see later.   
Table 6.4 Policy directives under the Blueprint
Policy directives Ministry responsible
Review of the Fijian Administration Fijian Affairs 
Reservation of 50% of Government shares in companies 
for Fijians and Rotumans as they become available
Public Enterprise 
Reservation of 50% of major licences or permits for Fijians 
& Rotumans
Business Development and 
Investment 
Reservation of 50% of Government contracts for Fijians & 
Rotumans
PM/Finance
Continuation of FDB Interest Scheme for Fijians & 
Rotumans
Finance
Establishment of Small Business Equity Scheme for Fijians 
and other races
Finance 
Establishment of a National Centre for Small and Micro 
Enterprise Development
Business Development and 
Investment
Dealings relating to mahogany PM/Fisheries and Forestry
Discontinuation of Land Use Commission NLTB/Land and Mineral 
Resources
Establishment of assistance scheme for Fijian landowners 
taking up cane farming on their reverted lands 
Land Reform
Determining of % of mining royalties to be paid to 
landowners
Land and Mineral Resources
Royalty regime for artesian or ground water Land and Mineral Resources
Resumption of Government Tenancy in provincial & tikina 
owned commercial office buildings
Public Service Commission 
Granting tax exemption to Fijian & Rotuman owned 
companies
Finance 
Preparation of a Twenty Year-Development Plan for Fijian 
and Rotuman development
Finance
Source: Fiji Government 2002.
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Policy directives provided more specific details of how the Blueprint was to be 
implemented, as Table 6.4 shows. Perhaps the most significant policy was the 
preparation of the 20YP. Most of the other policy initiatives were contained and 
elaborated on in the 20YP. This will be discussed in more detail later.
Table 6.5 Budgetary provisions under the Blueprint 
Budgetary provisions Ministry responsible
Government subvention to fund entire operation of Fijian 
Administration
Fijian Affairs 
Government annual grant to NLTB Fijian Affairs
Budget Provision of $1.5m payment to NLTB of arrears in 
rent for leases on State Schedule A Land
Lands and Mineral Resources 
Grant to endow the proposed Fijian Development Trust Fund PM 
Government provision for Fijian Education Fund Education 
Assistance to Fijian schools and research into Fijian 
education
Education
Conversion of $20m interest-free loan to FAB to a 
Government grant
Fijian Affairs 
Government provision of interest free loan to FAB for 
purchase of shares in Yasana Holdings Limited (YHL)
Fijian Affairs
Reinstatement of Government budget provision to assist 
Fijians in buying back ancestral land alienated as freehold 
land
Lands and Mineral Resources
Reinstatement of annual allocation from Government to 
Provincial Councils
MFA - Fijian Affairs
Land development for settlement of tenants whose ALTA 
leases have expired
ALTA and Land Resettlement 
Land development for low cost housing Housing 
Land development for resettlement of squatters Housing 
Assist commercial development of native land through NLTB Fijian Affairs
Village Improvement Scheme PM 
Source: Fiji Government 2002. 
The budgetary provisions relied heavily on state funding (Table 6.5) and some 
initiatives, such as the provision for Fijian education, were old ones; some, like 
the village improvement scheme, were relatively new ones.
The ethnic-based initiatives of the Blueprint were seen by critics such as the 
Fiji Human Rights Commission to be at odds with the spirit of the social justice 
provisions of the 1997 Constitution (Fiji Human Rights Commission 2001). 
However, given the tense political situation at the time, it was considered a 
possible remedy for communal tension. Even the military, which was opposed to 
indigenous ethno-nationalism, endorsed it on the ground that it would provide 
a good platform for peaceful transition away from the 2000 turmoil by appeasing 
the nationalists who were seen to pose a serious threat to security and stability.
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The proposed new constitution in the Blueprint was meant to replace the 
suspended 1997 Constitution. The suspension of the 1997 Constitution by 
the military was welcomed by many indigenous Fijians who were, ironically, 
opposed to the general position the military had taken during the coup. A 
constitutional review process was put in motion and the review commission 
was headed by Professor Asesela Ravuvu of the University of the South Pacific, 
an avid indigenous development advocate. The interim government envisaged 
that given the events of 2000 a constitution which would guarantee indigenous 
political supremacy similar to the 1990 one was the most appropriate. However, 
the constitutional process was later discontinued after the 1997 Constitution 
was reinstated by the Supreme Court on 15 November 2000.
There were other pro-indigenous proposals which were seen to have direct 
consequences on the economic wellbeing of other ethnic groups and thus 
provoked protests. They included the transfer of state land to native land, 
revocation of ALTA in favour of NLTA and transfer of ownership of offshore 
areas from the state to indigenous landowners. Indo-Fijians saw the land transfer 
and revocation of ALTA as a direct assault on their community interest while 
tourism industry business owners, many of whom were foreign nationals, saw 
the transfer of ownership of offshore areas as a threat to their business.
The compulsory savings proposal was seen by some as another form of taxation 
on top of contributions to church, provincial levies, land rates and other forms 
of traditional obligations. It was a form of communal capitalism but on a much 
larger scale. There was no suggestion as to how the money collected was going 
to be used and what the potential benefits were, except for the fact that they 
were to be used for “Fijian business.” A proposal to set up a Fijian trust was 
based on the relatively successful Malaysian Bumiputera trust fund model; but 
after the Fijian Holdings fiasco almost a decade earlier, there were doubts as 
to how it was going to operate, let alone benefit ordinary indigenous Fijians, 
especially those in the rural areas and those involved in the informal economy.
The tax exemption proposal for indigenous Fijian companies was an interesting 
one because for some time indigenous entrepreneurs had been making demands 
for special preferences to protect their businesses in an entrepreneurial 
environment dominated by Indo-Fijian business. The failure of previous 
governments to heed this call contributed to political agitation which led to the 
formation of the Fijian Nationalist Party in the 1970s. By 2000 these familiar 
demands were still echoing loudly. Tax exemption would have benefitted 
individual indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs as well as community-based 
companies. However, it would have provoked widespread protest from other 
communities.
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The establishment of a Fijian foundation had been suggested in the past; the 
problem was that, given the climate of ethno-political brinkmanship, any 
suggestion that dealt with researching and studying indigenous Fijian culture 
was often interpreted by Indo-Fijian leaders as nationalistic or even in some 
cases as “racist.” Proposals for communal projects had to be seen to be balanced 
and supportive of multiculturalism. Since independence, the fine line between 
what was “cultural” and what was “political” was always contentious and it has 
not been easy to make that distinction.
Other suggestions in the Blueprint, such as land compensation, strengthening 
of the Fijian administration and the Fijian trust, compulsory savings, an increase 
in mineral royalties, improvement in native land administration, affirmative 
action law and government assistance for NLTB and Fijian Holdings, were 
not new at all. In fact some of these have been part of on-going discussions 
since independence. The issue of land compensation and mining royalties, for 
instance, had been a major cause for grievance amongst landowners for years 
and was taken up by Bavadra during his reign as FLP leader in the 1980s.
The Blueprint, like past affirmative action initiatives, naturally attracted 
criticism from other ethnic groups. The favourite charge was that it was a 
“racist” document. The ensuing political debate was a replay of the same old 
tunes of ethnic condemnation and counter-condemnation. Despite the criticisms, 
Qarase was determined to use his position as head of the interim government to 
implement a comprehensive program of affirmative action to transform the lives 
of indigenous Fijians. The military had chosen him as interim prime minister 
because of his acclaimed commercial and public service background and as 
development adviser for various indigenous Fijian groups, including the GCC. 
Qarase quickly grabbed this opportunity to implement and institutionalize on 
a much larger national scale his ambitious plans for indigenous advancement. 
The main principles of the Blueprint were similar to those of the post-1987 
affirmative action programs. However, the major difference between affirmative 
action in 1987 and that of 2000 was that in the case of the former, the programs 
were driven by ad hoc policies compared to the latter, which attempted to be 
more coherent in the form of a state-sponsored formal framework. Nevertheless 
there were two major problems with the Blueprint. Firstly, there was no attempt 
to examine how similar programs failed in the post-1987 period. It would have 
been prudent to identify the causes of the failure and put in place remedies 
to ensure that the same mistakes were not repeated. Unfortunately the same 
players involved in the 1987 fiasco were also involved in creating the Blueprint. 
Secondly, the provisions of the Blueprint focused primarily on strengthening 
communal institutions rather than developing independent entrepreneurial 
skills. The assumption was that indigenous Fijians could survive only in a 
communally protected environment, a view which had its origins in Gordon’s 
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orthodoxy, as we saw in Chapter 2, and which was perpetuated in the communal 
capitalism framework, as we saw in Chapter 5. A symbolic gesture to reinforce 
this belief was when the Blueprint was presented to the GCC for its blessing 
on 13 July 2000. Instead of re-thinking new strategies (such as generating 
indigenous Fijian innovation and entrepreneurial training) which were more 
relevant to the contemporary economic climate, it was much more politically 
and culturally convenient to simply use old bottles to brew new wine. The 
lessons of history were ignored and this turned out to be costly later.
Implementing the Blueprint: The 20YP
While the Blueprint provided the broad framework for affirmative action, the 
20YP was much more comprehensive and detailed and was meant to be the 
implementation manual for the Blueprint. Nevertheless, there were a number of 
major differences between the Blueprint and the 20YP.
While the Blueprint conceptualized affirmative action as a natural right for 
indigenous Fijians by virtue of their status as indigenes, the 20YP attempted to 
position affirmative action in terms of Fiji’s multi-cultural context and in terms 
of how it could contribute to the creation of an equitable solution, fostering 
multiculturalism and lessening ethno-political tension. The mission statement of 
the 20YP talked about the need to socially engineer Fiji to become “a multi-ethnic 
and multi-cultural society”; a society where “the special place of indigenous 
Fijians and Rotumans as the host communities are recognized and accepted, 
and where their rights and interests are fully safeguarded and protected, 
alongside those of other communities, in the overall national development and 
in the interests of maintaining peace, stability, unity and progress in Fiji” (Fiji 
Government 2001: 1). Affirmative action was no longer seen as a given but as a 
historical necessity to help foster a multicultural society.
Furthermore, the Blueprint was more a political declaration inspired by the 
political sentiments of the time, where the 20YP was a much better-researched 
document with detailed statistics about the socio-economic performance of the 
different ethnic groups, the areas of inequity and how to target and address 
these over a twenty-year period.
Another important difference was that while notions of human rights and 
social justice did not feature in the Blueprint (this was one of the criticisms of 
it), the 20YP addressed them directly as a way of building up legitimacy and 
winning cross-communal and international support. For instance it argued that 
affirmative action was permissible under international legal instruments such 
as the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the ILO Convention on Indigenous 
Rights if it was geared towards addressing inequality and empowered a 
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disadvantaged group. Instead of asserting the rights of indigenous Fijians to 
preferential development, as was the case in 1987, there was a new shift in tone 
in the 20YP, signifying the diminishing influence of ethno-nationalists in the 
drafting of the document.
One of the most significant features of the 20YP was the formulation of the 
Equity Index (EI), which was meant to assess the levels of inequities between 
the different ethnic groups. It was based on a simple formula which took into 
account the different levels of achievement of the different ethnic groups (Current 
Distribution Ratio (CDR)) in relation to the national population, expressed as 
the Target Equity Ratio (TER) of 1:1. The TER depended on the population 
distribution and the ratio of the group designated as recipients of affirmative 
action to the rest of the population. Different countries would have different 
TER. The TER for Fiji was based on the premise that under the 1996 census the 
designated groups (indigenous Fijians and Rotumans) made up about 52% of 
the population and other ethnic groups made up about 48%. This approximated 
a 50-50 distribution or 1:1 ratio, thus the TER of 1:1. Achieving the 1:1 (50-
50) equity scale became the 20-year affirmative action target. Thus the EI 
represented the number of times indigenous Fijian output must be increased to 
achieve the 1:1 TER within 20 years. Table 6.6 shows the relationship between 
the TER (what is to be achieved), CDR (the situation at the moment) and EI (the 
number of times the indigenous output should be increased to reach TE). TE 
represents the equity threshold that needs to be targeted. According to this 
formula, real equity can only be achieved after CDR reaches the threshold of 1:1.
Table 6.6 Equity Index for selected occupational categories between 
Indigenous Fijians and other ethnic groups, showing Target Equity Ratio 
(TER), Current Distribution Ratio (CDR) and Equity Index (EI) 
Occupational category TER CDR EI
Corporate Manager 1:1 1:6 6
Physical, Mathematics, Engineering Sciences 1:1 1:3 3
Business and Legal Professionals 1:1 1:3 3
Physical and Engineering Science Technicians 1:1 1:2 2
Finance and Sales/ Business Service 1:1 1:3 3
Extraction and Building Trade 1:1 1:3 3
Plant and Machine Operators/Elementary 1:1 1:3 3
Source: Calculated from Fiji Government 2000: 49-54.
Table 6.6 shows that indigenous Fijians were substantially disadvantaged 
compared to other ethnic groups in various occupational categories such as 
corporate manager; physical, mathematics, engineering sciences; business 
and legal professionals; physical and engineering science technicians; finance 
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and sales/ business service; extraction and building trade (1:3); and plant and 
machine operators/elementary. In occupational categories such as education, 
tourism and in the primary industries, indigenous Fijians had performed well; 
but in some areas where technical skills were needed there was still a wide gap. 
The optimistic belief was that by 2020 every sector in Fiji where indigenous 
Fijians were lagging behind should have achieved a 1:1 ratio with other ethnic 
groups. To ensure this was achieved, a monitoring system was to be designed 
and, in addition, there were to be a major mid-term review and minor quarterly 
reviews. 
There were problems with the 20YP from the beginning. Perhaps the major 
weakness was the lack of a coherent link and coordination between the 
document framework and the various government ministries and their 
respective sectors. The sectors identified for reform were education, population, 
human resources development and utilisation, commerce and finance, public 
enterprise reforms, health, resource-based industries, tourism, culture and 
heritage and rural development. The idea was that relevant ministries in charge 
of these sectors were to carry out the affirmative action strategies in accordance 
with the prescribed processes in the plan. But often the ministries would do 
things through the initiatives of the departmental personnel. Because the 20YP 
provisions were mainstreamed into the respective line ministries, there was 
confusion as to the distinction between affirmative action initiatives and normal 
ministerial programs. It appeared that ministry officials were not well trained 
in the matter.
Furthermore, while there was a monitoring system in place, it was not strictly 
adhered to. It was quite difficult in the beginning to ensure accountability, 
transparency and the tracking of financial flows, partly because there was no 
professional training carried out of those involved in the implementation of 
the programs and disbursement of funds. The agriculture scam which we will 
discuss in detail later was due in part to this lack of capacity.
Another major problem was the politicization of the 20YP. The draft of the 20YP 
document was completed before the September 2001 election and the Affirmative 
Action Unit (AU) responsible for its implementation was transferred from the 
Central Planning Office within the Ministry of Finance to the Prime Minister’s 
Office. The SDL used the 20YP and Blueprint quite extensively for its election 
campaign by presenting it to indigenous Fijians as the “solution” to their socio-
economic problems. This may have contributed to the SDL’s election victory in 
2001. Meanwhile, there were allegations of vote buying in rural areas in various 
parts of the country. Voters were offered farming implements, amongst other 
things, for their vote. This led to the infamous ‘agriculture scam’. The scam was 
identified before the 2001 election and the investigation continued for a number 
of years after the election. 
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Post 2001 election: Unearthing the scam
The results of the 2001 election (see Table 6.7) show that the two major ethnic 
parties, the SDL and FLP, won most seats. The SDL won 32 seats and the FLP 
won 27 seats. The Matanitu Vanua (MV), a party linked to George Speight, the 
leader of the 2000 coup, won six seats. The SDL and MV formed a coalition, 
thus establishing indigenous Fijian dominance in parliament and control of 
government.
Due to fundamental political differences, the SDL refused to include the FLP 
in the cabinet as required by the constitution’s multi-party provision and this 
led to a court battle which was eventually won by the FLP in 2005. In response 
to the court ruling the SDL allocated some junior cabinet positions to the FLP, 
but did not include Chaudhry. One of the SDL’s concerns was that, given its 
antagonism to affirmative action since the 2000 coup, the FLP’s presence in 
cabinet would compromise the SDL’s affirmative action project.
Table 6.7 Results of the 2001 election by political parties  
Party Communal Open Total
FAP - -8 - - - -9
FLP 19 +1 8 -10 27 -9
MV 5 +5 1 +1 6 +6
NFP - -1 1 +1 1 -
NLUP 1 +1 1 +1 2 +2
NVTLP - -1 - -1 - -2
PANU - -4 - - - -4
SDL 19 +19 13 +13 32 +32
SVT - -6 - -3 - -9
UGP 1 -1 - - 1 -1
Others 1 -6 1 -1 2 -7
Source: Fiji Election Office 2002. 
With overwhelming indigenous Fijian support, the SDL victory was seen as an 
endorsement of its pro-indigenous policies and provided the political confidence 
needed to carry through the SDL’s affirmative action policies with greater vigour. 
However, from its first day in office, the SDL had to deal with the irregularities 
and scandals which had plagued the affirmative programs since 2000 and which 
continued to 2006. Even before the 20YP was eventually endorsed by cabinet in 
August 2001, abuse had already started.
The most high-profile scandal was in the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), where 
more than FJ$18 million was used without proper authorization. As we saw 
earlier, agricultural development was a common target of affirmative action in 
the immediate post-independence period; but after the 1987 coups there was a 
shift towards developing an indigenous entrepreneurial class. One of the reasons 
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for this change was the prominent support by the rural poor for the 2000 coup. 
Rural villagers turned up to parliament in their hundreds to publicly express 
their grievances and support the coup. There was a realization amongst those 
who drafted the 20YP that addressing rural poverty was critical in the long run 
for both national development and political stability.
The scam came to light after an audit by the auditor general and published in his 
report for the tear 2000. The report revealed that out of a total of FJ$18,344,696 
used on affirmative action, FJ$2,093,599 was incurred in 2000 and FJ$11,059,129 
in 2001; and there were outstanding payments totalling FJ$5,191,968. Of the 
outstanding payments, a total of FJ$1,421,141 of unpaid vouchers were held 
back due to lack of funds; FJ$676,072 worth of Local Purchase Orders (LPOs) 
had been issued but not paid; and there was a total FJ$3,094,755 of orders made 
without LPOs (Fiji Office of Auditor General 2002).
Most of the money was spent on farming implements and dalo (taro) suckers 
for planting. A total of FJ$3,094,754.75 worth of farming implements were 
purchased from Suncourt Hardware, a company owned by a prominent Indo-
Fijian company, at inflated prices. As Table 6.8 shows, the prices of farming 
implements from Government Supplies, where implements for government use 
were normally sourced, were considerably cheaper than the Suncourt Hardware 
prices. This became a central issue in later police investigations and subsequent 
court cases which led to the conviction and imprisonment of some government 
officials and the Suncourt managing director. 
Table 6.8 Comparisons between Suncourt Hardware and Government 
Supplies Prices
Item Suncourt Hardware price
Govt Supplies 
Dept price Difference ($) Difference (%)
Digging fork 125 71 54 76
Digging shovel 30 18 12 66
Digging spade 75 31 44 142
Post hole spade 95 50 45 90
Cane knife 14 7 7 100
Source: Fiji Office of Auditor General 2002: 10.
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A total of 5,587,327 dalo suckers worth $838,099 were bought from eight 
suppliers and sold to farmers in the rural areas. Ironically, of the eight suppliers, 
only four were indigenous Fijians and the other four were either Indo-Fijians 
or Chinese. Most of the dalo suckers were supplied to the following clients: 
Naitasiri Provincial Farm-Navuso (120,000); various other Naitasiri districts at a 
rate of 1,000 a month; district of Vuna in Naitasiri (15,000); Vanuakula Catholic 
Mission in Naitasiri (15,000); Wailevu Rural Development Co-operative Society 
(Tailevu), consisting of 210 farms in five villages (240,000); Sabeto Village 
Community Development Project; and Nadroga-Navosa province (454,400) 
distributed to 660 farmers. Of the dalo suckers distributed in Nadroga, 17% 
or 75,000 were distributed to coastal and cane land areas from Namatakula to 
Malomalo and Raviravi towards Nadi. Interestingly, an Indo-Fijian farmer in Ba 
was also supplied with 20,000 dalo suckers. As part of the MOA diversification 
program, there was an attempt to encourage dalo farming amongst indigenous 
Fijians in certain parts of the Nadi and Nadroga as an alternative to cane farming 
on land returned from Indo-Fijian farmers after the expiration of land leases.
The major beneficiaries of the dalo project were from the three provinces of 
Naitasiri, Nadi and Ba, out of a total of 14 provinces in Fiji. A possible explanation 
was that most dalo suckers were sourced in Viti Levu and it was easier to deliver 
them to these places. However, this does not explain why no dalo suckers were 
supplied to farmers in Rewa, Ra, Namosi and Serua, which were also located in 
Viti Levu. Widely circulated rumours in Fiji pointed to the role of ministers in 
the interim government and SDL candidates actively involved in the distribution 
of dalo suckers and farming implements as part of their 2001 election campaign. 
The reason provided by the interim Minister for Agriculture, Apisai Tora 
(whose own village of Sabeto was one of the beneficiaries) for the preferential 
distribution of dalo suckers was that “these areas had largely made up the crowd 
of agitators in Parliament” during the 2000 coup so “We thought we should give 
the initial concentration there” (Manueli 2001).
The way the purchasing of goods was carried out became one of the major 
concerns of the auditor general, who described the irregular processes used as 
tantamount to “risks of fraud and corruption” (Fiji Office of Auditor General 
2002: 14). The MOA officials broke the normal rules for purchasing and created 
their own system on a scale which was unprecedented in Fiji’s history. Table 6.9 
shows a comparison between the normal purchasing process and the irregular 
process used by MOA officials. 
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Table 6.9 Comparison between the normal process for Government Local 
Purchase Order and the irregular 
Normal LPO process Irregular process used by MOA
Original and duplicate issued to suppliers of 
goods and services;
Supplier keeps original and returns duplicate 
to Ministry with its invoice, and supplies good 
or service. From invoice, a liability is entered 
into the commitment ledger to record the 
expected amount owed by Ministry to the 
suppliers;
Ministry on receiving the goods, checks the 
goods against triplicate copy of the LPO, 
certifies that goods have been received in 
good condition, and processes the order for 
payment;
Fourth copy retained in the book.
Certified applicants’ letter is taken to the 
supplier;
Supplier processes the Order;
Goods are supplied to the applicants;
Invoices are sent by the supplier to the 
Ministry; 
Orders are raised & Commitment ledger is 
updated; 
Payment is then made to the suppliers.
Source: Summarized from Fiji Office of Auditor General 2002: 12-13. 
Over time, the link between the MOA officials and Suncourt became very 
personal and trusting, to the extent that even without an LPO Suncourt would 
deliver the goods on the strength of the customer’s application. About half of 
the approvals for the Naitasiri applicants were done this way. It was also found 
that some LPOs issued to suppliers were open and the items to be supplied and 
their prices were left entirely to the discretion of the supplier and farmers.
Another company involved in the supply of goods was Morris Hedstrom (MH). 
However, one of the MH employees, Pita Koney Alifereti, wrote and authorised 
all quotations from MH, Coral Island Traders (a subsidiary of MH) and Repina 
Wholesalers, Alifereti’s own company. The Repina price was often accepted 
because it was lower than the other two. It was later revealed during Alifereti’s 
trial that he also gave money to a number of senior officials of the MOA to 
ensure that his company, Repina Wholesalers, continued to be awarded the 
MOA contract (Fijilive, 11 September 2008). A total of FJ$336,246.52 was given 
to Repina between 8 September 2000 and 15 January 2001. It was a case of 
insider information, deception and bribery, for which Alifereti was later jailed.
The five MOA officials responsible for the approval process signed LPOs above their 
limits. The rules specified that the permanent secretary could approve an LPO up to 
$10,000 and those below him had lower ceilings. However, a total of FJ$2,083,787.34 
worth of approvals was signed beyond the authorized limits of the senior officers, as 
shown in Table 6.10. The actions of these officers were deemed to be in breach of the 
Public Service Code of Conduct (Fiji Government. 1999b). 
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Table 6.10 Amount signed by senior officers of the MOA beyond the 
authorized limits 
Designation Name No. of orders Total value (FJ$)
Permanent Secretary Peniasi Kunatuba 43 636,451.13
Deputy Secretary (Services) Samisoni Ulitu 67 545,983.66
Deputy Secretary (Operations) Ken Cokanasiga 36 340,834.44
Director, Administration and Finance Sereani Bainimarama 2 18,120.00
Principal Accounts Officer Suliasi Sorovakatini 78 542,398.11
Total 226 2,083,787.34
Source: Fiji Office of Auditor General 2002: 14. 
Kunatuba, the permanent secretary, was the first to be jailed for abuse of office in 
2006 and was handed a four-year term. In her ruling, High Court judge Justice 
Nazhat Shameem described the case as the most serious abuse of office to be 
brought before the Fiji courts so far (The Fiji Times, 16 November 2006).
On 17 September 2008, Alifereti was jailed together with Peli Kete Doviyaroi, 
a MOA officer who was given FJ$8,000 by Alifereti. Suncourt Hardware 
director Dhansukh Lal Bhika, the managing director for Suncourt, and Suliasi 
Sorovakatini, the principal accounts officer, were sentenced to five years and 
four-and-a-half years respectively by the High Court in March 2011 for official 
corruption. Bhika was accused of providing Sorovakatini with airline tickets to 
Australia and FJ$51,921.12 credit facilities in his company – all to ensure that 
Sorovakatini continued to approve the purchase of farming implements from 
Suncourt. Needless to say, the agricultural scam further tarnished the already 
negative image of affirmative action.
I have discussed these developments in detail in order to address two issues 
which have plagued other affirmative action policies in the past. The first is 
that without proper monitoring, affirmative action as a politically driven 
project can be subject to arbitrary manipulation and abuse by those concerned. 
Secondly, mainstreaming affirmative action programs into line ministries can 
cause confusion over which programs are routine and which ones are affirmative 
action initiatives.
A further issue here is the question of responsibility. Who was ultimately 
responsible for the debacle? Cabinet did not formally endorse the 20YP until 14 
August 2001, just 11 days before the election, although the program had been in 
place since 2000 (Fiji Parliament 2001b). There were conflicting messages from 
the MOA. Kunatuba, the permanent secretary, stated that the interim minister, 
Apisai Tora, had approved of the program in writing; but the letter was not 
found during the police investigation. Interestingly, the MOA’s official statement 
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defended the minister and contradicted the permanent secretary’s position. 
Kunatuba maintained his innocence during the court case and appealed. 
Kunatuba was later sacked by the minister before being imprisoned.
During Kunatuba’s trial, the prime minster, Qarase, and 11 other cabinet 
ministers and senior civil servants were named in court documents in relation 
to their role in the scam as part of the election campaign. The court affidavit 
said that the interim government had “known and had given its approval to the 
use of the farming assistance scheme to fund its policy on the development of 
indigenous Fijians and Rotumans” (AAP, 22 June 2002: 1). It was also claimed 
that Finance Minister Jone Kubuabola was fully aware of the abuse because the 
ministry had to make approvals of FJ$28,000 daily; and that by the end of 2000 
the government had approved FJ$2 million under the scheme. Mr Kunatuba 
claimed that he had become a scapegoat in a systematic scam involving the 
entire affirmative action program. 
In hindsight, it is inconceivable that Tora, Qarase, Kubuabola and other 
ministers of the interim government were not aware of what was happening. 
For instance Tora’s village had been a beneficiary of affirmative action in the 
form of dalo suckers and farming implements, while Qarase had accompanied 
the Assistant Minister for Agriculture, Marieta Rigamoto, in a trip to Rotuma, 
Rigamoto’s island, to distribute FJ$100,000 worth of farming implements in July 
2001, a month before the election (The Fiji Times, 10 July 2001). Kubuabola was 
responsible for overseeing the use of funds. Rigamoto stood as an independent 
in the Rotuman communal seat during the 2001 election and won. Rigamoto 
was not new to scandals. In a separate case, she was ordered by the Fiji Court of 
Appeal to pay back more than US$850,000 to the National Bank of Fiji (later to 
become Colonial Bank and lately Bank South Pacific) in September 2011 for her 
loan in the 1990s.
Tora defended himself during the trial by blaming the military for the scandal, 
arguing that they were the ones responsible for introducing affirmative action 
after the 1987 coup and for endorsing the post-2000 coup affirmative action to 
“diffuse the tension caused by the political crisis” (Radio NZ, 13 Oct 2006). The 
witch hunt was on and there were questions raised about the ethical practices 
of public servants, the reliability of the state in implementing affirmative 
action and more importantly the appropriateness of affirmative action itself. 
Despite the noble political intent the scam had further eroded the integrity of 
affirmative action and was a major slur on the indigenous Fijians’ reputation in 
the utilization of communal resources, although only a minority was involved. 
As a precaution against political backlash on the eve of the election, the interim 
government, which had by now formed the SDL Party, suspended the affirmative 
action program in August 2001.
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Nevertheless, it appeared that the scam did not deter indigenous Fijian voters 
from voting overwhelmingly for the SDL, perhaps because the publicity value 
of the affirmative action programs may have overshadowed an understanding of 
the actual outcomes. With the embarrassing scam in mind, parliament enacted 
the Social Justice Act on 21 December 2001 as required under Section 44 of 
the Constitution to provide the legal framework for future affirmative action 
initiatives.
Attempts at reconciliation and tension: 
Towards another military coup 
Affirmative action programs after the 2001 election and before the 2006 coup 
faced numerous challenges. The agriculture scam had shaken people’s confidence 
in the government to administer affirmative action. As investigations, court 
cases and recriminations continued for the next few years, ministries became 
more cautious and civil servants and ministers became more aware of the need 
to practice good governance. But this did not stop other scams (as we shall see 
later) from taking place. The Social Justice Act of 2001 provided affirmative 
action with more legitimacy and this gave the SDL new confidence in its desire 
to push forward pro-indigenous reforms.
The Social Justice Act was timely because it created an environment in which 
the 20YP could be more inclusive; and it also gave credibility to the SDL’s 
national dialogue and reconciliation policy, which was implemented in the 
form of the talanoa sessions, facilitated by Dr Sitiveni Halapua of the East-West 
Center in Hawaii. The government decided to expand the affirmative action 
provisions to include other ethnic groups, as required under the Social Justice 
Act and as a gesture of national unity.1 In addition, the SDL initiated a national 
reconciliation process which, unfortunately, was later overshadowed by the 
unpopular Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill (RTUB). However, thirdly, 
affirmative action and national reconciliation were challenged by growing 
protest and tension and, perhaps most seriously was the growth of protests 
and tension and, perhaps the most seriously, by pressure from the military 
on Qarase’s government to remove the RTUB and Qoliqoli Bill. These will be 
discussed in detail later.
In a report to Parliament on 4 October 2004, Qarase stated that since 2001 a total 
of 27 affirmative action projects had been implemented for indigenous Fijians 
1 Affirmative action for Indo-Fijians and other ethnic minorities was administered under the Ministry of 
Multi-ethnic Affairs (MMA). While scholarships for indigenous Fijians under the FAB were based on ethnicity 
and academic performance, scholarships under the MMA were based on ethnicity and parents’ income, set 
at $10,000 or less.  
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and Rotumans and 19 for Indo-Fijians and minority communities (Qarase 2004). 
There were problems in implementing some of the provisions because of a lack 
of indigenous Fijians in critical areas such as contracting. For instance, of the 
FJ$33.6 million worth of contracts awarded from July to December 2003, only 
$5.6 million (17%) went to indigenous Fijian-owned companies compared to 
$12.6 million (38%) to Indo-Fijian companies and $15.4 million (45%) to other 
minority groups. This was still a long way from the 50% target for indigenous 
Fijian participation envisaged under the 20YP.
The SDL put a lot of emphasis on indigenous education. It was realized that 
education was the most successful of the affirmative action initiatives since 
affirmative action started in the 1970s. In fact a large number of current 
politicians, civil servants, military officers, professionals and corporate sector 
employees were products of educational affirmative action in the 1970s and 
1980s; thus there was significant interest in this area. It is estimated that by 
2011, of those who had graduated, almost 7,000 were serving in Fiji. The success 
rate for indigenous students improved considerably over the years from below 
50% in the 1970s to 90.42% in 2011 (Fiji Ministry of Information 2011).
There were other initiatives, such as village banks, for grassroots people as part 
of the 20YP savings scheme. By 2004 total savings of $71,000 from 659 clients 
had been deposited. Perhaps the most significant increase in the participation 
of indigenous Fijians in business was in the taxi business, where the number of 
licences given to indigenous Fijians increased from 85 in 2001 to 123 in 2003; 
whilst for Indo-Fijians there was an increase from 2 in 2001 to 310 in 2003. As 
at 30 September 2004 the total number of taxi permit holders was 5,456, of 
which indigenous Fijians held 2,275 (42%), Indo-Fijians 2940 (54%) and for 
other minorities held 4%.
Despite these achievements, criticisms of affirmative action continued unabated. 
In its 2003 report on Fiji, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
noted that affirmative action did very little to address the issue of poverty. The 
Committee strongly recommended that affirmative action policies be devised 
to ensure that “poverty alleviation programs benefit all poor Fijian citizens, 
irrespective of their ethnic origin, to avoid undue stress on already strained 
ethnic relations” and that “the adoption of any affirmative action program be 
preceded by consultations involving all ethnic communities” (United Nations 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 2003). It has been argued along 
the same lines that affirmative action led to economic distortion, stifling of 
competition and corruption while sustaining, rather than alleviating, poverty 
(Chand 2007). In its review of affirmative action in Fiji the Fiji Human Rights 
Commission [FHRC] (2006) concluded that there was no coherent approach to 
addressing the problems of disadvantaged groups and added that the situation 
of other disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities and women were 
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not catered for. The FHRC recommended that the Social Justice programs 
should be reviewed and the affirmative action policies be removed because 
they discriminated against other groups and thus breached the human rights 
provisions of Section 38 (2) of the Constitution.
In another major shock reminiscent of the agriculture scam, the Auditor General 
identified irregularities in a $2 million project to promote educational centres 
of excellence as a way of upgrading indigenous education. A number of schools 
were identified as centres of excellence and the intention was that the facilities 
of those schools would be upgraded and the quality of education would be 
improved through increased resources in order to attract the best students and 
promote educational achievement and innovation in the region. However, the 
auditor general’s report in 2005 showed unauthorised advance payments for 
building materials, purchase of rugby jerseys for a team, unaudited accounts, 
unauthorised payments and excessive payments for casual labour (Fiji Office of 
Auditor General 2005).
The auditor general recommended that the principal of the Naitasiri Provincial 
High School be investigated for wrongfully authorising LPOs and payments 
in relation to the following: $215,000 paid in advance to HP Kasabia, an Indo-
Fijian retail company; $26,870 used to buy school uniforms that were not 
approved under the scheme; and $12,180 used to buy jerseys for a rugby team. 
These were expenses illegally diverted from the following approved allocations: 
upgrading of staff quarters ($135,000); upgrading of classroom blocks and a 
science laboratory ($65,000); a vocational centre ($20,000); building of toilets 
($30,000); improvement of water supply ($10,000) and electrical wiring and a 
switchboard ($15,000). About half of the $2 million grant for the project was 
subject to misuse (Fiji Office of Auditor General 2005).
It was alleged by the Fiji Labour Party Deputy Leader, Poseci Bune, on 23 
November 2005 that the company, Safeway Marine and Rabitech was contracted 
by the Ministry of Fisheries to build 90 fibreglass boats which were distributed 
before the August 2006 election (The Fiji Times, 24 November 2005). He also made 
revelations of villagers receiving grass cutters, outboard motors, digging forks, 
cane knives and other farming implements in various provinces. Allegations 
were also made of people being freely given airfares, refrigerators, dinner packs 
and accommodation.
It was the agriculture scam all over again, although on a much smaller scale. The 
auditor general’s report questioned why Naitasiri High School was chosen ahead 
of the dozens of indigenous schools. The SDL party was formed by the Naitasiri 
chiefs and there was an unwritten understanding that Naitasiri, which had been 
neglected in the area of development and education since independence, was 
to be a priority beneficiary of affirmative action. The workers employed in the 
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building projects were all from the tribe of the local chief, one of the founders of 
the SDL Party. The contract for the building works was awarded to Baba Forests, 
a company owned by SDL national secretary, Jale Baba. The report noted that 
the building work was not properly completed. It was obvious that the SDL 
had a direct hand in the implementation of the scheme and in the irregularities.
The hallmark of the client-patronage relationship, a common feature of past 
affirmative action, was clearly visible. The SDL had projected the image of being 
the saviour of the indigenous Fijians and was desperate to fulfil the heightened 
expectations in whatever way possible. Because of its political malleability, 
affirmative action was the perfect tool that could be utilized at will to achieve this 
purpose. Again like the agricultural projects, Naitasiri, a major SDL stronghold, 
was a major beneficiary. The unfair distribution of affirmative action projects 
amongst indigenous Fijians remained an unresolved issue.
Noble intentions turned sour: The RTUB and 
Qoliqoli Bill
With a comfortable parliamentary majority and overwhelming support amongst 
the indigenous Fijian people and indigenous institutions such as the powerful 
Methodist Church and the 14 provincial councils, the Qarase government 
initiated two bills which it hoped would transform indigenous political and 
economic life for the better. Although the intentions of the RTUB and Qoliqoli 
Bill may have been noble, they nonetheless invoked widespread resistance.
The RTUB was a form of political affirmative action first introduced into 
parliament on 4 May 2005, almost five years after the May 2000 coup. The 
RTUB proposed a Reconciliation and Unity Commission to grant amnesty to 
perpetrators of the 2000 coup and compensation to those who suffered as a 
result of the coup during the period from 19 May 2000 to 15 March 2001. The 
president was to have a veto power over the granting of amnesty. On the advice 
of the prime minister and in consultation with the leader of the opposition, the 
members of the commission were to be appointed by the president.
A Joint Parliamentary Select Committee on Justice, Law and Order, chaired 
by the Deputy Speaker of the House, Manasa Tugia, was set up to conduct 
public consultations around the country and altogether the committee received 
272 written and oral submissions. However, the Fiji Labour Party boycotted 
the committee and refused to provide a representative for it. The RTUB was 
presented as “a genuine attempt at political stability and unity in Fiji” after 
various nation-building approaches such as “multiparty Cabinet, the talanoa 
session, Parliamentary Standing Committee, Ministry of Reconciliation, 
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prosecution and jailing of offenders etc. have failed” (RTUB 2005). It proposed 
that the way forward for Fiji was through national reconciliation, forgiveness 
and tolerance. Since the 2000 coup had fractured and scarred Fiji deeply, the 
most appropriate way forward to nurture and consolidate inter-ethnic trust and 
unity was through restorative justice (Fiji Sun, 2 December 2005). The idea was 
to shift the conflict resolution approach from retributive justice, which was 
based on punishment, to restorative justice, which was based on reconciliation 
between the victims and perpetrators of the 2000 coup. The RTUB emphasized 
the importance of giving victims of the May 2000 events a chance to be heard 
as well as to apply for compensation and reparation. It also gave a chance for 
the perpetrators to ask for forgiveness and apply for amnesty. Earlier, a number 
of coup activists had been released under the Compulsory Supervision Order 
(CSO) and this had provoked criticism and opposition from the military and 
human rights groups.
The RTUB was the result of months of nation-wide consultations by the Ministry 
of National Reconciliation (MNR) as a build-up towards a national reconciliation 
week from 4 to 11 October 2004. The program for the week included public 
meetings and lectures on peace-building and multiculturalism around the 
country as a build-up to a public reconciliation ceremony at Albert Park in Suva 
on 10 October. The reconciliation ceremony was based on the indigenous Fijian 
model of peace-building known as veisorosorovi (forgiveness and reconciliation). 
The national ceremony, which was broadcast live around the country, consisted 
of inter-group forgiveness and acceptance of forgiveness between the various 
ethnic groups and religious groups. It was a solemn and moving occasion and 
the first of its kind in Fiji. A peace-building model which had been used for 
hundreds of years within the indigenous Fijian community was being used in 
the national context across ethnic, cultural and religious divides.
However, while the reconciliation program was hailed by participants as a 
success, it failed to achieve total reconciliation because two major players 
in the 2000 coup boycotted the ceremony – the military and the FLP. They 
both preferred “justice” through the retributive method (arrest, trial and 
imprisonment) to deal with the coup perpetrators. This exacerbated the already 
simmering tension between the military and the Qarase government and this 
antagonistic relationship spilled over into the RTUB debate.
The controversy over the RTUB was worsened by the existing climate of political 
animosity and suspicion. People’s reactions showed a clear ethnic demarcation. 
A public opinion poll by Tebbutt, published on 21 June 2005, indicated that 
55% of indigenous Fijians supported the RTUB compared to only 19% of Indo-
Fijians; also 29% of indigenous Fijians and 60% of Indo-Fijians opposed it. 
About 10% of indigenous Fijians and 14% of Indo-Fijians said they did not 
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care one way or the other (Fiji Times, 21 June 2005). A public opinion poll on 
2 July 2005 suggested that only 4% of the population had read the RTUB fully 
and 16% had read it partially only (Fiji Times, 2 July 2005).
Critics argued that the RTUB would help legitimize the 2000 coup and promote 
a coup culture in the process. The military saw it as a direct affront to their role 
as the last bastion of state security during the 2000 upheaval. Some saw it as 
an attempt to undermine the rule of law and the constitution, especially the 
constitutional and statutory powers of the judiciary, DPP, police, military and 
other constitutional offices. The amnesty provision of the RTUB in particular 
was objectionable since it was seen as an insult to the rights of the victims of the 
coup to have their situation addressed.
The RTUB was in itself a form of political affirmative action to supplement 
the economic affirmative action programs of the 20YP. It was hoped that a 
reconciliatory political climate created by the RTUB would make the Blueprint 
and 20YP more acceptable to other ethnic groups and critics. The RTUB did not 
get off the ground, as the protests intensified and stern demands for withdrawal 
by the military commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, worsened the 
tension between the government and the military. 
The Qoliqoli Bill (QB), first proposed in the Blueprint, was one of the SDL’s major 
indigenous projects. The QB proposed that ownership of offshore indigenous 
fishing rights (qoliqoli), which hitherto had been under state jurisdiction, should 
be transferred to indigenous landowners. Part 2 of the Bill stated that “the State 
shall cease to be, and the Board shall be, bound by the terms and conditions 
subject to which such legal interests and rights were originally granted”... and 
“all qoliqoli areas are deemed to be native reserve unless the Minister upon 
application by the qoliqoli owners, declares by order in the Gazette such areas 
as outside native reserve within the meaning of the Native Land Trust Act” 
(Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewe ni Vanua Party. 2006: 4-5). 
By law, the state had legal jurisdiction over minerals found below the surface 
of the soil as well as in the sea area up to the high water mark. While the 
state had legal jurisdiction over the offshore areas, there was also recognition 
of landowners’ traditional fishing rights or qoliqoli. While the two modes of 
jurisdiction existed harmoniously, there had also been cases of conflict between 
them, especially when issues of foreshore development and access to hotel 
beaches, private property and development projects were involved. In the case of 
the hotels, because of the often close ties between hotel owners and landowners 
through employment of local landowners in hotels or even shareholding, these 
problems had often been solved amicably. During the 2000 coup a few resorts 
and hotels were forcefully taken by landowners to show their grievances.
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The country was divided as a result of the QB. The SDL government and its 
supporters, including the Methodist Church and a number of chiefs, argued that 
the QB was an important lever to enhance indigenous economic progress. It was 
argued that indigenous Fijians rarely benefitted from their qoliqoli in terms of 
compensation, rent and royalty and that ownership of the offshore area meant 
control of sea travel, resource exploitation and trade. It was seen not only as 
a potential source of economic wealth for the landowners, it was also a source 
of social and political empowerment and a basis for the self-determination 
prescribed in the Blueprint. For the SDL this could guarantee its continued 
political support amongst the indigenous population. The passage of the QB 
was timed to coincide with the election campaign for the 2006 general elections.
Opposition to the QB was widespread. Opponents included hotel operators, 
business people, NGOs, the military and a host of indigenous Fijian individuals 
and groups. There were a number of reasons for the opposition. First, tourist 
operators feared that the QB would put restrictions on tourism activities 
such as snorkelling, surfing, swimming and fishing and also create potential 
conflict with landowners over use of the qoliqoli for these activities. This would 
seriously impact on Fiji’s largest industry. In addition to this they would have 
to pay extra fees for use of the qoliqoli on top of the lease and royalty they 
paid landowners. Second, many of those in the real estate, development and 
business industry feared that the QB was going to impact on their capacity to 
invest and generate income. Third, the military was more concerned about the 
security implications of the QB, particularly as it could potentially lead to more 
intra-communal conflict between landowners. Tension over fishing rights, some 
ending in physical assault, has been a cause of concern in many parts of Fiji 
over the years. Unlike the land area, there were no reliable boundaries for the 
qoliqoli and it was assumed that the land boundaries somehow would extend in 
an imaginary perpendicular line into the sea. The boundaries were supposed to 
be determined by a commission to be set up by the QB.
Another complication was that indigenous Fijians held a very flexible concept 
of traditional fishing rights and people from various localities could fish in other 
qoliqoli through mutual agreement with the local landowners. In some parts 
of Fiji, it was assumed that the qoliqoli was owned by everyone and everyone 
had rights of access to it. In some places such as Cakaudrove and Lau, the 
qoliqoli was said to be “owned’ by the paramount chief and thus it was open 
for fishing access by everyone as long as they used it for purely subsistence 
purposes. Commercial fishermen needed a government licence for fishing within 
designated qoliqoli, which were policed by fishing wardens, who were usually 
from the local landowning unit. The fear was that the QB could lead to disputes 
over sea boundaries and that such disputes might escalate and lead to instability 
within the indigenous community and beyond.
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The Fiji Law Society was opposed to the bill because it felt that it was 
unconstitutional, since it interfered with the Native Lands Act, which protected 
Fijian landownership; and also because it would weaken the sovereignty of 
the state as well as undermine the rights of other ethnic groups (Radio NZ, 
2 November 2006). The same view was echoed by the Fiji Human Rights 
Commission.
What was meant to be a major affirmative action program for indigenous Fijians 
became the final straw which contributed to the intensification of tension 
between the military and the government, culminating in another military 
takeover on 6 December 2006. 
Conclusion 
The seven years between 1999 and 2006 were among the most turbulent in Fiji’s 
history, with two coups and three elections. As this chapter has shown, there 
were different trends in affirmative action programs within this period and, 
beneath the veneer of indigenous advancement, affirmative action was utilized 
to serve various political interests such as appeasement, conflict resolution, 
mobilization for electoral support and the strengthening of political patronage.
The scams associated with affirmative action were indicative of how economic 
prudence became subservient to political expediency. There was no attempt to 
learn from the lessons of the post-1987 scandals, which cost the country more 
than FJ$200 million. Instead, political ambition and optimism overshadowed 
rational judgement in a negative way. Just as with the Alliance and SVT in 
the past, the desire of both the FLP and SDL to influence and transform the 
immediate political conditions in their favour through affirmative action became 
a primary consideration which outweighed the importance of indigenous 
advancement. The political rather than the transformational value of affirmative 
action became a priority consideration.
This was one of the reasons why affirmative action programs had very little 
creativity and innovation in relation to the self-empowerment and positive 
social transformation of the indigenous Fijian community.
As an example of this, there was a lot of emphasis on helping existing rural 
communal farming through provision of implements and dalo suckers, rather 
than reorganizing rural production using new knowhow and innovation to 
develop entrepreneurial skills, and to boost value-added productivity and 
large-scale marketing. Many of those who were supplied with dalo suckers and 
implements were community groups which produced agricultural produce for 
community projects. This was a form of communal capitalism which, as we 
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saw in previous affirmative action projects, would have promoted community 
solidarity but undermined entrepreneurial innovation. No doubt a significant 
amount of dalo produced by the village farmers would have been “lost” through 
communal obligation and subsistence consumption. There was no proper 
monitoring system to determine the contribution of these rural plantations to 
transforming and advancing the economic status of individual indigenous Fijian 
families
Worse still, there was no vision for an ideal future society which rural indigenous 
Fijians must work towards. For instance, there was no plan for improving rural 
housing, education, health and infrastructure through dalo farming. It was 
assumed that an increase in dalo production would automatically have multiplier 
effects in other areas of the community. Furthermore, overproduction of dalo 
would have flooded the market and the impact of increased dalo production in 
real terms might have been negligible. There were no supporting innovative 
projects such as using dalo for large-scale industrial processing such as chips 
and other secondary food products to sustain large-scale dalo production in the 
long run.
The shift from urban-based projects after 1987 to rural-based projects after 
2000 may have made political sense given the circumstances, but despite this, 
little changed in terms of the capacity of the state to carry out affirmative action 
programs effectively. This was a major shortcoming which had unfortunate 
consequences. The interests of the political masters rated higher than those of 
the group designated as recipients of affirmative action, the ordinary indigenous 
population. The distribution of affirmative action resources was skewed in 
favour of politically favoured provinces such as Naitasiri. Although affirmative 
action policies might have failed to achieve their objective of boosting economic 
advancement for indigenous Fijians and creating a more harmonious multicultural 
society, they nonetheless served more immediate political objectives in helping 
boost the SDL’s chances of winning the 2001 and 2006 elections.
The period between 1999 and 2006 was one of lost opportunity. Both Chaudhry 
and Qarase squandered a great opportunity to use their potential to work 
together to address the grievances of indigenous Fijians as well as address the 
broader issues of national prosperity and peace. Failure to do this unfortunately 
helped to create the environment for yet another coup.
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7. Post-2006 coup affirmative action: 
Development at gunpoint 
Bainimarama’s desire to forcibly remove Qarase’s government started not long 
after Qarase won the 2001 election and in the five years before the December 
2006 coup Bainamarama had made it clear a number of times that Qarase had 
to go (Tuatoko 2004; Fraenkel, Firth and Lal 2009). Two theories have been 
put forward to explain Bainimarama’s persistent eagerness to usurp power. The 
first and more widely accepted ‘official’ version was that Bainimarama came to 
the realisation that Qarase was strongly sympathetic to the ethno-nationalist 
ideology used to justify the 2000 coup. This was manifested in Qarase’s pro-
indigenous policies including the release of coup perpetrators from prison and 
the proposal for the Qoliqoli and RTU Bills. Added to this was the argument 
that corruption and racial politics were endemic in the system and a “clean-up” 
campaign was imperative (Fraenkel, Firth and Lal 2009).
The second theory claims that Bainimarama had more sinister motives and 
used the clean-up excuse as an escape mechanism. Because of the investigation 
relating to his possible involvement in the 2000 coup, the death of a number 
of soldiers during the November 2000 mutiny and possible treason charges 
relating to his threats to usurp state power, Bainimarama staged the coup as 
a way of avoiding dismissal and prosecution which would result in possible 
long-term imprisonment. Those who take this line of argument have quoted 
‘inside sources’ within the military, such as Lt Col Tevita Mara, a close associate 
of Bainimarama who defected to Tonga, as well as the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces (RFMF) Board of Inquiry’s report on the involvement of the military 
during the 2000 coup (Republic of Fiji Military Forces 2000).
Whatever the truth is, the coup on 6 December was very much a slow and 
public process, with Bainimarama warning of an impending takeover if Qarase 
could not fulfil certain conditions such as withdrawal of the Qoliqoli and RTU 
Bills, and treason charges against Bainimarama, amongst others. Although these 
conditions were later fulfilled, Bainimarama was uncompromising and was still 
determined to stage the coup. Amongst the targets for his ‘clean up’ campaign 
were indigenous-based institutions and policies, including affirmative action 
(Ratuva 2011). This was a clear reversal of the military’s initial support for 
the Blueprint when it was launched in 2000, as we saw in Chapter 6. In the 
light of this policy reversal, it can be argued that Bainimarama’s opposition 
to affirmative action was only temporary because, as this chapter shows, pro-
indigenous policies were implemented in earnest as part of the post-coup 
economic development policies of the regime. 
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Affirmative action after the 2006 coup was characterized by four major 
developments. The first was the attempt by the military to abolish affirmative 
action, at least in terms of public rhetoric; and simultaneously to weaken the 
indigenous Fijian middle class and those institutions which were suspected of 
providing support and legitimacy to the Qarase government and its affirmative 
action policies.
The second feature was the militarization of development, as military officers 
were substituted for displaced senior civilian officials in key positions in cabinet, 
the civil service and state corporations. Of particular significance was the 
deployment of military officers as regional commissioners to directly supervise 
rural development programs outside the cumbersome government bureaucracy 
and also to act as political links between the rural indigenous population and the 
military-led state. The term ‘affirmative action’, which was heavily demonized 
by the military, was removed from the development vocabulary and replaced 
with vakatorocaletaki ni taukei (Fijian development), the same term used to 
describe pro-indigenous affirmative action immediately after independence. It 
was a case of using a different vocabulary for the same thing.
The third feature was the creation of a consolidated national development and 
rebuilding framework in the form of the People’s Charter (hereafter referred to 
as “charter”). The charter was a major framework for rebuilding a new order 
which was considered suited to Fiji’s multi-ethnic community. However, there 
were contradictions within the charter which undermined its credibility.
The fourth feature related to the paradoxical shift in the regime’s ideological 
position from opposition to ethno-nationalism to reinvention of its own brand 
of ethno-nationalism by proactively mobilizing indigenous Fijian support 
and loyalty at the grassroots level through implementation of pro-indigenous 
development initiatives for rural indigenous Fijians. 
These four features are discussed here not necessarily in any chronological 
sequence’ since they were taking place simultaneously and were part of the 
same ‘clean up’ process, which involved unpacking the old order and rebuilding 
a new one. Where possible, parallels will be drawn with the Malaysian and 
South African situations – however, it must be noted from the outset that one 
of the major points of contrast with these two countries is that, unlike Fiji, both 
these countries have not had coups and direct military rule, although they have 
experienced degrees of repression by their security forces. Thus this chapter 
examines the distinctive affirmative action programs under a military regime.
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Paralysing the opposition and demonization of 
affirmative action 
Upon taking over power, the military put in place a number of draconian 
measures to consolidate its control, thwart opposition and give credence to its 
rhetoric of an ‘anti-racist’ and ‘pro-multiethnic’ coup. These mostly involved 
weakening indigenous Fijian institutions deemed to pose a threat to the post-
coup transformation process.
The first target for political control and repression was the SDL, the biggest 
indigenous Fijian political party. Formed in 2000 to contest the election in the 
same year, the SDL was no different in terms of political ideology from the 
SVT, which it replaced as the main indigenous Fijian party. Some leaders of the 
SDL were harassed, arrested and detained and the headquarters of the party 
was raided several times. Disabling the SDL, which had supporters all around 
the country both in the rural and urban areas, was critical if the military was 
to uproot its political influence and avoid potential grassroots mobilization 
against the coup. The complex military intelligence network planted within the 
community seriously handicapped the work of the party.
Meanwhile a systematic witch-hunt for suspected coup opponents within the 
state hierarchy commenced as early as one month after the coup. After the 
ministers were removed on the day of the coup, a number of CEOs of government 
ministries and government corporations, diplomats and senior civil servants also 
met the same fate. Within a few months, about 200 senior executives and civil 
servants were removed and replaced by military officers, expatriates, known 
civilian coup supporters or those seen to be ‘neutral’ and politically trustworthy. 
This was a highly significant process because a large number of those removed 
were products of educational and employment affirmative action over the years 
and were the cream of the indigenous educational and professional achievement. 
Although, the attempt to build up an indigenous business middle class did not 
fully succeed, as we saw in Chapter 5, it was a different story for the establishment 
and expansion of an educated professional middle class. Educational affirmative 
action created a dynamic indigenous professional class mostly in the public 
and semi-public sector. This group had been a major pillar of Fiji’s economic 
and social development and also acted as a strong stabilizing force. Most of 
those removed were charged with ‘corruption’, which was to be investigated 
by the all-powerful Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC) 
which was set up to perform multiple roles including investigation, arrest and 
prosecution (Fiji Government 2007). Successful prosecution by FICAC has been 
very low because of insufficient evidence and a lack of professional competence 
among the legal staff.  
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The systematic ‘dismantling’ of the indigenous Fijian professional class has 
seriously damaged and even reversed the concerted efforts over the years since 
independence to provide high-level training for indigenous Fijians as part of 
the localization process. Because Australia and New Zealand banned members 
of cabinet, heads of government departments and members of government 
boards and their families from travelling to those countries, many professionally 
qualified locals refused to take up government appointments. Many qualified 
locals also left the country and many Pacific island states have benefitted from 
Fiji’s loss as many professionals took up senior advisory posts in those countries.
While it was easy for the regime to remove individuals from their positions, it 
was not easy to dismantle existing corporations and institutions which came into 
being through affirmative action. For instance, Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL), 
with 30,464,650 communal and individual shares, still remains as the flagship 
of indigenous Fijian business under the patronage of the military regime (Fijian 
Holdings Limited 2011: 3). The original CEO, Sitiveni Weleilakeba, a close 
associate of Qarase, was removed and replaced by Sereana Qoro, an accountant, 
who was also later removed and replaced by Nouzab Fareed, an accountant. 
Since the 2006 coup the members of the board have all been replaced.
The breaking up of the indigenous middle class in Fiji is in stark contrast to 
events in Malaysia and South Africa, where there has been concerted effort to 
consolidate rather than dismantle the gains of past affirmative action policies. 
It seems that Fiji has somehow ditched the Malaysian lesson which it so 
meticulously and zealously followed in the 1980s.
The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) was also targeted because a number of 
senior members were opposed to the coup and, also, it represented the apex 
of indigenous socio-cultural power both in terms of symbolism and applied 
power politics. The GCC has always been the major political driving force 
behind affirmative action. FHL, for instance, was first conceived by the GCC; 
and scholarships for indigenous Fijian students funded by the Fijian Affairs 
Board were ultimately sanctioned by the GCC. Although the GCC operated on 
the basis of consensus, that consensus concealed the deeper power dynamics 
within the institution.
Amongst the competing chiefly blocs were the Mara and Ganilau faction on the 
one hand and the Cakobau family and its allies on the other. Prior to the coup, 
Ratu Epeli Ganilau was removed as chair of the GCC; however, later, as Minister 
for Fijian Affairs (which had responsibility for GCC) he used the opportunity to 
get back at his adversaries in the GCC by carrying out Bainimarama’s order to 
suspend the institution. Subsequently, two committees were set up to oversee 
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the reform of the indigenous Fijian governance system – one was to review the 
GCC and another to review the Fijian administration system generally, including 
the role of the Fijian Affairs Board and the provincial councils.
The recommendations of both committees were accepted by the regime. One 
of the recommendations of the GCC review was that only formally installed 
chiefs were to be members of the august body (GCC Review Committee Report 
2007). This meant that a large number of high chiefs, including those of the 
Cakobau family, supposedly Fiji’s most paramount chiefly family, were ruled out. 
Because of the long-running dispute within the Cakobau clan over the Vunivalu 
titleholder, this provision may see their removal from the GCC and thus weaken 
their national significance considerably. Ironically, Ganilau later resigned from 
cabinet as Minister for Home Affairs due to differences with Bainimarama over 
the deportation of a Fiji Water company executive. The GCC was eventually de-
established by the I-Taukei Affairs Revocation Decree on 16 March 2012. While 
some indigenous Fijians may see this as an act of cultural sacrilege, Bainimarama 
justified his decision saying:
The Great Council of the Chiefs (sic) is a product of our colonial past and 
Fiji must now focus on a future in which all Fijians are represented on 
the same basis. If all Fijians are to have their say during the consultations 
for Fiji’s new constitution, we must ensure every voice is equally heard 
and equally represented (Fiji Ministry of Information 14 March 2012).
Instead of nipping ethno-nationalism in the bud, as it were, the abolition of the 
GCC simply spawned a new wave of protest and nationalist agitation through the 
media and blogs. Now that the public emergency decree was being relaxed, the 
stage was set for more public debate on the issue. One of Fiji’s leading paramount 
chiefs, Ro Temumu Kepa wrote to Bainimarama complaining that the abolition of 
the GCC was based on a “serious error of judgement,” as the GCC “lives forever 
in the hearts of the people.” The letter asserted that the GCC was a “stabilizing 
factor for Fiji and they have helped to control the ethno-nationalism and helped 
facilitate ethnic conciliation in Fiji” (Ro Temumu Kepa 2012). The regime had 
underestimated people’s loyalty to the GCC and the potential destabilizing effect 
it could create and this could be a critical factor in determining Bainimarama’s 
fate in the 2014 general election.
The GCC controversy coincided with the announcement on 9 March 2012 of 
the appointment of a five-member constitutional review committee chaired by 
Prof Yash Ghai, an internationally renowned constitutional expert with a long 
association with Fiji. Other key components of the constitutional reform process 
included a national civic education process to take place from May to July; 
consultation between the constitutional commission and citizens (2 July to 30 
September); collation of public submissions (October to December); convening 
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of the a constituent assembly to receive, discuss and endorse the draft (January 
2013) and promulgation by the president in February 2013 (Fiji Ministry of 
Information, 9 March 2012). This process was to produce a new constitution 
after the old one was overturned in 2009. The draft constitution duly emerged 
in late 2012, only to be rejected by the government and replaced in early 2013 
with a draft of its own.
The suspension of the constitution on 10 April 2009 was one of the most dramatic 
acts by the military regime to eliminate opposition and entrench once and for 
all the military regime’s hegemony. This was in response to the decision on 
Thursday 9 April by the Fiji Court of Appeal, regarding the litigation brought 
by Qarase and the SDL, that the Bainimarama regime’s December 2006 takeover 
of executive power was unlawful. In response to this the president declared the 
Fiji Constitution abrogated and put forward a number of proposals for a “new 
legal order.” The declaration by the president also terminated all judicial and 
other constitutional appointments and nullified provisions relating to the role 
of the GCC and affirmative action. To the regime, the removal of the constitution 
was a blessing because it basically formalized its intentions to “wipe the legal 
slate clean and start again” (Iloilo, J. 2009). The newly proposed constitution is 
expected to have some “non-negotiable” provisions in the form of non-ethnic 
representation and the reduction of the voting age to 18 years. The electoral 
system is also expected to be based on the proportional representation model 
and there is expected to be a multi-party cabinet as a way of sustaining an 
institutionalized multi-ethnic order.
Another powerful indigenous institution, the Methodist Church, also became a 
target of military censure because of its close links with the SDL and its long 
association with indigenous ethno-nationalism since the 1987 coup. The military’s 
strategy was to dent the Methodist Church’s nationalist political base by demanding 
the removal of the leaders, who were well known ethno-nationalist sympathisers, 
and also to undermine the influence of the Methodist Church (to which 53% 
of the total indigenous population adhere) on the community by disallowing 
it from holding its annual conference as well as restricting its public activities 
under the Public Emergency Decree in 2009 (Fiji Government 2009b 2009). 
This had a crippling effect on the institutional operation of the church, which 
relied on the money raised from the fundraising during the annual conference 
to pay for its administration and outreach activities. Even after the lifting of the 
Public Emergency Decree on 7 January 2012 and its replacement by the equally 
draconian Public Order Act 2012, the church was still refused permission for an 
executive meeting. It might be relevant at this stage to note that Malaysia had 
similar draconian legislation in the form of the Emergency Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime Ordinance 1969, which was repealed on 24 November 2011, 
and the Internal Security Act of 1957. Both were used to suppress opposition and 
also to push affirmative action legislations forward unilaterally.
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The weakening of indigenous Fijian institutions was further reinforced by 
media restrictions under the Emergency Decree and later reinforced by the 
Media Decree 2010. Force or its threat was widely used to silence opposition 
and a large number of people were arrested, detained and some were physically 
abused. Within this general atmosphere of repression, opposition took the form 
of blogging and other “underground” forms of resistance (Walsh 2009).
In the beginning the crippling of the indigenous Fijian institutions was often 
represented as a necessary ‘clean up’ measure to rid Fiji of ethno-nationalism 
and race-based politics. The next step was to abolish policies, such as affirmative 
action, which were considered contrary to multicultural values. Affirmative 
action was seen to be associated with ethno-nationalism, Qarase’s government, 
the GCC and the indigenous professional middle class, the very institutions which 
had been targeted for reform. Chaudhry, who was a strong critic of affirmative 
action as leader of the opposition prior to the 2006 coup, took the opportunity 
as Minister of Finance to help phase out affirmative action and shift the policy 
focus towards poverty alleviation. For example, in a highly publicized case, 
under the pretext of an “ownership issue,” Chaudhry personally intervened 
to stop the government from renting Kadavu House, an office block owned by 
an indigenous development company linked to the province of Kadavu and 
acquired through an affirmative action loan from the Fiji Development Bank 
(Fiji Times, 9 February 2008).
Initially, many Indo-Fijian supporters of the coup saw Bainimarama’s attack on 
indigenous institutions as politically justified “vengeance” against nationalists 
who staged the 1987 and 2000 coups, in which Indo-Fijian-led governments were 
overthrown and Indo-Fijians victimized. The Methodist Church and GCC were 
two of the prime players in the wave of anti-Indian politics after the two coups. 
The view that the coup was “pro-Indian” and “anti-Fijian” slowly changed as 
Chaudhry himself was removed as Minister of Finance because of allegations 
of money laundering and tax evasion and also because of the increasingly 
trans-ethnic nature of those supporting or opposed to the coup. The support 
for Bainimarama amongst some groups was due largely to the regime’s pro-
indigenous rural development initiatives.
Militarizing indigenous development  
With affirmative action officially declared moribund and with the loss of 
significant Indo-Fijian support for the coup due to Chaudhry’s dismissal, 
one of the regime’s urgent tasks was to put in place development initiatives 
which would serve two important political purposes. The first was to appease 
the indigenous Fijian people and chiefs who felt betrayed and insulted by 
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Bainimarama’s attack on the GCC, Methodist Church and other indigenous 
Fijian institutions. Bainimarama needed indigenous support to make up for the 
loss of Indo-Fijian support, however small it may have been, and also to dispel 
the general belief that the coup was anti-indigenous. Secondly, the regime 
needed to provide something concrete or at least needed to be seen to be doing 
something substantive to give credence to the ‘clean up’ rhetoric.
Rural development was a major strategy to achieve both of these purposes; and 
the most convenient way to go about this was for Bainimarama to be directly in 
charge of all government matters relating to indigenous Fijians, rural development 
and information. To further speed up and ease the process, military officers were 
appointed heads of department, chairs of boards and regional commissioners to 
carry out Bainimarama’s direct orders.
Chaudhry’s removal made things easier for Bainimarama as he was now 
directly in charge of funds as Minister of Finance. In addition he was also 
responsible for the Ministries for i-Taukei Affairs, of Provincial Development 
and of Information, three key ministries which would ensure his direct access 
to and influence amongst indigenous Fijians. As Minister for i-Taukei Affairs, 
Bainimarama was in charge of the entire indigenous governance structure at 
the state, provincial, district and village levels and as Minister for Provincial 
Development he was directly responsible for the infrastructural developments 
and delivery of services to indigenous Fijians in the rural areas. Bainimarama’s 
control of the Ministry of Information allowed him to directly influence the 
contents and method of delivery of information to the people.
The officers appointed as commissioners at one stage were Commander (Navy) 
Joeli Cawaki for the western division, Colonel Inia Seruiratu for the northern 
division, Colonel Mosese Tikoitoga for the central division and Colonel Ifereimi 
Vasu for the eastern division. There have been changes in these posts over time 
as colonels have been moved from position to position. The commissioners 
assumed multiple roles as regional administrators, development advisors, public 
relations experts and political commissars of the regime. In many respects they 
were powers unto themselves over and above the normal state bureaucracy and 
were directly and dually accountable only to Bainimarama, who was both their 
ministerial head and their military commander.
Despite breaking almost every normal civil service regulation and procedure, 
this militarized structure ensured that delay in the implementation of 
development projects – a common feature of the previous system – was 
reduced considerably and services were directly delivered to targeted groups. 
The system also minimized corruption by civil servants, some of whom had 
amassed fortunes by milking the previous system, which often lacked proper 
accountability and transparency. Because of this, many rural people who were 
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often cynical about the efficiency of the government bureaucracy became 
converts to the new militarized system. Another reason for popular support 
was that the new authoritarian structure allowed for greater accessibility of 
the ordinary people to Bainimarama himself, who continually received personal 
requests for infrastructure and accolades for his “man of the people” generosity 
during his rural tours.
Bainimarama’s rural tours became frequent and were seen as important in terms 
of public relations for the regime. It was an opportunity to personalize and sell 
the human face of the coup with the hope of mobilizing political support at the 
village level. In an atmosphere of media censorship, these trips were widely 
publicized not so much for their news value but for their political and strategic 
purposes. The strategy seemed to work as chief after chief from different 
provinces declared public support for Bainimarama and asked for forgiveness 
for their initial opposition to the coup. This has given Bainimarama confidence 
that he would “win” the 2014 election if he stands (Sky TV Australia, 3 March 
2012). Qarase responded saying that he still commanded support and would 
“win” (Radio Australia, 13 March 2012). However, Qarase’s political future is in 
doubt after he was imprisoned for abuse of office in 2012.
While Bainimarama’s tactical manoeuvre appeared to be working favourably 
for him, one should not dismiss the rural people as merely an ignorant and 
passive audience. In the context of traditional indigenous politics, the rural 
villagers would no doubt be playing their own politiki gata (sharp politics). This 
consists of the dual approaches of veivakabekabei (public glorification) often 
followed by the stealth strategy of liumuri (backstabbing). This well-rehearsed, 
age-old political tactic involves publicly elevating someone’s ego through noble 
words at the manifest level and later pulling the rug from under their feet at the 
latent level – a tactical ploy indigenous Fijians routinely play on each other in 
either humorous or serious situations. For some, singing praises to Bainimarama 
was a way of attracting more development, while for others it was a genuine 
expression of gratitude for direct and quick provision of services that past 
elected governments failed to deliver.
Another effective means of changing the perception of villagers was the use of the 
large number of retired soldiers in villages as links between the commissioners 
and villagers. The link between the military regime and the local communities 
were strengthened by the fact that almost every indigenous Fijian had a relative 
in the military. In fact many indigenous Fijians believe that soldiering is a 
natural profession for them.
Politics of preferential development
180
No doubt both the indigenous rural communities and the military regime have 
benefitted from the development initiatives. However, the militarization of the 
development process (that is the use of military officers as well as military-style 
decision making and norms) would have broader consequences in the long run.
First, overdependence on authoritarian decision making outside the normal 
bureaucracy could breed collective sympathy and preference for military and 
authoritarian governance over democracy and thus has the potential to nurture 
pro-coup sentiments in the future. In fact, a number of chiefs had openly stated 
that Bainimarama should be in power for as long as he wanted since, based on 
past experience, an elected government would not have the will and honesty to 
fulfil its promises to the people.
Second, the militarized development process and circumvention of normal 
government structure has undermined the systems of accountability and 
institutionalized decision making which were once the hallmarks of constitutional 
state governance. After the 2014 election the civil service governance process 
will need to be re-established and reformed for greater efficiency and public 
servants need to be re-trained and re-programmed to fit back into the normal 
civil service procedures and culture.
Third, by responding so readily and generously to direct requests by the 
community, the regime is in danger of creating a “cargo cult” mentality 
predicated on the belief that requests will always be honoured by the regime. 
Ironically, while the regime has been generous with disbursement of development 
resources, Bainimarama has also been advising people in no uncertain terms not 
to rely on handouts but to work hard to achieve things for themselves. 
Fourth, rural development projects, like the SDL’s affirmative action policies, 
are unevenly distributed amongst the provinces. The most favoured provinces 
tend to be those on the island of Viti Levu, especially Tailevu and Naitasiri. The 
regime is determined to appease these two provinces through rural development 
because of their well-known opposition to the 2006 coup.
Fifth, one of the consequences of military-based development has been that 
projects tend to be too ad hoc, rather than being part of a coherent development 
design with a systematic sequence of implementation. This is because of the 
tendency to speed up the project implementation process to mobilize people’s 
support and loyalty through making visible changes before the 2014 election, in 
which Bainimarama is expected to stand.
Sixth, many civil servants have withdrawn into themselves or silently rebelled 
by refusing to commit themselves fully to their work because of the new 
authoritarian military work culture. Many continue to work in an environment 
of fear and suspicion after many were sacked and detained for making statements 
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deemed by the military to be provocative and undesirable. Bainimarama has 
denounced the lack of commitment by civil servants as one of the biggest 
obstacles the regime is facing in its desire to move Fiji forward.
The direct involvement of the military in the conceptualization, framing and 
implementation of the rural development projects for indigenous Fijians has 
redefined the structure and modus operandi of the state’s engagement with the 
community. While it has distorted the regular procedures, it has also sped up 
the implementation process. However, because the colonels do not have any 
economic and social development qualifications or experience, the effectiveness 
and sustainability of these projects need closer scrutiny. The desire to deliver 
is incompatible with the available skills and qualifications of the military 
decision-makers. This has been a major dilemma faced by the coup-makers since 
1987 and one of the solutions adopted by the military has been to hire willing 
civilian collaborators and even reluctant followers to carry out skill-based jobs. 
This is not to downplay the high level of training and the expertise of senior 
military officers. Many of them hold Masters-level degrees, but most of their 
skills revolve around military-related areas such as strategic studies, political 
analysis, security studies and, for some, engineering.
After the 2014 election, the military officers will have to make a choice either 
to remain in civilian service and maintain links with the military or return to 
the barracks with significant skills learned in the field that could be used to 
transform the military into a more development-friendly institution. Either way, 
these factors would have significant implications on the civil-military relations 
in Fiji in the long run.
From affirmative action to national development: 
The People’s Charter
One of the dilemmas Bainimarama faced after systematically demolishing 
opposition and neutralizing the power of state and indigenous institutions of 
governance was to provide an alternative system to move Fiji forward towards 
the non-racial utopia he had promised. Part of the initiative to fulfil this promise 
was the setting up in January 2008 of the National Council for Building a Better 
Fiji (NCBBF) an organization consisting of cabinet ministers and “moderate” 
community leaders from different ethnic and religious groups (see Table 
7.1), which was charged with putting in place a framework for change and 
reconstruction, popularly referred to as the People’s Charter. The assumption 
was that for any credible change to take place there should be visible broad 
participation by representatives of the different communities. 
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Table 7.1 Composition of the National Council for Building a Better Fiji 
Name Designation 
Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama Co-Chair, Interim Government
Archbishop Petero Mataca Co-Chair, Civil Society
Mr Mick M. Beddoes President, United People's Party
Mr Daniel Urai President, Fiji Trades Union Congress
Mr Patrick Wong Fiji Islands Hotel and Tourism Association
Mr Desmond Whiteside President, Fiji Manufacturers Association
Mr Dijendra Singh Chairman, Fiji Girmit Council
Mrs Lorine Tevi President, Fiji Council of Social Services
Mr Dewan Chand Maharaj President, Shree Sanatan Dharm Pratinidhi Sabha
Mr Kamlesh Arya President, Arya Pratindhi Sabha of Fiji
Rev. Akuila Yabaki Executive Director, Citizens' Constitutional Forum Ltd
Mr Tarterani Rigamoto Chairman, Council of Rotuma
Mr Teatu Rewi The Chairman, Rabi Council of Leaders
Mr Rajeshwar Kumar The President, Fiji Local Government Association
Mr Daryl Tarte President, Media Council (Fiji) Ltd
Mrs Penelope Moore President, Womens’ Action for Change
Ratu Jolame Lewanavanua Chairman, Lomaiviti Provincial Council
Ratu Filimoni Ralogaivau Chairman, Bua Provincial Council
Ratu Wiliame Katonivere Macuata Provincial Council
Ratu Meli Bolobolo Chairman, Ra Provincial Council
Ratu Josateki Nawalowalo Chairman, Kadavu Provincial Council
Atunaisa Lacakabuka Chairman, Serua Provincial Council
Josefa Serulagilagi Chairman, Tailevu Provincial Council
Mr Rupeni Silimaibau Provincial Youth Forum of the Fiji Islands
Mrs Selina Lee Wah Female social worker, Labasa
Mr Filipe Bole Minister for Education, National Heritage, Culture & 
Arts, Youth and Sports
Mr Mahendra Chaudhry Minister for Finance, National Planning, Sugar Industry 
and Public Utilities (Water & Energy)
Mr Joketani Cokanasiga Minister for Primary Industries
Ratu Epeli Ganilau Minister for Defence, National Security and Immigration
Dr Jiko Luveni Minister for Health, Women and Social Welfare
Ratu Epeli Nailatikau Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Co-operation 
and Civil Aviation
Mr Tom Ricketts Minister for Industry, Tourism, Trade and 
Communications
Mr Aiyaz Saiyed-Khaiyum Attorney General and Minister for Justice, Electoral 
Reform, Public Enterprises and Anti-Corruption
Mr Netani Sukanaivalu Minister for Lands, Mineral Resources and Environment
Source: National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008.
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However, despite attempts to create an ethnically balanced council, the 
membership was heavily slanted towards indigenous Fijians and “other” 
minority groups. Out of the 34 members, 18 were indigenous Fijians, 5 were Indo-
Fijians and 10 were ethnic minorities. As Table 7.2 shows, the minority groups 
were over-represented and Indo-Fijians were extremely under-represented. The 
gross disparity may have been due to difficulties in recruiting people to join the 
NCBBF, but in terms of public symbolism it undermined the very principle of 
equal participation and representation which the NCBBF claimed to represent.
Table 7.2 Proportion of membership of NCBBF
Ethnic group Number % Membership % Population 
i-Taukei 18 54% 57%
Indo-Fijians 5 16% 37%
Other minorities 10 30% 6%
Total 34 100% 100%
Source: National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008.
Nevertheless, the main task of the NCBBF was to put together the charter, a 
summary document derived from a collection of commissioned papers that were 
earlier published under the State of the Nation Report. Over 250,000 copies of the 
charter were published in English, Fijian and Hindi and distributed throughout 
Fiji. The NCBBF claimed that 65% of the population supported the charter but 
critics argued that people were literally coerced into endorsing it. It should 
be noted here that the charter was similar to the Malaysian New Economic 
Policies (NEP) in the sense that it was meant to be a “bible” for “structural” 
transformation. However, the differences were that the charter addressed both 
political and socio-economic transformation while the NEP dealt only with socio-
economic transformation. Furthermore, while the NEP was driven by ethnic-
based affirmative action, the charter attempted to remove ethnic preferences in 
favour of class-based preferences.
The overarching objective of the charter was to “rebuild Fiji into a non-racial, 
culturally vibrant and united, well-governed, truly democratic nation; a nation 
that seeks progress and prosperity through merit-based equality of opportunity 
and peace” (National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008: i). These objectives 
were guided by the following principles: “a just and fair society; achieve unity 
and national identity; merit-based; equality of opportunity for all Fiji citizens; 
transparent and accountable government; uplifting of the disadvantaged in all 
communities; mainstreaming of the indigenous Fijian in a modern, progressive 
Fiji; and sharing spiritualities and interfaith dialogue” (Peoples Charter 2008: ii).
The provisions which perhaps related directly to affirmative action were: 
firstly, “uplifting of the disadvantaged in all communities” and secondly, 
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“mainstreaming of the indigenous Fijian in a modern, progressive Fiji.” These two 
policy statements were meant to displace preferential indigenous development 
in favour of a national development framework.
The first statement no longer identified indigenous Fijians as a disadvantaged 
ethnic group as the Blueprint had, and instead the term ‘disadvantaged’ 
was defined in trans-ethnic socio-economic terms. The intention was to 
take ethnicity out of development. Indeed the economists who drafted the 
economic development papers were hostile to affirmative action as a form of 
ethnic preference. This position was a major shift from the 1997 designation 
of affirmative action target groups, namely indigenous Fijians and “other 
disadvantaged groups.”
While the first statement may be commendable, the second one, which 
suggested “mainstreaming” indigenous Fijians, may have been ideologically 
contentious. It was tantamount to the colonial social-Darwinian stereotype 
that indigenous Fijians were backward jungali (bush people) who needed to 
be “modernized” and “civilized” to reach a higher stage of human progress. 
Sadly, it may have reflected some of the latent ethnic prejudices still prevalent 
in Fiji. This perception failed to recognize the fact that indigenous Fijians 
were already politically, economically and culturally mainstreamed into the 
global community. However, their local and international success stories and 
achievements in the fields of education, commerce, technology and other areas 
have not been highlighted sufficiently to show that they had potential to be 
just as competitive as any other ethnic group in the world. The problem was 
not about mainstreaming indigenous Fijians into modernity but identifying 
the right development model, right leadership style, right environment and 
appropriate skills’ level to further enhance their achievements.
The charter’s shift from preferential development to national development was 
a reversal of the Blueprint but, ironically, it might even be beneficial to the poor 
and disadvantaged indigenous Fijians. As we have seen in previous chapters, the 
corruption and scandals associated with affirmative action under Rabuka and 
Qarase (see Chapters 5 and 6) were often linked to well-placed individuals and 
groups using affirmative action resources not on the basis of need, but to satisfy 
their own economic and political interests. Amongst the major beneficiaries 
were middle-class indigenous Fijians who did not need affirmative action at all.
Another major dilemma of the charter was that its claim to “Affirm that our 
Constitution represents the supreme law of our country” became void after 
the removal of the constitution by the President Iloilo, acting on behalf of the 
military, in April 2009. This was after the Supreme Court declared the 2006 
coup, the action of the president in appointing a new government and post-coup 
decrees, including amnesty for the military coup leaders, illegal. The removal of 
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the constitution effectively meant that the affirmative action provisions under 
the constitution were no longer lawful. It was replaced by the development 
strategy under the charter.
Moreover, although the affirmative action proposals of the Blueprint and 20 Year 
Plan had been replaced by the charter, affirmative action had not been completely 
removed. Perhaps one of the last elements of affirmative action to continue 
is the provision of scholarships for indigenous Fijians and for economically 
disadvantaged minorities. There has been talk of disbanding ethnic scholarships 
in the future. If this happens indigenous Fijians will have to work extra-hard to 
get their children through university. Because higher education scholarship is 
the most successful affirmative action policy and the most important means of 
social mobility, poverty eradication and socio-economic progress for indigenous 
Fijians (despite the failure of business and development affirmative action), the 
termination of Fijian Affairs Board scholarships might have a profound impact 
and could be a recipe for instability in the future.
While there has been loud public rhetoric since 2006 to phase out affirmative 
action policies in the name of multiculturalism, ironically, the regime has for 
pragmatic political reasons made a policy commitment towards indigenous 
Fijian development, but without using the term “affirmative action.”
Reinventing affirmative action for indigenous 
Fijians
In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2011, Bainimarama 
said: 
Communal philosophy has not served our people well. Affirmative action 
policies which were not based on acceptable definitions of disadvantage, 
but on racial origin alone, created a more divided society, and one in 
which many depended on handouts rather than on personal enterprise. 
Politicians represented particular ethnic groups, and drove policies 
which were intended to further divide the people of our nation. As 
in all parts of the world, ethnic origin and religious divisions simply 
became a tool to maintain power. I am determined that our society will 
remove the narrow walls of ethnicity and communalism to create unity 
and strength as a nation (Bainimarama, Speech to UN General Assembly, 
22 Sept 2011). 
Most of the contents of the speech were highly commendable in principle, 
except that, on closer examination, by the time of his address to the world 
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leaders, Bainimarama had initiated a development process which was pro-
indigenous for all intents and purposes. A detailed reading of the various policy 
documents relating to national development (see Table 7.3) shows that while 
the term ‘affirmative action’ has been eliminated and ethno-nationalism cast 
as a political scourge, the actual implementation process of the development 
initiative reveals a different story.
Table 7.3 Levels of development policy making 
Policy-making level Focus
People’s Charter Broad philosophy for change  
Strategic Framework for Change Key milestones to be realized with specific 
timelines to be achieved leading up to the 
elections in 2014.
Government Roadmap for Democracy 
and Sustainable Economic Development 
(2009-2014) 
Sets out a framework to achieve sustainable 
democracy, good and just governance, socio-
economic development and national unity.
Strategic Plan (3 years) Sets out specific strategies and objectives to be 
developed within 3 years (e.g. 2009-2011). 
Ministry Corporate Plan (Yearly) Individual Ministry internal priorities based on 
Strategic Plan. 
Source: National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008. 2008; Fiji Government 2009c; Fiji Government 2009d. 
The five hierarchies of development policies summarized in the table above were 
based on the trickledown effect from the charter to the ministry’s corporate 
plan. However, behind the technical language were latent political interests. 
For the regime, two important political considerations were at stake. The first 
was how to “sell” the coup and its “achievements” to the indigenous Fijian 
audience, many of whom opposed the takeover on the grounds that it appeared 
to be anti-indigenous and pro-Indo-Fijian. Bainimarama no doubt wanted to 
leave behind a legacy as a “man of the people,” a term often used to describe 
him (Radio New Zealand, 18 January 2012) and the only way he could do that 
was to make exceptions to the non-discriminatory spirit of the charter and 
directly implement pro-indigenous development policies. The second issue was 
that Bainimarama, who is likely to contest the 2014 election, needed something 
substantive to attract voters during the coming election campaign.
To fulfil these two aims, the regime has made it a priority to focus on very 
visible infrastructural rural and outer island development programs. Table 7.4 
provides a summary of the rural and island budgetary allocation for 2007, 2008 
and 2009. It shows that the allocation increased in 2008 and decreased in 2009 
as the financial squeeze forced the government to cut down on expenditure. 
Except for the multi-ethnic affairs allocation, most of these budgetary rural 
allocations were directed primarily at indigenous Fijians.
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Table 7.4 Allocations towards rural and outer island development 
programs: 2009 Budget (FJ$ million) 
Sector 2007 (FJ$m) 2008 (FJ$m) 2009 (FJ$m)
Fijian Affairs 0.92 0.90 0.90
PM’s Office (for village 
improvement)
1 .12 0.80 -
Agriculture  10.55 16 .15 21.40
Fisheries & Forestry 1.8 2 .4 1 .15
Provincial Development 10.5 8 5 .5
Multi-Ethnic Affairs 1 .6 1 .6 1.60
Lands & Mineral Development 0.23 0.23 0.40
Youth Development - - 0.20
Health 3.8 5 .2 2.50
Infrastructure & Works 80.1 80.15 38.30
Total 110.62 115.43 71.95
Source: Fiji Government 2009a. 
Rural infrastructure developments covered a wide range of sectors and 
geographical areas including electricity developments such as the Nadarivatu 
hydro dam, Buca and Taveuni hydro scheme, and electrification works in 
Tailevu, the interior of Naitasiri and Macuata. Roads were built in Wainibuka, 
Sigatoka, Kadavu, Naqali and Serea and will soon be built in the interior of 
Nadroga and Ba. A number of schools were also built and health centres were 
improved in places like Navua, Kadavu and Cuvu. A new development was the 
building of a bio-fuel plant on Koro Island to convert coconut oil into engine 
fuel. Many of these projects were funded through Chinese aid. China has already 
pledged more than $500 million worth of aid to Fiji (Fiji Government 2012).
About $200 million worth of road projects have been planned for 2012, including 
the 10-kilometre Buca Bay Road in Vanua Levu, the 19-kilometre Sawani-Serea 
Road in Naitasiri, the 15km Sigatoka Valley Road in Nadroga and the sealing 
of 5km of the Moto Road in Ba (Fiji Sun, 8 March 2012). These roads are very 
crucial for agricultural production and would benefit indigenous Fijians greatly. 
In addition, government has announced financial assistance for three hundred 
home owners around the country through a $2 million grant from government 
and, in addition, 92 families had their home loan accounts completely written 
off in 2011 (Fiji Times, 14 January 2012). Most of these are indigenous Fijians.
One of the most explicitly pro-indigenous policies of the regime was in the 
form of concessions first outlined in the 2009 Budget, without, of course, the 
use of the contentious words “affirmative action”. Bainimarama stated that the 
state would transfer ownership of thousands of hectares of mature mahogany 
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forest to indigenous landowners. In addition, tax holidays were to be offered to 
investors who established partnerships with indigenous Fijians in the areas of 
tourism, agriculture, forestry and fisheries (Fiji Government 2009a).
Other areas of potential indigenous development include resource-based 
projects such as the Bua bauxite mine, which opened in 2011, the planned huge 
Waisoi copper and gold mine in Namosi province, the proposed iron ore sand 
mining near the Ba River and a few other mining projects. These are major 
projects worth billions of dollars, in which Bainimarama has directly been 
involved either to intervene in compensation disputes between a company and 
landowners, as in Namosi, or to help facilitate the process to make it easier for 
the company to invest and maximize economic benefits for landowners, as in 
Bua.
Another issue which the current regime has been very sensitive about is land. 
Previous governments since independence had seen indigenous land both as a 
blessing and a curse. However, none of them succeeded in devising a system 
which could advance the socio-economic development of indigenous Fijians. 
Even the current regime, despite the introduction of new concepts such as the 
land bank, continues to perpetuate commercial land arrangements which led 
to the neo-colonial servitude of indigenous Fijians in the past. The exploitative 
division of labour during the colonial and post-colonial period was characterized 
by provision of land for mining and dumping waste as well as the provision of 
cheap, unskilled, manual labour by landowners, while the mining companies 
provided capital and expertise and were allowed to accumulate and repatriate 
massive profits.
Perhaps one of the most progressive policy initiatives by the regime was the 
suggestion for shareholding in and joint-ownership arrangement of the mining 
operations. One way of making this possible is to use land as an equity share for 
landowners but legislation (or a decree) has to be in place to make this happen. To 
enhance and facilitate shareholding and joint-ownership, the mining company 
should provide scholarships for locals to study relevant aspects of mining at the 
degree level (for example mining engineering, environmental science, mining 
economics, resources development, social and economic policy analysis) as a way 
of empowering locals to progressively assume a greater share and control of the 
mining operations. This is a way of consolidating the partnership between the 
landowners, company and government in the future. A full partnership cannot 
be realized when there is a large skills, knowledge and power differential.
One of the most contentious development policies of the regime is land reform. 
The regime hopes that reform will speed up agricultural production and help 
indigenous landowners: 
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Land reform in particular in relation to resource-based sectors is 
paramount. Issues pertaining to the ailing sugar sector, the need to 
diversify into other crops and the imperative to have commercial farming 
can only be addressed in a meaningful way if more land is available 
for productive use on long and secure tenure basis (Fiji Ministry of 
Information 2010).
Land reform is part of the broader development framework encapsulated in the 
Ten Point Economic Plan (TPEP), which sets out specific targets to be achieved 
by 2020. These are: (a) GDP to be increased two-fold; (b) balance of payments 
current account deficit to be eliminated; (c) poverty to be reduced from current 
levels to less than 5% of population; (d) visitor arrivals to increase to 6 million; 
(e) financial sector to be liberalized with a view to eliminating exchange controls; 
(f) Fiji to grow its communication services sector business by 100%; (g) Fiji to 
achieve self- sufficiency in rice, meat and liquid milk; (h) Fiji to convert up 
to 90% of all electricity generation from fossil to renewable sources; (i) Fiji to 
convert up to 80% of all arable land area into productive use; and (j) Fiji to 
reduce unemployment rate to less than 3% (Fiji Ministry of Information 2010).
While these targets are impressive, they are not clear in terms of the role of the 
landowners. Of particular interest here is the land bank, which has been used 
as an example of breakthrough in inter-ethnic cooperation in land development. 
While the idea of “depositing” land in the “bank” is novel, the underlying 
principle has not changed from the colonial and neo-colonial arrangement 
where landowners gave up their land for lease and the tenant farmers worked 
on the land. This arrangement contributed to the retardation of commercial 
participation of indigenous Fijians because, as landlords and recipients of lease 
money, they were not encouraged to develop their commercial farming skills 
and expand their business acumen. Since independence, government after 
government under a succession of prime ministers – Mara, Bavadra, Rabuka, 
Chaudhry, Qarase and now Bainimarama – perpetuated this landlord and tenant 
agreement, first under the Agricultural Land Tenancy Ordinance or ALTO (1966), 
then ALTA (1976) and now under NLTA, all of which locked indigenous Fijians 
into the role of passive providers of land rather than active entrepreneurs.
More innovative options for land use have not been explored. One suggestion 
would be to form business partnership arrangements between Indo-Fijian 
farmers and indigenous landowners in the form of cooperatives or other forms of 
commercial enterprises, which would entail development and sharing of skills, 
knowledge and resources by both sides. The same partnership model should be 
encouraged in urban-based industries where Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian 
entrepreneurs can engage in commercial collaboration to ensure sharing of skills, 
expertise, resources and wealth as well as contributing to multiculturalism 
and inter-ethnic goodwill. The government can encourage this by granting 
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tax concessions for companies which are based on inter-ethnic cooperation. 
Accepting and reinforcing the stereotype through policies that assume that only 
Indo-Fijians are business-minded and indigenous Fijians are not will continue 
to be divisive and potentially destructive.
However, while there is political aspiration for indigenous Fijian development, 
there is an absence of conceptual skills to define a new development paradigm 
that is forward-looking, relevant and sustainable. This deficit is partly due to 
the current and previous governments’ flirting with neoliberal development 
thinking, inspired by the IMF’s constant prodding for neoliberal reform. Part of 
the liberalization approach is the freeing up of indigenous land for international 
investors through the regime’s land bank policy. One of the latent results of 
the land bank policy is that it redefines the role of the state as a land agent to 
facilitate international investment.
The last issue is the most worrying, especially when large international 
companies gain control of local land and use it for intensive farming to send 
food back to their countries in a process that is known globally as “land grab”. 
Instead of benefiting indigenous Fijians, the land bank concept can potentially 
undermine their development aspirations in the future as good land is taken up 
by foreign investors.
Fiji’s land reform is in direct contrast with land reform in Malaysia and South 
Africa. While land reform in Malaysia was inspired by raising the level of 
entrepreneurial engagement and the skills of Malay farmers to alleviate poverty, 
in South Africa it was based on how to redistribute 87% of commercial farmland 
owned by 13% of the population (whites) to the other 87% of the population 
(blacks, coloureds and Asians). In both cases, the idea was to enhance commercial 
agriculture for the indigenous population – the land bank in Fiji does not have 
this in mind.
A way forward for Fiji would be the formation of business partnerships between 
foreign business and landowners for agricultural development, using land as 
equity. Again, as suggested in the case of mining, laws should be changed to 
enable this to happen. Another way forward is to begin to move away from 
the notion of land protection and rights towards land innovation. It has been 
established by law that native land cannot be removed from native ownership. 
With this in mind, the next step is to cultivate a culture of innovation by 
sponsoring students for high-level post-graduate training in land utilization, 
agricultural engineering, crop science, food technology and legal patents to 
raise land development to a higher level of entrepreneurial innovation. Some 
of the innovative initiatives such local experts might produce are in the areas 
of crop engineering for patenting, crop and vegetable preservation techniques 
for export and value-added food processing. These will take care of four major 
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concerns: effective use of land, development of innovative skills, empowerment 
of landowners and increased agricultural production, all of which would be 
good for the national economy.
For those reasons the NLTB should move away from its protectionist and 
bureaucratic role to one based on innovation and productivity. Increasing 
the land rent, as the Qarase and Bainimarama governments have advocated, 
is a minimalist and very short-term solution and does not solve the problem. 
Effective reform must not be driven solely by the neoliberal notion of liberalizing 
landownership; rather, it should be driven by considerations centred on 
innovation, empowerment and sustainability.
While the Bainimarama regime has spent significant resources, effort and time 
on indigenous development, as we have seen, it must be asked how much that 
expenditure has lifted the indigenous Fijian population out of poverty. Poverty 
eradication and social protection was a priority for the regime. The question 
can be partly answered by Table 7.5, which shows that there was a decrease in 
the level of poverty between 2002-2003 and 2008-2009. The level of poverty 
amongst indigenous Fijians decreased by 10% and amongst Indo-Fijians by 
11% during that period. The decrease may have been due to a number of factors, 
including an improved method of data collection or a change in the definition 
of ‘poverty’. If neither of these changed during the period under review, then 
it may be concluded that the reduction in the incidence of poverty can be 
associated with government policies. However, based on the figures presented, 
such a judgement is inconclusive.
Table 7.5 Percentage of population in poverty 
2002-2003 2008-2009 % Change 
Fiji 35% 31% -10%
Urban 28% 19% -34%
Rural 40% 43% 8%
I-Taukei 35% 31% -10%
Indo-Fijian 36% 32% -11%
Others 24% 25% 4%
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2011.
The Bainimarama regime may take credit for the decrease in the incidence of 
poverty; however, the 31% poverty rate amongst indigenous Fijians is still very 
high and needs to be reduced even further.
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Conclusion
Despite public denial, Bainimarama’s pro-indigenous development initiatives 
are tantamount to affirmative action and tend to be very similar to the 
Qarase government’s approach. The only difference was that Qarase was more 
explicit about his pro-indigenous policies while Bainimarama is less so. While 
Bainimarama has been careful not to contradict his purported multicultural 
ideology, he is under immense pressure to put in place pro-indigenous policies 
as a way of mobilizing indigenous support and loyalty. However, his pro-
indigenous development initiatives perhaps betrayed the ethno-nationalist side 
of him, which he has often concealed and even denied. The major difference 
between Bainimarama’s and Qarase’s versions of pro-indigenous policy is that 
Qarase tries to appeal to the indigenous sense of culture and identity through 
use of the mainstream institutions such as the GCC, the Methodist Church 
and provincial councils. On the other hand Bainimarama tries to appeal to 
people’s sense of socio-economic need by directly engaging and influencing the 
indigenous people himself through personal appeal and rural projects while 
weakening indigenous institutions which he thinks are in the way. With the 
2014 election looming, Bainimarama and other potential indigenous Fijian 
leaders will be in competition to win indigenous Fijian seats, and one has to play 
the ethno-nationalist game strategically. This is despite the new proportional 
open-list electoral system, which is meant to nullify ethnic mobilization and 
promote trans-ethnic voting. Bainimarama has been doing his own indigenous 
mobilization through rural development initiatives, despite the well-rehearsed 
rhetoric of multiculturalism and opposition to ethno-nationalism.
Despite the crippling of the old order and the attempt to re-create a new one, 
very little has changed in terms of the development paradigm for indigenous 
Fijians. No innovation in land development and indigenous entrepreneurship 
has occurred. The same rural division of labour based on leasing indigenous 
land, which kept indigenous Fijians economically marginalized, persists, and it 
could even be deepened by the land bank project. Indigenous Fijians continue 
to be tools of political manipulation by their own elites to serve their economic 
or ethno-political interests. As this book has demonstrated, all the coups since 
the first one in 1987 have made insignificant changes to the lives of indigenous 
Fijians generally, although some individuals were direct beneficiaries.
Like Rabuka, Qarase and Chaudhry, Bainimarama has missed another important 
opportunity to raise indigenous development to another level of innovation. 
His major problem was not his lack of commitment to reform or enhancement of 
indigenous interests, but rather his contradictory approach: preaching against 
ethno-nationalism and affirmative action but practising them at the same time 
under different guises. Affirmative action under Qarase, as we have seen, was 
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subject to abuse. However, because of heavy censorship of the media, possible 
abuse under Bainimarama cannot be fully ascertained and things may surface 
later after the eagerly awaited 2014 election.
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8. Ethnicity, reform and affirmative 
action in Malaysia
This chapter examines some of the salient features of Malaysian affirmative 
action and some of the important challenges associated with it. As discussed 
earlier, Fiji and Malaysia enjoyed a special relationship over the years based 
on assumptions about shared ethnic problems and other historical links. Some 
aspects of British colonial policies in the two countries were similar, especially 
in relation to the co-option of traditional elites into the colonial governance 
structure, the importation of foreign labour and provision for protective cultural 
political mechanisms commonly referred to as “paramountcy of Fijian interest” 
and Malay “special privileges.”
Affirmative action in Malaysia faced considerable dilemmas in relation to the 
authoritarian role of the state in determining resource redistribution, the 
interplay between state bureaucrats and business interests, the creation of an 
indigenous middle class through ethnic preferences and the issue of inequality 
within the Malay community itself. Nevertheless, despite their problems, 
Malaysian affirmative programs have been hailed as a model to be emulated by 
countries such as Fiji and South Africa.  
This chapter first discusses the relationship between ethnicity, socio-economic 
development and politics during the colonial period. It will then look at how 
economic disparity led to ethnic tension, culminating in the 1969 ethnic riots 
which accelerated the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the 
major development and affirmative action plan meant to address the issue of 
poverty and ethnic inequality. The chapter then examines attempts to eradicate 
poverty and how this transformed the rural sector. This is followed by a 
discussion of the growth of the Malay middle class as a result of the NEP. It 
also examines the processes of industrialization and privatization and their 
contribution in building up a Malay entrepreneurial class and the role of the 
state in actively encouraging and facilitating the process through preferential 
policies. As examples of Malay investment, the chapter discusses the operation 
of two of the biggest Malay trust companies, the Permodalan Berhad (PNB) 
and Amannah Sahm Nasioanale (ASN). The chapter then discusses some of the 
results of the affirmative action programs and implications on ethnic relations 
and national development.     
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Independence and Malay preferential policies 
The ethnic division of labour in Malaysia had its origins in colonial capitalism. 
Tin mining was one of the major factors which attracted the British into the 
interior of Malaysia’s peninsula and Chinese miners began arriving in large 
numbers from China, lured by the new-found wealth. They formed loose mining 
confederations with local sultans in the states of Perak. Other Chinese made 
their fortune in retail trade. 
Chinese immigration was followed by an influx of Indian immigrants, who mostly 
worked in government service and in rubber plantations. Some, like the Chinese, 
became merchants and retailers. Throughout the colonial period the Chinese and 
Indians dominated the mining, rubber plantation, manufacturing, service and 
retail trade sectors of the economy while the Malays were largely agricultural 
peasants and a few worked in government positions. Significantly, the relative 
class positions of various ethnic groups were tied to their occupational status 
(see Jomo 1986). This was a common tendency, where the colonial economy 
engendered the emergence of ‘racial-class’ groups which reflected identifiable 
parallels between economic division of labour and division by ethnicity. We 
have seen how this type of socio-economic differentiation also characterized 
the Fiji colonial economy, in which Indo-Fijians were largely engaged in sugar 
plantation work and indigenous Fijians remained locked into the communal semi-
subsistence sector. The socio-economic disparity in Malaysia led to simmering 
ethnic tensions which needed to be addressed urgently upon independence.
To address potential conflict, the Malaysian independence constitution of 1957, 
like the 1970 Fiji independence constitution, was essentially a consociationalist 
compromise by political parties representing the major ethnic groups – the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) for national consensus and unity 
under the umbrella Malaysian Alliance Party. Equally significant was the 
provision on the “Special Rights Programme” in Article 153 for preferential 
policies on economic development priority, obtaining business and professional 
licenses, civil service appointment and educational scholarships in respect of 
Malays (Lee 2005; Lee, Gomez & Yakob 2010).
By and large Malays interpreted the constitution as a mandate for their political 
ascendancy and this nationalistic interpretation became the ‘official’ version 
after it was adopted by the Bumiputera leadership of the UMNO. To cement this 
position, Malay traditional rulers who were co-opted into the British colonial 
system were made constitutional and religious heads of their respective states 
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(Lee 1990). Support amongst Chinese and Indians was canvassed through the 
MCA and MIC communal patrons by delivering economic and social development 
to the grassroots.
Meanwhile, class differentiation within the economy continued to widen and 
this had serious political consequences for the Alliance. For instance, between 
1957 and 1970, intra-ethnic income disparity (in terms of Gini Coefficient ratio) 
grew by 36.2% for Malays and 21.6% for Chinese (Osman-Rani 1990: 8). This 
generated the feeling that the Alliance had failed to deliver on its promises 
and, as a result, the poorer classes of various communities withdrew support 
from the Alliance and support fell from 79.6% of the vote in 1955, to 51.5% in 
1959, increasing to 58.5% in 1964 before plunging to 48.5% in 1969. Most of 
the poor Malays who deserted the UMNO supported the extremist nationalist 
Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), which believed in total Malay supremacy and 
the declaration of Islam as the state religion. This shift in loyalty indicated the 
failure of the Alliance patronage system and the desire to “search for alternative 
and more effective communal patrons on the part of the racially clustered 
subordinate class fractions” (Brown 1994: 234). Fearing that PAS would hijack 
the Bumiputera agenda and break up its support base, UMNO began pursuing 
Bumiputera economic interests in earnest. With the threat from the PAS on 
one side and the non-Malay parties on the other, the UMNO had to achieve a 
delicate ethnic balancing act. The big test came during the 1959 election, when 
non-Malay parties, especially Chinese parties, made some gains on the basis of 
their opposition to Bumiputera special preferences. The UMNO lost some of its 
Chinese votes and had to rely largely on Bumiputera support (Hua 1983).
Nevertheless, the lack of substantive improvement in Malay socio-economic 
life increased the tempo of opposition the Alliance rule. The number of public 
enterprises increased from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 1970 and this was hardly 
satisfactory in a situation of dire inequality (Gomez and Jomo 1999). By 1970 
only 2.4% of the total equity was owned by the Bumiputera while the non-
Bumiputera Malaysians held 28.3% and foreigners 63.4%. From 1957 to 1970, 
the income share of the top 5% of households increased considerably. The 
average income for Chinese was 1.89 times higher in 1957 and increased to 2.47 
in 1967, while Indian average income increased from 1.51 to 1.95 times higher 
in the same period (Anand 1981). The increasing disparity naturally heightened 
tension.  
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The 1969 violence and the New Economic Policy
During the 1969 election the Alliance captured the majority of seats in 
Parliament but its majority shares of the vote actually declined from 58.4% in 
1964 to 48.8%. A “victory march” by supporters of the opposition on 13 May 
triggered off a spate of violent attacks by Malays who felt threatened by the 
march. Four days of bloody violence led to the suspension of the constitution 
and the declaration of an emergency. The riots manifested the way in which 
longstanding socio-economic grievances were readily and spontaneously 
translated into ethnic violence when the circumstances were ripe.
One of the most significant lessons of the 1969 riots was the realization by the 
younger generation of UMNO leaders who assumed leadership after the demise 
of the old order that more aggressive socio-economic transformation was needed 
to avoid further crisis. This hastened the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP), which had been planned for some time. The NEP contained both 
a broad development framework for the nation and specific affirmative action 
provisions for the Bumiputera to address ethnic-based economic inequality.
First launched in association with the Second Malaysian Plan for 1971-75, the 
NEP consisted of two prongs: (a) the reduction and eventual eradication of 
poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for 
all Malaysians, irrespective of race and (b) the acceleration of the process of 
restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce 
and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function 
(Malaysia 1973).
The NEP allocations for poverty eradication and restructuring society from 1971 
to 1985 are shown in Table 8.1. The pattern shows that there was a gradual shift 
in emphasis from poverty eradication to restructuring. The ratio of allocation 
for restructuring compared to poverty eradication rose from 21.6% during 
1971–75 to 37.3% during 1976–80. Under the Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981–
85, the ratio rose to 47.2%. During the Second Malaysian Plan, the poverty 
eradication allocation was 4.7 times that of allocation for restructuring but this 
ratio declined to 2.7 for the Third Malaysian Plan period (1976–80).
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Table 8.1 Malaysian Development Plan allocation for poverty eradication 














2,350.0 6,373.4 9,319.2 6,699.1 10,497.0
Restructuring 508.3 2,376.0 4,397.6 5,406.8 6,576.8
Overlapping 3 .4 149.0 300.5 184.7 464 .5
Total 2,861 8,898.4 14,017.3 12,290.6 17,538.3
Source: Jomo 1986: 267.
The disparity between poverty eradication and redistribution showed a clear 
bias towards middle-class Malays, summed up by Jomo thus:
Since over half the Malay population were considered poor, theoretically, 
Malays would comprise the majority of the beneficiaries of poverty 
eradication measures such as race. On the other hand, the most well to-do, 
probably comprising no more than 3%, of the Bumiputera community, 
benefit directly and substantially from efforts to restructure society. 
Hence, shifting emphasis from poverty eradication to restructuring 
society would tend to increase inequality within the Malay community 
(Jomo 1986: 268).
The Politics of Poverty Eradication
Poverty was seen by the ruling UMNO elite as a potentially destabilising aspect 
in its attempt to unite the Malay community. Concern for poverty was in response 
to the 1969 riots which was seen as a consequence of the mass migration of rural 
poor into the urban areas; therefore the aim was to develop the rural areas to 
increase living standards and so to arrest this drift.
Rural development strategies did not include land reform because it would 
alienate landowners who were still influential within the UMNO. Thus there 
was emphasis only on infrastructural development, subsidising resettlement 
projects and provision of agricultural resources, such as irrigation schemes as a 
means of increasing productivity (Emsley 1996). 
The main NEP targets of poverty alleviation in the rural areas were rubber, palm 
oil and rice cultivation. About 95% of the rice farmers were Malays. In 1970, 
the incidence of poverty in the rice sector was reported at 88.1% and at just 
below 91.8% for the mixed agricultural sector. In 1990, of the 10,500,000 acres 
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of land under cultivation, 1,148,000 acres were for paddy and 7,907,000 for 
rubber and palm oil. However, because most of the rural farmers were Malays, it 
was important for political reasons to target them in the NEP poverty alleviation 
strategies (Ishida and Azizan 1998). As shown in Table 8.2, the incidence of 
poverty in 1970 for all ethnic groups was 49.3% of households. The target for 
1990 was 16.7%, while the achieved figure was 15.0%. The highest incidence of 
poverty in 1970 was amongst Bumiputera with 65.0%, compared to 26.0% for 
Chinese and 39.0% for Indians. Within twenty years of the NEP, the incidence 
of poverty was dramatically reduced to 20.8% for Bumiputera, 5.7% for Chinese 
and 8.0% for Indians. 
Table 8.2 Poverty eradication targets and achievements, 1976 and 1990 
(% of households)
Target Achieved
1970 1976 1990 1990
Peninsular Malaysia
Poverty incidence 49.3 16.7 15.0
By location
Rural 58.7 23.0 19.3












Bumiputera 56 .4 23.8
Chinese 19.2 5 .5
Indian 28.5 8.0
Others 44 .6 12.9
Source: Rasiah 1998: 127.
However, the success of the poverty eradication scheme is misleading for two 
reasons. First, part of the increase in production figures was achieved through 
heavy government subsidy. For instance, in 1984 about 69% of the estimated 
net annual income from rice cultivation was from subsidy. Second, the decline 
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in aggregate poverty levels amongst rice farmers camouflaged the widening gap 
between rich and poor farmers. There was decline in poverty but at the same 
time there was increased relative poverty.
The NEP ensured direct intervention of the state in rural development. 
Consequently, the interaction between the state actors and rural peasants 
increased, creating conditions for potential antagonism when circumstances 
dictated: 
The state was once largely a bystander or mediator...It is now a direct 
participant, decision maker, allocator and antagonist in nearly all vital 
aspects of paddy growing. Most of the buffers between the state and 
rice farmers have fallen away, thereby vastly increasing both the role of 
politics and the possibilities for direct confrontation between the ruling 
party and its peasantry (Scott 1985: 53).
For instance, dissatisfied poor farmers withdrew support from the UMNO and 
supported PAS. Class frustrations were mobilised along ethnic-religious and 
cultural lines. Peasant resistance through religious mobilisation (especially the 
PAS fundamentalist variant) became a political irritant to UMNO hegemony in 
the rural areas.
Consolidating the Bumiputera middle class
The second prong of the NEP was in effect an attempt to build up a Malay 
middle class through restructuring employment, ownership of share capital 
in the corporate sector and the creation of a Bumiputera Commercial and 
Industrial Community (BCIC). The focus of redistribution of share capital was 
most pronounced in the primary and service sectors, while export-oriented 
manufacturing was largely spared (Rasiah 1998). As Table 8.3 shows, in 1970 
Bumiputera employment in the agricultural, secondary and service sectors was 
66.2%, 12.1% and 21.7% respectively. The NEP aimed at decreasing reliance 
on the agricultural sector for Bumiputera by reducing it to 37.4% in 1990 and 
increasing employment in the secondary and services sectors by 26.8% and 
35.8% respectively. In 1990 employment in the agricultural sector had decreased 
to 29.0% and secondary and service sectors had increased to 30.5% and 40.5% 
respectively.
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Table 8.3 Restructuring targets and achievements, 1970 and 1990
Sectoral 















Agriculture 951.1 66 .2 1091.4 37.4 875.2 29.0 1404.6 36.7
(%) 67.6 61 .4 71.2 76.4
Secondary 173.1 12 .1 782.7 26.8 918.5 30.5 1038.9 27.2
(%) 30.8 51.9 48.0 49.8
Services 312 .4 21.7 1046.8 35.8 1219.8 40.5 1381.9 36 .1
(%) 37.9 48.9 51.0 50.9
Non-Bumis
Agriculture 454.9 33 .5 686.2 27.1 354.0 14.0 433.0 15 .5
(%) 32 .4 38.6 28.8 23 .6
Secondary 389.7 28.7 725.4 28.7 996.1 39.5 1048.6 37.5
(%) 69.2 48.1 52.0 50.2
Services 312 .4 37.8 1116 .6 44 .2 1170.5 46 .5 1314.0 47.0
(%) 37.9 51 .6 49.0 49.1
% Corporate Ownership
Bumiputera 2 .4 30.0 20.3
Others 32 .3 40.0 46 .2
Foreigners 63 .3 30.0 25 .1
Nominee Co . 2.0 8.4
Source: Rasiah 1998: 28.
The NEP led to a dramatic expansion in the size of state employment and 
employment in quasi-public corporations. The newly created jobs were reserved 
overwhelmingly for Malays. As a result, between 1970 and 1977 Malays were 
provided with 68% of the newly created jobs and by 1980 they made up 93% of 
the total number of new employees. Figures also show that the Malay proportion 
in the armed forces and police went up from 70% in 1970 to 86% in 1980 (Lin 
1984).
Apart from providing public sector employment, the NEP also provided incentives 
and assistance for Malay entry into industrial and commercial endeavours 
through provision of equity, capital, loan financing, education and training. It 
aimed to increase Bumiputera corporate wealth from 2.4% in 1970 to 30% in 
1990, to create a BCIC under the NEP’s Outline Perspective Plan (1971-1990) and 
increase the Bumiputera trust agencies share of Bumiputera share capital to 83% 
in 1990 (Jomo 1995: 43). But as Table 8.3 shows, Bumiputera corporate wealth 
in 1990 fell short of the 30% target by about 10%. Nevertheless, there was a 
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growth of state trusts, sheltering the interests of Bumiputera, in the mining and 
service sectors, while the number of public agencies swelled from 109 in 1970 to 
656 in 1980 (Jomo 1994a: 8). Amongst these were the well-known and leading 
trust agencies, Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) and Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB). Public institutions such as the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) 
also extended their role in economic participation by providing generous loans 
and other assistance to Malays. The Fijian Holdings model was based on the 
Malay trust concept, and both the Nine Points Plan and the Ten Year Plan drew 
inspiration from the NEP’s provision for increased indigenous control of the 
corporate sector.
To facilitate rapid entry of Malays into the civil service and commerce, 
privileged access to education and scholarships was readily provided. Quotas 
were introduced in 1971 to counter Chinese dominance in higher education. As 
a result, the proportion of Malays enrolled for local degree courses increased 
from 35.6% to 66.7% between 1969 and 1980; and by 1995 Malay students 
took up about 64% of all university places (Emsley 1996: 40). Preferential entry 
into university became problematic because Chinese and Indian students had to 
work extra hard to obtain university places. The use of Bahasa Malaysia as the 
official language of instruction entrenched cultural and communal dominance 
of Malay students and marginalized non-Malay students, who were required 
to use the language. Malay students who benefited from the educational quota 
system and who had a “perception of inferiority” as a result of preferences also 
resorted to radical Islam to provide moral support and political direction while 
rejecting new ideas and competition from non-Muslims (Muzaffar 1989: 15).
Industrialization and Malay embourgeoisment 
While the quantitative targets of the NEP were set out clearly (as shown in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3), there was also an emphasis on achieving qualitative targets 
in the form of creating a Bumiputera business class “so that the NEP’s equity 
participation could be backed by managerial control” (Rasiah 1998: 128). This 
could be achieved only through a concerted drive towards industrialisation 
in order to speed up the consolidation of the middle class. At the same time, 
industrialisation was important for UMNO’s mass support by the working class 
through the creation of employment. Thus growth became a political imperative 
to gain the loyalty of UMNO’s diverse political support base (Jesudason 1996).
Industrialization was really the major economic engine for affirmative action. 
In the late 1960s import substitution industrialisation (ISI) gave way to labour 
intensive export-oriented industrialisation (EOI), accompanied by new labour 
policies, tax concessions and other incentives to facilitate EOI. This policy shift 
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coincided with the introduction of the NEP. Increasingly, the NEP involved 
greater state intervention by way of public sector expansion and regulation of 
manufacturing sector investments. The export-oriented industrialisation came 
to be dominated by Free Trade Zones (FTZ) under the Free Trade Zones Act 
of 1971. The FTZs, especially the processing of primary products (rubber, tin, 
palm oil and timber and manufacture of electrical and electronic components), 
grew at a rapid rate and led to expansion of employment opportunities and 
rapid rural-urban migration.
In the 1980s, in an attempt to refocus industrialisation, Mahathir, the new Prime 
Minister, promoted heavy industries to balance the industrialisation process 
through private investment incentives. The heavy industries were spearheaded 
by companies relocated from East Asian economies such as Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan – South Korea in particular was seen as a model economy by 
Malaysia. This “Big Push” industrialisation was to involve state corporations 
acting on behalf of the Bumiputera (Jomo 1994b).
However, the international recession of 1985 adversely affected Malaysia’s export 
earnings from palm oil, rubber, tin and electronics, leading to negative growth 
for the first time since independence. A year later the situation worsened with 
the collapse of the oil price and Malaysia’s option was to restructure along the 
lines of the Washington Consensus. This meant that the heavily state-subsidised 
and state-controlled NEP had to be quietly “suspended” in favour of accelerating 
liberalisation measures under the Guidelines for Privatisation, which spelt out 
the rationale and broad framework of Malaysia’s privatisation plans (Jomo 
1994a). These were: first, to reduce the financial and administrative burden on 
the government of maintaining services and infrastructure; second, to promote 
competition and efficiency; third, to stimulate private entrepreneurship; 
fourth, to reduce the dominance of the public sector; and fifth, to help 
achieve the objectives of the NEP, given that Bumiputera entrepreneurship had 
progressed well and Bumiputera were ready to take up opportunities in the 
privatised services. Moreover, the political consequences of this low growth 
were significant, to say the least. Low growth intensified ethnic tension and 
factionalism within UMNO (Means 1991: 193-219). There was bitter rivalry for 
power between Mahathir and fellow cabinet member, Tengku Razaleigh, during 
the 1987 UMNO leadership elections. The economic recession made it difficult 
for the top leaders to unify disparate groups.
The privatisation program was closely controlled by the state and was channelled 
towards politically favoured corporations, thus impacting on ownership and 
employment patterns, income distribution and the control of vital economic 
sectors (Jones 1991). As a result there was rapid growth in the manufacturing 
sector, with eight-fold growth in employment in this sector by 1989. Employment 
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in manufacturing in this period accounted for more than 17% of the labour 
force. This employment trend was noticeable amongst Malays, whose share of 
the labour force grew from 20% in 1957 to 29% in 1970 and to 54% in 1980.
The NEP was succeeded in 1991 by the New Development Policy (NDP), which 
put more emphasis on human resource development as a means of achieving the 
30% Bumiputera ownership target, set down by the NEP (Jomo 1993). While 
keeping the Bumiputera agenda intact, the NDP formed the basis of Mahathir’s 
ambitious “Vision 2020”, referring to the date when Malaysia would achieve 
developed country status. Fundamental to “Vision 2020” industrialisation 
would be the leading function of the private sector, which was the aim of the 
accelerated privatisation since 1991 (Chowdhry 1997).
Thus, despite the economic crisis of the early to mid-1980s, affirmative action 
in Malaysia took place in large measure under conditions of a rapidly growing 
economy. The NEP coincided with the OPEC oil price rise in the critical years 
of the new plan, enabling a state-led redistribution from incremental (oil-based) 
revenues throughout the 1970s rather than a reallocation of existing tight 
resources. This was in contrast to Fiji’s post-1987 affirmative action programs, 
which tried to create an indigenous capitalist class in a very inhibiting 
environment of low growth. Industrialisation in Fiji was never associated with 
affirmative action in any way. The shift from ISI to EOI in the 1970s was part of 
the general economic policy for growth rather than an attempt to restructure 
society in a way that favoured indigenous Fijians.
A critical aspect of the process of Bumiputera embourgeoisment was state 
supervision and control of the process of industrialization and privatization to 
ensure selective targeting. Mahathir himself suggested “The best way to keep 
the shares in the Bumiputera hands is to hand them over to the Bumiputera most 
capable of retaining them, which means the well-to-do” (FEER 13 April 1979). 
The state was directly involved in Bumiputera capitalism through State-Owned 
Corporations (SOEs) or “state capitalism” (which operated directly on behalf 
of Bumiputera interest), trust corporations and direct preferential deals with 
Bumiputera businesses (Gomez 1994).
The SOEs came to symbolise two fundamental but related aspects of the 
Malaysian state: first, because SOEs were to secure Bumiputera economic 
interest, they also came to represent an aspect of the state’s ethnocratic designs; 
and second, through state ownership, SOEs confirmed the state’s commitment 
to direct capital accumulation. The assumption was that through direct state 
accumulation the communal interest of the Bumiputera would be protected. 
Encouraged by this and in the absence of proper regulation, there was a dramatic 
increase in the number of SOEs, with an increase of about 100 per year by the 
mid-1970s. This resulted in the creation of companies with de facto management 
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acting independently of any shareholder control. Importantly, however, it 
showed the government’s “ignorance of the extent of its assets and liabilities” 
(Adams and Cavendish 1995: 17).
In the late 1980s, about 25% of the total GDP was from the SOE sector account 
output (World Bank 1989). In 1990 there were 1,158 SOEs, 78 of which were 
operational with a total paid-up capital of M$23.9 billion. Of the 1,158, 396 
(34%) were fully state-owned, 429 (37%) were majority state-owned and in 333 
(30%) the state had a minority equity stake. Table 8.4 shows the three different 
categories of SOEs (federal, state and regional) by paid-up capital. In all three 
cases the government had majority equity (with a total of 70% in all cases) in a 
total of 1,158 companies. 











Federal 556 18,521 12,738 68.78 33 .3
State 553 5,048 3,829 75.85 9.1
Regional 49 241 170 70.54 4.9
TOTAL 1,158 23,810 16,737 70.29 20.6
Source: Adams and Cavendish 1995: 20. 
Over the years, the SOE sector was dominated by Petroleum Nasional Sdn Berhad 
(PETRONAS) and its subsidiaries because of its monopoly status, provided for in 
the 1974 Petroleum Development Act, and also because of its close links to the 
external markets.1 Petrochemicals, together with manufacturing and finance, 
constituted the most important components of the SOE sector. Most of the crude 
oil (80%) was exported to Japan, Singapore and South Korea and 95% of the 
liquefied natural gas was exported to Japan. In 1984, 27% of total Malaysian 
exports was made up of petroleum products, falling to 22% in 1989. In 1988 
PETRONAS had a turnover of M$6.7 billion and a profit of M$3.8 billion (Jomo 
1994b). However, SOE manufacturing generally underperformed compared to 
manufacturing by SOEs’ private counterparts (World Bank 1989). This led to a 
major privatisation drive announced in 1983 to increase efficiency and to “curb 
the subsidy mentality” of the Bumiputera (Gomez 1994: 15). 
1 An attempt to set up a similar state-owned petroleum corporation in Fiji, to be modelled on the  PETRONAS 
concept, failed due to political struggles within the post-1987 coup government and strong pressure from oil 
companies. The company, to be called  Fiji National Petroleum Company (FINAPECO), was to set up a distillery 
in Fiji to supply the South Pacific. The move was spear-headed by the post-coup interim Prime Minister (and 
current President), Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, but after the coup leader, Gen. Rabuka, became PM after the 1992 
election, he cancelled the project.     
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Privatization and Bumiputera preferences 
By the time privatisation started, a substantial portion of the corporate stock 
had already been secured by a small UMNO elite (either through “personal 
achievement” or proxies) who have been able to exploit their political influence 
to weave a web of cronyism and patronage within the corporate community. 
It was really after 1984 that privatisation gathered momentum. By the end 
of 1990 37 government projects had been privatised, 27 of which had been 
public enterprises. Another 93 projects were privatised during 1991 and 1992, 
including about 40 government-owned enterprises which were transferred to 
Bumiputera trust agencies such as the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and 
Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN). About 120 SOEs were sold to the private sector 
(Gomez 1994).
Privatisation ended the state’s monopoly in areas like broadcasting, shipping, 
airlines, telecommunications and power generation. The listing of shares of 
these privatised companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
expanded Malaysia’s capital market considerably, making it the fourth largest 
in Asia. Since the NDP was implemented, a number of major privatisations 
took place. By May 1994, the government had privatised 103 entities and 
over 15 previously government-owned companies. This included the national 
energy company, Tenaga Nasional, Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(HICOM) and Telecom. Each was listed on the KLSE. A total of 78 projects were 
identified for privatisation under the Rolling Action Privatisation Plan 1994/95, 
followed by 77 projects in 1995. Privatisation under the 1994 program included 
the development of seaports in Penang, Johor and Kelang, commissioning of 
independent power producers and development of a new television station. 
The 1995 privatisation projects included aspects of the new Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport, the ports of Kuantan and Kemaman, the National Savings 
Bank and the housing loan division of the Ministry of Finance (Chowdhry 
1997). Operations of financial institutions and equities under the privatization 
rubric were strictly controlled by the state to ensure conformity to the NEP 
requirements of 30% Bumiputera ownership by 1990. The bumiputerasation of 
the economy was a huge undertaking, given that in 1971 the Bumiputera owned 
only 4% of quoted equity. To achieve this, quotas were imposed on most types 
of government procurement. This ranged from 1% for sophisticated defence 
equipment to 100% for road haulage services for the Federal government. It was 
usual for Bumiputera tenders to be 10% in excess of those from non-Bumiputera. 
Quotas also determined the issuing of licences for a large number of services 
such as taxis (Emsley 1996).
The equity acquisition process was formalised in the form of the Industrial 
Co-ordination Act (ICA), which targeted a 30:40:30 (30% Bumiputera, 40% 
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non-Bumiputera and 30% foreign) ownership formula by 1990. All companies 
involved in manufacturing were required to have a licence, the provision of 
which required that submitted plans must include 30% Bumiputera shares by 
1990. Mechanisms were in place to ensure that the promise of the 30% equity 
was achieved. It was assumed that an annual growth of 9% was required to 
achieve the ICA goals. In fact Malaysia’s growth rate was 11.4% annually 
between 1970 and 1990 (Jomo 1994a).
There were exemptions from the ICA regulations. For instance, equity of less 
than M$0.10 million was excluded, but this was increased to M$0.25 million 
in 1977. There was also a limit on the value of fixed assets, set at M$0.5 million 
in 1977 but raised to M$1 million in 1985 and M$2.5 million in 1986. ICA was 
also strict on import-substitution foreign investment, while export-oriented 
establishments were allowed very high numbers of foreign equity shares. These 
restrictions were relaxed in the late 1980s. The ICA rules encouraged the growth 
of “Ali Baba” companies, where Chinese businesses were being fronted by 
Bumiputera (Lee, Gomez and Yakob 2010).
Because the privatization process was done in line with the NEP pro-Bumiputera 
objectives, political consideration was an important factor in determining 
equity. This led to allegations of extensive political nepotism and corruption. 
In the absence of a formal tender system, political leaders and politically 
aligned businessmen took advantage of the opportunity to secure stock (Gomez 
2009). The privatisation process often meant the prearranged transfer of a state 
monopoly to private monopoly. The complex web of political patronage and 
cronyism formed part of the process whereby corporate interest was co-opted 
into the state system of patronage.
Despite privatisation, government still controlled a substantial share of various 
aspects of the economy. In 1994 more than 1,100 SOEs made up vital utilities such 
as transport, communications, water supply, energy, and finance; and SOEs were 
heavily involved in non-traditional sectors such as services, construction and 
manufacturing (Adams and Cavendish 1995: 15). By 1992 about 42% of Malaysian 
Airline System (MAS), 29% of Malaysian International Shipping Corporation 
(MISC), 75% of Syarikat Telecom (STM) and 77% of Tenaga Nasional (all of which 
are monopolies) were still under government control (Gomez 1994). But even state-
controlled shares were still perceived as Bumiputera shares held in state trust.
Apart from the issuing of equity by large financial institutions, the government 
also provided subsidies for business premises, training, provision of credit 
and quotas in the issuing of licences and government procurement. In 1985 
for instance, 63% of the works contracts by the three largest public sector 
bodies (Public Works Department, FELDA and telecommunications), worth 
M$887 million, and 42% of the supplies contracts, worth M$751 million, were 
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awarded to Bumiputera.2 As a result of state preferential policies such as these, 
there was a significant increase in the number of Bumiputera professional and 
other salaried workers. Between 1973 and 1987, the Bumiputera share of the 
employers’ category relative to other ethnic categories increased from 14.2% in 
1973 to 32.7 in 1987. For instance within the “commercial” sector there was an 
increase in the Malay share from 8.6% in 1973 to 36.8% in 1987, while there 
was an increase in the “finance” sector from 0.0% in 1973 to 27.5% in 1987 
(Malaysian Government 1973; 1987).
These figures do not tell the full story. In fact the shortcomings of heavily 
protected ventures were common – complacency, inability to take risks and lack 
of business innovation. The Malaysian Central Bank (Bank Negara) required 
the banking fraternity to reserve 20% of its loan portfolio to Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs, but this target was “overachieved” by 12.7%. The MARA, formed 
to help Bumiputera entrepreneurship, subsidised interest rates on its loans, but 
despite this only 6,000 of the 55,000 loans granted have been repaid. We have 
seen that a high arrears rate was also a feature of the Fiji Development Bank’s 
Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme (CLFS). But, again, the differences were 
in terms of sheer scale. The banking system in Malaysia lent itself to massive 
wastage and corruption (Emsley 1996) but, despite the failures, one cannot deny 
the extent to which state patronage has strengthened the position of the Malay 
middle class. The middle class manifested “syncretic” characteristics through 
what Brown referred to as a “balancing act”, to provide a favourable climate that 
best served their interests:
The picture that emerges is of the state bureaucrats attempting a 
“balancing act”; employing the state machinery so as to promote 
their own interests and their emergence as the dominant class, but 
also willing to compromise their own interests in order to promote 
international capital, and to mediate between the other dominant and 
sub-ordinate classes. It is not suggested here that such a “balancing act” 
is unproblematic. Indeed it is the dynamics inherent in the politics of 
this venture, which provide the major explanatory focus for the analysis 
of political change (Brown 1994: 211).
The dynamic interplay between economic aspirations and political power bred 
widespread corruption. The prevalence of corruption and financial scandals 
involving senior politicians in the 1980s led to widespread dissatisfaction and 
the government had to face a broad front of dissenters, including opposition 
MPs, party dissidents, state land scheme settlers and a broad spectrum of 
government critics consisting of environmentalists, union leaders and Islamic 
fundamentalists.
2 These figures do not include joint ventures with non-Bumputera and foreigners or government 
procurement.
Politics of preferential development
210
The government’s reaction was, firstly, to deploy the Internal Security Act (ISA) 
in 1987, which was invoked to detain without trial about 130 people from a 
diverse range of dissident groups. Secondly, the government co-opted a number 
of important groups in a strategic approach towards national reconciliation. 
Most important of all was the attempt by the Prime Minister to move towards 
a “more consultative style” of government. This involved the setting up of the 
National Consultative Council in 1988, with 150 members from various interest 
groups, to formulate national economic policy after 1990, the year the NEP was 
scheduled to stop. These moves were necessary to appease non-Bumiputera 
demands for ending Bumiputera privilege and also because of pressure from the 
business sector for reduced government intervention in the economy.
The growth of the wealth of the Bumiputera elite was facilitated by the 
dominant UMNO political power and the attempt to keep excessive Chinese 
and foreign corporate interests in check. Between 1970 and 1990 there was a 
ten-fold increase in the proportion of share capital in the corporate sector held 
by Bumiputera. This represented an increase of 2.4% in 1970 to 20.3% in 1990, 
10% or so short of the 30% target of the NEP. The details are shown in Table 
8.5. Of the 20.3% of shares held by Bumiputera, which totalled $M22.3 billion, 
14% were held by individuals and the rest by trust agencies. At the same time, 
the number of shares held by Chinese also showed a remarkable increase, from 
27.2% in 1970 to 44.9% in 1990. The number of shares held by Indians showed 
a slight decrease, from 1.1% in 1970 to 1.0% of the total in 1990. The biggest 
decrease was for foreign investors: the number of shares held by foreigners 
plunged from 63.4% of the total in 1970 to 25.1% in 1990. However, one of the 
significant points of comparison with Fiji here is with regard to the difference in 
shares between individuals and trust agencies. Table 8.5 shows that the number 
of shares held by individual Bumiputera was much higher than of the number 
held by trust agencies (14.0% in 1990 for individuals, compared to 6.3% for 
trust agencies), signifying an emphasis on individual equity, as opposed to an 
emphasis on communal equity in the case of Fiji.
Table 8.5 Ownership of share capital, 1970-90 (in percentages)
Ownership Category 1970 1990
Bumiputera individuals 1 .6 14.0
Bumiputera trust agencies 0.8 6 .3
Chinese 27.2 44.9
Indians 1 .1 1.0
Other non-Bumiputera Malay residents - 0.3
Foreign residents 63 .4 25 .1
Nominee companies 6.0 8.4
Source: Gomez 1994: 23.
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Nevertheless, the figures for shares held by Bumiputera may be misleading, 
because many Bumiputera politicians were involved in “nominee companies” 
and foreign-domiciled companies. It has also been shown that expatriate Chinese 
Malaysians invested from abroad (see Jomo 1991). The Bumiputera figures could 
also be exaggerated because over the years a number of Bumiputera businesses 
were subcontracted to non-Bumiputera and foreign companies in what has 
been referred to earlier as an Ali Baba arrangement. This involved Bumiputera 
business licence holders fronting corporations run by Chinese. While it is true 
that Bumiputera investment has dramatically expanded, part of this has been 
due to the “Ali Baba” phenomenon:    
Statistics in the various industries seem to indicate considerable success 
in Malay participation; but the reality is less comforting. It is revealed 
time and time again, in almost every Malay economic conference, that 
most Malays resell their licenses or corporate control to non-Malays 
for a lucrative fee and allow their names to be used as fronts for non-
Malays who run the enterprise and pay a tribute to the Malays. This 
problem of sleeping partnership, termed Ali Baba...is as intractable as it 
is ubiquitous...(Lin 1984: 259). 
But this still does not detract from the fact that there has been a dramatic 
growth in the Bumiputera middle class, despite the fact that Chinese still 
predominated in the economy. Even contracting and sub-contracting licenses 
between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera businessmen constituted a “business” 
deal in itself, however politically undesirable it might be. Within the cosy 
and paternalistic climate of UMNO hegemony, the Bumiputera who had been 
granted licences or who had corporate ownership found it easier to sublease or 
relinquish corporate control in return for a lucrative fee rather than having to 
operate the business themselves.
Chinese business, with a much longer history of development, had mostly been 
built up over years of “self-made” accumulation, while Bumiputera business 
had mostly been achieved through heavy state subsidy and political patronage. 
It has been argued that a significant part of the new Bumiputera and non-
Bumiputera business class were not real entrepreneurs but rentier capitalists, 
contracting and sub-contracting business licences to each other. Bumiputera 
and Chinese business did not exist exclusive of each other, but intersected 
through UMNO political links. Many of these involved mergers, take-overs, 
management buyouts and share swapping, leading to conglomerisation through 
concentration of stock ownership and monopolies. The conglomerisation of the 
economy, facilitated by the centralised power of UMNO, has been a dominant 
trend of the NEP.
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Apart from its mediating role as a business broker, UMNO itself (like the MCA 
and MIC) has been directly involved in “party capitalism” by virtue of its easy 
access to funds through its undisputed political power, described thus:
…a range of practices whereby the beneficiaries of State economic 
sponsorship and protection are channelled to individuals, groups and 
private companies associated with ruling political parties, in particular 
UMNO...the rise of Money Politics has resulted in the blurring of State 
and UMNO business interests and the increasing dominance of UMNO 
and UMNO associated enterprises in the economy (Kahn 1992: 2).
Party capitalism had grown into a complex web of political and economic 
interests which constituted a powerful force in Malaysian political economy. 
This provided benefit for Malay business at all levels through special access to 
contracts; and also benefit for the UMNO itself through a steady flow of funds 
into party coffers (Kahn 1996: 61).
The NEP no doubt led to a rapid pace of political and economic transformation 
and accelerated growth, but these changes were basically horizontal in nature 
because instead of bridging the ‘vertical’ poverty gap it created a much more 
differentiated middle class and expanded and centralised state power in an 
increasingly authoritarian way. Thus policies that were meant to advance the 
political and economic dominance of an ethnic group ended up creating a strong 
fraction of middle class rentier profiteers.
An area of Bumiputera business which deserves special attention and which 
we examine next is Bumiputera trusts, because this area has been emulated as a 
framework for “communal investment” in Fiji, as we saw earlier. For instance, 
the Chief Executive of Fijian Holdings visited Malaysia through a Malaysia-Fiji 
bilateral agreement to study the operation of the PNB and ASN (which now 
enjoys a dominant position in Bumiputera finance) to learn relevant lessons for 
Fijian Holdings.
The Permodalan Berhad (PNB) and Amannah 
Sahm Nasioanale (ASN)
As early as the 1960s share reservations for the Bumiputera were introduced 
and implemented informally, but with little success. In 1964 for instance, of the 
M$15 million allocated to Bumiputera investors, only M$3.8 million was taken 
up, and of this the National Investment Company accounted for M$3.2 million 
(Jesudason 1990). To boost Bumiputera investment, the government-sponsored 
Yayasan Pelaburan Bumiputera (YPB) set up the PNB in March 1978. YPB was a 
8. Ethnicity, reform and affirmative action in Malaysia
213
trust set up in January 1978 to facilitate investment trusts for the Bumiputera. 
PNB acted as a trust corporation to buy equities and hold them in trust until 
they were resold at a later stage to the Bumiputera (Adams and Cavendish 1995: 
27). As the executive arm of the YPB, PBN was responsible for the evaluation, 
selection and purchasing of shares in public and private sector companies and 
distributed shares to individual Bumiputera through the ASN. PNB established 
the ASN in May 1979 as a subsidiary company to be responsible for administering 
and marketing a unit trust scheme for equity participation amongst Bumiputera.
Equity that was initially allocated for the Bumiputera was purchased by the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry and in 1978 the PNB was created to purchase 
shares on behalf of the Bumiputera. Under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976–80) 
the PNB received a budget of M$500 million, increasing to M$2,923 million 
under the Fourth Malaysian Plan (1981–85). The drive for Bumiputera equity 
was given impetus in 1981 when the Prime Minister, Hussein Onn, launched a 
two-stage “Scheme Transfer of Shares” to Bumiputera individuals through the 
PNB. The first stage saw the transfer of SOE shares to PNB at par value. By 
October 1986 shares for 37 companies with a par value of M$1,300 had been 
transferred to PNB and this increased to 93 companies in 1990. The next stage 
of the equity transfer involved transfer of the shares to ASN, which then issued 
par value units against the ASN share portfolio generally (Jomo 1994a).
PNB investments have been mostly of a secondary nature (redistribution 
mainly), rather than creating new assets. By March 1984 PNB had investments 
in 139 companies and 91 of these were listed on the KLSE. PNB held majority 
shares in 17 and 20% to 50% in another 17 companies, some of which were 
amongst Malaysia’s largest companies. PNB’s sector portfolio consisted of 51% 
plantations, 28% finance and 18% industrial. However, in 1981 a total of 
660 million shares worth M$1.5 billion were transferred to ASN (552 million) 
and to subsidiaries of another Bumiputera trust company, Perbadan Nasional 
Berhad (PERNAS) (108 million) for sale to employees. As Table 8.6 shows, 
since 1981,PNB/ASN had a high rate of return compared to other investment 
institutions. From 1981 to 1987, due to heavy state subsidy, the nominal rate 
of return almost doubled those of other major investment institutions. It was 
really this diverse and high return investment which Fijian Holdings based its 
investment strategy on. The idea was to invest in blue chip companies which 
would generate a high return.
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Table 8.6 Nominal rates of return by institution, 1981-1987 (%)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
PNB/ASN 20.0 18.0 18.1 17.2 17.2 10.1 10.1
Employees Provident Fund 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5
Commercial Bank Deposits 7.0 6 .5 6.0 7.5 6.0 6.0 4.0
20 year Government Securities - - - 8.6 8.6 8.6 7.6
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Equity 13.9 -18.9 40.8 -19.3 -17.3 12.8 0.5
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Equity 
(ex-dividend)
-4.6 -4.6 -3.0 -5.1 -5.5 -4.7 -4.7
Source: Adams and Cavendish 1995: 39.
ASN’s role as an equity distribution mechanism through wide marketing of 
units provided high and guaranteed returns for investors. From 1980–89 the 
dividend averaged 9.8%, with a bonus of 6.3%, which meant that the total 
return was 16.1%. This was about 10% higher than that offered by commercial 
banks. Credit was usually made readily available by banks for purchase of the 
units. In 1990 the total holding was M$6.8 million, with an average of M$2,752 
per unit holder (Emsley 1996).
While the PNB-ASN operation opened new windows of opportunity for many 
Bumiputera, the distribution of holdings has been largely unequal and in 
many instances reinforced the existing class structure within the Bumiputera 
community. Wealthy Bumiputera investors (who held as much as 25,000 to 
50,000 units) constituted only 0.6% of all unit holders, but held as much as 
approximately M$381 million worth of equity, or one third of the total equity.3 
The government’s decision to raise the investment ceiling to M$100,000 and to 
grant tax exemption for dividend income of up to M$5,000 was to the advantage 
of the rich. PNB-ASN shares were distributed on the basis of political patronage 
and cronyism and mostly benefited those who had close UMNO connections 
(Emsley 1996). A similar pattern of share distribution was seen in the case 
of Fijian Holdings, where those with close ties with the banking fraternity 
and state bureaucracy had the first chance to acquire the limited number of 
private shares. This also determined the extent of inequality of shares between 
unitholders. The major difference between PNB-ASN and Fijian Holdings was 
that the latter involved communal shareholders in the form of provinces, districts 
and village councils, compared to the former, which was based on individual 
and state unitholding. 
The PNB-ASN was directly subsidised by the government at a zero-interest 
term without any apparent repayment obligation. In 1983 the value of PNB 
investment was M$3,650 million, making a profit of M$145 million. The ASN 
3 One unit was worth M$1. Units could be purchased for as small a number as ten. The gini-coefficient put 
the distribution figure as high as 0.8. 
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profits were M$84 million out of an investment of M$1,000 million. The return 
for both investments was only 4.8%. Similarly the Fiji Government heavily 
subsidised Fijian Holdings operations through the FJ$20 million zero-interest 
loan for the “B Class” shares.
While the role of these Bumiputera financial institutions has been fundamental to 
the economy, there have also been growing concerns about their state-patronaged 
privileged positions. Their mode of operation created distortions and anomalies 
in the capital market, especially in relation to diversion of Bumiputera savings 
away from competitive investment through cross-subsidisation from other 
public resources. Through political patronage, PNB had been able to secure all 
new equity issues, which gave it a dominant role as a shareholder (Gomez 1994).
While large amounts of capital have been transferred to Bumiputera commerce, 
the 30% equity ownership target was still not met by 1990. Individual holdings 
grew substantially as a result of the ASN activities. There was a slowdown in 
equity growth after 1985, despite the tremendous growth in the early 1980s. 
Under the Fifth Malaysian Plan (1986–1990) the budget of the PNB was 
reduced and there was relaxation of the equity purchasing rules for foreigners 
and Chinese companies (Jesudason 1990). This considerably decreased the 
proportional value of equity for the Bumiputera.
Furthermore, a lot of the so-called Bumiputera equity was held by nominee 
companies, whose ethnic origins could not be identified. Nominee companies 
controlled 11.55% of the manufacturing sector’s capital stock in 1974–75, and 
this rose to 20.4% by 1983. Some of these were proxy companies which were 
used to hide the extent of the corporate wealth of politicians and political 
parties. Nominee companies were the majority shareholders in the 15 UMNO-
linked companies.
While the NEP, through the PNB-ASN secured Bumiputera equity, “the equity 
shift has been both highly skewed to the benefit of the richer Bumiputera and 
has offered only very indirect control over the corporate sector...it has acted in 
large part as an income transfer to the wealthy...” (Emsley 1996: 62). So in a way, 
the PNB-ASN system provided a false sense of ownership for the Bumiputera. 
I had made the same observation as Emsley, with regards to Fijian Holdings, 
which under the guise of indigenous business has in fact helped to consolidate 
the wealth of a few indigenous Fijians through state subsidy. The subsidy also 
extended to foreign and local non-indigenous corporations in which Fijian 
Holdings invested. But shares for ordinary indigenous Fijians were held by 
communal institutions such as the FAB, NLTB, provinces, districts and villages 
in a way that inhibited individual entrepreneurship.
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Some results of affirmative action
Affirmative action in the corporate sector helped build up a Malay middle class 
as envisaged. As shown in Table 8.7, the share capital ownership for Bumiputera 
increased steadily over the years from 1.5% in 1969 when the NEP was launched 
to 21.9% in 2008. However, Chinese shareholding has been consistent and 
between 1969 and 2008 still predominated. Indian shareholding, without the 
benefit of affirmative action, remained below 2% within the same period.       
Table 8.7 Share capital ownership (at par value) by ethnic group, 1970-
2008 (%)




1 .5 2 .4 9.2 12 .5 19.1 19.2 20.6 19.1 18.9 19.4 21.9
Chinese 22.8 27.2 n.a n.a 33 .4 45 .5 40.9 37.9 39.0 42 .4 34.9
Indians 0.9 1 .1 n.a n.a 1 .2 1.0 1 .5 1 .5 1 .2 1 .1 1 .6
Other – – – – – – – 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.1
Nominee 
companies
  2 .1 6.0 n.a n.a 1 .3 8.5 8.3 7.9 8.0 6 .6 3 .5
Locally 
controlled firms
10.1 – – – 7.2 0.3 1.0 – – – –
Foreigners 62 .1 63 .4 53 .3 42.9 26.0 25 .4 27.7 32.7 32 .5 30.1 37.9
n.a. = not available.
Notes: Par value denotes the price at which the share was first issued; Government ownership is omitted.
Source: Gomez 2009. 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 to 1998 greatly undermined the performance 
of many state-sponsored Malay entrepreneurs and conglomerates and the 
response was to re-nationalize them. Many large government-linked companies 
(GLC) re-emerged and continued to form the backbone of the Bumiputera 
corporate sector (Lee et al. 2010). Even after the exit of Mahathir in 2003, the 
new government still maintained a commitment to supporting the GLCs while 
nurturing the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through 
loans and other facilities. Part of the support was to link SMEs to large trans-
national corporations (TNCs) as a way of accessing local and foreign markets. 
Both the 2007 and 2008 national budgets encouraged companies to award 
contracts to Bumiputera vendors to encourage diversity and to develop human 
resources. Despite this, the role of the SMEs remained stagnant and did not 
show signs of the economic dynamism once envisaged (Lee et al. 2010).
One of the shortcomings of affirmative action in the corporate sector was the 
failure to reduce the involvement of the state in Bumiputera business. In 2009 
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not a single Bumiputera company was listed in the top 10 firms, although five of 
these were GLCs, three were Chinese-owned and one Indian-owned. Likewise, 
no Bumiputera company was in the top 20 firms in the industrial sector. One 
of the concerns is that, left to their own devices, Bumiputera would find it 
difficult to compete in the liberalized market. This has the potential to cause 
dissatisfaction and has potential political ramifications.
In the area of professional development, the Bumiputera have gained enormously 
compared to other ethnic groups. Table 8.8 shows that the proportion of 
Bumiputera in the various professional categories rose from 4.9% in 1970 to 
38.8% in 2005. This contrasts with the decline in the proportion of Chinese and 
Indians in the same professional categories.
 Table 8.8 Registered professionalsa by race (% of total)
Bumiputera Chinese Indian Others
1970b 4.9 61.0 23 .3 10.8
1975c 6.7 64 .1 22 .1 7.1
1980 14.9 63 .5 17.4 4 .2
1985 22 .2 61 .2 13.9 2.7
1990 29.0 55.9 13 .2 1.9
1995 33 .1 52 .4 12.9 1 .6
2000 35 .5 51 .2 12.0 1 .3
2005 38.8 48.7 10.6 1.9
a. Architects, accountants, dentists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, surveyors, veterinarians. 
b. Excludes surveyors and lawyers. 
c. Excludes surveyors.
Sources: Gomez 2009; Lee, et al. 2010. 
By and large, affirmative action has helped to advance the economic and social 
situation of many Bumiputera and many goals of the NEP had been achieved. 
For instance, poverty amongst Bumiputera had been substantially reduced from 
65% in 1970 to 3.6% in 2007 and there was growth in equity ownership from 
2.4% in 1969 to 19.4% in 2006. One of the impacts of the 2009 crisis was to 
loosen affirmative action policies and allow for greater diversity of government 
subsidy of corporations and the labour market.
Conclusion 
Malaysia’s attempt to address ethnic and socio-economic inequality has by 
some accounts been a success. It is no wonder that countries like Fiji and South 
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Africa saw it as a model to emulate. However, not all Malays benefitted: intra-
communal inequality increased and selected individuals became beneficiaries 
through state patronage.
Malaysia had some advantages in comparison with Fiji. It had a vibrant economy, 
driven by industrialization and abundant natural resources and an export-
oriented economy. Fiji’s economy did not have the same capacity and vibrancy. 
Malaysia’s NEP was also much broader in scope and incorporated a framework 
for national development including poverty alleviation and affirmative action. 
In comparison, affirmative action programs in Fiji were largely communally 
driven and were separate from the national development strategy. 
The growth and consolidation of the Malay middle class was a major affirmative 
action project but the process of achieving this was complex and fraught with 
patronage and corruption. The role of the middle class was significant because it 
was the powerhouse of national development and investment as well as having 
a role as a symbol of progress, achievement and status for the Malay people.
Affirmative action in Malaysia was a major social engineering undertaking 
which involved restructuring the economy and transforming the civil service 
and class structure with the hope of achieving peace and stability after the 
1969 riots, which still remains as the most significant political watershed in 
the Malay political consciousness. The strategy for social and political harmony 
involved experimentation with multi-party and multi-ethnic coalitions, but 
with Bumiputera political hegemony as well as affirmative action. As in Fiji, the 
politically and demographically dominant indigenous group also became the 
target group for affirmative action. 
One of the original intentions of affirmative action was the gradual withdrawal 
of state support as a precondition for greater self-reliance. This has been difficult 
to achieve as Bumiputera business had to compete on a level playing field with 
large and seasoned global corporate players. Thus it seems that state preferences 
for Malays may last some time yet.
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9. “Black empowerment” policies: 
Dilemmas of affirmative action in 
South Africa
This chapter examines some of the major dilemmas faced by affirmative action 
policies in South Africa as it attempts to transform itself into a democratic state. 
The gap between the abstract ideology of equity and the pragmatic world of 
entrenched human interests has been a major challenge in the post-apartheid 
reform process.
Apartheid was a form of pro-white affirmative action which was reversed after 
the change in government in 1994, when pro-black affirmative action became 
part of the post-apartheid reconstruction in South Africa as a remedial strategy 
to address the legal and historical exclusion of the black majority (Jeffery 2009; 
2010). Affirmative action was a mechanism for “black empowerment,” the term 
used to ensure higher levels of economic, educational, cultural and political 
attainment for previously oppressed blacks. A wide range of affirmative action 
policies were put into place to address issues relating to employment, income, 
poverty, and education and absence of equal opportunity in education.
As in Fiji and Malaysia, affirmative action has attracted considerable debate. 
Even in the 1990s concern was raised, ironically by supporters of apartheid, 
about the creation of a new “victim class” of white professionals, who, if ignored 
in favour of blacks with lesser skills could be disastrous for economic growth. 
Some, like Madona Mbatha, a black scholar, even argued that affirmative action 
was “racism in reverse,” and suggested that competence was not determined 
by colour but by individual skills and thus there should be encouragement 
of competition on a level playing field (Kemp 1992). The level playing field 
argument, often used by neo-liberals, was countered by the argument that it 
was a facade for the perpetuation of inequality. It has been suggested that the 
“truth is far worse: we are not even on the same playing field” (Sachs 1993: 107). 
The historical exclusion of blacks from ownership or active participation in the 
economic arena was deliberate and totalising; and affirmative action was seen as 
an imperative for the creation of equity and justice as provided for in the 1996 
Constitution.
For the new generation of leaders affirmative action was a necessity if the 
injustices of the past were to be addressed in order to build a more stable future. 
President Mandela himself emphasised that “the whole social programme of the 
new democratic government which we envisage for South Africa will be one of 
affirmative action” (quoted in Sadie 1995: 180). Affirmative action was deemed 
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morally justified because it is based on equity creation by way of “levelling the 
labour market.” Despite recent research that shows affirmative action may have 
led to problems such as inefficiency, patronage and corruption, affirmative action 
has led to great strides in the black community politically and economically 
(Jeffery 2009 and 2010).
Affirmative action in South Africa is often associated with the notion of “black 
empowerment”, a term which parallels the notions of Fijian interest and Malay 
privilege, except that black empowerment has a more revolutionary connotation 
which alludes to both economic redistribution and transformation of political 
power. This chapter examines a number of major affirmative action initiatives 
which were put in place to address the abject inequality and oppression 
associated with apartheid.
The chapter discusses some of the historical, economic and political aspects 
of institutionalized racial segregation in South Africa. It then examines some 
of the reform initiatives designed to support black empowerment and grow 
the economy. Of particular relevance is the interplay between the contending 
notions of growth and redistribution and how they shaped ideological and 
applied policy approaches to affirmative action. The chapter then examines the 
relationship between state patronage, privatization and the growth of the black 
middle class, followed by a discussion of successes and challenges, as well as 
the influence of the Malaysian experience on South Africa’s affirmative action 
program.
The apartheid legacy
The economy of the Cape revolved around slavery for 175 years until abolition 
in 1834. In that year, with 36,000 slaves, 59,000 colonists and 42,000 Khoikhoi 
and “bastards”, the colony’s ethnicity paralleled its socio-economic inequality. 
Slavery was the basic social relationship of production and accumulation. Even 
after slavery was abolished, inequality persisted as freed slaves later made up a 
class of skilled artisans, forming an underclass in the towns; while rural workers 
were subjected to even worse, brutal, exploitation.
Major geopolitical changes took place in the 1800s as a result of the British wars 
of conquest, in part instigated by the discovery of minerals. This led to forced 
transfer of property ownership and the creation of a new mode of production, 
resulting from the incorporation of once independent communities under British 
colonial control in the form of the Union of South Africa (Union). This process 
had profound effects on Africans: in particular, the emergence of a mission-
educated African elite and the inexorable process of black proletarianization on 
the other side of the social spectrum.
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Moreover, although mining was the major economic activity in the early years 
of the Union, over the years diversification dramatically increased and in the 
process inequality also grew in other sectors. In many respects the ideology and 
policies of the political party in power contributed to the growth of inequality. 
For instance, after the National Party came into power in 1948, deliberate policies 
for Afrikaner hegemony and ethnic exclusion were rigorously encouraged and 
practised. The real income of whites in relation to blacks in industry in the first 
five years of National Party rule rose by more than 10%, while income of blacks 
decreased by 5%. By 1960, real income of whites had increased by 30% while 
that of blacks consistently decreased annually by 5%. The large corporations 
dominated the economy and the National Party government “deliberately 
appointed National Party Afrikaners to the key positions of control in these 
corporations to ensure the advancement of apartheid” (Sonn 1993: 7). It was no 
coincidence that policies of the National Party to encourage the growth of state 
capitalism since 1948 was tantamount to promotion of Afrikaner business and 
further marginalization of black workers (Collinicos and Rogers 1977).
The inequality was quite apparent in public corporations. In 1952 about 80% 
of the employees of South African Railways and Harbours and 68% of public 
sector employees were Afrikaners. This was despite the growth in the size of the 
public sector by 50% from 1946 to 1976. In 1968 there were proportionately 
twice as many Afrikaners in the public sector than there had been in 1948. In 
1979 about 35% of economically active Afrikaners were in the public service 
and around the same time, 90% of approximately 150 key positions in the 
public sector were allocated to Afrikaners. There was undoubtedly a “direct 
link between the possession of political power and socio-economic upliftment” 
(Sonn 1993: 7).
As a result of diversification over a few decades, the South African economy 
had become “one of the most powerful and sophisticated” in the developing 
world by 1970 (Yudelman 1984: 2-3). However, this wealth was characterized 
by massive ethnic and class inequality. The period between 1970 and 1990 saw 
dramatic changes taking place, as the apartheid state slowly but reluctantly 
reformed. The pattern of income inequality remained constant from 1924 to 
1970, but a substantial process of reform took place in the 1980s. Some of these 
reforms were encouraged by the corporate sector, which was under pressure 
from international sanctions and was also beginning to realize the potential 
market represented by an emerging black middle class. This was, no doubt, a 
precursor to the pro-black affirmative action in later years.
Interestingly, by 1980 the white share in the economy had decreased to 60%, 
while that of Africans rose to 29% and this pattern continued well into the 1980s. 
This trend was largely a result of the redistribution of wage income rather than 
on fixed assets. In the same period, there was a substantial growth in the number 
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of blacks in managerial, executive, professional and entrepreneurial high-
income positions, resulting from the changing pattern of corporate culture and 
a greater access to tertiary education for blacks. While these changes facilitated 
the growth of a business and technical class, it did not alter the general trend 
and degree of poverty and unemployment. It is true that the ethnic income gap 
had narrowed, but class differentiation between whites and blacks remained 
structurally entrenched, supported by repressive laws and a white supremacist 
ideology.
One of the most overt ways of institutionalizing inequalities and white privileges 
was through direct state funding of budgetary expenditure (Maasdorp 1992). 
In 1982/83 the defence sector was allocated 13.57% of Government General 
Expenditure (GGE), increasing to 13.88% in 1987/88. Public order and safety 
expenditure in 1982/83 was 6.29% and increased to 6.89% in 1987/88 (Lundahl 
1998). Both of these expenditures were important because they played a direct 
role in maintaining the coercive apparatus of the apartheid state. Apartheid 
created inequality of “unequivocal and extreme proportions no matter what 
indicator is used” (Lundahl 1998: 26).
The stark disparities of the apartheid era in basic indicators of social well-being 
such as monthly household income, education, infant mortalities and electricity 
usage continued even after majority rule was achieved in 1994. By the time of 
liberation, the infant mortality rate for Africans was eight times greater than 
that for whites, while there was a difference in life expectancy of nearly 10 years. 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) revealed that South Africa’s child 
mortality rate (number of children per 1,000 live births who died before the age 
of 5) was 72, compared to the world-wide average of 35 (Sadie 1995: 181). In 
1994 only 10% of white households were without electricity compared to 60% 
of African homes. The National Manpower Commission (NMC) calculated that if 
the former independent homelands were included in the estimates, as many as 
66% of the total population would fall into the category of being illiterate at13 
years of age and above, instead of 46%. The high level of illiteracy amongst the 
unemployed made many of them virtually unemployable.
In 1996, two years after the elections, the poorest 20% of all income earners 
received only 1.5% of the total income, while the top 10% had 50% of the 
total income. In 1995, the poorest 20% of households received only 3% of 
all household income, while the richest 20% of households had 65%. These 
national figures need to be understood in the context of poverty being 
concentrated amongst the Africans and Coloureds, with 95% of Africans and 
33% of Coloureds being classified “poor” (South African Parliament 1998c: 1).
In a major shift, affirmative action since 1994 boosted the proportion of urban 
Africans in the top 20% income group, from 2% in 1990 to 6% in 1995 (South 
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African Parliament 1998a: 1-3). An ILO assessment in 1994 showed that public 
sector differentials in South Africa had a ratio of 25:1 from top to bottom. 
However, this was reduced to 20:1 in 1995 with the deliberate policy of freezing 
the top strata and raising the bottom strata with the target for 1999 set at 12:1. 
Attempts were made to persuade the private sector to carry out the same labour 
market reforms, although private owners took some convincing. The idea was to 
transfer highly qualified personnel from the public sector to the private sector, 
due to the compression of wage scales in the public sector.
Despite the political transformation since the 1994 election, racial capitalism, 
a legacy of apartheid, is deeply entrenched in South Africa. While there was 
political euphoria and optimism for a new South Africa, the ANC, five years 
after taking power, had to come to terms with the challenges of dismantling 
structural inequality:  
…1994 did not augur the demise of racial capitalism. The stark reality is 
that many of the social and economic inequalities brought about by racial 
capitalism are as acute as ever. South Africa’s wealth is still overwhelmingly 
concentrated in white hands, despite black empowerment, and the crisis 
of black poverty in the new South Africa is the unacceptable legacy of 
Apartheid (South African Parliament 1998a: 1). 
One of the difficulties in the process of transformation was the reconfiguration 
of the legal and political structures which supported apartheid. This is where 
South Africa differs from Fiji and Malaysia – neither of those countries had a 
minority-dominated apartheid state. For South Africa, apartheid, or separate 
development, was reinforced by draconian legislation. We examine that 
legislation next. 
‘Legalizing’ apartheid 
The apartheid system was sustained through discriminatory policies, repressive 
state coercion and deliberate segregationist laws. Even before apartheid became 
official state policy, segregation laws such as The Natives Land Act No 27 1913, 
which regulated the purchase or lease of land by blacks, and The Natives (Urban 
Areas) Act No 21 of 1923, which decreed residential segregation in urban 
areas, were already in place. Upon assuming power in 1948, the National Party 
formalized apartheid through various pieces of legislation. Social segregation 
was enforced through laws such as the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, Act 
No 55 of 1949 which made mixed marriages illegal, the Immorality Amendment 
Act, Act No 21 of 1950 (amended in 1957), which prohibited extra-marital sex 
between whites and blacks and the Population Registration Act No 30 of 1950, 
which officially classified people into distinct racial categories.
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Physical and social separation of people was reinforced through the Group Areas 
Act, Act No 41 of 1950 and in the same year the Suppression of Communism Act 
No 44 of 1950 was enacted to curb political resistance. A year later four more 
acts were passed to further institutionalize segregation. These were the Bantu 
Building Workers Act, No 27 of 1951, aimed at demarcating racially skilled 
workers; the Separate Representation of Voters Act No 46 of 1951, which led 
to the removal of coloureds from the common voters electoral roll; Prevention 
of Illegal Squatting Act, Act No 52 of 1951, which facilitated forced removal of 
blacks from public or private spaces; and the Bantu Authorities Act No 68 of 
1951 which created separate municipalities for blacks.
A number of laws were passed in succession in the next two years. These 
included the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1952, which redefined and limited 
the meaning of the black category and the Natives (Abolition of Passes and 
Co-ordination of Documents) Act No 67 of 1952, which ensured that every 
black must carry a pass at all times. These were followed by the Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, prohibiting strike action by blacks and 
the Bantu Education Act No 47 of 1953, which segregated education as well as 
prescribing an education system which largely reinforced the subordinate and 
domesticated position of blacks in society. In the same year the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act No 49 of 1953 was passed, paving the way for forced 
segregation in all public amenities, public buildings and public transport.
These laws laid the legal and political foundation for apartheid and the newly 
created apartheid constitution was revolutionary in that it totally reconfigured 
the state and legal system. Inequality was deliberately fostered by law as well as 
the repressive coercive arms of the state in the form of the police and military. 
While these apartheid laws were later removed and the state structure which 
sustained them was progressively dismantled as the transition progressed, the 
rebuilding process required a deeper process of social engineering and structural 
reconfiguration through affirmative action.
Dilemmas of post-apartheid reconstruction 
The collapse of apartheid was a result of a concerted internal and external 
struggle. For leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) it meant having 
to adjust to the new political climate and rising expectations. In its opposition 
days ANC relied fundamentally on the Freedom Charter of 1955 to provide the 
political and ideological paradigm of resistance, but by the early 1990s, as the 
prospects of democratic elections loomed, there was increasing pressure to 
devise new methods of governance for an emerging state (Myburgh 2006). This 
was a mammoth task because the post-apartheid government “has inherited 
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an insidious past of economic mismanagement, racial and social oppression, 
enormously complicated and costly bureaucratic structures, and extreme 
poverty and inequality” (Luiz 1994: 230).
One of the problems of reconstruction was how to facilitate the “trade-off 
between growth and equity” (Terreblanche 1992: 551). In addressing the 
equity question, two types of inequality needed to be focused on: “firstly, 
the (structural) inequality in the distribution of property, power, and control; 
secondly, the unequal opportunities, income, and consumption available to 
racially defined groups” (ibid: 552). At the same the economy needed to grow 
to ensure that redistribution was viable. In fact the growth versus equity 
debate had its origins in the beginning of 1990 and it sharply polarised the left 
and right of the ideological divide. On one side was the liberation discourse, 
which advocated growth through redistribution, and on the other was a more 
conservative stance, which favoured redistribution through growth. After 
1994, the ANC, the vanguard of the liberationist paradigm, managed to merge 
the two arguments together in response to the need to facilitate both the 
establishment agenda in order to embrace neo-liberalism and integration into 
the global economy, and redistributive measures such as the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) and the Economic Equity Bill (EEB). In the 
circumstances, this “mixed economy” seemed to be the most viable, but in the 
long run, “the problem is how to arrange the mix to satisfy political, social and 
economic goals” (Maasdorp 1992: 588).
This debate also saw ideological fluidity and contestation within the ANC itself. 
For instance, at the time of Nelson Mandela’s release in 1990, the ANC had 
only the Freedom Charter, a largely ideological statement of inspiration, rather 
than a concrete program of reconstruction, as a written guiding vision for the 
future. The realisation that liberation meant serious political and economic 
responsibility led to the first two workshops by the ANC and COSATU in Harare 
in 1990 and a Discussion Document on Economic Policy resulted from these. 
The main thrust of the document endorsed the central role of the state as the 
guardian of economic development. Redistribution was considered “conducive 
to growth, via a restructuring of demand leading to a creation of mass markets 
and as a way of satisfying the basic needs of the population” (Lundahl 1998: 28).
However, later the nationalisation agenda was gradually watered down and 
came to be seen only as a possible alternative in certain given circumstances. 
In 1991 there was a further shift away from the primacy of redistribution and 
in 1992 an ANC political guideline, Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for 
a Democratic South Africa was produced. This document emphasised for the 
first time the desirability of a mixed economy and the importance of the private 
sector. However, at the same time a research document in 1993 by the ANC-
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aligned academic network called the Macroeconomic Research Group (NERG) 
raised important questions of equity and redistribution which became the basis 
of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the ANC.
The Reconstruction and Development 
Programme
The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was one of the very 
first affirmative action and re-distributive policies of the post-apartheid state. 
It promised to provide ten years of compulsory education for everybody; the 
building of at least one million low-cost houses in the next five years; provision 
of electricity for an additional 2.5 million households by the year 2000; clean 
water and adequate sanitation for everybody; improved and affordable health, 
particularly preventive and primary health care for all; and land distribution 
to the landless. Based on the Malaysian NEP principles, these were ambitious 
provisions which were to rely heavily on spin-offs from economic growth.
However, the RDP was confronted with a series of challenges, which led to 
the closure of its office in 1996, after just two years of operation, thus “raising 
serious questions about the future of development and the government’s 
commitment to it” (Caliguire 1996: 5). Although the RDP Office was closed, 
RDP as a reconstruction program continued and its programmatic and strategic 
aspects were shifted to the office of then Deputy President Thambo Mbeki, 
where reassignment of responsibilities to the line departments was to take place. 
The dismantling of the RDP office itself was politically symbolic in the sense 
that it “indicates that economic growth, rather than redistribution, has won the 
day as the national primary tool for change” (Caliguire 1996: 20).
RDP did not have the institutional capacity for management and disbursement 
of funds. For instance, 2.5 billion rand were budgeted for 1994-95 and this 
was expected to increase in 1998-99, but 1.7 billion rand was unused and had 
to be carried over to 1995-96 (Lundahl 1998). From the beginning, there was 
confusion as to who was in charge of the RDP budget, the RDP office or the 
Ministry of Finance.
On other fronts, provision of houses, health and education facilities was 
frustratingly cumbersome and slow. Of 400,000 houses, which were to be built 
within a two-year period (1994-96), only 15,000 were built (Caliguire 1996). 
These problems were mostly associated with the budgetary process, resistance 
and a lack of commitment in the state bureaucracy, lack of support by civil 
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society organizations and lack of support by the private financial sector for 
government policies such as extending loans to low-income blacks, for example 
(Michie and Padayachee 1997: 18-19).
RDP projects were to be carried out in co-operation with civil groups and local 
government. However, despite the democratised implementation process, it 
was revealed that RDP would be costly to implement, especially when public 
investment in infrastructure would have to be increased by at least 21 % per 
annum. Furthermore, RDP operations came into conflict with existing line 
departments, which argued that their portfolios were taken over or duplicated 
by RDP. There were also persistent allegations of corruption, which led to the 
collapse of some RDP social and physical infrastructural projects, the President’s 
R500 million feeding scheme being one of them (South Scan, 18 September 1995).
Probably the most successful RDP project in the 1990s related to the supply 
of electricity. More than 300,000 new household connections per annum were 
achieved by the state corporation, ESCOM (Fine and Stoneman 1996: 27). 
Substantial progress was also achieved in the provision of water: towards the 
end of 1995 some 300 projects taking water to 4 million people were scheduled 
for completion within 18 months (Financial Times, 21 November 1995).
Neo-liberalism and affirmative action
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy, (GEAR) of 2006 largely 
reflected the incorporation of neo-liberal policies into the South African 
development strategy (Fitzgerald, McLennan and Munslow 1997: 49). In 
implementing GEAR South Africa was mindful of its obligations to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), which it joined in 1993, while at the same time it 
was conscious of its political and moral obligation to redistribution. GEAR 
aimed to create almost 1.5 million jobs over five years, as well as to promote 
competitiveness through trade liberalisation and productivity measures, to 
support direct investment and export orientation, to enhance the social and 
economic infrastructure through partnership with the private sector and 
improved flexibility in the labour market (Cargill 1996). GEAR’s fiscal policy was 
aimed at reducing the deficit by half over a period of six years, while no direct 
intervention in monetary policy was envisaged. The entire budget process for 
1996 and 1997 was committed to reducing deficit, with a target of 4% (Gelb 
1997: 4).
GEAR did not adequately address the issue of job creation, which relied heavily 
on infrastructural and public works programs. To create 400,000 jobs, a 6% 
growth rate was needed; but this could be achieved only if fixed investment 
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increased 19% to 24% of GDP. Investment needed funding from savings by 
government, and from the private sector and foreign investors. These were not 
easy to attract.
Meanwhile, frustrations within the ANC hierarchy over GEAR increased, as 
there was a strong feeling that focus on growth had undermined the principles 
of equity and redistribution (Cargill 1996). At the same time, there was a belief 
that GEAR should fund RDR, but due to the low growth rate (minus 2.2% in 
1992; 1.3% in 1993; 2.7% in 1994 and 3.3% in 1995) this expectation seemed 
to ring hollow. This was a huge contrast to events in Malaysia, where a growth 
rate of almost 10% in the 1980s provided the necessary resources for the NEP. 
For South Africa, the “growth before redistribution” neo-liberal transformation 
has been in part stimulated by multilateral intervention by the WTO and IMF.
ANC’s shift towards the “Washington consensus” caused fractures within the 
democratic alliance. For instance, two major pillars of the alliance, the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) criticised the ANC-dominated government for “yielding to 
World Bank pressure on privatisation and the reduction of trade tariffs” (Star, 
4 July 1995). The ANC government was in a difficult situation and, given the 
economic realities, it had to reposition itself to address the looming crisis. One 
way of doing this was to redefine its strategic alliances to include an enlarged 
circle of players: the emerging black middle class, certain sections of the 
white entrepreneurial class (with whom the ANC had a love-hate relationship) 
and global multilateral capital. To consolidate this partnership, the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was established as part 
of the corporatist strategy of the government to engage business, labour and the 
community in dialogue and to negotiate policy on the economy and social equity. 
In addition, the National Empowerment Consortium (NEC) and New Africa 
Investments Ltd (NAIL), which were based on the Malaysian Bumiputera trust 
companies, were set up to facilitate the black empowerment policy (Kallaway 
1997: 38).
The building of this mainstream alliance tested the democratic provisions and 
resilience of the constitution because it marginalized extreme politics. The 
excluded political forces included the white right, consisting of the Afrikaner 
Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) and the Freedom Front (FF) and the black radical 
groups such as the Pan African Congress (PAC), the Azanian People’s Organisation 
(AZAPO) and the Black Consciousness Movement in general.
Interestingly, the neo-liberal reforms benefited the emerging black business class 
through a carefully orchestrated mix of liberalisation policies and affirmative 
action. An example of this was the preferential award of privatised utilities’ 
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contracts to black companies. While redistribution and poverty alleviation was 
foremost in the minds of the political elites, there was also a strong belief that 
building a strong black middle class was imperative for the country’s prosperity.
Transformation in the labour market: The 
Employment Equity Act (EEA)
The Employment Equity Act (EEA) of 1999 was intended to address the specific 
question of equal opportunities and preferential employment of blacks in the 
labour market. Section 5 (1) prohibited discrimination in employment on the 
grounds of “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth.” Apart from 
targeting employment, the EEA also had implications for black business because 
it aimed to absorb more blacks into the private sector, where there would be 
increased chances of directly participating in entrepreneurship. Blacks were 
fast-tracked to managerial positions so that they could launch their own business 
careers. The EEA also made businesses more accountable to state regulation, 
thus ensuring that competition took place within the framework of employment 
equity. There was an expectation that EEA would generally encourage inter-
ethnic integration in the labour force.
The concept of EEA was a revolutionary one in that it linked employment 
equity to the democratization of the workplace, worker training, recruitment, 
and promotion and worker empowerment through collective bargaining. The 
challenge was to transform the racially based and authoritarian nature of the 
apartheid workplace into a more democratic one which recognized the racial 
equality of all workers. The EEA also identified blacks, women and the disabled 
as designated groups who needed to be empowered through a two-pronged 
approach: firstly, the creation of employment audit or analysis by employers 
to publish the profile of their entire workforce; and secondly, the creation of 
an employment plan by employers which, in consultation with the workforce, 
would outline the targets for employment equity within a one- to five-year 
period. The plan was to be submitted to government, monitored and reported 
on regularly and appropriate sanctions were imposed for breach of these 
provisions. At the state advisory level the EEA established the Commission for 
Employment Equity (CEE) to provide advice and strategic directions for the 
Minister.
However, despite these preferential provisions, the EEA made certain concessions 
and included delicate balancing which proved to be problematic. For instance, 
there was provision for both state regulation and self-regulation by employers 
and employees. In addition, there was provision for both rigid targets and 
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negotiated targets. State regulation through the quota system tended to benefit 
a small group of individuals who were thrust into management positions in 
what was perceived to be mere tokenism. At the same time, imposing targets 
from above did not take into account the actual problems of industries and 
individual enterprises and had the potential to undermine the collective process 
of workplace transformation and the workplace empowering process of labour 
generally.
However, on the other hand, abandonment of state intervention in favour of 
“self-regulation” proved to be counter-productive, as there were no incentives 
for companies to implement affirmative action nor disincentive to not implement 
it. Many private enterprises did not have the political commitment to implement 
what they perceived as something outside their narrow business interests and 
there was resistance to the EEA by white employers.
There was a fear amongst the labour unions that the EEA had the potential to 
reinforce employer hegemony by providing that “a designated employer must 
take reasonable steps to consult and attempt to reach agreement", especially 
when it has been established that the “burden of proof is placed on the employer 
... and that the employer has to justify any action that might be considered 
unfair discrimination” (South African Parliament 1998c). The response to this 
provision by COSATU was one of reserved suspicion because of the fear that 
employers were going to drive, and ultimately decide, the employment equity 
plans and outcomes. This was deemed inconsistent with the principle of a labour 
market democratized through collective bargaining.
Conservative white critics argued that the EEA would re-racialize South Africa, 
lower standards, introduce unfair quotas, encourage rigidity in the work place 
and put an unsound economic burden on business. The Government rejected 
these criticisms, saying that opponents of the EEA were misled by self-interest 
and were bent on conspiring to “create fear and insecurity by attacking 
affirmative action aspects of the EEA” (South African Parliament 1998c).
State patronage, privatization and black 
empowerment
One of the major lessons which South Africa leant from Malaysia was the complex 
art of finely balancing the paradoxical interface between state intervention 
and control on the one hand and liberalization and privatization on the other. 
The interplay between neo-liberalism and state interventionism helped build a 
huge and vibrant Malay middle class, which provided the inspiration for South 
Africa’s move towards the dual system of growth and redistribution. A more 
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regulated form of capitalism was needed to build up and expand a black middle 
class which would not only provide a lucrative market and professional skills, 
but also act as a visible political symbol of liberation and empowerment.
The ‘hows’ of privatisation were outlined in the 1995 Discussion Document by the 
Government of National Unity on the Consultative Implementation Framework 
for the Restructuring of the State Assets, which attempted to deal with the 
complex question of privatising government assets worth between R30 billion 
and R120 billion. Five key areas of concern in the privatisation debate were 
identified. These related to meeting RDP goals, including black empowerment; 
addressing trade union concerns related to debt and interest payment relief; 
preventing big business domination; mobilising local and foreign capital; and 
improving managerial efficiency. Initially, there was a fear that privatised state 
assets would end up with white-dominated conglomerates and privatised para-
statals. That would not be in the best interest of the rural and urban poor and 
would undermine the re-distributive and developmental aims of the RDP and 
the ideological thrust of the ANC.
However, there was a strong argument that privatisation could in fact be an ideal 
vehicle for affirmative action and black empowerment by ensuring preferential 
black shareholding of privatised enterprises and by allowing black professionals 
to fully participate in the privatisation process (Thomas 1995). There was 
growing pressure from the emerging African middle class for a greater share 
in privatisation assets and, in response, by 1997 the government had already 
earmarked 10% of the para-statal telecommunication company TELKOM for 
black empowerment groups (Adam, van Zyl Slabbert and Moodley l997: 217).
The group which was most sceptical about privatisation was COSATU, which was 
angered by the government’s privatization of crucial areas of the public service. 
There was fear that job rationalisation and tougher labour relations would hit 
the unskilled and poor hardest. The other faction of COSATU, especially those 
who had benefited from the new alliance with the white corporations, argued 
that privatisation would be a “golden opportunity to establish participatory 
management and more enlightened labour relations” (Thomas 1995: 6).
Pressure had been mounting from multilateral institutions, private corporations 
and groups within the government to speed up the privatisation process because 
of escalating public debt and the need for growth. Accumulated debt has been 
blamed on the “irresponsible spending” of the apartheid regime (South African 
Parliament 1998b: 2). Foreign debt made up 2.2% of GDP in 1996, while domestic 
debt was 56.0% of GDP. South Africa needed to spend 6.5% of its GDP to pay 
for interest on these debts. Around R39, 643 billion was spent on servicing the 
Politics of preferential development
232
interest alone. Growth in the 1990s was slow but steady. The economy grew by 
3.1% in 1996, the fourth consecutive year of growth, but the general picture of 
the economy was still one of mixed fortunes.
To enhance growth and support black empowerment, reform in strategic areas 
of the economy was critical. The provisions for reform included an increase in 
funding for industrial development and research and technology, from R454 
million to R604 million; setting up of a new Competitive Fund and sectoral 
partnership facility to enable firms and organisations to draw on consultant 
advice in advancing competitiveness; and creating a new short-term Export 
Finance Guarantee Scheme for small and medium-sized firms.
The impact of neo-liberal policies on affirmative action was quite direct. The 
African bourgeoisie or “1iberation aristocrats”, as Adam et al. (1997) called 
them, were the most direct beneficiaries of the privatised assets. Some of them 
were independent entrepreneurs while a sizeable number were “black” fronts 
for white companies (or “Ali Baba” companies as the Malaysians called them). An 
emerging trend was the consolidation of entrepreneurial links between the white 
and the black middle class. Often blacks were used as token representatives to 
enable white-run companies to acquire privatized assets. Recruitment of blacks 
into the managerial ranks of white corporations was found to be advantageous 
“both for a progressive public relations image and the utilisation of an additional 
pool of talent, but above all for the advantages black management bestows in 
marketing to a fast growing black consumer market and establishing linkages 
with government for state contracts” (Adam et al. 1997: 210). By 1997, just three 
years after the ascendancy of the ANC, black conglomerates controlled 10% of 
market capitalisation in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). A powerful 
and wealthy black middle class, increasingly isolated from its original political 
base, and progressively identified with the corporate status quo had firmly 
consolidated itself.
While there was a phenomenal rise in a black middle class which benefitted 
from privatisation and preferential policies, there was also a growing mass of 
poverty-stricken citizens, which posed a direct challenge to the new political 
order. A lot of the poor were recent arrivals from the countryside and did 
not have any formal employment whatsoever. This underclass was not being 
addressed adequately by the EEB because of its primary focus on the formal 
sector. That worsened the socio-economic inequality and led to an escalation of 
violent crime.
The situation was made more critical by the loss of jobs as a result of privatization. 
GEAR’s aim of creating 1.5 million jobs within five years was mocked by the 
actual net loss of 80,000 jobs emanating from GEAR’s own privatization policies. 
Although 11,000 posts were reserved for affirmative action candidates in the 
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public service in 1994, the cost-cutting rationalisation process led to a net 
loss of jobs. This trend continued, even after the government’s White Paper 
on Transformation of the Public Service (1996), which identified a number of 
relevant policy areas such as the introduction of a minimum wage, equal pay for 
equal work value, reduction in differentials, development of appropriate career 
paths, occupational transformation and improvement of conditions for women 
and the disabled. 
Meanwhile, privatization continued to help the black middle class to expand into 
diverse sectors of the economy, classified by Iheduru (1998) into seven categories: 
(a) holding/listed companies, or what white stockbrokers derogatorily referred 
to as “black chips;” (b) potential listed companies; (c) portfolio investment 
trusts; (d) professional women investors; (e) micro and small enterprises (MSE) 
ranging from registered unlisted companies to “closed corporations” to sole 
proprietorships and partnerships; (f) the informal sector, where the majority of 
black entrepreneurs operated; (g) political business entrepreneurs. The majority 
of black businesses were MSE, which numbered one million, or informal sector 
businesses, with a total of 2.5 million: but because they were so small and had 
few resources they had to struggle hard to survive. On the other hand, the 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) were the most 
prominent in terms of the publicity they received. Although only eight black-
owned companies were listed on the JSE in July 1997, this number increased 
steadily over the years.
It is worth noting that the development of the black entrepreneurial class had its 
roots in the 1960s, when a number of black business organisations were formed. 
The first was the Greater Soweto Chamber of Commerce and Industries (GSCCI), 
from which the National African Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC) emerged, 
and others followed. Membership of these business organisations varied from 
300,000 to 400,000 in the case of the Foundation for African Business and 
Consumer Services (FABCOS) to 40, as in the case of the Western Cape Black 
Builders’ Association (WCBA) (Sidiropoulos 1994). FABCOS and NAFCOC were 
in fact umbrella organisations, to which other small organisations were affiliated. 
The leaders of these organisations were closely linked to the ANC leadership 
and were part of the emerging middle class discussed earlier.
NAFCOC’s affirmative action plan, accepted during the 1990 annual conference, 
provided for the following targets for corporate changes by the year 2000: (a) 30% 
of all board members of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) should be black; (b) 40% of all shares on the JSE should be black-owned; 
(c) 50% of the value of all outside purchases by the companies listed on the JSE 
should come from black suppliers; (d) 60% of top management in JSE-listed 
companies should be black (Nkuhlu 1993: 16). FABCOS’s membership comprised 
individuals from different political parties such as ANC, Azanian People’s 
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Organisation, Inkatha Freedom Party and Pan-Africanist Congress. It was set up 
primarily to negotiate with the government for the removal of all discriminatory 
laws and policies; ensuring the establishment of independent companies and 
institutions for the purpose of fostering black economic advancement; and 
raising awareness about the need to extend the free enterprise system to the 
black community. Both NAFCOC and FABCOS have been criticised for being 
too undemocratic, “top heavy”, and based on “petty hierarchies” dominated 
by clique loyalties (Sidiropoulus 1994). Despite their own conflicts, their new- 
found power in the form of their alliance with the ANC and membership of 
the National Economic Forum (NEF) provided them with the necessary political 
legitimacy.
The proliferation of black entrepreneurship was encouraged by the lifting of 
various restrictions which once prohibited black participation in business. An 
example was the abolition of the Group Areas Act, which had prohibited black 
businesses from operating in white areas and vice versa. Paradoxically, during 
the apartheid era, the state poured money into black business, principally for 
the purpose of building a large black middle class that would become a willing 
ally of the apartheid state and to overshadow the radicalised urban political and 
youth leadership (Iheduru 1998). Black business was also boosted after many 
official restrictions on business ownership by blacks disappeared by the 1980s 
and by the removal of many of the pillars of apartheid by President F.W. de 
Klerk, facilitated by the passage of the Abolition of Racially Based Measures Act 
of 1991.
Many black businesses were voluntarily integrated with white companies and 
black businessmen quickly developed corporate skills in acquisition, equity 
purchase and takeovers in respect of dozens of existing white and black 
businesses in the areas of banking, insurance and other financial services, 
transportation, construction, print and electronic media, tourism, health care 
and manufacturing. Some black businessmen also formed close links with African 
and American diplomats, politicians, sports and entertainment superstars, 
business people and legal luminaries and broadened their shareholdings in the 
process.
The potential listed enterprises, which were mostly founded in the 1990s, 
were the fastest growing black holding companies. Their interests ranged from 
financial services, tourism and aviation, entertainment and leisure to industrial 
holdings in catering services, computers, educational publishing, properties, 
and printing (SouthScan, 16 June 1995). A number of the founders and directors 
of these companies were ex-guerrillas and former anti-apartheid activists who 
later forged ties with mainstream white business. 
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Black entrepreneurs consolidated their interests with ease. For instance, in 1991 
blacks occupied only 30 (less than 2%) of the 2,550 directorships available in 
the top 100 companies listed on the JSE. This number increased to 120 in 1993 
and by May 1995 black males held 276 directorships. This accelerated growth 
was accompanied by a debate about “integration” and “parallelism.” Should 
black business integrate with white business or maintain a separate identity? 
Economic pragmatism and political imperatives dictated that there should be 
increasing integration to boost the national economy as well as to provide black 
entrepreneurs with the skills and resources they needed. Integration rather 
than isolation was critical for black empowerment. 
Results and challenges of black empowerment 
The optimism of the early years of affirmative action after 1994 could not be 
matched by the complex realities. Some of the targets were met while some were 
not. For instance, in 2008, despite attempts to improve the level of education 
to match the demand for blacks to enter the higher levels of management, only 
about 379,000 Africans, or 1.8% of the African population, had completed 
higher education (Jeffery 2010). Despite this shortcoming, a concerted effort to 
achieve the aims of black empowerment led to accelerated transformation of the 
labour market. By 2008 blacks, who made up 74% of the economically active 
population, were well represented in public sector management positions, where 
they held 76.41% of the total public service positions compared to 11.31% 
for whites, 3.2% for Asians and 8.74% for coloureds. For senior management 
positions, blacks made up 57.31%, compared to 26.87% for whites, 7.81% for 
Asian and 7.59% for coloureds (Business Day, 11 February 2008). 
The original target for black managers in the public service was 50%, but this 
was increased to 75% in 2003, to be achieved by March 2005. Of these, 30% 
were to be women. By 2005 these targets had been more or less achieved, with 
blacks accounting for 70% of senior management posts, 29% of whom were 
women (President Thabo Mbeki, State of the Nation address to Parliament, 
February 2006). This provided the platform for ambitiously increasing the 
target for women to 50%. However, part of the problem was that, while there 
was intense political will for the empowerment of blacks and women, the level 
of education and skills in the target population could not match up and this led 
to a failure to meet targets (Jeffery 2010).
The proportion of blacks in the civil service varied from department to 
department. For instance, in 2009 more than 80% of the top posts in the 
Department of Home Affairs, Department of Science and Technology and the 
Independent Complaints Directorate of the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
Politics of preferential development
236
were held by blacks. This was a comparatively high proportion, given the fact 
that blacks made up 79% of the population and 74% of the economically active 
population (Business Report, 9 April 2010).
The impact of affirmative action in the corporate sector has also been significant. 
In September 2009 black executives held an estimated 25% of senior management 
positions, a major increase compared to 5% in 1994. Nevertheless, this was still 
a long way from the initial target and only a slight increase compared to 22% 
in 2004. The inability to reach the target was due to a skills’ shortage, lack 
of suitably qualified black executives and “job hopping” by affirmative action 
appointees who tended to change jobs due to “attraction premiums” paid to 
affirmative action appointments (P-E Corporate Services (SA) Pty Ltd 2009). 
Also, in 2009, about 32% of middle management positions were held by blacks 
compared to 7% in 1994. Once again there was only a modest increase since 
2004, when blacks held 28% of middle management positions. This was far 
below the government targets. At the same time, the proportion of blacks at the 
lower management level increased from 26% in 1994 to 55% in 2009. This was 
a rather slow increase given the 49% level in 2004 (P-E Corporate Services Pty 
Ltd (SA) 2009).
The emphasis on black employment equity targets meant that businesses 
had to configure their employment structure in a pro-active way. The targets 
included 60% for senior management within a ten-year period and 80% for 
junior management, also within 10 years. This is a big ask, given the fact that 
less than 17% of Africans are of senior managerial level age (40 to 64 years) and 
only 1.8% of them hold degrees. In 2006 blacks with degrees made up 28% 
of legislators, senior officials and managers and 41% of professionals. This is 
an indication that skilled blacks were already established in certain positions 
(Jeffery 2010).
A survey by the Unilever Institute at the University of Cape Town showed that 
the black employment equity strategy has helped consolidate a “black diamond” 
class, which in 2007 was estimated to number about 2.6 million, with a spending 
power of R180 billion. Within a year the black diamond class had grown to 3 
million people, with an increased spending power of R250 billion. This analysis 
was based on the definition of middle class as those, including civil servants, 
earning at least R5,000 a month. This definition has been criticized for being too 
broad. The alternative definition, which puts the required income at R16,700 a 
month, yields a much lower figure of 322,000 “core” black middle class in 2004 
(15% of total core middle class); 454,000 in 2007 (20% of total core middle class) 
and 788,000 in 2009 (31% of total core middle class) (Jeffery 2010). 
It has been argued that affirmative action has been used by the ruling ANC as a 
tool for hegemony. One such case refers to the “cadre deployment” program, in 
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which ANC supporters were assigned headship positions in local government, 
government institutions and other areas of political significance as a way of 
overseeing the operations of those organisations and linking up to the central 
state apparatus. This has led to cronyism and has undermined efficiency in 
governance and productivity. It also contradicted Section 197 of the Constitution, 
which made illegal favouring or prejudicing a person “because that person 
supports a particular political party or cause,” an argument supported by a 
recent High Court decision in the Eastern Cape (ConsWatch 2008: 1–3).
While cadre deployment was categorized as an affirmative action program, it 
was seen by political opponents of ANC as a political instrument of control. As 
the leader of the Democratic Alliance, Helen Zille, argued: 
Cadre deployment went undetected for what it was for so long because 
it was disguised by the fig leaf of affirmative action. Now, more and 
more South Africans are beginning to see the policy for what it really is: 
a means to centralise power, accumulate wealth corruptly, and subvert 
the Constitution (Zille 2009: 1). 
ANC’s attempt to control the public service and different levels of governance 
and the drive to create a black middle class has created distortions within 
the economy and greater society. Many unqualified people are being thrust 
into senior positions and as a result there has been visible degradation of the 
standard and quality of service, infrastructure and neglect of the lower end of 
society. About 19.65 million people are still in poverty and subsist on an average 
of about R3,000 a month for a household of eight members or more. About half 
of the youths between the ages of 15 and 24 are unemployed and this has helped 
to escalate the problem of crime and violence. Crippling poverty, inadequate 
education, high crime rate and the HIV/AIDS crisis have all given the ANC 
heightened challenges.
A further problem is the issue of the foreign labourers who have been 
attracted to South Africa since the early 1900s. Initially most of them were 
from Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; over the years 
workers have come from other countries. In 1971 there were about half a million 
foreign workers in South Africa, more than double since the first decade of 1900 
(Prothero 1974). This grew over time as the South African economy prospered, 
attracting both skilled and unskilled foreign workers. Some employers gave 
preference to skilled foreign workers over locals and this caused considerable 
opposition, which led to racial violence.
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The Malaysian connection
South Africa imported the celebrated “Asian Renaissance”, to use Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed’s term, to provide inspiration for what 
former president Thambo Mbeki referred to as an “African Renaissance.” The 
new South African leaders saw in Malaysia a vision for what they wanted: 
economic growth and economic empowerment of the indigenous population 
(Hyslop 1997). Mbeki’s political adviser reinforced this thinking, stating that, 
“The advent of the East Asian Economic miracle is one of the most important 
socio-economic developments of the 20th century…This miracle has offered 
hope to the people of Africa that economic development can be rapid” (Sunday 
Independent, 15 June 1997).
After 1994 Malaysia became the fastest growing source of investment in South 
Africa within a short time. Malaysian companies initially invested in hotels and 
in the leisure and tourism fields and later expanded into investment in petrol, 
telecommunications, baking and stock brokering. The cumulative effect was 
that South Africa increasingly came under considerable Malaysian influence 
(Hyslop 1997). During his 1996 visit to Malaysia, Mandela praised Malaysian 
affirmative action for overcoming the legacy of colonialism and poverty and the 
economic policies which made economic development possible; and suggested 
that South Africa had a lot to learn from Malaysia in the areas of training and 
technology, in creating an investment climate, in privatisation and in affirmative 
action (Gopher://gopher.anc.or.za, 7 March 1997). The Bumiputera middle 
class inspired the ANC to focus its attention on building a black middle class 
within the shortest possible time. Stell Sigacau, the Minister responsible for the 
privatisation of public industries, suggested that South Africa must emulate 
the Malaysian affirmative action target of 40% of Bumiputera ownership of the 
economy in 20years and suggested that 40% of the South African economy 
should be in black hands by the year 2000 (Business Day, 9 May 1995).
South Africa’s incorporation into the “the globalisation of Bumiputeraism” has 
been described by Hyslop as “almost hegemonic:”
The Malaysian intervention in South Africa has involved the export 
of not only economic but also socio-political organization. Some South 
African business ventures have become incorporated into the structure 
of Malaysian business empires. Forms of economic indigenisation have 
not only been copied from Malaysia, but also undertaken in co-operation 
with Malaysian companies. Malaysian companies have become entangled 
with South African patronage networks (Hyslop 1997: 16). 
A number of so-called “empowerment partnerships” between Malaysian and 
black entrepreneurs were entered into. The formation of the Black Economic 
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Empowerment Commission (BEECom) in 1998 as the powerhouse for the creation 
of a black middle class through direct state intervention was based on the 
Malaysian NEP. The links between the emerging South African and Malaysian 
middle classes have been consolidated over the years through joint investments 
and the formation of business and friendship societies.
A National Empowerment Trust (NET) was also set up to facilitate this 
partnership. Among its projects was the development of a new bank and a 
shipping line, in co-operation with Malaysian concerns. Although a number 
of deals relating to awards of contracts by both sides were based on cronyism, 
this was seen as important in growing and consolidating transnational alliances 
between the Bumiputera and black middle classes. 
Conclusion 
Affirmative action in South Africa involves a major social engineering project 
aimed at reconfiguring the political power structure and the economy and 
transforming society at different levels to meet high expectations locally as 
well as internationally. While the political triumph of Mandela and the ANC 
over white minority rule is an epic moment in world history, the actual process 
of transformation to ensure black empowerment continues to be a momentous 
challenge as poverty continues to increase and crime reaches record high levels. 
Although affirmative action has transformed the political and economic face of 
the once-apartheid state, it has not been the awaited saviour for many poor and 
marginalized citizens.
Indeed, there is pressure to withdraw some preferential policies. However, 
the ruling ANC is not in a position to turn the clock back, because affirmative 
action has served a very important political function in consolidating ANC 
power and hegemony. The challenge is to devise ways and means to address the 
rising poverty, inequality and crime. The ideology of a people’s democracy and 
multiculturalism has been politically unifying but the hard realities of economics 
means that constant adjustments and negotiations between contending positions 
need to continue in order to look for a consensus. Consensus is becoming 
increasingly difficult because of the continuing political differences within the 
country.
Nevertheless, by and large the strides made for blacks have been momentous, as 
can be seen in the public service and corporate sector, where the initial targets 
have been achieved. However, the political imperative to achieve equity is often 
complicated and at times is undermined by the lack of higher education and 
expertise amongst blacks. The fact that politically defined objectives and targets 
have to be achieved means that compromises have to be made and, at times, 
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quota fulfilment takes precedence over quality. This has led to deterioration in 
the area of services and infrastructure and provoked criticisms of patronage, 
corruption and inefficiency. However, the push for dramatic transformation 
of the system is inevitable, given the high expectations driven by the mass 
euphoria of the post-apartheid era. Nurturing and consolidating a black middle 
class is a desirable political tactic to assimilate and appease disgruntled and 
potentially disruptive educated blacks and intelligentsia, thus lessening the 
prospect of intra-communal tension and instability.
Unlike Fiji and Malaysia, where affirmative action has more or less reached 
saturation point, in South Africa, despite continuing problems, there is still 
political demand for more affirmative action. The rise in poverty and crime 
means that a more substantive focus should be placed on addressing the plight 
of the poor, rather than just focusing on empowering the black middle class. 
The dilemma is how to create a balanced affirmative action paradigm which 
addresses the divergent interests of opposite ends of the social spectrum.
241
10. Trans-global affirmative action: 
Some critical lessons
We need to learn broader and deeper implications and critical lessons from the 
trans-global study of affirmative action in Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa. No 
doubt it provides an insight into diverse experiences of different countries, 
which nevertheless may be using the same affirmative action template.
Although countries may be using the same affirmative action framework, 
justification and philosophy, the local political, economic and socio-cultural 
conditions do matter in determining the final outcome of preferential programs. 
The preferential policy templates are often reconfigured to suit local circumstances 
and interests. This is usually the prerogative of local elites in power. In ethnically 
divided societies, different political parties can use affirmative action programs 
as short-term leverage for ethnic and political mobilization as well as using them 
as a long-term mechanism for institutionalized ethno-nationalist appeal.
The role of the elites needs to be emphasised here because of the dual role they 
play in being communal elites as well as state elites. As communal elites they 
are able to use cultural appeal to mobilize support within their community; 
and as state elites they are able to make use of the powerful state machinery 
and resources to further consolidate the political power of their respective 
communities. They are thus placed strategically to act as ethnic entrepreneurs 
in rallying their own ethnic group against the other or, when the circumstances 
demand, in assuming the role of trans-ethnic national leaders. Ethnic elites often 
negotiate these two seemingly opposing roles amidst multiple oppositions from 
opposing ethnic elites, more ‘liberal’ members of their own communities, civil 
society organizations, intelligentsia, and international organizations concerned 
with human rights, equity and justice.
As the case studies have shown, consolidation of state control and power by ethnic 
elites is often more complex than it seems. A critical aspect here is the formation 
of complex patronage systems consisting of co-option of strategically located 
players such as businessmen (both indigenous and non-indigenous), political 
party leaders, local community leaders and others considered significant. The 
patronage system has its own power dynamics and accountability is usually to 
itself. This may change from time to time as new political parties come to power, 
as in the case of Fiji. For easy and ready access to the benefits of affirmative 
action, being associated somehow with the patronage system does help. The 
patronage system may lead to institutionalized and entrenched hegemony of 
the ruling elites as well as to abuse of power and corruption. Consequently, the 
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classical notion of the state as an independent arbiter of competing interests 
is seriously compromised and thus needs to be redefined. The cases of Fiji, 
Malaysia and South Africa clearly demonstrate these dynamic tendencies.
Another significant issue in relation to the patronage system is how the 
notion of merit as a means of social mobility is being redefined. The system of 
meritocracy, which is often associated with fairness and equal opportunity, is 
subject to reinterpretation based on one’s contribution – monetary, political or 
professional – to the party hierarchy. Disbursement of affirmative action benefits 
can be used as payoff for political loyalty.
The concentration of resources within an elite group associated with the 
patronage system contributes directly to intra-communal inequality. This is a 
serious consequence of politically driven preferential policies. It reflects the 
skewed allocation of resources in favour of those who least deserve assistance. 
This raises the moral issue of justice and its paradoxical usage. Affirmative 
action is used as a means of achieving equality and justice, yet in the process, 
it leads to inequality and denial of justice for the less fortunate members of the 
community. This is a fundamental contradiction the three case studies share.
In an era in which neoliberal development policies predominate, affirmative 
action is often seen as a distortion of economic strategies because it is not 
based on growth-based outcomes. Perhaps the real picture is more complex and 
involves a mixture of both preferential access to shares and investment of these 
shares for growth. However, the environment for growth is carefully nurtured 
and supervised by the state rather than being dictated solely by the market. 
This ensures the development and consolidation of the indigenous middle class.
As the three case studies have shown, the development of an indigenous middle 
class is in itself a major social engineering undertaking. This is not always 
recognized because of the tendency to focus on the specific policy prescriptions 
of affirmative action rather than the broader structural dimension. The ensuing 
structural transformation involves reshaping the relationship between class and 
ethnicity in a way which reverses the old order in favour of the designated 
group. While there is usually a time frame for the changes to take place, this is 
often ignored because of ever-emerging factors which demand the continuation 
of affirmative programs.
We need to be mindful all the time of the differences between majority-based 
and minority-based affirmative action models because of the different political 
dynamics they represent. The affirmative action models used by Fiji, Malaysia 
and South Africa are majority-based – the designated group is also politically 
and demographically dominant. This is in contrast to minority-based models 
as in the United States and New Zealand, where the designated group is also 
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politically and demographically a minority. Affirmative action programs in 
the United States were put in place as a means to redress its racially turbulent 
history, characterized by slavery and institutionalized racial discrimination. It 
is meant to provide equal opportunity in the areas of employment, education 
and contracts to ensure that public institutions such as universities, hospitals 
and police forces reflect in such areas proportions in the wider population 
they serve. Like the United States and unlike Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa, 
affirmative action in New Zealand is not entrenched in the constitution but 
is legislated and treated as a normal policy program. Also there are no strict 
quotas in employment, business licences or contracts unlike in Malaysia and 
South Africa. However, some New Zealand universities provide enrolment 
quotas for Maori and Pacific Islanders as part of their equity programs. Critics 
of affirmative action in New Zealand argue that affirmative action is tantamount 
to handouts and encourages parasitism on the state, but advocates of affirmative 
action contend that the state has a moral obligation to compensate Maori for the 
loss of their land and sovereignty through colonialism.
No other Pacific island state, apart from Fiji, provides ethnic-based affirmative 
action programs. Although they have minorities such as Chinese, most minority 
populations are economically well-to-do and are not considered eligible for 
affirmative action. Although there are no affirmative action policies, even for the 
majority indigenous population, often those in politics and the state bureaucracy 
have better chances of access to state services such as scholarships and business 
deals. Pacific Island migrants in New Zealand become ‘disadvantaged’ minorities 
and have access to affirmative action.
The impact of ethnic-based affirmative action on ethnic relations cannot be 
understated. Preferential treatment for an ethnic group is bound to generate 
hostility from others who feel deserving but have been left out. Charges 
of reverse discrimination and worse still ethnic stereotyping which depict 
designated groups as social parasites are often used. Instead of improving race 
relations, as the initial justification intends, affirmative action has the potential 
to widen the ethnic gulf and increase tension.
The last question which needs to be asked is whether affirmative action has led 
to a fairer, more just and peaceful society or has it simply worsened the existing 
situation. In other words, have the reasons and ideological justifications behind 
affirmative action been achieved? It is not easy to answer this question with a 
blanket “yes” or “no” because of the complex sets of factors which support or 
negate either side of the debate. The answer very much lies in how one justifies 
one’s discourse and how much that is supported by selected empirical evidence. 
Whatever one’s position is, the undeniable fact is that because affirmative action 
has served the interests of many people well and it will continue to exist as a 
major developmental strategy in the foreseeable future.
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These lessons, drawn from a trans-global study of Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa 
case studies, are crucial in understanding the complexities and paradoxes of 
affirmative action and may also help us understand possible situations in other 
countries. Ethnic-based affirmative action has had its fair share of problems and 
there is a need to look again at its shortcomings for the purpose of moving 
towards more innovative alternatives.     
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